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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the role of nationalism in shaping Japan’s relations with China.
Although not discounting the significance of external-structural constraints, it aims to
explicate “nationalism” as a domestic (power and ideational) variable, and its interactions
with other determinants in re-defining Japanese external policy-orientation that affected
the bilateral relationship, during the Koizumi administration (2001-2006). Interpreting from
a neoclassical realist (NCR) perspective, it offers a theoretically informed examination
about why, how, when, and the extent to which nationalism matters in Japan’s China
policy. This is done by operationalising, and systematically assessing nationalism’s
salience vis-à-vis other external-domestic dynamics (i.e. alliance commitment/resolve,
economic interdependence, domestic political process/actors) that simultaneously affect
Japanese state-elites’ policy decision-making. It also establishes whether these factors
serve to exacerbate, or mitigate domestic nationalist impulses, and their corresponding
impact on Japan’s China policy-options. Two nationalist-flavoured bilateral disputes –
Yasukuni Shrine and East China Sea – are utilised as case-studies.
This thesis argues that nationalism matters, albeit to a qualified extent. Taking a realist-
oriented, “middle-ground” position, it hypothesises that nationalism’s salience is dependent
on state-elites’ perception/calculation of the conditions related to its interactions with the
other aforementioned variables that concurrently influence foreign policy-making, during a
given time period. It finds nationalism especially prevalent under perceptively sanguine
external conditions, where an advantageous relative power position vis-à-vis China,
fostered, in particular, by favourable US-Japan alliance resolve, tends to encourage
assertive-nationalistic foreign policy-options, and vice-versa. Given the findings, it
concludes that nationalism is an important, but not necessarily the primary driver of
Japan’s China policy.
Overall, this thesis makes a sustained theoretical contribution to our understanding of the
international relations of Japan, and the utility of IR realism. Specifically, the hospitability of
NCR to domestic-ideational theorising, can bridge mainstream IR and domestic/Area-
studies approaches to advance a more holistic, albeit realist-oriented appreciation of
nationalism in Japan’s relations with China.
1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Japan and China has long been a source of interest to scholars of
International Relations (IR). It is perhaps a puzzle for those who expect that intensified
economic relations during the last three decades would result in warmer political and
diplomatic exchanges. However, developments since the mid-1990s demonstrate that
despite flourishing economic interactions and deepening interdependence, political ties
remain, at best, lukewarm. Besides an increase in diplomatic friction arising from frequent
resurrections of unresolved bilateral issues, public opinion in recent years have noted
declines in mutual affections between the two societies. Indeed, bilateral relations reached
an unprecedented nadir during the spring of 2005, in the wake of the outbreak of massive
anti-Japanese demonstrations across Chinese cities that uncharacteristically elicited
corresponding incidents of popular anti-Chinese reprisal in Japan1 (Roy 2005:191; Chan
and Bridges 2006:128). Although both governments endeavoured to repair their fragile
relationship following the so-called “April storm”,2 their efforts were eventually undermined
by then Japanese prime minister, Koizumi Junichiro’s fifth pilgrimage to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine in October 2005, which resulted in a year-long suspension of bilateral
summitries, as Japanese-Chinese ties struggled to find traction against a potential free-fall.
Experts commonly opine that political, socio-economic, and strategic
transformations, or “structural changes” in both domestic and international realms have
made post-Cold War Japanese-Chinese relations volatile (Kokubun 2001; 2003; 2006; Self
2002; Green and Self 1996; Green 2001; Takahara 2004; Wan 2006; Mori 2007; Hughes
2008). Apparently, the revival of nationalism as a product of this “structural changes” has
become a potent force redefining their national interests and external orientations, which
1 This declining state of affair was acknowledged by then Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister (Vice-FM) Wu
Dawei in his conversation with Japan’s Foreign Minister (FM), Machimura Nobutaka, during the latter’s visit
in the aftermath of the unfortunate events. Wu reportedly told Machimura that problems developed in the
bilateral ties were “the most serious difficulties since China and Japan normalised their relations in 1972.”
(SCMP 19/04/2005 cf. Chan and Bridges 2006: 127-128; see also BBC 18/04/2005).
2 This particular depiction of the April 2005 anti-Japanese demonstration in China (April storm) can be found
in several news articles and media commentaries on the fateful event.
2concomitantly affected their contemporary bilateral relationship. According to observers, the
noticeable shifts in Japanese and Chinese foreign/security policies have been as much, a
strategic response to the structural transformations brought about by the Cold War’s
demise, as a reflection of the ongoing domestic socio-political changes, where nationalism
has become influential in shaping the public mood and domestic political debate. Media
coverage of their current bilateral affairs has been unrestrained in blaming nationalism as
the major culprit, while informed Japan-China watchers have consistently associated their
fragile relationship to strong nationalist undercurrents in both countries. Although few
predict violent conflict between Japan and China, many contend that domestic nationalist
pressure is increasingly constraining both governments’ foreign policy-options, especially
when managing nationalist-nuanced issues that persistently haunt diplomatic relations.3
Scholars like Whiting (1989; 2000), Rozman (2002), Gries (2004; 2005a/b)
Tamamoto (2005b) and Shi (2007) argue that rising nationalism is responsible for
cultivating mutual negative images, stereotypes, and prejudices, and raising the stake of
competition for pride and prestige. Meanwhile, Austin and Harris (2001), Self (2002),
Glosserman (10/09/2003), and contributors of Heazle and Knight’s (2007) edited volume
highlight its role in perpetuating and widening the perceptual divides between the two
governments and societies, all of which are contributory to one another’s markedly
assertive foreign policy, and hardnosed attitude in recent handling of bilateral issues that
underscore their deteriorating relationship. Heazle construes that both Chinese and
Japanese people’s “strong sense of national pride and growing [mutual] indignation…play a
large part in the current pattern of blame-laying and accusations between the two countries”
(2007:181). Similarly, Roy (2003; 2004; 2005), Christensen (1999; 2005), Berger (2000),
Yahuda (2006; 2007), Gurtov (2007), Chan and Bridges (2006), and Hughes (2008), among
others, share the opinion that reactive-confrontational nationalisms, and “duelling national
identities”4 are exacerbating mutual suspicions, mistrusts, and historical acrimony, which
not only threaten to derail overall Japanese-Chinese relations, but also draw the two East
3 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of, and contributors to these widely noted opinions/arguments.
4 This phrase is taken from Self (2002:81)
3Asian powers into potential rivalry and conflict. Simply put, the conventional wisdom
recognises nationalism’s efficacy in (re)defining contemporary Japanese-Chinese ties.
To be sure, both governments have thus far managed to maintain a relatively
functional/pragmatic relationship, and kept bilateral tensions from spiralling out of rational
control. They also appear to have the capacity to rein in domestic nationalist sentiment, to
an extent, and prevent it from undermining their broader national interests in the context of
the bilateral ties, and the region, as a whole. In fact, diplomatic exchanges have proceeded
at various levels and channels, despite the ‘‘political chill”.5 Similarly, both sides have
demonstrated willingness to put aside differences to cooperate via multilateral platforms on
key regional security issues, i.e. the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s denuclearisation, not
mentioning, the political will to seek mutual, albeit ad-hoc measures to manage their own
periodic diplomatic crises arising from unresolved bilateral disputes. Moreover, both
countries have seen their socio-economic linkages strengthened during the period of
worsening politico-diplomatic relations (Takahara 2007).6 Burgeoning bilateral trade and
investments have brought mutual benefits and deepened interdependence, with an
economically vibrant China not only supplanting the United States (US) as Japan’s top
trading partner in 2004, but also widely recognised as the “growth engine” responsible for
lifting the sluggish Japanese economy out of its prolonged doldrums (Taniguchi 2005; Tok
2005). Meanwhile, “human diplomacy”7 or grassroots-level interactions between the two
societies have increased significantly, exemplified by the growth in tourism,8 cultural and
educational/academic exchanges, as well as flourishing sub-national-level cooperation, i.e.
sub-regional economic integration schemes between Japanese prefectures and Chinese
provinces, and the mushrooming of sister/twin cities (Jain 2006). The Chinese characterised
this dichotomous trend as “cold politics, hot economics” (zheng leng, jing re), a
5 This term is commonly used by the Chinese to describe the worsening political climate (see PD 29/03/2006).
6 According to Takahara, “progress in economic integration and the growing perception of common interests
constitute the core part of the resilience of the [Sino-Japanese] relationship” (2007: abstract).
7 For a commentary on the current development in grassroots-level exchanges or “human diplomacy” between
Japan and China and its positive effects, see “Editorial: China and Japan”, Japan Times (JT), 29 October 2007.
8 According to statistics from the Japan National Tourist Organisation (JNTO), Chinese tourists made up
449,000 of the 5.21 million, or almost 9% of the total number of tourists visiting Japan in 2003. The number of
Chinese tourists is expected to double to 20% (1.99 million) by 2010 (cf. JT 24/10/2007).
4representation likewise, shared by the Japanese media and commentators in describing the
state of the bilateral relationship9 (Gurtov 2007:1; Chan and Bridges 2006:128).
Against the backdrop of flourishing domestic nationalist sentiment in both countries,
such paradoxical trends and developments appear to contradict the conventional notion
regarding nationalism’s salience in shaping one another’s foreign/security policy-orientation,
let alone becoming an overarching feature in recent Japanese-Chinese relations. It is
undeniable that the negative dynamics of rising nationalism, historical animosity, and
changing power relations are fuelling mutual insecurity, and working against the
emancipation of a genuinely stable and progressive relationship. Yet, one cannot but
account for the propensity of other factors in the external and domestic realms, i.e.
deepening economic interdependence, Washington’s role within the US-Japan-China
“triangular” relationship, and the domestic political process, among others, that
simultaneously affect foreign policy-making, which can mitigate (or exacerbate)
nationalism’s impact on one’s policy-behaviour/preferences towards the other. More
importantly to this thesis, how nationalism interacts with these variables, and how they are
mediated by the intersubjective perception/calculation of state-elites under specific
conditions and time period, are crucial questions that need to be addressed, to ascertain
the extent to which it influences Japanese policy-making.
Considering these fundamental yet important queries concerning nationalism’s role
and potency, this study sets out to systematically, explore the complex dynamics that shape
contemporary Japanese-Chinese relations. Although not discounting the significance of
external-structural-material factors, it aims to explicate the role of domestic-ideational
determinants, namely “nationalism”, and its interactions with other external-internal
variables in influencing state behaviour/preferences in the bilateral ties. More specifically,
this dissertation seeks to analyse the so-called “revival” of nationalism in post-Cold War
Japan, its causality in redefining Japan’s external policy-orientations, and its impact on the
atmosphere of the bilateral relationship. Interpreting from a neoclassical realist perspective,
9 The Japanese equivalent term, “Seirei keinetsu” (cf. Itoh Moteshige 21/06/2004) is, however, lesser known.
5it offers a theoretically informed and novel examination about why, how, when, and to what
extent nationalism matters in Japan’s China policy, arguing that nationalism can be salient,
albeit under specific external-domestic conditions and time period, as perceived and
calculated by Japanese state-elites.
1.1. Preliminary Literature Review and Theoretical Conceptualisation10
From the outset, nationalism/identity politics has been an ever-present determinant in
Japan-China relations, due to the complex interplay between their shared history and
culture, and the evolving power dynamics that have shaped their past and present
interactions. It is therefore common to find it mentioned, and/or addressed, either explicitly,
or implicitly, in most studies that scrutinise the subject matter. There is a rich collection of IR
and Area-studies literature on Japanese-Chinese diplomacy. Classic works by Newby
(1988), Taylor (1996), Howe (1996), and Drifte (2003) provide comprehensive accounts of
the history, trends, prospects, and the politico-security and economic developments of the
bilateral relationship. Similarly, Whiting (1989) offers a critical analysis of the changing
external and domestic dynamics on mutual perceptions and images, which have begun
affecting Japanese-Chinese ties during the 1980s. Meanwhile, Zhao (1993), and Caroline
Rose (1998) focus on the foreign policy-making process, the former analysing the informal
mechanisms of Japan’s China policy-making, while the latter proposes an IR-centred
analysis of the interaction between domestic and systemic variables to interpret their
respective foreign policy deliberations, when managing the 1982 history textbook dispute.
Japan’s China policy is also specifically examined by Johnstone (1998), Kojima (2000),
Sasajima (2002), Hagstrom (2003; 2005) and Murata (2006), with all three Japanese
authors scrutinising the policy-making role of domestic factors, while Johnstone explores its
implications for US-Japan ties, and Hagstrom offers a relational power analysis of Japanese
policy towards the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute. Also, recent book-length studies and edited
works by Austin and Harris (2001), Soderberg (2002), Lam (2006a), and Wan (2006) offer
comprehensive studies of their post-Cold War bilateral ties, drawing on the logic,
10 See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive listing and literature review of, and theoretical debate on Japanese-
Chinese relations.
6transformations, and shifting power dynamics that are reconfiguring and affecting their
multi-dimensional relationship. Additionally, works by Wu (2000), Zhao (2002), Hughes
(2002), Takamine (2005), and Yang Jian (2007) pay particular attention to developments in
the security dimension of Japanese-Chinese relations, whereas Okabe (2001), Yang
Daqing (2002), Rose (2005), and Lind (2008) highlighted the problems concerning history,
memory, and historical reconciliation that periodically undermine their diplomatic
exchanges. The abovementioned works are all but a few examples of a myriad of literature
in the English language that address one of the key bilateral relationships in East Asia,
besides the abundant materials published in their respective vernaculars (Soderberg 2002).
While these literatures have dealt comprehensively on Japanese-Chinese relations,
from one angle or another, and notwithstanding their acknowledgement, to varying degrees,
of “nationalism” as a factor, most have dedicated limited treatment to understanding its
adverse impact on the bilateral ties, let alone how it affects their respective policy-making.
To be sure, there are several works drawing explicit attention to the question of rising
nationalism in Japanese-Chinese relations, namely those by Down and Saunders (1998/9),
Rose (2000), Deans (2000; 2007), Rozman (2002), Satoh (2006a/b), He (2006), Chan and
Bridges (2006), and Heazle (2007), and this list is by no means exhaustive. Both Down and
Saunders (1998/9) and Deans (2000) explore nationalism’s role in the bilateral
management of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute during the 1990s. The former focuses on
how the contradictory goals of promoting Chinese nationalism and economic development
as a twin “legitimisation” strategy affect Beijing’s responses, while the latter emphasises the
manipulation of nationalism during the periods of dispute by elites and domestic actors in
China, Japan, and Taiwan, to realise their respective political/diplomatic expedience.
Rose examines the resurgence of state and cultural nationalisms in both countries,
arguing that they are “predominantly inward-responses to domestic and external changes”,
and therefore carry no serious implications for Japanese-Chinese ties (2000:169).
Conversely, Rozman (2002) found that nationalism, as a political tool and emotive
sentiment, has contributed to their worsening mutual images, undermining both
7governments’ political will to bring a lasting thaw in bilateral ties. Meanwhile, He (2006),
Satoh (2006a/b), Chan and Bridges (2006), Deans (2007), and Heazle (2007) argued that
clashing nationalisms, national mythmaking, and the advent of the politics of pride, history,
and identity, are central to understanding current Japanese-Chinese problems. Although
emphasising on nationalism’s role, these article-length analyses have neither incorporated
clear theoretical frameworks to, systematically assess, the extent to which nationalism is
responsible for their deteriorating ties, nor explicitly addressed crucial questions regarding
its salience, compared to other external/domestic variables influencing Tokyo and Beijing’s
behaviour in the bilateral relations. Also, with the exception of Downs and Saunders
(1998/9), most have not thoroughly explored the role of other variables in mitigating, or
exacerbating domestic nationalist impulses, and their consequential impact on both
governments’ responses towards sensitive bilateral issues. Furthermore, the questions of
how, in what manner, and under what conditions nationalism affect the domestic political
apparatus and foreign policy-making process are left unexplained in these studies.
That said, there are book-length analysis like those of Bong (2002), and Chung
(2004) that apply existing analytical frameworks to allude to nationalism’s role in shaping
Japan and/or China’s territorial policies. The former introduces a “legitimisation strategy
model” [similar to Downs and Saunders (1998/9)], which is also akin to Robert Putnam’s
“two-level game” theory utilised by the latter, in their respective enquiries of the 1992 and
1996 Japanese-Chinese disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyudao. However, both studies focus
exclusively on one issue-area: territorial dispute per se, and not on Japan-China relations
over a variety of issue-areas. Their analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute is also the
only specific case involving Japanese-Chinese interactions among the several case-studies
employed, with Bong (2002) looking chiefly into island disputes between East Asian states,
whereas Chung (2004) focuses predominantly on China’s management of its neighbourly
territorial rows. Moreover, nationalism is not explicitly identified as their research
objective/theme, and the period of investigation is limited to the early post-Cold War years,
without much contemporary references, which is what this study aims to address.
8Indeed, as important a factor as it has been deemed to be, there are few IR-oriented
studies that pay specific attention to nationalism/identity politics in explaining Japanese-
Chinese diplomacy, and even lesser, Japan’s China policy-making. Elaborated in the
following chapter, there is a qualitative difference between contending analytical
approaches/theoretical traditions in terms of their treatment of nationalism in international
relations, with the arguments largely transpiring within the mainstream IR-versus-
constructivism/Area-studies debate.11 The former, especially of the mainstream
realist/liberal genre, tends to under-appreciate nationalism, and in fact, the role of domestic-
ideational variables in constraining one another’s policy-behaviour that affects their bilateral
affairs. This is inherently due to mainstream IR theories’ preoccupation with structural-
material variables and system-level analysis, which causes them to ignore ideational and
domestic-level theorisation, and assume “nationalism” and the likes to be unproblematic
and a priori given (Tooze 1996). In contrast, nationalism and identity politics is central to
constructivism/Area-studies’ line of enquiry, which emphasises domestic-level analysis and
cultural-ideational factors in explaining Japan-China relations. Expectedly, the subject
matter has received most attention amongst constructivists and Japanese/Chinese studies
specialists, but existing works also encounter analytical limitations that include the lack, or
absence of discernible theoretical frameworks to operationalise nationalism, and
overemphasis on domestic/cultural-ideational factors in explaining foreign policy-making
and international outcomes, at the expense of external/structural-material imperatives.
To address such limitations, this thesis proposes Neoclassical Realism (NCR), a
“middle-ground” IR construct that emphasises external-domestic interaction, and bridges
mainstream IR-constructivist reasoning, to operationalise and systematically assess
nationalism’s role in Japanese-Chinese relations, giving specific emphasis to Japanese
nationalism, and Japan’s China policy-making. According to Gideon Rose, NCR is a theory
of state behaviour/preferences within the broad realist research programme that generally
share the tradition’s standard assumption that “the scope and ambition of a country’s
11 See Chapter 2 for an elaboration of the contributors of the theoretical arguments/debates, specific
terminologies, and quotations mentioned in this sub-chapter.
9foreign policy” is driven primarily by systemic pressures, and its relative power position in
the international system (1998:146).12 However, it rejects structural/neo-realism’s “ultra-
parsimonious” “privileging of systemic-structural variables over [unit-level-ideational] factors”
(Roth 2006:487). Neoclassical realists like Gideon Rose assume that the effects of systemic
imperatives are indirect, complex, and subjective, and that “there is no immediate or perfect
transmission belt linking [them] to foreign policy behaviour” (1998:146-147). Instead, they
must be filtered through, or mediated by peculiar domestic political process/actors, or unit-
level “intervening” variables, i.e. state-elites/decision-makers’ perception/calculation,
domestic political competition, nationalism, state institutions, all of which, under specific
condition/time context, stand to affect and cause variations in states behaviour/preferences
(Gideon Rose 1998; Sterling-Folker 1997; Cha 2000; Taliaferro 2001; 2006; Schweller
2003; 2004). In other words, external constraints do not automatically induce states towards
specific policy choices. “Rather, states respond (or not)…in ways determined by both
internal and external considerations of policy elites, who must reach consensus within an
often decentralised and competitive political process” (Schweller 2004:164).
Specifically to this thesis, NCR allows nationalism to be operationalised as a
domestic, ideational (identity) and material (power) variable within its essentially realist-
oriented framework that interacts with the domestic political process and influences
Japanese policy-makers/state-elites’ perceptions/calculations, which then, determine
particular foreign policy-option that either exacerbates, or alleviates bilateral problems vis-à-
vis China. By problematising nationalism, the NCR model developed in Chapter 2 can
systematically assess its impact, and helps explicate the conditions in which it does, or
does not prevail in Japanese (or Chinese) policy-making, when managing their bilateral
affairs. More significantly, it can promote a better understanding of other dynamics involved,
while simultaneously answering pertinent questions regarding nationalism’s role in
Japanese-Chinese relations that previous works have not convincingly elucidated.
12 The term “neoclassical realism” was coined by Gideon Rose (1998). For overviews of NCR, see his work,
and those of Schweller (2003; 2004), and Taliaferro (2001; 2006).
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The NCR framework has been utilised in previous studies to incorporate ideational
explanations in specific areas of East Asian diplomacy, namely those by Cha (2000),
Davidson (2002), and Nau (2003). For example, Cha (2000) elucidates the role of historical
animosity within an NCR model of “quasi-alliances versus balance-of-threat” to address the
concepts of abandonment and entrapment in the triangular alliance dynamics between the
US, Japan, and South Korea during the Cold War. Meanwhile, Davidson (2002) introduces
the “balance of allied resolve” model with domestic political pressure serving as the
“intervening” variable, in his proposed solution to the “puzzle” of whether a rising China
would become a status-quo, or revisionist power, whereas Nau (2003) seeks to explain the
balance of power in Asia, via a structural model of power and identity.13 Although all three
studies introduce variables that are partially symptomatic of, and related to nationalism, it is
not their explicit undertakings to examine and operationalise nationalism’s role in explaining
their respective dependent variables, let alone their superficial definition and
conceptualisation of the national phenomenon, which differs from that espoused by this
study. Indeed, apart from these article-length analyses, there is to my knowledge, no
existing literature that incorporates a clear, systematic NCR model to specifically
operationalise, and address the question of nationalism in Japanese-Chinese relationship
and/or post-Cold War Japanese foreign policy-making.14
Aforementioned, nationalism has been explicated in previous studies that utilise
liberal-oriented, or other “integrative” theoretical constructs to explain Japanese-Chinese
management of territorial disputes, mainly from China’s perspective (e.g. Downs and
Saunders 1998/9; Bong 2002; Chung 2004; 2007). Considering their inherent
characteristics, these “mid-range” theories, like NCR, share relatively similar basic
assumptions, which lead to the deduction, albeit to varying extent, of comparable sets of
hypotheses (see Bong 2002:20-23). However, as argued in Chapter 2, there exists,
13 Although Nau (2003) does not explicitly stipulate NCR as the basis of his conceptualisation, his analytical
model shares the fundamental tenets, and is akin to the neoclassical realist construct.
14 Although Bong (2002) introduces a realist-oriented sub-hypothesis, which he claims to be in the mould of
NCR, the overall conceptualisation and operationalisation of his “legitimisation strategy model”, as well as
both theoretical and empirical arguments/analysis ontologically reflect the Putnamesque “two-level game”
rather than NCR’s logic and assumptions.
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discernible theoretical distinctions, mainly in the theoretical arguments/nuances, and the
deductive and ontological emphasis between these frameworks and the “NCR model of
nationalism and state behaviour” incorporated in this thesis, besides the differences in the
conceptualisation of the analytical construct/model, research problem, and issue-
area/scope of investigation. This study is, therefore, a relatively novel undertaking, which
can modestly contribute in theory-building terms, to enhancing realism’s explanation of
nationalism, not only in Japan-China ties and Japanese foreign policy, but also in the
international relations of East Asia, or other regions, where nationalist/identity politics thrive
in interstate diplomacy.
1.2. Definitions, Empirical Scope and Limitations
In Chapter 4, nationalism is described as a nebulous phenomenon, intrinsically
psychological, socio-cultural, and profoundly political in essence, as it is emotional and
instrumental in disposition. Chan and Bridges rightly observe that the meaning of
nationalism “changes with issue, time, space, and target or object” (2006:130), which
explains the numerous jargons found in the literature on nationalism to define the various
aspects/dimensions of its manifestation.15 Considering its complexities and intersubjectivity,
and for clarity and relevance, this study limits “nationalism” to an amalgamation of three
mutually embracing and reinforcing meanings:16
i) “a state of mind” (Kohn 1946:10), or psychological condition that cultivates sentiments
of belonging, and unites a collective group of people (community/nation), whose
members perceive to share a common identity based on unique physical-territorial,
socio-cultural, historical, and emotional elements (Guibernau 1996:47) (“Self”) vis-à-
vis the “Others”;
ii) a political ideology/principle that identifies the nation with the state (Gellner 1983), and
mobilises the political will of its population “to decide upon [and realise] their common
political destiny” (Guibernau 1996:47; 62), domestically or internationally; and
15 Among the notable terms introduced to define the various manifestations of nationalism include “banal”
(Billig 1995); “assertive” (Whiting 1983; 1995); “reactive” (Zheng 1999; Zhao 2000; 2005); “pragmatic”
(Zhao 2000; 2004; 2005); “confident” (Oksenberg 1986; Rose 2000); “realpolitik” (Guang 2005); “cultural”
(Yoshino 1992; Hutchinson 1994); “wounded” (McCormack 2000; Chang 2001; Gries 2004), and “dependent”
(Kingston 2004; Tsunekawa 2006). Some of them are also listed in Chan and Bridges (2006:129-130, fn.5-11).
16 These three definitions, especially the first two [e.g. (i) and (ii)], are adapted from Guibernau (1996:47, 62)
and Alter (1989:3-4), whose basic ideas derive from Kohn (1946; 1965); Gellner (1983); Gidden (1985); Smith
(1986; 1991; 1995), among others.
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iii) a political instrument utilised by state/state-elites for mass mobilisation and other
domestic political expediency (state/official nationalism), and by nationalist groups as
political pressure on governmental decision-making process (popular nationalism).17
Deriving their essence from the classic definitions of Kohn (1946), Gellner (1983),
Gidden (1985), Smith (1986), and Guibernau (1996), they represent nationalism’s
fundamental underpinnings and multi-dimensional characteristics. These meanings typically
manifest two distinctive yet correlated, and at times, mutually embracing forms, namely
state/official/elite-driven and popular/grassroots nationalisms.18 Both are examined in this
study, since state/state-elites and popular nationalists concurrently “participate in nationalist
politics” (Gries 2004:87). Nationalism’s rational-utility and emotional dispositions are equally
taken into account, as both “sense/passion” and “sensibility/reason” matter, when analysing
international relations and foreign policy-making (Gries 2004:20, 87-90).19 Taken together,
such a conceptualisation that places emphasis on the “top-down” and “bottom-up”
perspectives,20 as well as nationalism’s political/instrumental and socio-psychological
dimensions,21 helps generate more accurate interpretations of its role in shaping both state-
society and interstate relations. It is especially applicable to understanding its impact on
Japan’s contemporary relations with China, since Japanese nationalism professes most of
these meanings and exhibits the suggested attributes.
The primary research scope draws on the causal role of Japanese (neo-)nationalism
in shaping Japan’s China policy during the Koizumi administration (April 2001-September
2006), with a hindsight to the mid-1990s. Here, (neo-) nationalism’s definition is limited to its
“normalcy-driven”, “anti-China”, and “dependent” manifestations.22 Chinese nationalism is
periodically, albeit briefly addressed to elucidate its reactivity towards Japanese policy, and
17 This widely noted definition draws from the elaboration regarding nationalism’s instrumental nature found in
Gellner (1983); Brass (1991); Gries (2004); McVeigh (2004); and Downs and Saunders (1998/9).
18 The above categorisation is common to studies of nationalism, and can be found in the works of Seckington
(2005); McVeigh (2004); Gries (2004); and Zhao (2000); among others.
19 I take the terms “sense/passion” and “sensibility/reason” from Gries (2004) to be used throughout this thesis.
20 The “top-down” and “bottom-up” view of nationalism is specifically mentioned in Gries (2004).
21 Nationalism serves as both a power (material) and an identity (ideational) variable in this thesis.
22 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of nationalism, generally, and Japanese (neo-) nationalism, in particular,
especially the abovementioned manifestations, and contributors of the terminologies, i.e. McCormack (2000),
Kingston (2004), Samuels (2007a/b), and others.
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propensity in triggering reactive, anti-Chinese nationalism/sentiment within Japan that
induces Tokyo’s specific policy-responses. State agency and state-to-state relations are the
central focus, while non-state elements are explored “with a view to determining how they
affect the intergovernmental relationship” (Austin and Harris 2001:3). In this regard, this
thesis utilises the “state” or more specifically, “state-elites”23 as the principal agent, since
they ultimately make the foreign policy decisions. The definition of “state-elites” is limited to
a small cohort of central decision-makers/power-wielders within the Japanese state
apparatus, comprising typically the Prime Minister (PM), Foreign Minister (FM), Chief
Cabinet Secretary (CCS), heads of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),
Japan Defence Agency (JDA),24 and to varying degrees, other relevant Cabinet members.
The PM and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is afforded particular emphasis following
their consolidation of power vis-à-vis the bureaucracy via the political and administrative
reforms in 2001, not mentioning, the advent of a dynamic yet allegedly “unconventional”
leadership and policy-making modus operandi under Koizumi Junichiro. Besides state-
elites, this study also addresses the role of relevant Japanese bureaucracies, namely the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), METI, and JDA, as part of the state agency. Equally
under scrutiny are other domestic agents, especially political parties, i.e. the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), its coalition partners, and their political oppositions. Within the
LDP, attention is given to the influence of factions (habatsu), policy-tribes (zoku), and senior
“power-brokers” (kuromaku and “China-Hands”) on China policy-making. Meanwhile, the
business community (zaikai), interest/pressure groups, and public opinion represent the
non-state agency in this analysis.25
Since nationalism manifests through both state and non-state agencies, an
important aspect of this study is to observe the aforementioned actors’ association with, and
participation in nationalist politics. Particularly under scrutiny are the politico-ideological
dispositions and affiliations of state-elites, their dependence on nationalism as a power
23 This thesis takes the commonly used term “state elites” from Bong (2002).
24 Officially upgraded to “ministry” status on 9 January 2007, the JDA is now referred to as the Ministry of
Defence (MOD), Japan (Reuters 09/01/2007). I use the former name in view of my period of investigation.
25 The commonly noted Japanese terms mentioned above derive from Hagstrom (2003) and Hook et.al (2001).
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instrument, their inclination towards nationalist, or pragmatic foreign policy agenda, and
their domestic political resolve vis-à-vis nationalist and moderate elements, to infer on
nationalism’s salience in affecting their policy perception/calculation. Similarly, the role of
key nationalist pressure groups highlighted in Chapter 4, as well as public opinion towards
China shall be elucidated, since popular nationalism, when expressed via these civil society
channels can be a formidable domestic political constraint on the Japanese state’s
behaviour/preferences.
Externally, the atmosphere of the US-Japan relationship, specifically Tokyo’s
perception of Washington’s “allied commitment/resolve”26 under their bilateral security
alliance, shall be examined in concurrence with the developments in Japanese-Chinese ties
to measure Japan’s relative power position vis-à-vis China at a given time period.27 Relative
power position as defined here, does not merely refer to the conventional material power
capabilities that a state possesses (i.e. economic; military, including “offensive-defensive”
capabilities, and other typical material-based wherewithal) (Taliaffero 2000/1), but equally
concerns, if not more, the estimation of one’s favourable/unfavourable overall position and
politico-diplomatic resolve vis-à-vis the other during a specific period and context. The result
may not necessarily reflect the actual power distribution between the interacting states,
since information on the relevant indices of power position has to be translated through
what Sterling-Folker (1997:19) sees as the “opaque filter” of state-elites’ perception and
other domestic actors/processes, in accordance to NCR’s dictum. The analysis also
accounts for other significant contextual factors/actors in the international environment that
concurrently affect Japanese state-elites’ perceptions/calculations in China policy-making.
This research introduces two highly visible bilateral issues as case-studies to test
the NCR model, namely the Japanese-Chinese debacle over prime ministerial visits to
Yasukuni Shrine, and their multi-dimensional dispute in the East China Sea (ECS), which
26 This term is referred to as “balance of allied resolve” and “patron commitment” in the NCR studies of
Davidson (2002) and Cha (2000), respectively. This thesis borrows, and uses all three terms, interchangeably.
27 The given period is mainly, though not exclusively based on the specific period leading to the respective
diplomatic rows between Japan and China over the selected case-studies, and the immediate aftermath.
15
comprises the Senkaku/Diaoyudao territorial row, Chinese maritime incursions, and bilateral
competition for energy resources in the contested waters. The case-studies are selected on
the criteria/reasons of relevancy, and nature of dispute. Firstly, both are highly relevant
cases insofar as they are contemporary issues that strike the nationalist chord, and arouse
strong nationalistic impulses within Japan and China. As shall be elaborated respectively in
Chapters 6 and 7, the Yasukuni problem relates to their clashing national/historical
identities, whereas the ECS disputes are reflective of their competing territorial nationalism
and its correlation to the notion of sovereignty. Indeed, rising nationalism in both countries
is widely perceived to have increased the stake and retarded possible resolutions of both
issues. Besides inciting unadulterated nationalistic passion and emotion, both issues also
have the tendency to be instrumentalised by Japanese (and Chinese) state/state-elites, and
non-state actors (i.e. nationalist pressure groups/ individuals, etc.) for domestic political and
external expediency. Secondly, both were amongst the most visible and contested bilateral
issues during the period of investigation. Indeed, Koizumi’s annual Yasukuni visits during
his premiership became arguably the single, most damaging problem affecting their
diplomatic relations, while the ECS debacles constantly ratcheted up bilateral tension that
equally contributed to the Koizumi era being labelled as one of the most debilitating periods
in Japanese-Chinese ties since their normalisation in 1972. Also, both case-studies
resonate their longstanding and unresolved quarrels over wider issue-areas, Yasukuni
reflecting the perennial “history problem”, whereas the ECS concerns territorial/maritime
sovereignty and geo-strategic/geo-economic considerations.
Relatedly, the two case-studies are qualitatively different; the former is
predominantly a symbolic and “soft” issue, whereas the latter represents a “real/tangible”
and potentially explosive problem. In other words, the Yasukuni issue, like most other
“history” problems, is the kind of bilateral issue in Japanese-Chinese relations that, although
having the capacity to stir passionate popular and official nationalistic outbursts, is not
likely, on its own, to manifest into more potent forms of bilateral confrontation. Conversely,
the ECS debacles are, to an extent, “zero-sum” issues of national security and sovereignty/
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integrity, which have the propensity to arouse nationalistic impulses that galvanise societal
and governmental responses “disproportionate to the material stakes involved“ (Roy
2003:3). Last, but not least, both case-studies are dissimilar, in that one is primarily a
single-actor/single-issue dispute, whereas the other is multi-actor/multi-issue. Specifically,
Yasukuni is a “history”-related, single-issue dispute, concerning only prime ministerial
Shrine visits, and mainly, triggered by a single actor in former PM Koizumi’s controversial
decision to pay annual homage, during his time in office. In contrast, the ECS is, as
aforementioned, a multi-issue/multi-dimensional dispute that involves not only their rivalling
sovereignty claims, but also competition for geo-economic and geo-strategic control over
the contested area (namely the symbolic, economic, and military-security dimensions of
their bilateral ties). It is likewise, a multi-actor issue involving the actions, management, and
coordination of multiple state/official actors (i.e. related ministries and agencies), as well as,
the direct, provocative actions of non-state actors (i.e. related nationalistic activities of
popular nationalist groups/individuals).
The selection of these two relevant, yet qualitatively different case-studies is
intended to ensure that this thesis can adequately address not only the fundamental
question regarding whether nationalism matters, but equally to examine why, how, when,
and to what extent it matters in Japan’s relations with China, especially when it comes to
managing sensitive bilateral issues of nationalistic persuasions. Since both issues are
essentially, highly visible, nationalistic disputes, they are primed to help explicate: 1)
whether nationalism (domestic nationalist pressure and/or state-elites’ personal nationalist
convictions) is important in shaping Japan’s China policy, and if so; 2) when, and under
what circumstances nationalism becomes most salient, in relations to other external-
domestic factors that concurrently affect Japanese policy-making; and 3) the conditions in,
and the extent to which the emotional and/or instrumental dimensions of nationalism
manifest most profoundly in Japanese state-elites’ policy decision-making. In doing so, both
issues, which were also amongst the most hotly and frequently contested during the period
of investigation, allows this thesis to simultaneously elucidate on the much anticipated
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question of whether nationalism is, in fact, the primary driver of Japan’s China policy-
making during the Koizumi administration, and the major factor in shaping their deteriorating
ties. Likewise, the intention to select these qualitatively different case-studies is mainly to
promote a broader, yet more astute comprehension of Japanese policy-makers’ perception,
attitude, and responses toward domestic nationalist pressure and/or their personal
nationalistic convictions over a variety of issue-areas, which this thesis argues, may not be
necessarily consistent, despite occurring under similar conditions/time contexts. Finally, the
advantages of having single-actor versus multi-actor case-studies are that they not only
allow this thesis to comprehensively capture the whole range of Japanese policy actors,
and the different levels of policy-making involved, but also shed light on the degree of
policy-making leverage/influence that different levels/categories of actors have, or can
exude, when managing single- and multi-issue bilateral disputes of nationalistic orientation
vis-à-vis China, under specific conditions/time period.
Overall, this is essentially a study of state behaviour and international outcomes
between Japan and China. Specifically, its analytical aim is to explain how, when, under
what conditions, and to what extent nationalism as a domestic determinant affects Japan’s
China policy and the bilateral relationship. This means that, despite the necessary
references on China and Chinese nationalism, it is Japan and Japanese nationalism, which
are the primary objects of investigation, not vice-versa. Yet, this is not a study of Japanese
nationalism per se and therefore, does not purport to meticulously, explore from all angles
the intersubjectivities of the “national” phenomena in contemporary Japan, although its
fundamental underpinnings, nature, manifestations, and political/external dynamics are
adequately explicated for the purpose of this investigation. It is also neither a general
analysis of Japanese foreign policy-making, nor a “bi-country” undertaking to understanding
Japanese-Chinese relations from a multi-dimensional perspective, but principally, a study of
the contemporary trend and development of their bilateral ties, as effected by resurgent
nationalistic forces on the workings of Japanese statecraft in Japan’s China policy.
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1.3. The Research Problem and Objectives
Since rising nationalism is commonly regarded as a driving force behind the decline in post-
Cold War Japanese-Chinese relations, the central research problem assesses:-
i) the manner, conditions, and the extent to which domestic nationalist pressure/
sentiment in Japan is responsible for their problematic bilateral relationship;
ii) its salience vis-à-vis other external-domestic factors constraining Japan’s
behaviour/preferences, towards China over sensitive bilateral issues; and
iii) whether these other factors exacerbate/mitigate nationalism, and the related
impact on Japan’s policy-options, under specific conditions and time context.
This thesis agrees with the conventional notion, but only to a qualified extent.
Bearing in mind the plausible roles of other variables, it takes a “middle-ground” position by
hypothesising that nationalism matters in Japan’s relations with China, albeit under specific
external-domestic conditions and time context, as perceived/calculated by state-elites. It
argues that, besides domestic nationalist pressure, Japanese state-elites need to consider
other factors, which they may perceive, during specific periods, and under particular
conditions, as more crucial in determining their policy-decisions, even when managing the
most sensitive of bilateral disputes. Moreover, domestic nationalist pressure does not act in
isolation, but interacts with these other policy-determinants, which can exacerbate/mitigate
its effects on external decision-making. This study contends that nationalism’s salience in
affecting foreign policy-choices, i.e. choosing between assertive-nationalistic, and
moderate-conciliatory policy-options, hinges on state-elites’ perception/calculation of the
conditions related to its interaction with other “power” variables that concurrently affect
foreign policy-making, namely Japan’s relative power position vis-à-vis China, and state-
elites’ domestic political resolve vis-à-vis nationalist and moderate forces, at a given time
period (see also Bong 2002; Downs and Saunders 1998/9). It also depends on their ability
to balance, or “trade-off” between achieving nationalist and pragmatic policy-objectives.28
Ideally, the Japanese government/state-elites would like to embrace the domestic
nationalist agenda, while simultaneously seeking to realise Japan’s broader national
28 For works with similar assumptions from which this thesis draws its ideas, see Downs and Saunders
(1998/9), Bong (2002), Brooks (1997), and Fearon (1994). For a good work on “trade-off”, see Morrow (1993).
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interests. However, their ability to advance narrow/nationalistic foreign/China policy-goals is
dependent primarily on the condition of a favourable relative power position vis-à-vis China.
Conversely, an ambiguous or disadvantageous relative power position would require state-
elites to either balance, or trade-off between the two contradictory objectives (see Downs
and Saunders 1998/9; Bong 2002). When the balancing becomes unmanageable, they may
have to trade-off one for the other (Downs and Saunders 1998/9; Bong 2002), during which
decision-making (rational, or otherwise) may decisively hinge on the intersubjective
perception/calculation of state-elites and the prevailing domestic political process (see
Sterling-Folker 1997; Schweller 2004). Such considerations underscore this thesis’ NCR
supposition regarding the primacy of power politics, and the intervening function of
domestic-ideational variables in affecting state behaviour and the conduct of interstate
diplomacy.
The results of this academic enquiry are expected to address crucial questions
regarding nationalism’s propensity in shaping Japan’s contemporary relations with China.
Indeed, depending on the condition/time period, nationalism may, or may not necessarily
prevail in Japan’s actual policy-options, even when managing discernible nationalist issues,
like the Yasukuni Shrine and ECS disputes, although it may manifest via the
symbolic/rhetorical dimension of their diplomatic responses. This study also aims to:-
i) promote a balanced interpretation of the background, driving forces,
characteristics, and international orientations of contemporary Japanese
nationalism (especially the so-called neo-nationalism), and its role in domestic
politics/foreign policy-making process;
ii) comprehend the workings of domestic nationalist pressure and other external-
domestic variables in shaping Japan’s China policy trends, and the regressive
atmosphere of their post-Cold War bilateral relationship;
iii) enrich the related body of literature by providing an assessment of nationalism in
Japanese-Chinese ties, via an “integrative” IR framework that operationalises
and systematically analyses its role in the case-studies concerned; and
iv) contribute to the progressiveness of IR realism, where NCR’s hospitability to
domestic-cultural-ideational theorising, can promote interactions between, and
theoretically bridge mainstream IR and constructivist/Area-studies reasoning to
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advance a holistic, albeit realist understanding of Japan’s foreign policy and
international relations.
1.4. Research Design and Thesis Structure
This qualitative study employs documentary analysis, supplemented by elite interviewing as
the main research methods. The basis of primary sources derives from: i) publicly available
official documents (i.e. official publications, annual reports, and white papers from related
ministries/agencies and think-tanks); and ii) relevant information in various published forms
(i.e. official declarations and press statements, and media reports/commentaries/debates
via newspapers, magazines, and news monitoring services). The latter, especially, media
coverage from the Reuters, Kyodo News (KN), Agence France-Presse (AFP), Yomiuri
Shimbun (YS), Asahi Shimbun (AS), Japan Times (JT), Mainichi Shimbun/Daily News
(MS/MDN), Sankei Shimbun (SS), People’s Daily (PD), Xinhua News Agency (XNA), and
South China Morning Post (SCMP), among others, were a crucial empirical source in lieu of
the contemporary nature of the study. These sources derived mainly from online archives of
the related newpapers, and media monitoring services like Dow Jones FACTIVA.
Additionally, public opinion surveys conducted by both government and the media provided
statistical data for the analysis and interpretation of popular sentiment on nationalism,
Japanese-Chinese relations, and Japanese perceptions, images, and attitudes towards the
Chinese government and people, and vice versa. Meanwhile, secondary sources from the
related literature furnished the background information, contending theoretical approaches,
substantive argumentations, and critical perspectives that helped deepened the knowledge
and understanding required to tackle the research problem.
Also, elite/expert interviews (semi-structured and open-ended formats) were
employed as a supplementary, albeit important source of information to
overcome/circumvent problems concerning restricted access to, and the “superficiality”
(tatemae) of official Japanese (and Chinese) records/documents, as well as language
limitations. The targeted interviewees comprised relevant government officials, academics,
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politicians, press members, public figures, and other informed individuals.29 The selection of
interviewees is, principally based on identifying those with first-hand experience/knowledge
of Japan’s China policy pertaining to the two case-studies, preferably the direct/indirect
protagonists of the policy/diplomatic processes concerned (Hagstrom 2003:92). Equally
important are relevant members of the academic/research community and media, and
opinion leaders knowledgeable on Japanese nationalism and foreign policy-making. Access
to interviewees derived from a combination of strategies, including personal contacts,
introductions, and credible affiliations with the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies (KIEAS),
and Faculty of Law, Keio University.30
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first two deal with the introduction and
theoretical framework, respectively. Chapter 3 offers a background of the dynamics, trends
and developments in Japanese-Chinese relations during the Cold War and post-Cold War
periods. An insight into nationalism in postwar/contemporary Japan is the undertaking of the
fourth chapter. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of nationalism and Japanese foreign policy-
making, followed by an overview of the interactions between, and the reality of nationalism’s
salience vis-à-vis other variables in shaping Japan’s China policy and the bilateral
relationship. The subsequent two chapters are dedicated to the case-studies of the
Yasukuni Shrine and ECS disputes. A generalisation of the findings and a view of
nationalism’s implications for future Japanese-Chinese diplomacy are the concluding
chapter’s provision.
29 Elite/expert interviews were concentrated mainly in Japan, as with the research fieldwork, in view of the
primary scope of investigation and object of study. That said, there were opportunities to interview Chinese and
Western scholars that were either visiting, or based in Japan and the United Kingdom, which helped generate a
richer, more objective, and less Japan-biased opinion/perspective of the subject matter. See Bibliography.
30 The candidate was attached to the KIEAS as a junior visiting scholar, hosted by Prof. Kokubun Ryosei
(former Director) during the first phase of doctoral research fieldwork in Japan between January-March 2007.
The affiliation with, and introductions by Prof. Kokubun helped yield key interviews with senior politicians
from the LDP, as well as renowned Japan-China scholars via the exclusive participation in the “Conference on
The Need for Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Sino-Japanese Relations”, jointly organised by
KIEAS-Silk Road Studies Programme on March-8-9, 2007. The candidate was granted another short-term
affiliation with Keio University during the second phase of his fieldwork (between May-June 2008), under the
auspices of the Faculty of Law.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTERPRETING NATIONALISM IN JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS:
CONTENDING APPROACHES AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS
The study of Japanese-Chinese relations, like most analyses of interstate relationship and
foreign policy-making, has largely transpired within a broad range of analytical frameworks
that straddle along different approaches and contending theoretical paradigms. Depending
on their respective choice of central variables and level-of-analysis, these approaches have
yielded rich, but often diverse explanations of their complex, multi-dimensional ties, and the
periodic variations in Japanese policy behaviour/preferences vis-à-vis the Chinese, when
managing their bilateral affairs. This chapter discusses the efficacies and fallacies of the
contending approaches, paying particular emphasis on their treatment of nationalism in
explaining the nature of post-Cold War Japanese-Chinese diplomacy. It assesses, and
questions the viability of their respective interpretations, offering instead, a modest, realist-
oriented, “hybrid” analytical framework that bridges the reasoning of the competing
disciplines and theoretical traditions, to systematically, assess nationalism’s role in Japan’s
policy-making in the context of the bilateral ties.
2.1. Contending Approaches to Explaining Japanese-Chinese Relations: Area-
Studies versus Mainstream IR Theories and Alternative Frameworks1
The task of identifying a suitable approach and theoretical framework is no less daunting, as
a literature survey on Japanese-Chinese relations and Japanese/Chinese foreign policies,
not only points to the complexity of choosing between competing approaches [between IR
and Area-studies approaches], but equally in opting one theory over another within the IR
theoretical divides (Caroline Rose 1998:29). According to Caroline Rose (1998), previous
studies have largely developed within the confines of the separate disciplines of IR and
Area-studies. The key distinction between these two so-called “mutually exclusive”
approaches lies on their perennial debate regarding the prevalence of the “general” and
“specific” features in understanding state behaviour and the nature of international politics
1 The inter/intra-disciplinary debate (notably on IR versus Area-studies) in this section draws ideas/arguments
from Caroline Rose (1998:Chp.2). For a similar line of argument, see other theory-based works focusing on the
contending debates within IR studies like Desch (1998); Gideon Rose (1998) and Zakaria (1992).
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(Caroline Rose 1998:28). Whilst IR-oriented studies seek to establish “universally-
applicable” explanations by privileging general over “country-specific” attributes, Area-
studies emphasise the understanding of foreign policy via a state’s peculiar/idiosnycratic, or
sui generis features (Caroline Rose 1998:28). Rose opines that although both approaches
have produced quality research, their respective preoccupations expose them to criticisms;
the IR approach for overemphasising parsimony and “denigrating factual detail”, whereas
Area-studies is guilty of “amassing empirical data but [is] usually devoid of theoretical value”
(Brecher 1972:1; quoted in Caroline Rose 1998:28).
Adding to this conundrum has been the presence of effervescent debates between
competing theoretical paradigms within the IR discipline itself, notably realism versus
liberalism of the mainstream genre,2 and lately, between mainstream and alternative/critical
theories like constructivism3 (Caroline Rose 1998:28-29). These contending IR theories can
be, fundamentally divided, according to their respective emphasis on the “level-of-analysis”
and preoccupation with particular variables in explaining state behaviour/preferences and
international outcomes (see Singer 1961; Zakaria 1992; Desch 1998). Proponents of macro-
level analysis, or aussenpolitik, favour external determinants and systemic-level
explanations, in contrast to their exponents at the opposite end of the theoretical divide, who
privilege innenpolitik, or domestic, unit-level reasoning (Zakaria 1992:179-180; Gideon Rose
1998:146).4 There is likewise, analytical distinction amongst theories within aussenpolitik
and innenpolitik, based on their preferred analytical variables, with some privileging
structural-material imperatives, while others stress on cultural-ideational factors.5 For
example, conventional macro-level theories like neo-realism (Waltz 1979; 1993; Gilpin 1981;
1984; Grieco 1988; Layne 1995, Mearsheimer 2001) and neo-liberal institutionalism
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1984; 1989;
2 For an overview of the mainstream IR theoretical debate, see Baldwin (1993) and Kegley, Jr. (1995).
3 For a critical debate between mainstream IR and constructivism/culture-oriented theories, see Lapid and
Kratochwil (1996).
4 Aussenpolitik and innenpolitik found in Zakaria (1992) are similarly termed as International Politics (IP) and
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), respectively, by scholars. For example, see Kubalkova (2001).
5 Rather than pitting one theoretical paradigm against the other (i.e. realism versus liberalism, or constructivism)
Desch contends that the theoretical divisions are best, explained “across two dimensions: domestic versus
international, and material versus ideational” (1998:155-156).
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Oye 1986) privilege structural-material explanations6 (i.e. neo-realists on systemic
distribution of power and relative capabilities; neo-liberal institutionalists on the logic of
economic interdependence,7 degree of cooperation8 and institutionalisation). Meanwhile,
alternative discourses in the guise of Alexander Wendt’s “systemic-constructivism” (1992;
1995; 1996) rationalise the workings of international politics primarily on ideational and
normative grounds.9 On a similar note, there are innenpolitikers that advocate structural-
material arguments: classical realists implicitly press on state-society relations, and human
nature10 (Taliaferro 2006:470; Morgenthau 1946; 1967; Wolfer 1962; Aron 1966), and
proponents of liberalism place premiums on domestic politics, institutions, and regime types
(Riise-Kappen 1991; Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Evangelista 1995; 1997; Milner 1992;
1997; Moracvsik 1997), i.e. “two-level game” and “democratic peace” theses (Putnam 1988;
Lake 1992; Russett 1993; Gowa 1995),11 as opposed to ideational arguments – culture,
norms, identity and interests (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Berger 1996; 2000; 2003;
Katzenstein 1996) – championed by domestic-constructivists.
In a sense, this theoretical division within the IR approach reflects, and even, to an
extent, subsumes the inter-disciplinary divides between IR and Area-studies (Caroline Rose
1998:29), considering the overlapping assumptions and exclusively domestic-centred
analysis espoused by both innenpolitik and Area-studies. To be sure, there are subtle
differences between Area-studies and innenpolitik theories, insofar as the former is country-
specific in focus, targeting on attributes peculiar to the country/area-of-study, whereas the
6 That said, their theoretical brethrens, namely classical realism and liberalism do emphasise the role of
domestic factors/actors in shaping foreign policy and international outcomes, albeit implicitly by the former
(Taliaferro 2006:470), and explicitly by the latter.
7 For a comprehensive review of the liberal perspective on the logic of economic interdependence, see Copeland
(1996); and Russett and Oneal (2001:Chp.4).
8 See Higgott (1993) for an interesting analysis of the opportunies and obstacles of economic cooperation.
9 Whilst structural-realists in the Waltzian tradition assume that the structural attributes of international anarchy
govern state behaviour/preferences (see Waltz 1979), systemic-level constructivists like Wendt argues that
“Anarchy is What States Make of It”, where the international system is a social and cultural construct, defined
by states (units) within it (see Wendt 1992; 1995).
10 For this discussion, see Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry (1989:460) and Taliaferro (2006:470; 472-475).
Also, Nau contends that although “Classical realism recognized the relevance of goals, aims, values and
domestic politics (identity)”, these constructivist factors are conceptualised “only at the level of relationships,
not the level of structure”, where power (structural-material) remains the ultimate aim of international politics
(2003: en.1).
11 For an overview of the literature, and summaries and critiques of the “democratic peace”, see also Brown,
Lynn-Jones and Miller (1995); Layne, Spiro and Owen (1994).
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latter, especially of the mainstream genre, is inclined on applying generally applicable
variables and explanations. Yet, hospitability to ideational variables, which are also
inherently sui generis, puts Area-studies and the alternative IR theory of constructivism well
within the same analytical confines. The similarities and differences between these
contending approaches and theories are defined in Table 1, based on the “level-of-analysis”
and “choice-of-variables” criteria. To overcome their inherent rigidity and weaknesses, not
mentioning, fastidious categorisations, scholars have embraced an “intra/inter-disciplinary”
approach, developing frameworks that not only integrate macro- and micro-level analyses
(i.e. Zhao 1996), but also IR and Area-studies, to generate more comprehensive and
accurate accounts of international relations and foreign policy-making (Caroline Rose
1998:29; see also Katzenstein and Okawara 2001; Katzenstein 2008). Indeed, all three
mentioned approaches appear in the literature on Japanese-Chinese relations.
Table 1 Similarities and Differences between
Contending Approaches and Theoretical Paradigms
Type-of-variable
Level-of-analysis
structural-material cultural-ideational
Macro-level (external) 1. mainstream IR theories
of aussenpolitik (neo-
realism/neo-liberalism)
2. integrated framework
1. systemic constructivism
2. integrated framework
Micro-level (domestic) 1. Area-studies
2. mainstream IR theories of
innenpolitik
3. integrated framework
1. Area-studies
2. domestic constructivism
3. integrated framework
Source: Adapted and modified from Desch (1998:156).
2.1.1. Area-studies approach
The Area-studies approach, which is akin to the constructivist and innenpolitik line of
thinking, and emphasises the idiosyncratic features as well as prevalence of domestic-
ideational factors in shaping a country’s foreign policy, is traditionally popular in the analysis
of Japanese/Chinese foreign policies, and Japan-China ties. This approach explicitly targets
the “unique”, internal attributes and processes of Japanese/Chinese foreign policy-making,
highlighting the significance of political and strategic culture, history, identity, ideology,
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domestic political process, and the roles of decision-makers’ perceptions,
bureaucratic/factional politics, etc., while paying little attention to the forces of the
international system in shaping state behaviour (Caroline Rose 1998:33).
According to its proponents, Japanese-Chinese relations can be, best explained
through culturally and historically specific lenses, which shape the distinctive nature of their
bilateral ties. For instance, they have frequently cited historical-cultural legacies, i.e. the
“cultural affinity” and “teacher-student complex” theses (Scalapino 1977; Iriye 1980; 1990;
1992; Ijiri 1996; Gries 2004:40; 2005a), historical experiences, and “war-guilt” complex
(Mendl 1995:85; Blaker 1993; Kojima 1988; Gong 2001b/c), among others, as key to
understanding what Drifte defines as postwar Japan’s “deferential” policy towards China
(2003:6-7), or Japanese “minimalist” foreign policy for that matter (Miyashita 2002:163).
Others draw on political cultures, i.e. Japan’s traditional culture, behavioural patterns, and
isolationist tendency (Sato 1977; Reischauer 1977 cf. Caroline Rose 1998:35);
Sinocentrism, or China’s “middle-kingdom” mentality (Fairbank 1968) and cultural inclination
towards elite/factional politics (Hamrin 1994) to explain their foreign policy behaviour, which
are reflected in the bilateral ties. There are also works that highlight peculiar characteristics
of foreign policy-making. Zhao (1993) argues that “behind-the-scenes policymaking
mechanisms”, or informal channels and practice, which are distinguished features of
Japanese domestic politics, have been traditionally influential in Japan’s China policy-
making. The unit-level and sui generis emphasis of this approach, however, as Singer
asserts, tend to “overdifferentiate” states (1961:83), while under-appreciating the constraints
of the international system on their foreign policy orientations (see Caroline Rose 1998:31).
2.1.2. The IR approach: aussenpolitik and innenpolitik
Conversely, the IR approach, characterised by a lively intra-disciplinary debate, has
received favourable attention in studies of Japanese-Chinese diplomacy (Caroline Rose
1998:30). Proponents of aussenpolitik in the neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist
moulds emphasise the salience of systemic imperatives, and the primacy of structural-
material factors in shaping Japanese/Chinese state behaviour/preferences towards their
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bilateral relations. According to neo-realist studies, the contemporary trend in Japanese-
Chinese relations can be, primarily viewed as a reflection of rational manoeuvring by both
states in response to the structural transformation of the international environment, and their
changing power dynamics, which offer constraints and opportunities in augmenting their
respective external goals and strategies. Kokubun (2001; 2003; 2006), Wu (2000), Lampton
and May (2000), Self (2002), Zhao (2002), Roy (2004; 2005), Pei and Swaine (2005),
Mochizuki (2005; 2007), Yahuda (2006), and Glosserman (2003; 2006), among others,
argue that the demise of the Cold War security architecture, growing regional uncertainties,
and changing power equations between Japan and China are key to explaining the
downturn in contemporary Japanese-Chinese relations. Both states are seen striving to
readjust to these new dynamics in their relationship, competing strategically, on the one
hand, and cooperating economically on the other, while redefining and jockeying for
leadership position in the unravelling post-Cold War regional order. Glosserman (2003;
2006) construes that their problematic relationship is predictably, shaped by the new
“geometry” of East Asia, with China “the ascending dragon” and Japan “the setting sun”,
locked in an asymmetrical triangular relationship with America, the sole superpower. In his
assessment of the security dimension of Japanese-Chinese ties, Wu notes this realist logic
in Japanese post-Cold War external orientation, where “concerns over balance of power,
geopolitical competition, and military-strategic rivalry constantly inform Tokyo’s thinking
about the PRC” (2000:304; see also Waldron 2005:722-723).
Similarly, analysis of Japan’s shifting foreign/security policies by Heginbotham and
Samuels (1998; 2002), Singh (2002), Hughes (2005), Shuja (2006), Samuels (2006), and
Kliman (2006), and specifically, its China policy by Green and Self (1996), Green (1999;
2001), and Choi (2003), came up with terminologies like “normal country”, “mercantile
realism”, “reluctant realism”, “creeping realism”, “transitional realism”, and “selective
realism”, to characterise what they saw as Japan’s increasingly realist-oriented
external/security orientations, and its inclination towards a containment-cum-engagement
strategy, or policy of hedging against China’s rise in the fluid East Asian environment. A
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realist-oriented definition of engagement is partially employed by Drifte (2003), and Hughes
(2005), who both see Japan as having chosen a policy that is “based on providing China
with economic and political incentives, hedged by military balancing through its own military
force and the military alliance with the US” (Drifte 2003:3). The conventional realist
interpretation of Japan‘s post-Cold War relations with China can be best summarised by
Green’s observation that:
Japanese foreign policy is increasingly being shaped by strategic considerations about the
balance of power and influence in Northeast Asia, particularly vis-à-vis China…Where Japan’s
relations in East Asia were primarily determined by the conjunction of mercantile interests and
US strategy in the past, they now tend also to reflect a self-conscious competition with China
for strategic influence in the region. Confidence that Japanese economic leadership would
integrate China on Japan’s terms has ebbed and a new realism has emerged regarding the
limits of Japanese economic influence and the growing power aspirations of Beijing (2001:6 &
9; quoted in Murata 2006:41).
Meanwhile, neo-liberals see Japanese-Chinese relations as having been,
fundamentally shaped by economic considerations, where both states place high premiums
on maintaining a pragmatic and functional relationship, via bilateral and multilateral
engagements, to reap the benefits of deepening economic interdependence, despite
periodic tensions fuelled by issues in the politico-strategic dimension. Heazle (2007),
Taniguchi (2005), and Tok (2005) opine that flourishing economic cooperation and
interdependence are salient in keeping Japanese-Chinese relations in check against serious
degeneration, and in understanding the “hot politics, cold economics” dichotomy, or “cold
peace”, in their contemporary bilateral ties. Wan Ming likewise, suggests that dramatic
growth in Japanese-Chinese economic interactions fuelled by the global market, are
“providing a cooperative foundation for the overall bilateral relationship and moderating
political and security tensions” (2006:3). The powers of interdependence and economic
imperatives in promoting a pragmatic, and relatively stable bilateral relationship are also
echoed by Howe (1996), Fukushima (2002), Sutter (2002), Drifte (2002; 2003), Roy (2004),
Ohashi (2004), and Xia (2007) in their less pessimistic observations of the contemporary
trend in Japanese-Chinese diplomacy.
Undoubtedly, both mainstream IR theories offer broad insights and persuasive
explanations, via their respective analytical foci. Nonetheless, their inherent over-emphasis
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on systemic-structural influences make these IR approaches relatively inhospitable to unit-
level investigation, and thus render them problematic by critics, who consider domestic and
ideational factors as equally, if not more crucial to understanding the bilateral ties.
On the contrary, innenpolitikers advocating an approach that scrutinises the contents
of the domestic “black box” argue that the trends in Japanese-Chinese diplomacy are often
manifestations of internal decision-making processes and fierce domestic political
competition, i.e. among state-elites, and between contending factions and ideological
divides. Deriving mainly from the mainstream IR tradition, studies of this nature remain
affixed to understanding their bilateral policies and relationship via generally applicable,
domestic, structural-material (i.e. political system, decision-making apparatus, level of
development) and agent-based (decision-makers’ perception, personality and
idiosyncrasies, etc.) explanations (Caroline Rose 1998:32). For instance, in his scrutiny of
the domestic politics of the principal actors in Japanese policy-making, Tanaka contends
that “critical foreign policy areas such as Sino-Japanese relations have long been dominant
themes of manoeuvring among domestic actors in the Diet, in the interagency bureaucracy,
and in the media” (2000:3). Murata also views highly complicated domestic politics as a
major source of Japan’s China policy, arguing that “changes in Japanese political parties,
bureaucracy, and public opinion”, or more specifically, “negative mass sentiments towards
China, the lack of policy coordination among coalition parties in power, and the relative
decline of MOFA and its “China school” have made the Japanese [China] policy-making
process more complex, defused and fragmented” (2006:37). These observations are echoed
by Calder (1991; 1997), Kojima (2000) and Sasajima (2002) in their respective analysis of
the domestic determinants/institutions shaping Japan’s China policy.12
Similarly, Takamine (2005; 2006) explores the domestic political and bureaucratic
interests motivating Tokyo’s strategic use of foreign aid, which brought a “new dynamism” to
12 Calder (1991; 1997) looks generally into the domestic constraints of Japanese foreign policy, while both
Kojima (2000) and Sasajima (2002) scrutinise Japan’s China policy, specifically. Kojima (2000:41), for
instance, notes that Japan-China diplomatic problems are increasingly becoming domestic issues in both
countries, which cannot be fully comprehended without taking domestic political struggles into account.
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its security relationship with Beijing. Meanwhile, Tok sees China’s policy towards Japan as
“a contentious issue among the Chinese leadership” (2005:296), shaped by fierce political
infighting between the competing factions in the ruling echelon, a view shared by Barnett
(1985), Breslin (1990; 2008), Hamrin (1994), Shambaugh (1990), and Whiting (1989; 2000),
who develop understandings of Chinese foreign policy-making via the analysis of leadership
politics and perceptions, bureaucratic structures, institutions, and policy processes.
Some of these studies have also partially derived their explanatory power from the
Liberal analytical tool of “domestic political systems/regime type” to explain the degeneration
in post-Cold War Japanese-Chinese ties. The most common argument refers to their
different political systems (i.e. divergent political norms, institutions, and values), magnified
since the Tiananmen Incident and the Cold War’s demise, which have widened the
“perception gap” between both governments and societies (Glosserman 10/10/2003;
Takahara 2004). Such divergence, according to Tsang (1999) and Takagi (2006), is one
reason driving Japanese closer to a democratising Taiwan, and increasingly turning the
island into a point of contention between Japan and China. The “Putnam-esque” “two-level
game” framework is likewise, utilised to analyse Japanese-Chinese disputes, i.e. the studies
by Chung (2004; 2007) on China’s management of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute.
An alternative and increasingly popular line of domestic-focused investigation on
Japanese-Chinese relations and their respective policy-making is constructivism, which
draws specifically on the power of unit-level, albeit cultural-ideational variables similar to
those identified by Japanese/Chinese-studies scholars. Constructivist works by Katzenstein
(1996) and Berger (1998) explore the norms and culture of anti-militarism in postwar
Japanese society, in accounting for Japan’s pacifist-oriented foreign policy, which according
to Drifte, is an important source in explaining “Japan’s inclination to deference and restraint
in the bilateral relationship with China” (2003:6) that mainstream IR theories of realism and
liberalism cannot fully grasp. Most popular in the constructivist vein of study has been the
emphasis of “historical memory” in shaping the perceptions and images, not mentioning
identity and interests of Chinese and Japanese that underscore their problematic
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relationship since diplomatic normalisation in 1972. In his seminal work, Whiting (1989)
draws on the salience of history/memories in shaping Chinese images of Japan and the
bilateral ties. Whiting contends that Japanese war legacies in China remain pivotal in
influencing the external perceptions, attitudes, and decision-making of China’s revolutionary
generation of leaders, as reflected in Beijing’s hypersensitivity towards any shift in Tokyo’s
China policy-orientation, and vitriolic responses, when managing their bilateral disputes
during the 1980s. Similarly, Okabe (2001), Wu (2001), Yang (2002), and Rose (2005)
highlight the problems concerning history, memory, and historical reconciliation that
periodically undermine their post-Cold War diplomatic exchanges, while He (2006)
elucidates on the manipulation of historical memories by both sides to create national myths
and revisionist discourse, which are responsible in fuelling contemporary Japanese-Chinese
enmity. Another typical/regular constructivist line of reasoning is the “clash-of-identities” and
“divergent nationalisms” theses, which are elaborated in the following section.
As described in Table 1, there are overlaps between constructivism, mainstream
innenpolitik theories, and Area-studies approach, in terms of their chosen “level-of-analysis”,
and choice of analytical tools. Accordingly, constructivist explanations tend to suffer from
similar fallacies and criticisms rendered on innenpolitik and Area-studies, namely an over-
emphasis on domestic-level explanation, while failing to adequately acknowledge and
theorise systemic constraints on Japanese/Chinese external behaviour towards the bilateral
ties. Additionally, constructivism is guilty for marginalising structural-material factors in
favour of cultural-ideational attributes peculiar to, and/or shared by Japan and China, which
hinders its ability to make systematic and generalised assessments of the bilateral relations.
2.1.3. The holistic/integrated approach
The third approach is one that favours a synthesis of IR and Area-studies assumptions.
Advocates of this eclectic and holistic approach opine that a more accurate explanation of
Japanese-Chinese relations, and/or Japanese/Chinese foreign policy can be derived by
integrating the micro- and macro-levels of analysis, and delving on both structural-material
and cultural-ideational variables. Works by Caroline Rose (1998), Austin and Harris (2001),
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Drifte (2003), and Wan (2006), among others, have precisely developed their studies
utilising such a framework, to explain both governments’ policy-options/responses, when
managing their bilateral relationship. Rose asserts in her analysis of the history textbook
issue that the incorporation of an organising framework explicating the interactions between
international and domestic variables, is useful in overcoming the shortcomings of “standard
explanations of conflict in Sino-Japanese relations” (1998:37-39). Meanwhile, Drifte
proposes “a dynamic model of engagement…based on elements of Realism, Liberalism and
Constructivism” (2003:4), which he deems necessary to adequately comprehend Japan’s
common and unique behaviour/policy-options, when managing its security relations with
China. Drifte’s opinion is shared by Katzenstein and Okawara (2001) in their espousal of
analytical eclecticism that avoids unproductive “paradigmatic clashes”, while fostering a non-
exclusive, “problem-driven” approach to explaining Japan, China, and Asian-Pacific security
(see Katzenstein 2008:9-10, 20-24, Chp.2). According to Katzenstein, “[e]clectic scholarship
complements and utilizes, rather than replaces scholarship produced by existing traditions”
(2008:9), and it promotes epistemological and ontological flexibility that help avoid
parsimonious and myopic assumptions based on a single paradigm (2008:46). By combining
realist, liberal, and constructivist-oriented analytical tools, and recognising the benefits of
multi-level/multi-variable analysis, analytical eclecticism generates a fuller interpretation of
the evolution of Japanese-Chinese relations, which in Katzenstein’s opinion, “will be shaped
by a mixture of engagement and deterrence in their bilateral relations, by their competitive
and complementary region-building practices in an East Asia that will resist domination by
either country (Katzenstein 2006), and by the cultivation of their different strategic and
economic links to the American imperium” (2008:24; see also Higgott 2007). Also, Wan Ming
concludes that “the complex Sino-Japanese relationship has been affected by systemic,
social, and emotional factors following multiple causal processes in political, military,
economic, and socio-cultural dimensions” (2006:3), which underscores the necessity for an
integrated/eclectic approach to reduce the “analytical myopia” suffered by the individual/
parochial lines of argument (Berger 2000:411), in studying their multi-dimensional ties.
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Since this research explores the causal role of domestic-ideational determinants,
specifically nationalism, and its interactions with other external-internal variables in re-
defining Japan’s relations with China, it is commonsensical to pursue this “third” line of
inquiry as the basic organising framework. Indeed, nationalism’s salience vis-à-vis other
determinants in affecting Japanese behaviour/policy-preferences towards the Chinese can
be systematically assessed by developing a “hybrid” framework that utilises analytical tools
from both mainstream IR and constructivism/Area-studies. Such “middle-range” theories that
depart from the analytical orthodoxy are presently available, with some claiming to be more
hospitable to, and deductive in incorporating both external-internal variables, than others, in
the analysis of foreign policy. However, these theories, notably those foregrounding on
realism, have been accused of “reductionism” and “degenerative” analysis by as much, their
hardcore theoretical brethrens, as exponents from the opposing sides of the theoretical
divides, for sacrificing parsimony, coherence, and compromising realism’s fundamental
premises13(Lakatos 1970:117-118; Vasquez 1983;1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Before
ascertaining a viable analytical framework, it would be appropriate to gauge the treatment of
nationalism, generally, and its role in Japanese-Chinese ties, specifically, through the
discourse found in existing literature, which have largely transpired within the context of the
mainstream IR versus constructivism/Area-studies debate.
2.2. Treatment of Nationalism in Mainstream IR Theories: Realism and Liberalism
The orthodox IR theoretical traditions of realism and liberalism are generally “rationalist”
theories that privilege structural-material variables in the analysis of state behaviour and
international outcomes.14 In their contemporary guise, both neo-realism and neo-liberalism
foreground systemic over unit-level investigation. The former emphasises the overarching
importance of the anarchic international system in defining states interests and actions in
terms of relative distribution and balance-of-power within it (Waltz 1979); while the latter
13 This debate foregrounds on the so-called definitive “Lakatosian” understanding of what constituted a
coherent and falsifiable social science research programme. See Lakatos (1970). For a critique on neo-realism,
and other variants of the realist research programme as degenerative, see Vasquez (1983; 1997); Legro and
Moravcsik (1999), and Wendt (1995).
14 According to constructivist critics like Steve Smith, the “rational choice” emphasis underpinning both neo-
realism and neo-liberalism makes these mainstream theories “barely distinguishable” (2001:40).
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conceives state behaviour/preferences in the light of complex interdependence and
interstate cooperation (Keohane and Nye 1977). Both share the assumption that unit-level
and ideational factors are a priori givens, “self-evident and non-problematic” (Lapid 1996:6)
in the analysis of world politics. According to critics, their fundamentally “statist”, “rationalist-
materialist”, as well as Hobbesian-oriented, “ahistorical”, “asocial”, and “acultural”
perspectives of international relations, not mentioning, fixation with systemic-level theorising,
make these mainstream IR theories analytically inhospitable to problematising non-material
factors, like culture, identity, historical memories, and ideology (Inayatullah and Blaney
1996:66-67; Pasic 1996:85; Tooze 1996). In fact, cultural-ideational variables are deemed
trivial, and of secondary importance by both neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and are
conveniently “relegated to the domestic realm, where they remain irrelevant to the workings
of international relations” (Pasic 1996:85; Tooze 1996:xix).
2.2.1. Mainstream IR theories’ “analytical myopia” on nationalism
Understandably, mainstream IR theories have severe limitations in offering a comprehensive
understanding of nationalism in international affairs, since the “national” phenomenon is a
social construct, domestic and non-material in essence, as well as subjective and inter-
subjective in meanings/nature (Tooze 1996:xviii-xix; Farrands 1996:12-13; Lapid 1996:13).
This inadvertently leads these theories, or the IR discipline for that matter, to conveniently
ignore “the problem of nationalism” (Judt 1994:51; cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:105),
despite its growing salience, as events of the post-Cold War epoch suggest. According to
Lapid and Kratochwil:
It is indeed strange but hardly overstated that, in an age of nationalism, international relations
and most other social disciplines seem to have converged on little else but the sustained
exclusion of the national problematic from their respective research agendas, relegating it to a
fringe phenomenon (1996:105).
For instance, nationalism is often under-appreciated, if not trivialised, or neglected,
altogether by neo-realism, due to its rigid theoretical construct and underpinnings that view
states as undifferentiated (like-units), unitary actors, whose behaviour are conditioned and
governed primarily by structural attributes of international anarchy (Waltz 1979). Also, the
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conventional realist thought is dominated by the “primacy of foreign policy” notion, which,
according to Zakaria, can be meant; i) international relations being significant in affecting/
influencing the domestic arrangements of states; and ii) interstate politics as a realm
separate from domestic politics, where state behaviour is prevalently influenced by systemic,
rather than domestic factors/pressures (1992:179-180). By treating nation-state as a given,
conventional realists in the Waltzian tradition are, forgone to overlook unit-level and
ideational-normative imperatives, i.e. issues concerning character of states and the social
construction of state identity, which are related and essential to comprehending nationalism.
Indeed, neo-realism’s dismissal of such factors, its excessive indulgence with parsimony
(Roth 2006:487), and overdependence on “system-level”, “rationalist-centred” and
“structural-material”-driven explanations, among others, are fallacies that render it
“problematique” when encountering nationalism from a theoretical viewpoint (cf. Lapid and
Kratochwil 1996:116; Copeland 2000).
Similarly, liberal analysts tend to “underestimate the potency of nationalism” (Holsti
1995:44; see also Rosecrance 1986; Mayall 1990).15 Especially to neo-liberalism, the
construction of political identity, according to Tooze, is “assumed to be unproblematic”, due
to its state-centric position (1996:xviii). Despite viewing it as more of a collective, the state
remains the neo-liberal construct’s central unit of analysis, which makes “sub-state”
variables, like nationalism and identity beyond its investigation (Tooze 1996:xix).
Critics of mainstream IR theories are also quick to highlight their flaws in theorising,
and explaining developments in particular regions like East Asia, where the political climate
and intra-regional relations are commonly characterised by rising nationalist impulses, which
tend to promote irregular and irrational state behaviour that somewhat defy the conventional
IR logic and assumptions (Berger 2000; 2003). Realistically, the politico-security instability
occurring in contemporary Northeast Asia is as much, a reflection of confrontational
15 Interestingly, there are domestic-liberal works utilising the “democratic peace” thesis like Mansfield and
Snyder (2005) that explicitly incorporated nationalism in understanding why democracies go to war. However,
it has been charged for conflating the state and nation concept, and simplifying the treatment of nationalism, not
mentioning over-emphasising its salience in precipitating conflicts. For a critique, see Bloom (2006:339-341).
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nationalisms and identity-related predicaments, as with the usual variables identified by
mainstream IR theories that affect regional stability, i.e. structural transformation of the
regional security architecture; profound shifts in the power balance; emergence of potential
non-status quo/revisionist powers; asymmetrical distribution of relative capabilities between
regional actors; insufffcient levels of economic interdependence; and underdevelopment of
multilateral norms and institutions, to name a few (Christensen 1999:49; Friedberg 1993/4;
2000; Mearsheimer 1990a; 2001; Betts 1993/4; Buzan and Segal 1994; Van Evera 1999;
Berger 2000; Ross 2006). In fact, rising nationalism and duelling national identities are
increasingly shaping bilateral relations between regional actors like China and Japan, Japan
and Korea, and China and Taiwan, which are problematic to standard neo-realist, or neo-
liberal explanations (Berger 2003).
To be sure, mainstream IR theories have made efforts to incorporate nationalism and
other unit-level, ideational variables to address the glaring anomalies found in their
theorisations of interstate relations, especially in specific regions during the post-Cold War
epoch. To stem the retrogression of IR realism, which has come under severe attack from
constructivists for its theoretical inadequacies, contemporary realists, i.e. Mearsheimer
(1990a; 1992),16 Posen (1993a/b), Snyder (1991; 1993), Van Evera (1994) have opened up
to nationalism’s role under a revised neo-realist construct (cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996;
Downs and Saunders 1998/9). Lapid and Kratochwil opine that, through “inclusionary
control”, they seek to address major nationalism-related problems in international politics
from essentially neo-realist premises, a position that reflects a departure from the typically
narrow Waltzian tradition of “exclusionary control” (1996:110-116).
However, critics argue that the treatment of nationalism by these variants of neo-
realism appears more of a “retrofitting”, or juxtaposing of the elusive phenomenon to fit into
the traditional neo-realist construct without proper theorisation (Lapid and Kratochwil
1996:112). In their opinion, nationalism is treated as “merely a reflection of the more “basic”
16 Mearsheimer (1992) introduces the notion “hypernationalism” into the traditional premises of neo-realism,
albeit as a secondary factor that exacerbates the insecurities of the anarchic international system, which remains
his central analytical variable (cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:110-113).
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forces – such as the security dilemma17 and power balancing among the preexisting “like
units”” (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:112), reducing it to being a ““second order” variable, [or]
an epiphenomenon of the international system and its anarchical structure” (Mearsheimer
1990b:32; cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:112). In other words, nationalism is often, invoked
as an ancillary factor to supplement the inadequacy of the Waltzian logic,18 exogenously
incorporated to explain away anomalies in their non-traditional case-studies.
2.2.2. Neo-realism’s under-appreciation of nationalism in Japanese-Chinese relations
Indeed, most IR-centred studies of Japanese-Chinese relations tend to take nationalism less
seriously, providing assumptions and analysis that fall short of appreciating the extent of its
influence on their contemporary bilateral affairs. From the conventional realist perspective,
nationalism is mostly a sub-factor exacerbating the “strategic conundrums”19 and shifting
power distributions between Japan and China, which studies by Green and Self (1996),
Zhao (2002), Wang (2002), Self (2002); Pei and Swaine (2005), Roy (2003; 2005),
Taniguchi (2005), Calder (2006), and Yahuda (2006), among others, deem as the core
determinant affecting the bilateral ties. According to Yahuda, “the key to understanding the
deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations is the structural change in the international politics
of East Asia” (2006:162). Induced by the Cold War’s demise, he believes this change “has
led to the repositioning of regional great powers and…an intensification of economic
development” among East Asian states, which has helped transform “the regional and
international balance of power” (2006:162-163). Compounding the structural change has
been the renewed efforts by regional actors “to redefine their domestic, regional, and
international identities”, which Yahuda insists, has engendered a revitalisation of assertive
nationalisms in China and Japan that are developing divergently, with one cast as the
other’s “putative adversary” (2006:163; see also Self 2002).
17 Christensen (1999) also acknowledges nationalism’s role in aggravating the “security dilemma” – a self-
fulfilling realist logic regarding the tendency of states to be involved in unwanted conflicts, resulting from their
very act of seeking security and wanting to avoid conflicts. For a seminal work on the “security dilemma”
concept, see Jervis (1978).
18 This term is, commonly used with other equivalent expressions like “straightjacket” in IR theoretical works,
to describe the rigid underpinnings of conventional/neo-realism (see Brooks 1997; Guzzini 2004:535).
19 This term is taken from Yahuda (2006).
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On a similar note, Kokubun (2001; 2003; 2006; 2007) has consistently associated
the degeneration in contemporary Japanese-Chinese relations and shift in Japanese
strategic thinking with the structural transformation of the post-Cold War international
context, which brought an end to what he calls the “1972 System” that held the bilateral ties
amiably together since diplomatic normalisation. The ensuing “power shift” that saw China
rising, and Japan stagnating, economically and politically/militarily, has invoked negative
Japanese images and perception of the Chinese, fostering nationalistic attitudes that are
increasingly driving Japan towards a so-called “psychological cold war” with China (Kokubun
2007:146-154). Zhao (2002:39) equates China’s rise to a foreign policy that is “more
assertive” and “sensitive” to domestic popular nationalist sentiment, which complicates
Tokyo and Washington’s strategic calculations, as the Chinese leadership becomes more
vulnerable to nationalist demands, to address sovereignty issues like Taiwan and
Senkaku/Diaoyudao, and redress Japanese-inflicted historical legacies.
The opposite is true with Japan’s regression vis-à-vis China, notably in economic
terms, which Watanabe (2000), Takagi (2006), and many others insist, has triggered
Japanese consternation, fuelling anti-Chinese sentiment that exacerbates their negative
perceptions of the changing power balance (Takahara 2004; Pei and Swaine 2005; Roy
2005; Teufel-Dreyer 2006).20 Yang Bojiang notes that “facing China’s rise, Japan’s
nationalism prevents the country from perceiving itself as a second-rate power”, compelling
it to use the US-Japanese alliance “to balance out Chinese development while defending or
promoting Tokyo’s own international status” (2006:133). The “power shift” argument is also
emphasised in several other studies, although some identify the shift not in terms of
“diverging fortunes”21 but from a “strong China, strong Japan” standpoint (Jin 2002:51;22 see
also Wang 2002; Yang Jian 2007; Yang Bojiang. 2006; Calder 2006). Nonetheless, they
generally share the view that Japanese-Chinese enmity and rivalry are the offspring of
changing power dynamics, accentuated by rising nationalism in both countries.
20 Indeed, as early as 1998, Funabashi Yoichi noted that a rising China would “induce critical, painful, and
psychologically difficult strategic adjustments in Japanese foreign policy” (1998:32).
21 This term, which will be used occasionally in this thesis, derives from Pei and Swaine (2005).
22 This phrase is, specifically quoted in Rose (2005:6).
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Nationalism as a “factor” aggravating the confrontational forces spawned by the fluid
international order is also a theme shared by Christensen (1999), Self (2002), Calder
(2006:130), Tsunekawa (2006), and Hagstrom and Lagerkvist (2006), in their observations
of how the unravelling Japan-China power equation, coupled with resurgent nationalisms fed
by historical legacies, ethnocentrism and xenophobia in both countries, are magnifying
mutual security concerns, and fuelling a potential security dilemma. In his analysis,
Christensen pessimistically suggests that even though nationalist emotion has yet to
severely affect “the practical, day-to-day management of Sino-Japanese relations”, it does
influence one another’s longer-term threat assessment, which “may be more important in
fuelling the security dilemma than particular diplomatic policies in the present” (1999:54-55).
Meanwhile, Tsunekawa sees Japan’s “dependent nationalism” as a product of, and a source
“that has precipitated the security dilemma through action-reaction cycles aggravating
perception gaps among major powers in the region” (2006:14), including China.
Another related, key external-structural variable in the realist observation is the role
of the US, and the US-Japan alliance, which is, in Zhao Quansheng’s opinion, “the most
significant external actor/factor” shaping the direction of Japanese-Chinese relations
(2002:32). Echoing this is Takahara, who sees the US-Japan alliance as “the largest issue in
Sino-Japanese ties in the 1990s” (2004:161-162). Its salience is likewise, noted in
Johnstone (1998; 2000), Liu (2000), Green (2001), Vogel (2003), Drifte (2003), Wan (2003),
and Christensen (2006), as with most of the works cited earlier, although opinions do
diverge regarding the implications of its interaction with nationalism, or the appreciation of
nationalism’s role in these works, for that matter. Optimists view the US-Japan alliance as a
countervailing force suppressing chauvinistic nationalism in Japan and China. For instance,
Green suggests that the reason for MOFA’s insistence for “an iron-clad defense
commitment” from the US on Senkaku/Diaoyudao during the 1996 dispute, was to curtail
Japanese nationalist pressure for “a unilateral military capability” to deal with the issue,
which could trigger a Japanese-Chinese confrontation (2001:87). Meanwhile, despite its
fierce rhetoric, Beijing has always been, quietly confident of the US-Japan alliance in
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containing a resurgence of Japanese militarism, although such confidence has somewhat
eroded in recent years (Green 2001:89; Wu 2000; 2005/6). Conversely, pessimists tend to
see Washington’s “lopsided” policy as facilitating Japanese nationalist aspirations, i.e.
reinstating military force as a foreign policy instrument, and emboldening other “revisionist”
agendas (history revisionism, Taiwan policy, etc.), that are bound to trigger reactive anti-
Japanese nationalism in China (Liu 2000; Tamamoto 2004).23
Apart from limited theorisation, another standard realist misgiving of nationalism is
the tendency to accentuate its malignancy (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:114), of which the
majority of the abovementioned studies have exaggerated in explaining Japanese-Chinese
competition, rivalry, and conflict. Such extreme interpretation of nationalism is to be
expected, due to realism’s preoccupation with the assumption regarding state behaviour as
being conditioned by the “possibility of conflict”, where states are pressured into making
calculations based on a zero-sum, worst-case scenario (Brooks 1997).
Likewise, it is common for realists to over-emphasise nationalism’s instrumentality as
a political tool utilised by both governments for diplomatic and domestic expedience. Tsang
(1999) sees realist calculations as leading the PRC to foster a kind of narrow-minded
nationalism that targets Japan, as a means to undercut Tokyo’s credibility and intention to
seek a larger political role in the region, which could hinder its own long-term external goals
of irredentism and leadership in the Asia-Pacific. Conversely, the Japanese government,
increasingly dominated by hawks, and shaped by realpolitik, is, according to Miller (2000),
Tamamoto (2004), and Taniguchi (2005), seeking to rejuvenate nationalism to mobilise
popular support for a broader Japanese security role that has China well within its radar.
Simply put, a conventional neo-realist perspective of Japanese-Chinese relations
draws explanatory power mainly from structural-material imperatives, namely shifts in
relative capabilities and the balance of power, and the role of other external factors/actors,
23 In general, “defensive realists” are known to be more optimistic and positive-sum in perspective, while
“offensive realists” are more inclined to view international politics from a pessimistic zero-sum lens, although
both groups are not mutually exclusive (see Brooks 1997; Taliaferro 2000/1).
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i.e. the US in explaining Japanese/Chinese behaviour vis-à-vis the bilateral ties. Meanwhile,
nationalism and identity issues are generally, treated as a given, and incorporated
“atheoretically” as an auxiliary variable exacerbating the salience of the realist central
variables (Tooze 1996).
2.2.3. Neo-liberalism’s treatment of nationalism: a “mirror-image” of neo-realism?
Similar to neo-realism, nationalism’s treatment by neo-liberalism is, at best, marginal and
lacking in proper theorisation. The marginalisation is due to neo-liberalism’s fixation with its
own set of analytical tools, which are state-centric and structural-material in essence.
Although there are liberal theories that draw on domestic-level explanations, their preference
for structural-material variables makes them less appreciative of nationalism or any
ideational factors.
Most research in the liberal vein tend to under-estimate nationalism’s forces, with
Taylor (1996), Sutter (2002), Heazle (2007), and Xia (2007), among others, implying that
deepening socio-economic interdependence, and incremental political reforms in China’s
case would help mitigate virulent nationalist sentiments, and eventually foster a
progressive/matured bilateral relationship. Likewise, a higher degree of institutionalisation of
diplomatic norms and functions, and participation in multilateral institutions serve to
suppress excessive nationalism, while promoting greater cooperation between the two
countries. For example, Sutter (2002) agrees that rising nationalist impulses in China and
Japan are fuelling potential Japanese-Chinese rivalry even in the economic realm, as
reflected by increased frictions in bilateral trade and Official Development Assistance (ODA)
arrangements, and competition to establish regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
However, there are in his opinion, “countervailing factors” limiting the rivalry, “the most
important” of which “is that both Japanese and Chinese governments are domestically
focused on the economic development of their countries”, and thus understand the
importance of fostering peaceful, stable and cooperative relationship with each other, and
with their regional neighbours, to realise this priority goal (2002:39). This is echoed by Pei
and Swaine, who cited two critical factors mitigating the risk of a Japanese-Chinese “cold
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war”, namely “the top policy agenda of domestic economic reform”, and steadfast interest in
“maintaining their mutually beneficial commercial ties” (2005:4-6).
Similarly, Whiting believes that against the prevailing negative factors (i.e. fragile
domestic politics fuelled by rising nationalism and mutual negative images), pragmatic
considerations of mutual benefits with economics playing the key role, are “likely to tip the
balance in a positive direction” (2000:30). Meanwhile, Chung notes that assertive
nationalism in China and Japan “is held at bay by expectations of mutual economic gains
through increased trade and investment, and fear of accidental military provocation”
(2004:53), in his “two-level-game” study of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute. Heazle also
concludes his analysis by suggesting the salience of the “hot” economic relationship, which
would, at least for the foreseeable future, provide both governments “with enough motivation
to contain their [mutual] political animosity…and resist any temptation to cause the
relationship to deteriorate any further” (2007:200), despite the nationalism conundrum in
current Japanese-Chinese diplomacy.
Indeed, from the liberal perspective, economic relations have always provided stable
foundation for Japanese-Chinese politico-diplomatic ties, as with their effectiveness in
channelling discord in the said arena, and are thus, expected to remain so, as Burns (2000)
and Rose (2002:243) argue in their studies. Nonetheless, the logic of economic
interdependence is critically questioned by Yahuda (2006), who concedes that deepening
economic interactions and mutual dependence have not necessarily led to more sanguine
mutual images and improved political ties in the Japanese-Chinese case. Furthermore,
Hilpert and Katsuji note that growing economic interdependence can become problematic in
the event of increased Japanese-Chinese economic competition, and that “economic
relations may also be a reason and a trigger for bilateral conflict” (2002:152), besides their
unresolved nationalist disputes and shifting power relations. Shi best sums it up by
concluding that “economic interdependence is far from a sufficiently reliable “safety cushion”
for China-Japan relations” (2007:7).
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Another common neo-liberal view refers to multilateralism’s mitigating role, where
participation in regional multilateral platforms, like the ASEAN-Plus-Three, ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), not mentioning, the Six-
Party Talks on North Korean denuclearisation are deemed constructive in forging mutual
interests and cultivating “a habit of cooperation” (Lam 2006a:18), while containing
nationalism-inspired bilateral competition and rivalry (Yang 2003; Heazle 2007; Lam 2002).
Meanwhile, from the domestic-centred liberal perspective, the “democratic peace” thesis
highlights the potential role of increased political reforms and democratisation in curtailing
the forces of confrontational nationalisms between China and Japan, paving the way for the
development of a mature relationship. To be sure, observers tend to see popular anti-
Japanese nationalism becoming more salient in a democratised China, as the restraining
hand of the pragmatic CCP regime withers (Takamine 2006:146-147). However, Yang
Daqing suggests that although “democracy is not a panacea” (2002:23), and that “greater
openness in China in the short term may unleash some more extreme ultranationalist forces,
in the long run, greater openness and critical examination of its own history – by a robust
intelligentsia and by journalist” will help towards realising a genuine Japanese-Chinese
reconciliation (2002:26).
Proponents of sub-state/non-state level of analysis equally share sanguine views of
Japanese-Chinese ties, emphasising the mitigating roles of non-government organisations
(NGOs), local governments, business groups, and intensified “people-to-people diplomacy”
in cushioning the debilitating impact of nationalism and state-centred, “zero-sum politico-
strategic competition” on bilateral relations (Lam 2006a:12). In his study of Japanese-
Chinese interaction at the sub-national government (SNG) level, Punendra Jain (2000;
2006) explores the dynamic role of Japanese SNGs in promoting grassroots linkages with
their Chinese counterparts via the twinning of cities/prefectures/provinces, trade promotion,
and economic/technical cooperation, which he asserts, “can do much – and sometimes
more than the central government – in cultivating close and valuable ties with China” (cf.
Lam 2006a:13). Takahara (2006) also claims that Japanese NGOs’ activities have
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contributed to forging mutual trust and alleviating anti-Japanese sentiment amongst Chinese
peasants, in his case-study of a Chinese province, while Hook (2006) contends that the
“China threat” discourse brewing in Japan did little to hinder the micro-regional economic
cooperation and integration between Kyushu and Dalian (see also Breslin and Hook 2002).
In sum, mainstream IR studies in the realist and liberal veins are predominantly,
focused on theorising their respective central variables in explaining Japanese/Chinese
behaviour/actions in the bilateral ties. Although commonly cited in their analysis, most have
not dedicated adequate treatment on nationalism’s role in shaping contemporary Japanese-
Chinese relations. Such marginalisation is the result of their respective theoretical
preoccupation, which causes them to under-appreciate nationalism, and therefore explains
their limited, and typically, “after-thought” analysis of how it affects Japanese/Chinese
domestic politics and foreign policy-making, and when nationalist pressure does, or does not
translate into “nationalist” foreign policy, due to state responses to external and domestic
constraints/opportunities.
2.3. Nationalism in Constructivism and Area-studies
As an alternative theoretical paradigm, constructivism addresses key issues in international
relations that mainstream IR theories fail to adequately comprehend and explain.24 Like
Area-studies, constructivism derives its strength from a set of assumptions and variables
that systemic-based IR theories tend to ignore and consider as trivial, and of secondary
importance. Specifically, it emphasises the constitutive and discursive role of domestic,
cultural-ideational imperatives in shaping world affairs, i.e. culture, nationalism and identity,
precisely the kind of (non-material/sui generis) variables scorned generally by proponents of
24 Constructivism, like realism and liberalism is more of a broader theoretical approach to the analysis of
international politics than an IR theory per se (Berger 2003:389). There are variants to the constructivist
paradigm, in lieu of its growing membership and stature as a viable “school of thought” in the IR discipline
(Kubalkova 2001:6-7). Hopf (1998) contends that constructivism should be understood in its conventional and
critical variants, while Burchill et.al. (2005) suggest the classification of the constructivist school based on the
“level-of-analysis” criteria, namely systemic-level, unit-level and holistic constructivism. To be sure, there are
clear differences between the exponents of this intra-school divide, but apart from the inherently systemic focus
of Wendt’s version, constructivism as a relatively coherent theoretical paradigm, predominantly focuses “on
issues of identity in world politics and the theorisation of domestic politics and culture in international relations
theory” (Hopf 1998:172; see also Katzenstein 1996). Besides the above works, key text on IR constructivism
includes Onuf (1989); Kratochwil (1989); Kubalkova, Onuf and Kowert (1998); and Kubalkova (2001).
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neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Wendt 1995; Higgott 1994; Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein
and Okawara 1993; Johnston 1995; Hopf 1998; Berger 1996; 1998; 2000; 2003).25
According to Berger, constructivists draw attention to the “ideational and cultural
world” of their “research subjects” to understand the intersubjective meanings that generate
their behaviour and actions (2003:390). Constructivism explicates the social processes that
endow actors (states, societies and individuals alike) with particular cognitive lenses, which
help define their identities and interests, and give meaning to their preferences and actions
(Berger 2000:410; Hopf 1998:174-175). International politics/relations is assumed to be an
ever-changing social process, defined by the peculiar identities and interests of its
constituents (states), which are themselves, social constructs shaped, and reshaped by
intersubjective social norms and practices of their subjects (i.e. society/groups/individuals)
(Wendt 1995; Hopf 1998). The emphasis on the intersubjective nature of the international
system, and of identity and interests means that constructivists are opposed to the “rational-
actor” assumption that state identity and interests are unchangeable, and fixed to that of
self-help, self-interested actor, and driven purely by the distribution of material capabilities
within the international system (Wendt 1995; Hopf 1998; Berger 2003). This helps explains
why some states/actors behave “irrationally” in the conduct of international relations, which
mainstream realism and liberalism cannot comprehend, and thus classified as anomalies in
their respective analysis.
Nationalism, as an intersubjective, socially constructed, and psychological-emotional
rather than rational-material phenomenon, is a staple diet in the constructivist analytical
menu. Indeed, constructivism and, to an extent, Area-studies have (re)gained much of their
explanatory power following the advent of nationalism and identity-related issues, and
conflicts during the post-Cold War epoch, which have imposed a redefinition of the state-
centric and structural-material meanings of international politics espoused by mainstream IR
25 Derived to overcome the limitations of mainstream theories, constructivism shares with other alternative IR
schools of thought a common view regarding the social construction of world politics; the social rather than
predominantly material basis of the basic structures of international politics (Wendt 1995:71-72); and the equal
importance of domestic, unit-level analysis and the role of culture and identity in shaping international relations
(Berger 2003; Hopf 1998; Katzenstein 1996).
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theories.26 Contrary to IR orthodoxy, a constructivist analysis problematises nationalism, not
as an “epiphenomenon”,27 but an independent and intangible variable that shapes state
identity and interests, which then “mediate the material world, [or structure] including
features like the balance of power, or opportunities for trade and cooperation” (Berger
2003:390). Also unlike mainstream reasoning, constructivism stresses on the discursive (not
material) power28 of nationalism and identity to explain state behaviour. This requires an
approach similar to Area-studies, where the researcher, in Berger’s opinion, needs “to be
sensitive towards, and engaged in a sustained investigation of the debates” surrounding the
meanings of nationalism and identity “within the community of relevant policymaking actors,
and to place those debates in the context of the broader societal discourses in domestic and
international politics” (2003:392). This demonstrates constructivism/Area-studies favouring
“interpretivist”/empirically dense and sui generis analysis (Hopf 1998:198) over the
parsimonious and universal theorisation of the IR orthodoxies, which reflects their
explanatory salience on nationalism and other ideational/non-material factors.
2.3.1. Constructivism/Area-studies’ understanding of nationalism in
Japanese-Chinese relations
Aforementioned, there is a rich collection of constructivist/Area-studies literature on
Japanese-Chinese relations. Whilst studies of nationalism and identity have flourished in this
analytical vein, most are dedicated to analysing Chinese, or Japanese nationalism per se,
paying moderate emphasis on its external role, but limited attention to assessing its impact
on one’s foreign policy vis-à-vis another that underscore the contemporary atmosphere of
their diplomatic relations.
Indeed, there is a proliferation of research on Chinese nationalism, with Whiting
(1983; 1995); Oksenberg (1986); Unger (1996), Zheng (1999), Zhu (2001), Chang (2001);
Gries (2004; 2005a/b), Chen (2005), Zhao (2000; 2004; 2005), and Hughes (2006) providing
among the most extensive understandings of nationalism’s role in shaping China’s modern
26 For an insightful discussion of nationalism from the constructivist lens, see Hall (1998). See also Druckman
(1994); Farrands (1996); Deudney (1996); and Doty (1996).
27 This specific term derives from Lapid and Kratochwil (1996:112).
28 Discursive power means the power to control intersubjective understandings (Berger 2003; Hopf 1998:177).
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international relations. Postwar Japanese nationalism has likewise, received adequate
scholarly attention, although specific studies on its role in Japanese foreign policy-making
are surprisingly limited, despite growing recognition of its contemporary efficacy. Besides
Pyle’s (1996) realist-inclined study on nationalism and post-Cold War Japan’s newfound
assertiveness, key works by Yoshino (1992; 1997), Stronach (1995), McCormack (2000),
Nish (2000), McVeigh (2001; 2004), Wilson (2001), Sasada (2006), Shimazu (2006), and
Seaton (2007) provide accounts of Japanese nationalism mainly from the
constructivist/Area-studies perspective, delving on its historical, socio-cultural, ideological
and political dimensions, giving only partial treatment to its influence on Japan’s external
orientations, and almost negligible on Japan’s China policy and their bilateral relationship.
Miller (2000), Muto (2001), and Samuels (2007a/b) also impress on how nationalism is
reshaping Japanese attitude toward security thinking, and its implications on Japanese
foreign policy, without explicating its impact on China policy-making. That said, Rose (2000),
Rozman (2001; 2002), Tamamoto (2001; 2005a/b), Matthews (2003), Kingston (2004),
Shibuichi (2005), Satoh (2006a/b), Tsunekawa (2006), and Deans (2007) did address
Japanese nationalism and identity politics in affecting the bilateral ties.
The most common constructivist explanation of nationalism in Japan’s relations with
China centres on the “clash-of-identities” and “identity politics” theses, which are
persuasively argued in Rose (2000), Tamamoto (2001), Shibuichi (2005), Satoh (2006a/b),
and Chan and Bridges (2006), among others. This line of reasoning links to the arguments
on historical memories and changing images and perceptions that are elaborated in some of
the above studies, as well as those by Yang (2002), Rozman (2001; 2002; 2003), He (2006)
and Sasada (2006).
According to Rose (2000:178-179), the resurgence of state and cultural nationalisms
in Japan and China is a fundamental reaction and readjustment to the aforesaid
international and domestic developments, which have reignited nationalist debates on the
questions of history, culture, and national identity, at both elite and popular levels. Although
primarily meant for domestic consumption, these debates have occasionally spilt over into
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their bilateral relations, triggering diplomatic controversies over “highly symbolic issues
which struck at the heart of Chinese and Japanese national consciousness, identity, and
interests” (2000:170). However, since they are “overwhelmingly domestic debates with
domestic aims” (2000:179), Rose contends that rising nationalist impulses have “not
necessarily translated into an aggressive foreign policy”, and that state nationalism in China
and Japan, specifically, “did not threaten to spill out to the extent that it would jeopardize the
stability of Sino-Japanese relations” (2000:170).
Similarly, Satoh (2006a) links the “odd-couple” relationship between Japan and
China to the rise of the politics of history and identity in both countries. She sees their
contemporary bilateral relationship as no longer predominantly defined in terms of material
interest, but increasingly by expression of identity, especially in Japan’s case. The re-
definition of foreign policy based on one’s identity in relation to the other is fundamental to
the worsening bilateral ties, as their identities and nationalisms are apparently at odds with
one another (Satoh 2006a). Whilst modern Chinese nationalism is very much defined by
historical memories of Imperial Japan’s exploits in China,29 she sees Japanese seeking to
either distance themselves from, or reinterpret such memories positively, in their quest to
reinvent a more prideful national identity. This “clash of identities” is, in Satoh’s opinion “an
obvious recipe for disaster”, when translated into their mutual bilateral policies (2006a:5-7).
Tamamoto (2001), Hashizume (2001), Shibuichi (2005), and Deans (2007) also
assert a similar argument in their studies of the Yasukuni Shrine dispute. According to
Tamamoto, “there is discontinuity in the Japanese [psyche] between the prewar and postwar
states”, with the August 15, 1945 surrender date marking the break, and becoming “the
defining moment of a new postwar Japanese national identity” (2001:36). As such, it is
common for Japanese to be somewhat ambivalent regarding the prewar/wartime eras, as
reflected in their lackadaisical attitude towards war apology and Chinese (and Koreans)
sensitivities surrounding prime ministerial Yasukuni visits and historical revisionism, a
sentiment which the Chinese find so repulsive (Tamamoto 2001:36). Meanwhile, Shibuichi
29 See Gries (2004; 2005a/b) and Callahan (2004) for the Japan factor in Chinese identity formation.
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sees “a clash of incompatible identities” as “the essence of the Yasukuni dispute”
(2005:213). According to him, the disputants (China, and Japanese leftists and rightists)
hold contending images of Yasukuni that correspond with their respective historical
identities: the Chinese perceive the shrine as a symbol of unrepentant Japanese militarism,
while many Japanese, notwithstanding the leftists, view it as “honoring those who sacrificed
their lives for [the betterment of] the Japanese nation” (2005:199, 213). Such divergent
identities and symbolisms, Shibuchi insists, leave the contending parties with little choice,
but to either oppose, or support Yasukuni, triggering “conflicting political and diplomatic
pressures” on Japanese premiers’ decisions regarding shrine visits (2005:199).
Undoubtedly, the formation of confrontational national identities has much to do with
conflicting interpretations of history, and the evolving nationalist narratives in both countries,
which have accentuated the perennial “history problem”, making it a major thorn in
contemporary Japan-China relations. This line of inquiry is found in most constructivist-
oriented analysis, and specifically elaborated in Okabe (2001), Yang (2002), Gries
(2005a/b), Rose (2005), and He (2006). According to Rose, “The history problem centres on
an inability to agree on a shared version of history (both within Japan and between Japan
and China)” (2005:6), a conundrum that has brought ramifications on other areas of the
bilateral ties, which makes a genuine Japanese-Chinese reconciliation difficult, if not
impossible to achieve. This is echoed by Satoh, who sees both countries holding particular
and incompatible views on national history, especially of WWII; the Japanese war narrative
has a narrower scope that generally begins with the Pearl Harbour attack, compared to the
Chinese version of a protracted war starting from the 1931 Manchurian Incident (2006b:6).
The widely perceived Japanese “collective amnesia” over this “obscured” war episode is
pivotal to understanding the Japanese-Chinese “history problem” (Satoh 2006b:6).
The conflicting interpretation also stems from the so-called “victor-victim” genres that
evolved in their nationalist historical narratives. While Gries attributes Chinese indignations
towards Japan to the emergence of a popular “victimisation narrative” “that blames “the
West”, including Japan, for China’s suffering”, besides the official Maoist “heroic” or “victor”
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national narrative (2005a:9), Fujiwara (2001),30 Miller (2002), Rozman (2002), and Kingston
(2004)31 see an enduring Japanese “victim consciousness” as justifying a “self-vindicating”,
revisionist history in Japan that contradicts Chinese interpretations. Indeed, He (2006)
identifies such “national mythmaking” triggered by domestic nationalist politics, as
fundamental to comprehending their current diplomatic problems. Specifically, she blames
“elite historical mythmaking” in both countries for the flourishing of “flagrantly nationalistic
historical myths”, which created divergent national memories that “perpetuated and
reinforced the problems of history” in Japanese-Chinese relations (2006:69). That said,
Seaton (2007) claims that despite the stereotypical images of Japanese in collective denial
over their war history, Japan’s war memories are not oxymoronic and dominated by the
narrow elite-led nationalist narrative, but are probably “the most contested memories of any
of the major WWII combatant nations.” However, “this perspective does not seem to matter
in China and Korea where the “orthodoxy” of an unrepentant Japan in denial goes
unchallenged” (quoted in Kingston 05/08/2007, see also Berger 2007; Hartley 2007).
There are also those who view different cultural responses to history as a basis to
understanding their divergent treatment of the past. Whereas it is the Chinese cultural norm
to reflect on history, Austin and Harris opine that the Japanese “cultural tradition of letting
bygones be bygones” (2001:61) makes them comparatively less receptive of the past.
Whiting similarly notes a “professed proclivity of the Japanese to live in the present with little
interest in the past, particularly if it reflects unfavourably on the nation” (1989:187 cf. Austin
and Harris 2001:61). Yang Daqing (2002:18-19) also shares the notion of cultural
differences in creating misunderstandings that exacerbate the history row between China
and Japan, such as those caused by their culturally rooted interpretations and usage of
lexicons/terms to describe sensitive events of their shared history.
30 For a detailed discussion of history and nationalism from the Japanese perspective, see Fujiwara (2001).
31 Kingston notes that “many Japanese may nurture a keen sense of victimization regarding the Pacific War that
baffles its Asian victims” (2004:231). Japan is thus “seen to be shirking the burden of its history to the extent
that it continues to embrace a self-vindicating narrative that casts the nation as victim and relegates competing
narratives to the margin” (Kingston 2004:250).
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Another closely related argument refers to changing mutual images and perceptions,
fuelled by growing fear/vulnerability, and the “superiority-inferiority” complexes inherent in
both nations. Aforementioned, Whiting (1989) links the shift in Japanese-Chinese ties during
the 1980s to changing Chinese images of Japan that was fuelled by nationalism-induced
historical memories of Japanese war exploits. Indeed, the correlations between nationalism,
and images and perceptions have become salient in shaping their post-Cold War
relationship. According to Rozman (2002), nationalist emotions in Japan and China, coupled
with a lack of political will from both sides to overcome mutual distrust, and contain the
intensity of public emotions, were responsible for the major deterioration in mutual images,
and the downturn in bilateral ties between 1989 and 2001. Sasada (2006) also relates the
rise of emotional, anti-Chinese nationalism in Japan, notably amongst youth to deteriorating
images and perceptions of China, which have been exacerbated by the “China threat
perception”, and the proliferation of nationalist narratives via various media sources (i.e.
manga, anime, internet, etc.), in light of the “conservatisation” of the Japanese media and
intelligentsia. Meanwhile, Yang Bojiang sees China and Japan as having both “superiority
and inferiority complexes” resulting from their “mixed histories of being the most powerful
East Asian countries and also being humiliated and marginalized” (2006:136), which makes
nationalism much more salient in Japanese-Chinese relations. The psychological-emotional
dimension that generates nationalist-flavoured sentiments of supremacy and fear, pride and
prejudice, and power competition in their bilateral interactions are likewise, argued in
Matthew (2003), Tamamoto (2003; 2004; 2005b), Tsunekawa (2006),32 and Hagstrom and
Lagerkvist (2006).
Undoubtedly, constructivism is feasible in explaining nationalism. In contrast to the
conventional IR approaches, which commonly ignore cultural-ideational and identity-related
variables, constructivism explicitly identifies them in formulating its analytical underpinnings.
Indeed, constructivism provides a useful platform for analysing nationalism in Japanese-
32 Tsunekawa contends that contemporary Japanese nationalism “is not an expression of aggressive
affirmativeness”, but rather “a defensive bluff” to offset the psychological vulnerability of Japanese weakness
and fear toward, among others, an increasingly assertive China (2006:2).
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Chinese ties that are significantly affected by history, culture, and identity-related issues.
However, limitations of the constructivist/Area-studies literature include their prevailing
tendencies of not incorporating explicit analytical frameworks to operationalise nationalism,
and in overstating the sui generis features of Japanese-Chinese relations and policy-
making. And, if mainstream IR studies marginalise cultural-ideational factors, i.e. nationalism
and identity, constructivism/Area-studies often exaggerate their importance, while failing to
adequately acknowledge the effects of the external environment and structural-material
variables on state behaviour/preferences.
2.4. Bridging the Divides: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective
In view of the highlighted limitations, this study advocates Neoclassical Realism (NCR),
which is hospitable to both mainstream and constructivist variables, as the central analytical
framework. Aforementioned, NCR’s “middle-ground” position of favouring domestic-
level/constructivist reasoning allows this thesis to problematise nationalism as a variable that
mediates the external environment and influences the domestic political process and
perceptions of Japanese policy-makers, which in turn, shape particular foreign policy
behaviour that either exacerbates, or alleviates bilateral problems vis-à-vis China.
NCR is a variant of IR realism that posits the role of domestic politics in international
relations and foreign policy analysis. Emerging in the 1990s, NCR has gained relative
grounds as a realist theory of foreign policy that generally shares the fundamental tenets of
the realist theoretical tradition, only to separate itself from its systemic-focused brethren by
explicitly underlining and theorising the “intervening” role of domestic variables in producing
foreign policy behaviour.33
Indeed, contemporary realists, i.e. Zakaria (1992); Desch (1998); Sterling-Folker
(1997); and Finel (2001/2); among others, have begun “paying more attention to interactions
between international and domestic politics”, and “integrating domestic political concerns
33 There are similarities between NCR and Stephen Brook’s “postclassical/defensive realism”. However, the
former can be distinguished by its explicit and deductive theorisation of domestic-level variables within its
analytical construct, as opposed to the ad-hoc application espoused by the latter (Gideon Rose 1998:150-151).
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into the realpolitik framework” (Sterling-Folker 1997:3) to enhance realism’s explanatory
power. Major neoclassical realist works (Gideon Rose 1998; Zakaria 1998; Taliaferro 2001;
2006; Schweller 2003; 2004; 2006; Cha 2000; Christensen 1996; 1999; Wohlforth 1993;
1995; and Nau 2003) all illustrate the significance of what Schweller deems as the “peculiar
domestic structures and political situations” of states as “intervening” variables that partially
affect their behaviour and response to the external environment (2004:164). Beginning with
the assumption that systemic and domestic-level theorising is potentially compatible,
neoclassical realists distance themselves from the orthodoxy of the Waltzian tradition that
invariably views realism as a priori “systemic theory, which is deductively inhospitable to
domestic-level theorizing” (Sterling-Folker 1997:3). According to Roth, neoclassical realists
reject neo-realism’s ultra-parsimonious “privileging of systemic-structural variables over
second-image factors–those at the level of individual state–and first-image variables–those
at the level of individual human beings” (2006:487).34 This means that NCR does not deny
the primacy of systemic-level analysis, but believes that unit-level impetuses are equally
responsible in affecting state interests/policy-choices, and thus ought to be incorporated to
account for actor behaviour in interstate relations. Unlike most structural-realists, NCR
adherents like Gideon Rose, contends that there is no such thing as a clear and automated
“transmission belt” that directly translates systemic imperatives into foreign policy outcomes
(1998:146-147; Schweller 2004:164; Taliaferro 2006:485). Instead, constraints/opportunities
offered by the international system are defined and translated through the complex domestic
political process that serves “to channel, mediate, and (re)direct policy outputs” (Schweller
2004:164) in response to such external forces.
In other words, neoclassical realists agree that the parameters of a state’s foreign
policy and external interests are driven primarily by systemic pressures, i.e. relative power
distribution of states within the international system (Gideon Rose 1998:146). However, the
definition and causality of such imperatives is “indirect and complex, because [they] must be
translated through intervening variables [such as state-elites] at the unit-level” (Gideon Rose
34 For a similar argument, see Gideon Rose (1998) and Thayer (2000).
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1998:146). More specifically, they argue that constraints and opportunities thrown up by the
anarchic international system are “murky and difficult” to interpret (Gideon Rose 1998:152),
and have to be filtered through the fuzzy and intersubjective prism of foreign policy-makers,
or state-elites involved in the decision-making process, before being translated into policy
outputs (Sterling-Folker 1997). State behaviour/actions are therefore, dependent on the
perception of those individuals, or groups involved in foreign policy-making regarding the
incentives/disincentives imposed by the international system, and their choosing of one
option over the others, in the foreign policy menu (Taliaferro 2006:485-486).35
Neoclassical realists have also earmarked other unit-level factors deemed important
to the domestic political process, which include bureaucratic and factional politics, public
opinion, media, political culture, and state institutions, among others (Sterling-Folker 1997:2;
Gideon Rose 1998; Roth 2006; Taliaferro 2006). From NCR’s perspective, these variables
have to be accounted for their role as arbitrators between the condition of the international
environment and state responses to it. They are treated as “intervening” variables that serve
to affect state ability to respond effectively to systemic pressures, such as to explain what
Desch opines as “the lag between structural change and alterations in state behaviour”, and
the “irrationality” of some states that fail “to adapt to the constraints of the international
system” (1998:166). The “intervening” role posited to domestic variables is based on the
conventional realist assumption that the level of pressure in the international system is
always high, or what is defined as “structurally determinate condition” (Desch 1998:169). As
such, states responses are expected to be primarily motivated by systemic pressure, and
failure to do so are mainly due to domestic-level “intervening factors” (Desch 1998).
However, some neoclassical realists suggest that domestic variables may have a
more “independent” impact on state behaviour, under specific structural conditions.
According to those who assume that the international system is not always a constant state
of malign power and security competition, domestic factors may be afforded “greater
35 According to Gideon Rose (1998:157-161), perception, notably that of political and foreign policy elites is
regarded by most neoclassical realists as an important domestic variable, with some making perceptual factors
central to their analytical framework. For similar views, see Schweller (2003:336-339)
55
independent explanatory power” (Desch 1998:169) on foreign policy-making, under
relatively benign/ambiguous external conditions (see also Sterling-Folker 1997:22; Schweller
2004; Taliaferro 2000/1).36 This means that domestic variables can intervene most saliently
under such conditions, during which they may even assume some independent functions.37
Here, the “independent” notion refers more to “flexibility” in effecting policy-variations, rather
than the propensity to “operate independently of structural variables in shaping states’
foreign policies” (Taliaferro 2006:486), since such independence is still dependent on
external-structural conditionalities. Generally, neoclassical realists share almost, if not
similar assumptions in describing the nature of the international environment and its impact
on actor behaviour/preferences, as well as the function of the domestic political process in
encouraging, or preventing actors from effectively recognising and addressing structural-
systemic imperatives.
2.5. A Neoclassical Realist Framework of Nationalism and State
Behaviour/Preferences
How nationalism/national identity as an “intervening” (with at times, “independent” function)
variable affects the foreign policy of nation-states, and how best can it be incorporated into
the NCR theoretical construct? NCR adherents have introduced domestic variables to
supplement foreign policy analysis. Perception of state-elites,38 bureaucratic/factional
politics, political culture, elite-mass linkage, and “strong state-weak state” dichotomy are,
considered variables that potentially influence foreign policy direction (Schweller 2003;
Taliaferro 2006). Notwithstanding the primacy of systemic imperatives in defining the
parameters in which foreign policy-choices are tailored, neoclassical realists argue that
these domestic determinants are important, and depending on the particular time and
36 According to Taliaferro (2000/1:132), NCR, like neo-realism can be separated into two different camps,
namely the “defensive” and “offensive” variants. Those making the above assumption are mainly “defensive-
neoclassical realists” (2000/1). Taliaferro suggests that the defensive variant of neo-realism (defensive-realism
or postclassical realism) and “defensive-NCR” are mutually complementary, as both share four auxiliary
assumptions, namely “(1) the security dilemma is an intractable feature of anarchy; (2) structural modifiers
influence the severity of the security dilemma in particular regions or between particular states; (3) material
power drives states’ foreign policies through the medium of leader’s calculations and perceptions; and (4)
domestic politics limits the efficiency of states’ responses to systemic imperatives” (2000/1:159).
37 I thank Prof. Christopher W. Hughes for clarifying and enlightening me on this mid-ground realist trait.
38 For a comprehensive analysis of perception and misperception in international politics, see Jervis (1976).
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situational contexts, may have the power to affect state interests and policy-preferences via
their “intervening” properties. According to Schweller, “Structural imperatives rarely…compel
leaders to adopt one policy over another”; rather, states respond to structural constraints
and opportunities “in ways determined by both internal and external considerations of policy
elites, who must reach consensus within an often decentralized and competitive political
process” (2004:164). This suggests that state responses to external pressures/incentives
“may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones” (Schweller 2004:164).
Guided by NCR’s dictum, this section aims to develop an analytical framework that
incorporates and explicates nationalism’s relationship with the said domestic variables,
along with its interactions with external determinants, to assess its salience vis-à-vis these
imperatives in shaping Japan’s post-Cold War relations with China.
The perceptions of decision-makers, or state-elites responsible for, and involved in
foreign policy-making are deemed crucial, and commonly utilised in NCR frameworks
(Wohlforth 1993; Christensen 1997; Zakaria 1998; Van Evera 1999), since systemic
pressures are assumed as having to be filtered through their “opaque” cognitive lenses
(Sterling-Folker 1997:19). Without a clear/direct link between system structure and actor
behaviour, the incentives/constraints imposed by the structural environment are at best,
vague/fuzzy, and have to be translated through the intersubjective understandings of “flesh
and blood officials” (Gideon Rose 1998:158). This implies the need to account for policy-
makers’ perception, and scrutinise how these actors actually comprehend international
pressures in particular situations, as it is such understandings that are then, causally
translated into foreign policy behaviours/outcomes (Gideon Rose 1998:157-158; Schweller
2003:336-337). According to Gideon Rose (1998), the introduction of perception as an
“intervening” variable marks a distinctive separation between hardcore structural-realists and
their neoclassical brethrens, the latter offering a theoretical bridge that makes them relatively
amenable to constructivists’ reasoning.39 It allows the theorisation of identity-related,
39 Without sacrificing the fundamental realist premises, namely the primacy of relative power and structural
constraints, NCR holds the “middle ground” between neo-realism and constructivism (Gideon Rose 1998:152),
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cultural-psychological factors, including nationalism that “may serve to exacerbate, or
mitigate the tendencies that are inherent in a system’s structure” (Friedberg 1993/4:11; cf.
Gideon Rose 1998:164), or more importantly, how they affect actors’ perceptions of “their
own and others’ capabilities, and how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy”
(Gideon Rose 1998:168).
Indeed, neoclassical realists have called for the explicit incorporation of socio-
psychological and cultural-ideational variables to elucidate how they inform state-
elites/decision-makers’ perceptions (see Gideon Rose 1998:168; Taliaferro 2000/1:161).
Nationalism is one such variable, insofar as it derives its political character, meanings, and
power from these elements. How then, does nationalism and national identity affect
perception? Perception is generally, understood as one’s intersubjective understandings of
an object, or situation that derive from his/her particular cognitive lenses (Jervis 1976).
These cognitive lenses are endowed by the socio-psychological, cultural and communicative
processes that one is subjected to in life, which help define one’s identity and interests, and
inform his/her choices of actions by “mediating the material world or structure” (Berger
2003:390). Nationalism, with its socio-psychological and cultural underpinnings, is one such
cognitive lens that serves to i) imbue individuals or groups within the modern political
community known as the nation with a collective identity, essentially defined as the “national
identity”;40 ii) shape their perceptions; iii) and inform their interests and preferences
(Guibernau 1996).41 Since national identity is defined in the context of the society of nation-
states, nationalism as its denominator essentially has direct causal effects on nation-state
perceptions regarding its place in the objective, material world, and its relationship with other
national actors (Guibernau 1996:73). These perceptions, shaped by socio-psychological,
cultural, and communicative processes like shared historical memories, education, media,
a position that offers greater explanatory power compared to the two extremes, insofar as the synthesis of
systemic-material and domestic-ideational factors makes NCR analysis more detailed, and non-exclusive.
40 Like individual identity, national identity is an interpretation of the “self” that establishes who, what and
where the nation is in social, psychological and political terms (Guibernau 1996:72; Hopf 1998:175).
41 According to Guibernau (1996:72-73), the identity of one “self” (the question of who, what and where am I)
is often defined in reference to the existence of the “other”, implying that identities exist only in societies. Thus,
national identities exist in the international society of nation-states, which define and organise them (Guibernau
1996:73). See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on nationalism and national identity.
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and pre-existing cultural and belief systems, among others, give meaning to, and drive the
forces of nationalism (Berger 2003; Guibernau 1996: Druckman 1994). Nationalism thus, not
only orientates the national consciousness, but also forges the perceptual lenses of both
government and people of a nation-state.
In the NCR construct, nationalism is affective on state perceptions via state-
elites/central decision-makers. That said, the perceptions of other elite and societal groups,
and the public are equally relevant in mediating the state’s policy-making process (Taliaferro
2006:485). For instance, in countries where factional politics is a dominant feature, rival elite
groups’ perceptions may at times, influence policy-choices. Likewise, the perceptions of
pressure groups and the masses, when translated into public opinions, can have a strong
policy-making impact, depending on the degree of elite-mass linkage (see Beasley et.al
2002). Specifically in foreign policy-making, nationalism can define central decision-makers’
perceptions by invoking friendly, or adversarial images of other countries, accentuating, or
reducing their mutual differences, not mentioning, promoting confidence, or scepticism of
their place vis-à-vis other states in the international system (Druckman 1994). Moreover, in
countries where the state is relatively susceptible to domestic politics and public opinion,
nationalist sentiments that drive the domestic political debate and public perceptions may
have a strong, albeit indirect arbitrary impact, insofar as they can pressure state-elites into
adopting particular foreign policies that may, or may not effectively address the
constraints/opportunities imposed by the international system. In interstate relations,
nationalism can widen, or bridge mutual perceptual divides, which may consequently
translate into either policy of appeasement, or confrontation (Van Evera 1994).
Indeed, nationalism is affective on domestic politics, i.e. moulding the domestic
political debate and influencing political competition, which may have bearing on a state’s
foreign/security policy-orientation. In countries where nationalist elements dominate the
political leadership and apparatus, the “national interests” tend to reflect their parochial
interests, and thus, the prevalence of policy-preferences geared towards realising nationalist
goals. Meanwhile, in countries where domestic power struggles between rival political
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parties/factions/bureaucracies/groups tend to affect governmental policy-making, nationalist
pressure (i.e. from rightwing parties/factions, conservative politicians, military hardliners,
etc.) can influence policy-decisions, and potentially undermine the pragmatic considerations
of state-elites, when managing “nationalist” issues. This is especially in cases where state-
elites are dependent on nationalist support to secure their domestic power position, which
makes them vulnerable to such pressure (Downs and Saunders 1998/9; Bong 2002).
Similarly, nationalism can be introduced in realist frameworks that draw attention to
“strong state-weak state” dichotomy, or domestic mobilisation theories in explaining foreign
policy-making. Both Zakaria (1998) and Christensen (1996) draw on the concepts of “state
power” and “national political power”, respectively, to emphasise the significance of
state/government ability to control and mobilise domestic resources (human and material), in
shaping their foreign/security policy initiatives. Such “powers”, according to them,
underscore the relative effectiveness of state-elites in making unilateral decisions and
dispensing strategies to meet international challenges or opportunities (cf. Gideon Rose
1998:160-164; Taliaferro 2006).
Nationalism, when viewed as a political instrument, certainly has an “intervening” role
insofar as it can be, and has been often utilised by state-elites for domestic mobilisation. Its
utility function, in Taliaferro’s opinion, is especially noticeable amongst “weak states”
(governments with limited powers of domestic extraction), where state-elites have greater
inclination towards manipulating nationalist sentiment to mobilise the political support of their
citizenries for the adoption of particular domestic, and/or external policy strategy (2006:488,
491-492). Conversely, domestic nationalist elements tend to stoke nationalism to undermine
the efforts of pragmatic, but “weak states” to mobilise national resources towards pragmatic
policy considerations (Downs and Saunders 1998/9).
Aforementioned, nationalism can equally affect foreign policy-making to varying
degrees, via non-governmental pressure groups and public opinion (Beasley et.al 2002).
Although nationalism is generally associated with the state, popular nationalism may feature
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prominently in the domestic nationalist discourse. Popular nationalism, in exerting its
influence through civil society channels can be a significant source of domestic political
pressure on foreign policy-making, especially if strong elite-mass linkage characterises a
state’s political system, and when state-elites’ domestic political resolve is dependent on
nationalist support/patronage. Simply put, nationalism has the propensity to not only shape
the perceptions, images and attitudes of state-elites, but also colour the domestic political
debate (moderate-pragmatists vs. ultra-rightist/revisionist), determine the adhesiveness/level
of elite-mass linkages, and affect state capacity to mobilise domestic resources for
national/foreign policies, among others.
In view of its encompassing effect, this thesis develops an NCR analytical construct,
with nationalism serving as a key variable possessing an “intervening” (with sometimes
“independent”) role that interacts with other unit-level and external factors to affect Japanese
state-elites’ policy-choices that either exacerbates, or mitigates the problems in Japanese-
Chinese relations. For a start, the basic NCR framework comprises two sets of interactive
variables (Diagram 1). Whereas external factors are primarily “independent” variables,
domestic determinants serve as “intervening” variables (with sometimes, independent
function) that mediate, and interact with the former, and with one another to produce
particular foreign policy-options, or the “dependent” variable. The external variables
identified for this study are the: 1) international security environment; 2) allied
resolve/commitment;42 3) diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis disputant-state; and 4)
interdependence (bilateral/multilateral), which ascertain the parameter of Japan’s China
policy-options. Meanwhile, the domestic variables include: 1) nationalism (state/popular
manifestations); 2) state institutions (strong/weak state); and 3) domestic politics (power
competition between elites/factions/parties/ bureaucracies). Specifically to this thesis,
nationalism is assumed to interact with these other determinants in affecting Japanese
state-elites’ perceptions/calculations of the external-domestic conditions, namely Japan’s
42 This variable draws ideas from, and is partially based on the concepts of “patron commitment” by Cha (2001)
and Davidson’s “balance of allied resolve” (2002), introduced in their respective NCR-oriented analysis. It
adopts their generally shared assumption that perceptions of favourable allied resolve/commitment would
encourage states to seek more self-serving external policy-goals (i.e. nationalist goals), and vice-versa.
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relative power position vis-à-vis China, and their domestic political resolve vis-à-vis
“nationalist” forces, which then define their specific policy-options, when dealing with the
Chinese over the case-studies.
Diagram 1
NCR Framework of Nationalism and State Behaviour/Preferences
EXTERNAL
(Independent Variable)
 International
Environment
 Alliance/Allied
Resolve
 Diplomatic
Leverage
 Interdependence
DOMESTIC
(Intervening Variable/
with sometimes
independent function)
 Nationalism
- State Nationalism
- Popular
Nationalism
 State Institutions
- Strong state
- Weak state
 Domestic Politics
FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOUR/OPTION
(Dependent Variable)
 Assertive/nationalist
- actual policy
- rhetorical policy
 Moderate/Conciliatory
 Non-action
Source: Partly adapted and modified from Taliaferro (2006:486)
This framework requires the Japanese “state”, or more specifically, “state-elites” be
made the primary agent, since they ultimately dispense the foreign policy-decisions. This
necessitates the task of identifying their political-ideological dispositions and affiliations, their
dependence on nationalism as a power instrument, their inclination towards nationalist, or
pragmatic external agenda, and their domestic political resolve vis-à-vis nationalist and
moderate elements to infer on nationalism’s salience in affecting their perception/calculation.
Also under scrutiny are other domestic agencies, namely the LDP and its coalition partners,
bureaucracy (MOFA, JDA/MOD, METI, etc.), political oppositions, and non-state actors (i.e.
media, intelligentsia, nationalist/pacifist pressure groups, zaikai, and public opinion). For
external agencies, the responses of the Chinese government and society, and the US’ role
(within the US-Japan alliance, and as a salient actor in the US-Japan-China “triangular”
relationship) are considered, together with other relevant contextual factors/actors in the
international environment that simultaneously affect Japanese foreign policy-making.
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Building on the modest framework, this section operationalises nationalism within an
interactive “macro-micro” model to explicate how, when, and under what condition, it
prevails in Japan’s China policy-making. NCR stresses that domestic influence on foreign
policy depends on the constraints/opportunities imposed by the international system. This is
coherent with the realist tradition’s basic assumption, which emphasises the primacy of
systemic imperatives in conditioning the environment in which nation-states function and
operate. Nonetheless, NCR goes further by assuming that the environment primarily serves
to limit, but not govern a state’s specific foreign policy-choices, leaving such processes to
domestic factors/actors, i.e. nationalism and state-elites’ perception/calculation (Sterling-
Folker 1997; Dessler 1989). When international pressures are low, or when the probability of
conflict is relatively obscure, NCR assumes that states can exercise a wider range of policy-
options, thus giving nationalism and other domestic factors a bigger impact on foreign
policy-making (Desch 1998). Under such conditions where domestic political bargaining
enjoys greater saliency in the decision-making process, nationalist pressures (i.e. nationalist
politicians, popular nationalist sentiments, etc.) may prevail and force, or even encourage
states to adopt nationalist over prudent foreign policy-options. Likewise, state-elites
fostering, or are dependent on nationalism for domestic political expediency, may allow it a
more affective role in engendering state behaviour, under a relatively low-pressure
international environment. Conversely, when external pressures are high, and the likelihood
of threat becomes imminent, state preferences are bound to be curtailed, thus reducing the
leverage of domestic imperatives on foreign policy-making (Desch 1998). This implies that
nationalist forces have lesser bargaining power in policy-making. Instead, state-elites as
“rational” actors are expected to respond to systemic imperatives, rather than domestic
nationalist pressures, or their nationalistic convictions, when determining policy-options.43
NCR, however, does not exclude the possibility of domestic attributes superseding
systemic imperatives even in times of tremendous structural constraints, since international
pressure does not directly translate into specific set of behaviour/preferences, but must be
43 This paragraph’s line of argument is developed based on the NCR-oriented works of Desch (1998); Taliaferro
(2001; 2006), and Sterling-Folker (1997).
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filtered through unit-level factors/actors, namely state-elites’ perceptions, which can
“intervene”, and cause states to act contrary to systemic imperatives.44 According to
Sterling-Folker, since state-elites perceive external pressures through the “prism” of their
own intersubjective processes, their evaluation of the situation may not be necessarily
objective. Even in the pursuit of survival, their efficiency in responding to those pressures
“remain grounded in the processes from which actor identities, interests and behaviours are
derived” (1997:22). This assumption grants nationalism an “intervening” role affecting state-
elites’ ability to dispense “rational” policy-options.45 In sum, NCR prescribes nationalism with
mostly “intervening” and, sometimes “independent” functions in foreign policy-making,
pending on prevailing external conditions. Nationalism serves mainly as an “intervening”
variable under structurally determinate conditions, whereas under a low-pressure, external
environment, it may develop concurrent independent functions in affecting actor
behaviour/preferences (Sterling-Folker 1997:22; Desch 1998:169).46
Superficially, NCR’s incorporation of external and domestic-level theorisation looks
similar to other middle-grounding frameworks deriving from both liberal and realist traditions.
However, Sterling-Folker argues that, unlike the liberal construct, both the systemic and the
domestic can be deductively incorporated, and “act as simultaneous independent variables
in the [neoclassical] realist argument” (1997:22). This is done by separating and juxtaposing
both contexts under the “environment-process” nexus, with the international system acting
44 This means that the international system imposes pressures on, and opportunities to the “self-help” units that
constitute it, but according to Waltz, it cannot determine “how effectively” these units (state actors) “will
respond to those pressures and possibilities” (1979:71).
45 According to Sterling-Folker, the domestic process, serving as an “opaque filter” through which assessments,
choices and judgements are being made regarding the international realm, would not only “inhibit actors from
objectively judging choices, behaviours and outcomes”, but could even act as “a barrier to their survival during
time of major external crisis” (1997:19-20).
46 Desch (1998) in his analysis of how cultural theories may supplement realist theorising, suggest the
possibility of domestic factors having a more independent role under specific structural conditions. According
to him, under a “structurally indeterminate” environment, where states have more policy-options and domestic
bargaining have greater leverage, domestic factors may have more independent impact on state behaviour/
preferences (1998:168-169). Conversely, under a “structurally determinate” environment, where a state has
limited policy-choices, and is expected to respond primarily to systemic-material imperatives, he asserts that
domestic factors has less independent impact on foreign policy-making, but may still act as “intervening”
variables that can limit the effectiveness of state responses towards the structural condition (1998:169). Desch,
nevertheless, contends that domestic factor is mostly an “intervening” variable in realist theories (1998:170).
This argument is also noted in Brooks’ assumption on domestic and non-realist variables shaping state
behaviour/preferences-of-action, under his “postclassical realist” construct (see Brooks 1997).
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as the anarchic “environment” that disposes a set of constraining conditions, while domestic
factors serve as the internal “process” through which systemic constraints are translated into
policy-outcomes (Sterling-Folker 1997:4-8; Taliaffero 2006:479-480; Dessler 1989).
Ontologically, this “environment-process” nexus separates NCR from the liberal-oriented
“two-level game” framework that incorporates both systemic and domestic as process-based
variables, which actually renders the latter deductively inconsistent and theoretically
inhospitable to domestic-level theorising (Sterling-Folker 1997:4).47 NCR also differs from
postclassical/defensive realism that purports to entertain domestic/unit-level analysis. Unlike
NCR, the latter variant is susceptible to charges of reductionism, “because its first-order
systemic argument does not account for much of the actual behaviour, thus forcing its
adherents to contract out the bulk of their explanatory work to domestic-level variables
introduced on an ad-hoc basis” (Gideon Rose 1998:150-151). Last, but not least, NCR
needs to be differentiated from analytical eclecticism (Katzenstein 2008; Katzenstein and
Okawara 2001), despite their convergence on the importance of adopting a holistic
approach that derives analytical tools from other theoretical traditions to comprehensively
explain state behaviour and international outcomes. Unlike neoclassical realists, whose
basic theoretical assumptions/arguments derived from IR realism, which explain their
advocacy for the primacy of power politics and first-order systemic/external explanation,
while not discounting other levels and types of variables of analysis, proponents of analytical
eclecticism do not favour specific research traditions, but rather, draw selectively elements
from multiple theoretical paradigms to generate their explanations. In doing so, they also
totally eschew parsimony, in preference for a non-“method-driven” analysis (see Katzenstein
2008), which inevitably leads to an absence of clear, systematic analytical frameworks to
produce theoretically informed understandings of foreign policy and interstate relations.
Such differences, and its incompatibility with this thesis’ research objectives (i.e. to provide a
systematic analysis via a discernible analytical construct, and to enhance IR realism’s
47 According to Sterling-Folker, since realism is essentially an environment-based theory, while liberalism
claims to be a process-based theory, the incorporation of domestic factors as process-based variables by the
former is deductively consistent compared to the latter (1997:4-5). The ontological nuance makes this thesis’
framework theoretically different from previous works like those of Bong (2002) and Chung (2004) that employ
the liberal-oriented “two-level-game” or other mid-range constructs.
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explanatory power and relevance), are the reasons why NCR is chosen ahead of analytical
eclecticism, as the central analytical framework for this study.
Diagram 2
NCR MODEL OF NATIONALISM AND STATE BEHAVIOUR/PREFERENCES48
Y
favourable
C B
Assertive-Nationalist FP Freedom/flexibility of FP Choices
(actual policy)
X
Unfavourable favourable
D A
Non-action Moderate-Conciliatory FP
(cloaked in Nationalist FP rhetoric) (actual policy)
unfavourable
X = Domestic Political Resolve (vis-à-vis domestic nationalist pressure)
Y = Relative Power Position (vis-à-vis disputant-state/China)
Based on the stipulated assumptions, a modest NCR model can be generated by
juxtaposing the external (independent) and the domestic (intervening/independent) variables
in two separate axes, to represent their interactions, which produce foreign policy-outcomes
(dependent variable). Represented in Diagram 2, the external variables identified earlier are
incorporated into the model to measure Japan’s relative power position vis-à-vis the
disputant-state, China (as perceived by state-elites), along the Y-axis. Meanwhile,
nationalism is factored with other domestic determinants, to measure the domestic political
resolve of state-elites, specifically against nationalist pressure, along the X-axis.
Independently, both axes provide a measure of state-elites perception/calculation in terms of
the degree to which they feel confident, or vulnerable against the pressure imposed by the
respective set of variables, based on a “favourable-to-unfavourable” continuum. Ceteris
48 This NCR Model draws the basic idea of the “X-Y-axes” modelling from Nau (2003).
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paribus, each axis generates its respective hypothesis on the expected Japanese
behaviour/policy-option: (H1) by the Y-axis, and (H2), the X-axis. Essentially, the
juxtaposition of X- and Y-axes would yield four more sub-hypotheses (H3-H6) representing
the likely foreign policy-options under specific external-internal conditions and time context
(marked by Quadrant A to D; see also Table 2).49
Table 2
NCR HYPOTHESES ON STATE BEHAVIOUR/PREFERENCES
HYPOTHESIS/
(QUADRANT)
EXTERNAL-DOMESTIC CONDITIONS AND
EXPECTED FOREIGN POLICY-OPTIONS
H1 When the relative power position vis-à-vis the disputant-state is decisively/
determinately favourable (strategic environment + allied resolve + diplomatic
leverage + interdependence), a state tends to adopt assertive-nationalist
foreign policies (domestic-ideational factors gain FP salience under low-
pressure external-structural environment, hence the opportunity for state-elites
to advance state/popular nationalist agendas to realise personal nationalist
convictions and/or political expedience). Conversely, maintaining a moderate-
conciliatory/non-action policy is the likelihood, when a state faces unfavourable
relative power position (state-elites expected to respond to external-structural
constraints and suppress domestic-ideational goals).
H2 State-elites suffering from a decisively unfavourable domestic political resolve
(vis-à-vis nationalist pressure), ceteris paribus, are compelled to adopt
assertive-nationalist policies, when managing sensitive bilateral issues.
Conversely, moderate-conciliatory policies are likely, when they enjoy
favourable domestic political resolve (vis-à-vis nationalist pressure).
H3 (A) When state-elites perceive a determinately unfavourable relative power
position vis-à-vis the disputant-state, but enjoy favourable domestic political
resolve, the tendency is to adopt moderate-conciliatory policies.
H4 (B) When the state encounters an advantageous relative power position vis-à-vis
the disputant-state, and the domestic political resolve of state-elites is
favourable, they will enjoy flexibility/freedom in terms of policy-choices.
H5 (C) State-elites perceiving a favourable relative power position vis-à-vis the
disputant-states, but feeling vulnerable towards domestic nationalist pressure,
may be inclined towards assertive-nationalist foreign policy-option.
H6 (D) State-elites perceiving their state’s relative power position and domestic
political resolve to be decisively disadvantageous are constrained to opt for
non-action, cloaked in nationalist rhetoric/symbolic gesture, as a means to
circumvent the problem of contradictory foreign policy-goals posited by the
international environment and domestic processes (external pressure
supersedes domestic constraints).
Sources: Adapted and modified from Bong (2002:20-23); Davidson (2002); Downs and Saunders
(1998/9).
49 The hypotheses H1-H6 are adapted and modified from Bong (2002:18, 20-23), Davidson (2002) and Downs
and Saunders (1998/9). Comparable hypotheses and models are found in other “mid-range” theoretical
conceptualisations. See Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989), Cha (2000), and Nau (2003), among others.
What differentiates this thesis’ NCR-based hypotheses with the “two-level-game” or, other mid-range
hypotheses adopted by the likes of Bong (2002) and Downs and Saunders (1998/9), are theoretical nuances like:
i) its espousal of the primacy of external factors; ii) nationalism’s “intervening” role on state-elites’
intersubjective perception of the external-domestic conditions; iii) auxiliary assumptions regarding the potential
irrationality of state behaviour, iv) ontological positioning of the “external” as environment rather than process-
based variables; and v) conceptualisation of analytical framework.
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These policy-options (H3-H6) are primarily, hypothesised on the condition of the respective
external-internal domains being either determinately favourable, or otherwise. In the event
where state-elites face an ambiguous domestic political resolve, NCR’s first-order systemic
argument assumes that the preferred policy-option would largely depend on the perceived
relative power position vis-à-vis the disputant-state. Conversely, an ambiguous relative
power position would make a combination of assertive-cum-conciliatory measures the
favoured policy-option, irrespective of the prevailing domestic condition (Table 3).
Table 3
Expected State Behaviour/Preferences-of-action
Relative Power Position
(vis-à-vis disputant-state)
Domestic
Political Resolve
(vis-à-vis nationalist pressure)
Favourable
(H1)
Ambiguous Unfavourable
(H1)
Favourable (H2) Flexible policy-option
(H4) (Quadrant B)
Assertive-cum-
conciliatory policy-
options (btwn. A & B)
Moderate-conciliatory
policy-option (H3)
(Quadrant A)
Ambiguous Assertive-nationalist
policy-options (btwn B
& C)
Assertive-cum-
conciliatory policy-
options
Moderate-conciliatory
policy-options (btwn.
A & D)
Unfavourable (H2) Assertive-nationalist
policy-option (H5)
(Quadrant C)
Assertive-cum-
conciliatory policy-
options (btwn. C & D)
Non-action (H6)
(Quadrant D)
By problematising nationalism, which under specific international and domestic
conditions, can cause variations in state behaviour/policy-options, this NCR model enables
its impact to be systematically assessed, and helps explicate the conditions in which it does,
or does not prevail in Japanese (or Chinese) policy-making, when managing their bilateral
affairs. More significantly, it can contribute to a better understanding of other dynamics
involved, while simultaneously answering questions on nationalism’s role in Japanese-
Chinese ties that traditional IR theories and constructivism have not adequately explained.
2.6. Conclusion
There are contending approaches and theoretical constructs to explaining Japanese-
Chinese relations, generally, and assessing nationalism’s role in the bilateral ties,
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specifically. Notwithstanding their respective explanatory power, “standard” theoretical
approaches, from mainstream IR realism and liberalism, to constructivism/Area-studies tend
to be ill equipped in comprehensively addressing the subject. The “analytical myopia”
reflects their rigid analytical confines and limited tools, which lead to their respective over-
emphasis on, and/or marginalisation of particular “level-of-analysis” and “type-of-variables”.
In view of such limitations, this chapter proposes an NCR-oriented analytical framework to
provide a better understanding of nationalism’s role in Japan’s China policy. The
operationalisation of nationalism in the NCR model can help realise the research objective of
making a modest contribution to theory-building, specifically in enhancing IR realism’s
explication of nationalism in Japanese-Chinese relations. Indeed, NCR’s underpinnings, as
opposed to those of neo-realism, allow a degree of reciprocity with respect to non-realist/
constructivist assumptions, which enhances realism’s explanatory power of nationalism/
identity in the study of contemporary international relations. Although, neoclassical realists
may be criticised by their hardcore brethrens and non-realist exponents for failing to defend
the tradition and integrity of IR realism (e.g. Legro and Moravcsik 1999),50 many
contemporary realists are contend to viewing such a reconstruction as necessary to
enhance the “progressive power of realism” (Walt 1997; Schweller 2003). What NCR offers
is a level of flexibility not found in the narrow premises of the Waltzian construct, which
opens the path for a deductive engagement with constructivism-inspired approaches, and a
step towards alleviating some of the “enduring dilemmas” of IR realism (Guzzini 2004:558).
The NCR model of nationalism and state behaviour/preferences is operationalised in
Chapter 6 and 7, to assess nationalism’s salience in affecting Japan’s policy-options in the
bilateral disputes over Yasukuni and the ECS. Preceding them are chapters that analyse the
background of Japan-China ties, and Japanese nationalism and foreign/China policy-
making.
50 In fact, the “theoretical degeneration” critique of realism, and especially NCR by Legro and Moravscik
(1999) was, according to neoclassical realists, due to their misintepretation of the realist canon, and overly rigid
definition/labelling of IR realism, and preoccupation with “paradigmatism” (Feaver 2000). For a defence of
NCR and realism, and comprehensive response to the critique, see Feaver et.al. (2000), especially the
correspondence by Schweller, Taliaferro, and Wohlforth. See also Schweller (2003).
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CHAPTER THREE
THE TRENDS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND DYNAMICS OF
JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS
The decline in recent Japanese-Chinese relations is hardly surprising, considering their
historically tainted and hostile bilateral interactions throughout Asia’s modern history.
Japan’s imperialistic transgression on Chinese soil during two Japanese-Chinese wars that
lasted until the end of World War II (WWII), have evidently set in motion and shaped the
problematic trends of their bilateral exchanges, thereafter. Although formal diplomatic ties
resumed in 1972, and a progressive relationship ensued under the so-called “peace-and-
friendship” framework, it has remained fragile, to date, and yet to mature into one based on
mutual trust and genuine amity. Instead, historical excesses continue to haunt the
governments and peoples of both countries, occasionally stifling, and threatening to haul
their contemporary relationship “back to the future”.1 Interpreting from a neoclassical realist
perspective, the following is an overview of the trends and developments, and the external
and domestic dynamics (identified in the NCR framework) that shape the bilateral ties
throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.
3.1. Bilateral Relations during the Cold War: From Confrontation to Normalisation
Japanese-Chinese relations were largely adversarial during the Cold War, imposed mostly
by ideological division, and leanings on confrontational blocs that epitomised the rigid bipolar
security order in East Asia. The physical and emotional-psychological “wound” from the
second Japanese-Chinese war also made the Chinese Communist regime, whose
legitimacy derived from its anti-Japanese resistance and heroics, cautious of postwar Japan.
Since 1950, China had sought to align with the Soviet Union, following the US containment
policy and threatening encroachment of its borders.2 Conversely, the Cold War’s advent saw
Japan’s postwar position strategically transformed from being an American-occupied
1 Used by Mearsheimer (1990a) to describe the reversion of the post-Cold War European system to its past
system of multipolarity, prior to the WWII, this phrase is adapted here to describe the possibility of Japanese-
Chinese relations returning to its past confrontational posture.
2 The conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on 14 February 1950,
incorporated the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the Soviet alliance framework, placing it in direct
confrontation with the US and its allies, including Japan (see Bedeski 1983; Yahuda 1996).
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territory to becoming Washington’s “junior partner” in the strategic calculus against the
broadening Communist “sphere-of-influence”. The “policy-reversal” saw Japan absorbed into
the US-led alliance framework, via the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty. Correspondingly, its
China policy was subordinated to the Cold War “alliance logic”, placing the Japanese directly
in confrontation with their Chinese neighbour (Zhao 1997:98-100).
The overarching alliance framework resulted in the absence of official diplomatic
relations. However, it did not prevent both countries from maintaining unofficial economic
ties, where bilateral trade proceeded, albeit at minimal proportion (Zhang 1998:57; Taylor
1996:3; Burns 2000:38).3 Japan, led by the “pragmatic” Yoshida administration, was
reluctant to adopt an overtly confrontational posture, and thus, did not sever all channels of
interaction with China (Iriye 1996:48). Beijing also sought to maintain unofficial interactions
via “people’s diplomacy”, or “cultural diplomacy” aimed as much at wooing the Japanese
citizenries, as a strategy to detach Japan from its American ally (Jain 1977:8; Caroline Rose
1998:43).4 The pragmatism demonstrated by both governments propelled an expansion of
non-governmental exchanges, and the conclusion of several joint statements and private
trade agreements in the 1950s saw a gradual increase in Japanese-Chinese commercial
relations (Jain 1977:Chp.2-3).5 The 1962 semi-formal “Liao-Takasaki” trade system,
designed explicitly to help expand overall bilateral ties, with a view of ultimately realising
diplomatic normalisation (Burns 2000:39), also led to both sides enjoying a relatively
congenial relationship, despite being technically at war (Taylor 1996:3; Iriye 1996:54).6
3 In 1950, unofficial bilateral trade amounted to less than USD60 million, comprising mostly Chinese soybeans,
salt, coal and iron exports to Japan, and Japanese exports of textile machinery, steel, engines, and pumps to
China (Burns 2000:38; Taylor 1996:3; Zhang 1998:57).
4 Beijing adopted this grassroots-level diplomacy to foster “good-neighbourly” relations between the two
citizenries via the promotion of cultural and economic exchanges (Jain 1977:8; Chp.2). According to Caroline
Rose, it was a “charm-offensive” strategy implemented to inculcate “a large body of pubic opinion in Japan
favourable to the PRC that would put pressure on the government to normalise relations with China” (1998:43).
5 More than thirty non-governmental agreements and joint statements were concluded between the various
socio-economic groupings of China and Japan at the height of the “peoples’ diplomacy” period between 1953
and 1957, on areas of trade, fishery, cultural and scientific exchanges, as well as repatriation of Japanese
nationals and war criminals (Jain 1977:8-9; 1981:11-12; Caroline Rose 1998:43-44)
6 The “L-T trade agreement” represented Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, the names of the two
“semi-formal” representatives used to facilitate bilateral trade (Iriye 1996:54). According to Caroline Rose, this
“friendly trade” system was limited to Japanese companies designated as “China-friendly”, specifically, those
permitted to trade with China via their acceptance of the preconditions set forth by the Chinese government. It
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That said, the “unofficial” ties were intermittently undermined by developments in
their respective domestic politics. For instance, most observers consider the 1958 “Nagasaki
flag incident”7, where China temporarily suspended relations with Japan, to be Beijing’s
pretext to display its discontentment over the reluctance of successive pro-US and pro-
Taiwan administrations led by Hatoyama and Kishi to reciprocate Chinese efforts to
enhance unofficial relations (Lee 1976:38; 1984:3; Burns 2000:38).8 Similarly, bilateral
tension rose in the 1960s following the arrival of the Sato administration, whose purported
“anti-China” stance, and overt leanings on Taiwan and the US incensed Beijing (Jain
1981:54-56; Caroline Rose 1998:47-48),9 exacerbating an already delicate political situation
stirred by earlier Chinese provocations, i.e. nuclear test, and participation in the Vietnam
War that drew strong Japanese criticisms. Japanese-Chinese ties also suffered during the
Cultural Revolution. Political friction ratcheted up to extreme levels, while trade activities
were stifled by China’s “inward-looking” policy of self-sufficiency and overwhelming
ideological considerations (Iriye 1996:55), not mentioning, the escalation of anti-Japanese
rhetoric, and pressure on Japanese companies to meet Chinese political demands (Caroline
Rose 1998:47; Lee 1984:7).10
was, as Rose’s asserted, “semi-official, long-term”, and based on fixed volumes of annual bilateral transactions,
“negotiated collectively by representatives of Japanese companies and Liao’s liaison office” (1998:47).
7 The incident took place in May 1958, where a Japanese youth tore down a Chinese flag at a Chinese stamp
exhibition held in a shop in Nagasaki (Caroline Rose 1998:44-45; see also Jain 1977:38).
8 Beijing’s displeasure towards Tokyo began to mount by mid-1950s, when the Hatoyama administration, under
pressure from Washington, failed to response to persistent calls for the establishment of a Chinese resident trade
mission in Tokyo, as stipulated in their first two unofficial trade agreements (Burns 2000:38; see also Lee
1984:3). The arrival of the “pro-Taipei” Japanese premier and ex-member of the Tojo war cabinet, Kishi
Nobusuke, caused further deterioration with his Taiwan visit, and efforts to remilitarise Japan under the
proposed revision of the US-Japan security treaty. Although the Kishi government initially supported the
provisions granting semi-diplomatic status to Chinese trade officials, and the establishment of the resident trade
mission under the fourth private trade agreement, it consequently rescinded these privileges following pressures
from Washington and Taipei, much to Beijing’s disappointment (Burns 2000:38; Jain 1977:36-39).
9 PM Sato Eisaku’s state visits to Taipei and Washington in 1967 and 1969, respectively, and his explicit pro-
Taiwan declarations, and commitment towards the US-Japan security arrangement, which included implicitly
guaranteeing Taiwan’s security, were perceived by Beijing as a sign of Japan’s support for a “Two-China
policy”(Caroline Rose 1998:48). Together with the renewal of the US-Japan security treaty in 1970, these
policies were seen as an affront, and a revival of Japanese militarism under American patronage, as well as
imminent steps towards establishing a military alliance, aimed principally at suppressing China (Lee 1976:86).
10 According to Lee, Japanese firms and trade negotiators were required to express unequivocal support for the
Cultural Revolution, by participating in mass demonstrations or attending political lectures, and issuing joint
political statements that favour enhanced relations between China and Japan, in return for improved trade deals
(1984:7; see also Caroline Rose 1998:47).
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Japanese-Chinese diplomacy unravelled during the late 1960s as profound
developments in the PRC’s “strategic-triangle” relationship with the two superpowers saw it
distancing from the Soviet Union towards a confluence of strategic interests with the US
(see Breslin 2000:Chp.6). Beginning with Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic overtures to Beijing in
1971, Sino-US rapprochement led to China rejoining the international community as a full-
fledged UN member-state, before culminating in President Nixon’s visit in February 1972
(Yahuda 1996:80). Japan was caught off-guarded by the dramatic shift in Sino-US relations,
and the “Nixon Shock” (Zhao 1997:133), but convergence of economic, and increasingly,
security interests over a growing Soviet threat enabled Tokyo to rapidly respond to the shift
in Western attitudes to normalise relations with Beijing (Austin and Harris 2001:16).11
Without the structural constraint, Japan and China formally established diplomatic ties in
September 1972. Obviously, the “normalisation” would have had been impossible without
Washington’s consent (Kokubun 2001:10), as Tokyo had always subordinated and
callibrated its China policy with its senior partner’s grand strategy. It would also be
unfeasible without Chinese forbearance of the US-Japan alliance, which they previously
perceived as threatening, but had since, appreciated its significance in constraining Soviet
expansionism and underpinning East Asia’s strategic stability (Yahuda 1996:84).
That said, domestic developments also laid the groundwork for a smooth
normalisation process. Besides earlier efforts to maintain unofficial economic relations as a
harbinger towards eventual diplomatic ties, the ebbing of the Cultural Revolution and
emergence of a more pragmatic Chinese and Japanese leadership provided an environment
conducive for doing so (Burns 2000:40). Particularly, the arrival of a powerful “pro-China”
Japanese administration under Tanaka Kakuei (Schlesinger 1999), whose diplomatic
initiatives and skillful negotiations over problematic bilateral issues, ranging from Taiwan and
Senkaku/Diaoyudao, to war reparations, facilitated the swift establishment of diplomatic
11 Ijiri opines that the shift in Japan’s China policy after the “Nixon shocks”and China’s entry into the UN were,
based on “a great deal of flexibility and dynamic situational adaptability”(1996:63).
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relations with Beijing, besides strong encouragement from the zaikai, media, and opposition
parties (Burns 2000:40; Lee 1976:10; Fukui 1977b; Drifte 2003:22-23).12
Japanese-Chinese relations further strengthened following the signing of the 1978
Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT). Preceding it were twelve other practical agreements
covering various aspects of their engagement,13 including the Long Term Trade Agreement
(LTTA),14 which established the legal framework for a progressive bilateral relationship,
under the “peace-and-friendship” slogan (Kokubun 2001:11-12). Although these earlier
accords catapulted economic relations to new heights,15 overall interactions remained
limited primarily to bilateral matters, and conducted almost entirely via government-to-
government initiatives (Kokubun 2001:11). It was the PFT, which reconstituted Japanese-
Chinese relations at the heart of East Asian international politics, especially with their tacit
recognition of the Soviet “threat”, and de facto “strategic alliance” with the US, to contain its
expansionism (Yahuda 1996:85; Bedeski 1983). That said, the process towards concluding
the PFT had its share of obstacles, characterised by protracted negotiations over the
inclusion of the “anti-hegemony clause”, and the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute (Mochizuki
2007:232-233).16 Ultimately, both governments’ pragmatic resolve facilitated the process,
opening a new chapter in Japanese-Chinese ties.
12 According to Burns, while agreeing to the “One-China” policy, Tanaka was able to secure Chinese
acquiescence over Japan’s intention to maintain non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan via trade offices that
double-up as de facto political representatives, in an arrangement similar to that of the Japanese-Chinese “pre-
normalisation” framework (2000:40). Both sides also agreed to shelve their territorial dispute over Senkaku/
Diaoyudao, and China, on its part, agreed to renounce war reparations claims worth around USD50 billion (Lee
1976:10 cf. Yahuda 1996:84). Fukui (1977b:98) credits the swift normalisation to ““critical” decisionmaking”
in response to growing pressure from Japan’s opposition parties, zaikai, and media for an early Japanese-
Chinese rapprochement, while Drifte (2003:23-24) credits the role of “strong political leadership in Japan”.
13 For the list of agreements, refer to Zhao (1993:119).
14 Concluded on 16 February 1978, the LTTA was designed to facilitate economic complementarities and
address bilateral trade issues between the two economies. More importantly, specific provisions under this
accord linked bilateral economic relations to their respective domestic/national economic interests, making
economic interdependence a fulcrum in advancing overall bilateral ties (Zhang 1998:66-68; 2000:51-53).
15 Bilateral trade jumped several folds within the first few years of diplomatic normalisation, with Japan
emerging as China’s largest trading partner (Iriye 1992:127; Zhang 1998:62; Burns 2000:41).
16 Japan’s initial reluctance to conclude the PFT was due to concerns over the controversial “anti-hegemony
clause” that could antagonise the USSR, and its desire to maintain an “equidistant” policy with all neighbours,
including the communist superpower (Bedeski 1983). Also, the indecision in resolving the Senkaku/Diaoyudao
dispute during the 1972 joint communique saw its untimely resurfacing as a problematic issue that delayed the
PFT negotiations. However, besides shelving the territorial dispute, Japan’s acceptance of, and China’s
reciprocal decision to include a “disclaimer” to neutralise the implication of the contentious clause, exemplified
both sides’ pragmatism to realise a progressive relationship (Bedeski 1983:31-32; Zhao 1997).
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Indeed, bilateral relations have flourished since 1978, underpinned by burgeoning
economic interactions throughout the 1980s. The PFT, which coincided with the launching of
China’s economic modernisation programmes, facilitated a rush of Japanese firms into the
Chinese market and the establishment of joint industrial plant projects during the so-called
second “China Boom” period (Kokubun 2003:32). Most conspicuous was the financing of the
Baoshan Iron and Steel by Nippon Steel Corporation, a product of intergovernmental
initiative that became “the flagship symbol of friendship between the two countries”
(Kokubun 2003:33; 1986). The Japanese business community’s enthusiasm, were however,
short-lived, when Chinese firms started revoking their contracts following structural problems
in the domestic economy that necessitated the implementation of an “adjustment” policy
(Howe 1996:111; Takagi 1999:20-21).17 Japan was thus compelled to offer China ODA
loans to help salvage these projects and alleviate the bilateral dilemma (Kokubun 2003:33;
Whiting 1989:97).
The “Baoshan” setback proved temporary as structural reforms and excess demands
in China during the mid-1980s rejuvenated bilateral economic interactions (Howe 1996:111-
112). Especially, the decentralisation and “marketisation” of the Chinese political economy
saw market-driven decisions gradually replacing elite-inspired, intergovernmental initiatives,
a new trade pattern that greatly facilitated the expansion of economic ties (Howe 1996:15;
Zhang 2000:53-68). By the latter half of 1980s, more Japanese businesses began investing
and moving their production facilities to China in search of cheap labour, amid the sharp rise
of the Japanese yen, and their desire to access the Chinese consumer market. Although the
overall amount was insignificant throughout the 1980s, constituting less than 1% of Japan’s
annual global FDI figures,18 Japanese investment started soaring following the signing of the
17 Ijiri opines that the “Baoshan” issue reflected the zaikai’s failure to thoroughly consider the fundamental
differences, and realities of China’s political and economic systems, before rushing into the Chinese market
(1996:64). The “Baoshan shock”, according to Caroline Rose, precipitated “cancellations and postponements”
of other joint projects, between 1980-1981, bringing “disillusionment and bitterness…amongst the Japanese
business community” (1998:53), as well as temporary negative repercussions to their budding economic
relations (1998:54). For a detailed analysis on the “Baoshan shock”, see Kokubun (1986).
18 Chinese statistics recorded only 27 cases of Japanese direct investments, amounting to USD950 million,
between 1979 and 1983 (Kokubun 2003:36). Japanese FDI began to increase between 1984 and 1987, in a
period that coincided with amicable developments in Japanese-Chinese political relations.
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1988 Investment Protection Pact, and Deng Xiaoping’s symbolic “southern tour” in 1992,
which affirmed China’s commitment towards economic liberalisation/reforms (Austin and
Harris 2001:207, 209-211, 226).
Equally boosting the bilateral relationship was the generous amount of Japanese aid
to China. Beginning with the first package in December 1979, Japanese ODA19 has become
a symbol of Japan-China “friendship” ties (Burns 2000:45; Takamine 2005). Not only was
Japan the pioneering distributor of ODA to China, it also became the single largest provider
of bilateral loans to the Chinese, through four major assistance packages amounting to more
than USD13 billion (Burns 2000:45; Mori 2007:30-32).20 China emerged as the largest
recipient in 1987, and remained amongst the leading destinations of Japanese ODA
throughout the 1990s (Wakisaka 1998:117; Soderberg 2002:120; Mori 2007:31). Likewise,
bilateral trade grew exponentially, especially with the opening of China’s coastal provinces
to international trade in the 1980s. Geographical proximity and mutual trade
complementarities saw two-way trade figures surpassing USD19 billion in 1988 from just
over USD5 billion, a decade before (Taylor 1996:124; Takagi 1995:99). The flourishing trade
ties especially benefited Japan, which gained annual trade surpluses throughout the 1980s
as Japanese goods dominated the Chinese market, prompting discontentment and concerns
over a “second [Japanese] invasion” (Wilson 1985:143-144).21 Nonetheless, the
diversification of China’s foreign economic relations (Burns 2000:43), and gradual
transformation of its trade composition saw the surplus pattern swinging in its favour in
1988, and Japanese trade deficit has since become an annual trend in their bilateral trade
statistics (Zhang 2000:53-68). By the early 1990s, Japan became China’s largest trading
partner, while the Chinese rose steadily in the Japanese list of largest trading nations
(Taylor 1996:122), epitomising their deepening economic interdependence.
19 Japan’s ODA to China comprises yen loans, technical cooperation, and grant aid/assistance. For a record
between 1980-2004, see MOFA (2006:41). For more specific discussions about Japanese ODA to China as a
foreign policy tool, see Iokibe (2003), Drifte (2003:136-137), and Takamine (2006).
20 Between 1979-1999, Japan provided 41.91% of the total major foreign government loans to China, making it
by far the largest contributor, followed by Germany with merely 9.86% (Lin 2003:381 cf. Mori 2007:32).
21 See Austin and Harris (2001:256), for the use of a similar term.
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Japan was also at the forefront promoting China’s integration into the international
community. Besides helping China attain “developing country” status in the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to facilitate ODA disbursement, Japan
proactively supported Chinese membership in international institutions, from the World
Bank, to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and also admission into regional multilateral
fora, like the APEC in 1991 (Deng 1997:375, 383; Burns 2000:48). Tokyo also played a key
role persuading other Group-of-Seven (G-7) member-states to lift their economic sanctions
on China, not long after the 1989 Tiananmen incident (Whiting 1992:46).
Similarly, mutual dependence has deepened via significant increases in grassroots-
level exchanges. From tourists and students, to industrial and business personnel, the
number of Japanese entering China multiplied from 54,000 in 1979 to approximately 1.47
million in 2000 (Kokubun 2006:27). Reciprocally, Chinese entering Japan rose
unprecedently since the 1980s, besides the influx of illegal entrants (Kokubun 2006:27).
Beginning in 1982, the “twin/sister-cities” concept was introduced to commemorate the 10th
anniversary of diplomatic normalisation (Caroline Rose 1998:55), and this has since,
become a common practice in promoting greater socio-cultural exchanges. Favourable
mutual societal images, reflected in public surveys also depicted the generally amiable
mood. Japanese affections towards the Chinese peaked at 78.6% in 1980, based on the
annual PMO opinion poll, and the affinity ratings remained high throughout the decade,
hovering between the upper 60% to lower 70% range (Kokubun 2001:9; see Figure 1).
On the diplomatic front, Japanese-Chinese ties recorded remarkable progress. The
upbeat political climate was typified by the numerous high-ranking exchanges under the
“Japan-China friendship” banner,22 making 1980s as amongst the most conducive and
friendly period (Takagi 1999). In May 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang traveled to Japan
to commemorate the 10th anniversary of normalisation. Japan reciprocated with a visit in
September by PM Suzuki Zenko. The CCP Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Tokyo the
22 This maxim to describe the nature of Sino-Japanese ties is used in Kokubun (2001; 2003), and found in other
works by both Japanese and Chinese scholars.
77
following year, and this was ensued by official callings from the new Japanese premier,
Nakasone Yasuhiro, in 1984 and 1986. The amicable atmosphere continued with visits by
Nakasone’s successor, Takeshita Noburo and Chinese Premier Li Peng, in August 1988
and April 1989, respectively.23 These state visits were usually, accompanied by new
concepts to enhance overall bilateral ties, and, on Japan’s part, economic incentives and
loan/investment packages to cajole the Chinese (Deng 1997).
The bilateral relationship had its share of problems, the superficially positive trend
notwithstanding. Specifically, unresolved “history” problems and rising nationalism in Japan
during the 1980s saw the Chinese dampening diplomatic relations temporarily, only to
resume after obtaining Japanese concessions on negotiations over a variety of other issues.
A case in point was the 1982 Japanese school history textbook controversy that coincided
with the 10th anniversary of diplomatic normalisation. In what was originally a domestic affair,
in which Japan’s MOE was “falsely reported” by the leftwing media for “diluting” Japanese
wartime actions in a school textbook screening exercise, the issue became
“internationalised” and developed into a major diplomatic row vis-à-vis China (Ijiri 1996:65;
Yang 2001:181). The event triggered a series of “Japan bashing” rhetoric by the Chinese
leadership and media, who not only accused Japan of trying to “sanitise” its war history by
downplaying and omitting sensitive facts on Japanese brutality in China and Asia, but also
charged Tokyo for abetting the revival of Japanese militarism (Caroline Rose 1998:Chp.4).
The controversy was eventually contained, after the Japanese government yielded and took
measures to appease the Chinese. Observers see the incident as a classic example of how
China skillfully manipulates “history” to put Japan on the defensive, and in the process,
drawing Japanese concessions on other bilateral issues (Ijiri 1996; Caroline Rose 1998).
Following the textbook incident, Japanese-Chinese ties returned to the superficial
“friendship” mood that signified the third “China boom” phase (Ijiri 1996:69).24 The goodwill
23 For a comprehensive account of these high-ranking exchanges, from which information on this section
derives from, see Takagi (1999:22-23).
24 The terms “boom”, “honeymoon” (Kokubun 2001; Mori 2007) and “fever” (Ijiri 1996) are used to describe
periods of rapidly improved overall relations between Japan and China.
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eventually ebbed, and bilateral relations suffered another temporary setback, when
Japanese PM Nakasone made an official visit to the controversy-laden Yasukuni Shrine on
15 August 1985. The untimely homage, coinciding with the 40th anniversary of Japan’s WWII
surrender, triggered popular indignation across China (Whiting 1992:45-46). Beijing’s
vehement criticisms and student-led anti-Japanese demonstrations in Chinese cities saw the
Japanese government again buckling to Chinese pressure (Shibuichi 2005:207). The trend
repeated itself in the 1987 “Kokaryo” issue, where a Japanese high court ruling recognising
Taiwanese jurisdiction over an old Chinese student dormitory in Kyoto, sparked yet another
diplomatic row that saw Beijing pressuring, and Tokyo “kowtowing” in the usual diplomatic
fashion. Both issues were, subsequently settled, following Tokyo’s conciliatory measures,
which further entrenched the asymmetrical trend governing the bilateral ties (Ijiri 1996:73).
There were other bilateral irritants throughout the 1980s ranging from the 1984 and
1986 sequels of the textbook issue, and Japanese politicians’ controversial remarks on war
history, to bilateral trade imbalances that escalated political tensions. Bilateral relations also
suffered temporary interruption following the Tiananmen incident of June 1989,25 when
Japan and other industrialised nations imposed sanctions on China for alleged serious
human rights violations by the Chinese authorities in suppressing the pro-democracy
demonstrations (Austin and Harris 2001:186). That said, Japan was initially reluctant to
openly reprimand China, and was prudently managing the issue, due to its own dubious
moral position and blemished wartime record, and the potentially negative repercussions of
isolating the Chinese (Shambaugh 1996b:85-86: Drifte 2003:30). Indeed, it was Japan’s
initiative as the first G-7 state to lift the sanctions and resume diplomatic ties with China.
However, it is widely believed that the Tiananmen incident has severely damaged Japanese
perceptions and images of China, generating stark awareness and magnifying differences
regarding the norms and values shared by the two governments and societies (Matsuda
2005:3). Most analysts view it as another watershed in Japanese-Chinese relations, which
25 In the June 4, 1989 incident, the Chinese government took drastic measures to quell student-led pro-
democracy and anti-government demonstrations at the heart of the Chinese capital that saw the PLA launching
what Western media described as a forceful and “bloody” crackdown/“massacre”. For an overview of the
Tiananmen 1989 tragedy as a “test” of Japan’s China engagement strategy, see Drifte (2003:29-32).
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compounded by transformations in the international and domestic realms, propelled the
beginning of a declining trend throughout the remainder of the 20th century (Takagi 1999).
3.2. Post-Cold War Relations: “Hot Economics, Cold Politics”?
The “boom-bust” trend and political frictions not only persisted, but have risen exponentially
during the post-Cold War period, following “structural changes” in the traditional framework
of Japanese-Chinese relations (Jin 2002:34-35; Kokubun 2001:10: Mori 2007:37-63).
Externally, the Cold War’s demise rendered the tacit US-Japan-China “strategic triangle”
meaningless, bringing a strategic transformation to the international order that affected
bilateral relations to the core (Kokubun 2003:37). Conversely, deepening socio-economic
interdependence has spawned problems that were non-existent during the period of
superficial relationship, while generational shift in leadership and masses, and changing
tunes in domestic politics amid rising nationalism have spun what Self opined as “new social
threads and political dynamics” that continually exposed the limitations of the “friendship
framework” (2002:80; Kokubun 2003:32). Indeed, their vibrant economic interactions have
not, contrary to some expectations engendered closer politico-security relations (Yahuda
2006; 2007). Diplomatic ties have reached a nadir in recent years, reflecting the so-called
“hot economics, cold politics” dialectic, or what some observers deemed as “cold peace”
(Taniguchi 2005), making Japanese-Chinese relations increasingly fluid and enigmatic
(Heazle 2005:6).26
Aforementioned, Tokyo’s belief in engaging, and not isolating China following the
Tiananmen incident, witnessed the speedy resumption of bilateral ties in 1991, marked by
PM Kaifu’s August visit to Beijing (Takagi 1999:24).27 A year later, diplomatic relations
reached a new milestone, when Emperor Akihito made an official visit to China, in what was
considered an act of “emperor diplomacy” (tenno gaiko) (Hook et.al. 2001:170). The historic,
“first ever” visit by a Japanese monarch, was laden with symbolism, given Imperial Japan’s
26 Some observers deemed this contradictory development in the political and economic dimensions of their
bilateral relationship as a potential sign of Sino-Japanese “cold war” (see Hagstrom and Lagerkvist 2006).
27 Green sees the Tiananmen tragedy ironically creating an “artificial honeymoon” in Japanese-Chinese ties
(2001:78).
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war legacy in China (Shambaugh 1996b:87). Although drawing protest from Japanese ultra-
nationalist elements, the event proceeded without unforeseen incidents.28 Indeed, the
generally positive reception in Japan and China has had both governments reckoning a
“new episode” in Japanese-Chinese relations (Jin 2002:106), which ironically, turned out to
be one that was eventually marred by persistent deterioration until late 2006.
Japanese-Chinese diplomacy progressed following reciprocal top-level visits by then
CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin and the first non-LDP Japanese premier, Hosokawa, in
1993 and 1994, respectively, heralding a “distinct warming in relations” (Shambaugh
1996b:87) that raised expectations of a genuine reconciliation. The Japanese leadership
has, on its part, offered various degrees/expressions of war apology during such summitries,
with the Emperor offering his “deep remorse” statement in 1992 (Okabe 2001:59), followed
by Hosokawa’s “landmark” apology during his visit, where the term “aggression” was used
for the first time (KN 20/03/1994; cf. Austin and Harris 2001:56). Since then, successive
Japanese premiers, from Muruyama to Koizumi, had in almost ritualistic fashion, professed
different degrees of apology, when they formally met their Chinese counterparts. Despite
several “history”-related problems, i.e. discovery of the “Unit 731”, “comfort women”,
Chinese civil demands for war reparations, and insensitive statements made by Japanese
elites regarding the “Nanjing massacre” and the Sino-Japanese war, diplomatic ties
remained generally favourable. China’s pragmatism in securing Japanese goodwill and
support during the post-Tiananmen period saw the 1990 diplomatic row over
Senkaku/Diaoyudao quickly subsiding without much of the usual Chinese rhetorical display
(Drifte 2003:51; Chung 2004). Japan’s moderately independent China policy, exemplified by
the Hosokawa administration’s acquiescence of the Chinese, or generally “Asianist” stance
on human rights, which differed from its American ally’s position, also facilitated warm
relations (Shambaugh 1996b:87; Hook et.al 2001:171).
28 Besides the uyokus, there were 26 LDP “Young Turks” amongst the most vociferous in protesting against the
Emperor’s planned visit (MS/MDN 09/11/1992 cf. Austin and Harris 2001:46). Likewise, there were public
opposition in China over the visit, but was effectively suppressed by Beijing (Rozman 2002).
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Meanwhile, economic relations remained robust. Bilateral trade reached USD39
billion in 1993, before escalating to USD57.5 billion in 1995, fuelled by trade
complementarities and mutual comparative advantages between the two economies
(Shambaugh 1996b:88-89; Hillpert 2002:44-46). Paralleling this trend has been the
expansion of Japanese FDI, which soared 84% to USD1.07 billion in 1992 alone, making
Japan the fourth largest investor in China, with investment totalling USD3.39 billion
(Shambaugh 1996b:89; Taylor 1996:58; Burns 2000:46). Another three-fold increase saw
annual FDI reaching USD4.32 billion in 1995 (Farrell 1998 cf. Austin and Harris 2001:212).
Likewise, Japanese ODA to China increased, despite the introduction of more stringent
guidelines,29 with annual figures surpassing USD1 billion, between 1992-1995.30
Nevertheless, mutual security developments have had both countries re-evaluating
and raising concerns regarding their respective strategic ambitions in the transiting post-
Cold War order. China’s double-digit increase in annual defence spending since 1989, and
modernisation that focused on enhancing the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) power-
projection capabilities (Bitzinger 2003), not mentioning the resumption of nuclear tests,
began to worry Japanese security planners (Drifte 2003:43). By 1993-1994, growing
anxieties over China’s security development were publicly expressed in both Japanese and
foreign media, leading to explicit calls of concern from successive Japanese administrations
(Shambaugh 1996b:93; Drifte 2003).31 Conversely, a shift in Chinese strategic
perception/thinking saw Japan emerging as a major rival and potential nemesis in the
uncertain future regional order (Shambaugh 1994:6; Whiting 1996:609-611). Exacerbating
this mainstream Chinese perception and distrust of Japan were the groundbreaking, albeit
gradual expansion in Japanese security policies, especially after 1992, besides the Self-
29 During PM Kaifu’s 1992 visit to China, a new ODA guideline was announced, stipulating that disbursement
to recipient countries would be based on, among others: i) trends in defense expenditures; ii) development and
production of WMD, iii) efforts to promote democratisation, and iv) respect for basic human rights and freedom
(MOFA 1991:131; cf. Shambaugh 1996b: 87; Takagi 1995:107-108).
30 Figures based on OECD-compiled data on Table 5.1. “China’s ODA Receipt from Japan (1979-1998)” found
in Austin and Harris (2001:164).
31 Drifte highlights Japanese elites concerns over China’s military modernisation, which among others, included
the so-called “Higuchi Report” that gave veiled references to the “Chinese military challenge” (2003:44, 88).
See Drifte (2003:Chp. 2, Part 2 and 3) for an excellent overview of Japan’s security concerns about China.
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Defence Forces’s (SDF) growing military capabilities and comparatively huge budget
(Hughes 2005).32 Their changing mutual security perceptions and developments proved to
be a principal factor affecting their contemporary bilateral affairs.
As with the traditional tendency, their “good-neighbourly” relations proved
ephemeral. Diplomatic goodwill started receding from mid-1990s onwards, as structural
transformation inevitably forced both countries to manoeuvre and readjust to the changing
international and domestic environments (Yahuda 2006:162). Their growing asymmetries
and changing relative strategic and economic positions began to develop into a pertinent
source of mutual discomfort. With China’s economy growing annually at spectacular rates,
matched by sustained military augmentation, concerns over a perceived “Chinese threat”
began to echo, not only in the West, but also among Japan’s “China” watchers, and within
the “corridors-of-power” in Kasumigaseki and Nagata-cho (Drifte 2003:80-83). Japan’s
protracted “post-bubble” recession further accentuated the asymmetries and fuelled
Japanese insecurity. Conversely, Tokyo’s expanding international role and increasingly
assertive foreign/security policy-orientation generated unease in Beijing. Compounded by
domestic developments, i.e. generational change and rising nationalism fuelled by historical
enmity, bilateral relations deteriorated amid an increased frequency of diplomatic clashes.
Japanese-Chinese tension ratcheted up in March 1996, when China took belligerent
measures to deter Taiwan from comtemplating unilateral independence during the prelude
to the Taiwanese presidential election. The PLA conducted full-scale naval exercises and
missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, precipitating a dangerous escalation of hostility that saw
two US Navy aircraft-carrier battle groups deployed to the narrow sea-lane to check Chinese
intentions (Garver 1997:Chp.6; Christensen 1999:62). Although the crisis did not manifest
into a military confrontation, it heightened Japanese awareness regarding their own
(in)security vis-à-vis the Chinese (Wang 2000:363), prompting Tokyo to freeze grant aid to
32 Although Japan’s annual defence budget rarely exceeded 1% of its annual GDP (except during the Nakasone
adminstration), it was still comparatively large, due to its gargantuan national economy. See Chapter 5.
83
China (Takamine 2005). In fact, the Diet had rallied for a similar punitive action the year
before, in response to Chinese nuclear weapons testing (Green 2001:78).
Not surprisingly, Taiwan has re-emerged a contentious issue, with the fragility of
Japanese-Chinese diplomacy aggravated by the shift in Japanese attitude towards Taiwan
(Wang 2000:358). Although officially committed to the “One-China” policy, Tokyo has
become increasingly flexible, especially in granting Taiwanese state-elites permission for
official/semi-official visits to Japan since 1994, while Japanese public images of Taiwan
improved favourably vis-à-vis China, much to Beijing’s chagrin (Wang 2000:362-363;
Takahara 2004:161).33
Similarly, Japan has begun reviewing its security policy in conjuction with the US,
including the view of maintaining the status quo of Taiwan and its surrounding areas/sea-
lanes that are strategically vital to Japan (Roy 2005:200). The Clinton-Hashimoto joint-
declaration for the revision of the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Security Cooperation, soon
after the Taiwan Strait crisis, reflected such intentions, besides the alliance’s strategic
interests in hedging against future Chinese power, as advocated in the “Nye Initiative” (Yang
2003:307; Drifte 2003:89-93). Under the revised Guidelines, Japan agreed to provide
“logistical and rear-area support” for American operations covering military contingencies in
“areas surrounding Japan” (Johnstone 2000:132; Soeya 1998; Green and Mochizuki 1998).
Despite both allies’ reiteration regarding the non-inclusion of Taiwan, and the “situational”
rather than “geographical” nature of the definition, Beijing remained unconvinced, perceiving
it to be none other than a US-Japanese grand strategy to contain, and intervene in China’s
domestic affairs (Yang 2007:139; van Kemenade 2006:57-58). Tokyo’s reluctance to
renounce any involvement in a Taiwan contingency (Roy 2003:9), and subsequent
33 The Olympics Committee of Asia (OCA) controversially extended an invitation to Taiwan’s President Li
Denghui to attend the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima, triggering strong Chinese protest and threats of boycott
(Takagi 1999:28). Although Tokyo caved in to the protest by thwarting Li’s visit, it did not budge in inviting
Vice-Premier, Xu Lide, to attend the Games in his place, marking the first high-ranking visit by Taiwan’s elite
since 1972 (Shambaugh 1996b:92; Takagi 2006:118). Tokyo also invited Taiwanese officials to the Osaka
APEC conference months later, where a meeting held between the two trade ministers, broke a 22-year
moratorium on ministerial-level summits between the two sides (Shambaugh 1996b:92).
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participation in the US-sponsored Theatre-Missile-Defence (TMD) programme, further
evinced the Chinese of Japan’s conviction to support a US-led intervention to derail their
reunification aspirations (Drifte 2000:455). Roy sees Chinese observers perceiving Japan’s
“North Korean threat” excuse to be a “smokescreen” for a TMD project, ultimately aimed at
negating China’s missile capabilities (2003:9; Wang and Wu 1998:32; Ulland 2002:16; Wu
2000:299-300). Besides advancing Japanese strategic interests, they fear its deployment on
Aegis destroyers could effectively nullify the potency of a Chinese missile threat on Taiwan
(Roy 2003:9; Hughes 2002:76; Takagi 2006:120-121; Yahuda 2006:167) and inevitably,
reinforce Taipei’s secessionist tendencies.
The mid-1990s onwards also witnessed the eruption of territorial dispute and history-
related problems that failed to dissipate, despite earlier reconciliation efforts. The changing
domestic political dynamics, and resurgent nationalism fuelled by a new generation of
leaders and masses have made these issues highly “visible” and increasingly difficult to
manage. Besides PM Hashimoto’s July visit to Yasukuni, the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute
resurfaced in 1996, when popular nationalist actions dragged both governments into a
diplomatic conundrum, characterised by mutual high posturing and assertive rhetorical
exchanges (Deans 2000). Although subsequently shelved through the usual ad-hoc
diplomatic manoeuvres and statecraft, the incident underscores nationalism’s growing
constraint on both sides’ ability to effectively resolve the territorial issue. More significantly, it
highlights Tokyo’s departure from its “deferential” attitude in dealing with Beijing (Drifte
2003), signifying a “new realism” and assertiveness in Japan’s China policy (Green 2001).
Japanese-Chinese diplomacy worsened following Jiang Zemin’s 1998 state visit to
Japan that was marred by the Chinese head-of-state’s excessive “history” mongering. It was
widely reported that Jiang had tenaciously sought for the insertion of a formal apology
statement from Japan in the Japanese-Chinese joint declaration during the visit, partly due
to Tokyo’s recent similar offering to South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung, and domestic political
pressure that ostensibly compelled him to forthrightly address the “history” problem (Gong
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2001c:50-51). However, PM Obuchi’s refusal to oblige (Takahara 2004:166)34, prompted the
Chinese leader to lecture his Japanese hosts on their failure to appropriately redress
“history”, a proven manouevre in pressuring Tokyo to satisfy Chinese demands (Roy
2005:195). The Japanese “war-guilt and apology fatigue” set in on this occasion, Jiang
actions triggering strong media and public indignation (Takagi 1999:36; Murata 2006:43).
The visit ended disappointingly for both sides. It also reinforced the negative images of, and
hardened attitude in Japan towards China that would bring longer-term repercussions to
their relationship.
“History” festered on with the Obuchi administration demolishing significant postwar
taboos, a development the Chinese deemed as counterproductive to the bilateral
relationship. The 1999 legislations to expand the SDF’s role alarmed Beijing, while the re-
enactment of Hinomaru and Kimigayo brought more Chinese consternation regarding
resurgent Japanese nationalism that could further strain their problem-infested ties (Itoh
2001). That said, Premier Zhu Rongji’s diplomatic finesse during his Japan visit in October
2000, proved successful in mending relations that were gravely affected following the
mentioned bilateral impasses. According to Rozman, the Chinese “charm-offensive” under
the so-called “smile diplomacy” was a remedial step to address the badly damaged
Japanese images of China, and safeguard their vital economic interests (2002:113).
The ambiance of Japanese-Chinese relations, nonetheless, failed to improve as the
new millennium dawned. Despite general progress, bilateral ties remained bedevilled by
history-related quarrels that undermined mutual efforts to move relationship forward (Yang
2003: 307). The Koizumi admistration’s assertive China policy did not help matters.
Koizumi’s contentious visits to Yasukuni-jinja, and his explicitly pro-Washington posture and
34According to Takahara (2004:166), Obuchi was also under pressure from the LDP to rebuke Chinese apology
demand. The Japanese premier thus, presented a declaration that stated “the Japanese side is keenly conscious
of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its
aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this” (quoted in
Rose 2005:106), which fell short of an apology similar to the one given to Korea. For a comprehensive account
of the “apology issue”, see Rose (2005:100-108) and Gries (2004:90-97).
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unprecendented efforts to transform Japan into a “normal state” made him amongst the
most unpopular Japanese leaders in China (Curtin 2003b). Besides its alleged
acquiescence to history revisionism, the Koizumi administration’s espousal of constitutional
reform of the Article IX, incremental policy-shifts via legislations that extended the
parameters of Japanese security activities abroad, and strengthening of military relations
with the US in the post-“9/11” era, have caused Chinese unease. In certain respects, China
would prefer the retention of the US-Japan alliance as a constraint against independent
Japanese remilitarisation, but such perception has become fuzzy with Taiwan imminently re-
emerging in the US-Japan strategic calculus. Japan’s decision to jointly declare Taiwan as a
“common strategic objective” during the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (or
“Two-plus-Two”Talks) in February 2005 aggravated Chinese suspicions regarding Tokyo’s
shifting posture, and more significantly, the realness of the alliance’s hedging strategy
against China’s rising power (Lam 2005:280-282). The JDA’s identification of China as a
potential security concern in the 2005 National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG),35
further fuelled Chinese apprehensions (van Kemenade 2006:55).
Exacerbating Japanese-Chinese tension were several history-related incidents,
ranging from accidents involving chemical weapons abandoned in China by the Imperial
Japanese Army, to Tokyo’s endorsement of “revisionist” history textbooks. Diplomatic
squabbles had also risen amid frequent recurrence of their territorial/maritime disputes in the
ECS, namely their rivalling claims over Senkaku/Diaoyudao, the demarcation of its maritime
resource boundaries, and contested jurisdictions regarding gas exploration rights (Drifte
2008a/b). Another related issue was the intrusions of Chinese vessels into Japanese
territorial waters, under the pretext of conducting maritime research, but perceived as
Chinese attempts to collect “military data”/intelligence for eventual submarine operations
(Takamine 2006:129). Compounded by steady increases in Chinese naval capabilities,
35 The NDPG for Fiscal Year 2005 and Aftter which received the approval of Japan’s National Security Council
and Cabinet in December 2004, noted that “China, which has a strong influence on the security in this region,
has been modernising its nuclear and missile capabilities as well as naval and air forces, and expanding its area
of operation at sea”, and in response, called for greater Japanese attentiveness to the future direction of Chinese
security ambitions. See National Defence Program Guidelines for FY2005 and After, 10 Dec. 2004.
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these incidents have heightened Japanese concerns over China’s destabilising actions in
maritime affairs (Pei and Swaine 2005:5-6).36
Other notable diplomatic discords included the storming of the Japanese consulate in
Shenyang by Chinese authorities in September 2002; the “fracas” following China’s defeat
to Japan in the 2004 Asian Cup final; and Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi’s abrupt cancellation
of a scheduled meeting with Koizumi in May 2005. Bilateral ties were also undermined by
the all-out Chinese efforts to block Japan’s intensified bid for a permanent UNSC seat in
2005, which sparked-off a popular Chinese internet petition campaign that garnered 44
million signatures (Calder 2006:133), whilst Beijing covertly lobbied against Tokyo’s bid. To
be sure, there were positive expectations in 2002-2003 that the new “fourth generation”
Chinese leadership under the technocratic “Hu-Wen” administration would embrace a “new
thinking in Sino-Japanese relations”,37 and pursue a more pragmatism-oriented Japan policy
(Soerensen 2006:116-117). However, such optimism remained elusive as diplomatic
relations reached an unprecedented nadir following massive anti-Japanese demonstrations
across Chinese cities in April 2005.
Deepening socio-economic interdependence has also begun manifesting problems.
Indeed, rather than bearing the expected fruits, enhanced people-to-people interactions
have unwittingly accentuated their stereotypically negative mutual perceptions and images
(Yahuda 2006:162). Recent public opinion surveys illustrate a dramatic decline in mutual
affections between the two societies. In Japan, the PMO annual polls reveal a regressive
trend, with the percentage of respondents feeling no affinity to China gradually increasing,
and reaching unparalleled highs in 2005-2006, while figures on those with positive response
plummeted from the surreal highs of over 70% during the early 1980s, to less than 50%
(Figure 1). Conversely, Chinese polls in 2002 recorded a dismal 5.9% of respondents
36 See Chapter 7 for a detailed case-study of the ECS disputes and China’s maritime/naval incursions.
37 The “new thinking on Japan” refers to the intellectual voices in Beijing’s academic circle, i.e. Ma Licheng
and Shi Yinhong, calling for the abandonment of the “history” card in favour of pragmatic engagement with
Japan, which apparently reflected the Japan policy direction of the new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.
For a thorough discussion on the “new thinking”, see Ma (2003) and Gries (2005b).
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suggesting Japan as “friendly”, while 43.3% voted the opposite, and that, escalated to 63%
in 2005 (cf. Yang 2003:306; BBC 24/08/2005). As Self construes, the premise regarding
intensified personal contacts breeding mutual affections between peoples has yet to be
proven, in the case of Japanese-Chinese relations (2002:81).
Figure 1
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On the economic front, Japanese have become acutely aware of, and concerned
about China’s growing challenge, and the shifting balance in Japanese-Chinese economic
interdependence. Notwithstanding the trade deficits, the spectre of Japan’s manufacturing
sector “hollowing out”, following mass relocation of manufacturing firms to China (Nikkei
19/08/2002) to exploit Chinese comparative advantages and lower production costs, raised
fears of a Chinese economic threat, as their lopsided interdependence deepens (Roy 2003:
9; Ohashi 2004:182-184). The 2001 trade dispute that saw both sides invoking protectionist
measures to curtail mutual imports of certain products, illustrate the drawbacks of deepening
economic interdependence, which adds to their conventional bilateral impasses (Hilpert
2002:46-47; MOFA 2002:59). Also, their contest to offer separate FTAs to ASEAN member-
states and competing ideas of East Asian regionalism (see Higgott 2007), has enlivened the
prospects of Japanese-Chinese economic competition, and possibly, regional rivalry (Roy
2003:6; Terada 2006).
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That said, both governments have resolutely rallied behind their deepening economic
interdependence to effectively buffer against serious erosions of diplomatic relations
throughout the last decade. Japan, on its part, has maintained its policy of economic
engagement and actively supported China’s enmeshment into the global economy (Drifte
2003), i.e. China’s accession into the WTO, where Japan was first amongst G-8 nations to
conclude the WTO bilateral negotiations with China (Lawrence 1999:20; cf. Zhao 2002:37).
Similarly, China’s “third” and “fourth” generation leadership has continuously promoted
economic ties with Japan as the vehicle towards realising economic modernisation. Hence,
the “hot economics, cold politics” dialectic in Japanese-Chinese ties is not surprising,
considering the continued emphasis on the economic dimension as the foundation of overall
bilateral relations, despite their fallout in the politico-diplomatic realm.
Retrospectively, bilateral trade surpassed USD100 billion in 2002 (MOFA 2003:28),
with China set to overtake the US as Japan’s largest trading partner. This feat was duly
achieved in 2004, with trade volume reaching an all-time high of USD214.6 billion (BBC
26/01/2005; cf. Tok 2005:299), as China accounted for 20.1% of Japan’s total trade,
surpassing the US at 18.6% (MOF 2004; cf. Lam 2005:289). Indeed, Japan has China’s
phenomenal economic performance to thank for, serving as the “growth engine” that
successfully alleviated the protracted Japanese economic recession (Taniguchi 2005:446;
Anonymous interview G). The reversal of economic fortune, and awareness of China’s
importance to Japan’s economic health saw the “Sinophobic” perception abating by 2003, as
the zaikai appeared to increasingly “tie its fate with the Chinese economy” (Taniguchi
2005:445-446). With China maintaining its outstanding economic growth, a renewed sense
of optimism accelerated Japanese FDI inflows into the Chinese mainland. According to
Kokubun (2003:34), Japan experienced its “fifth China boom”, with the rate of Japanese
commercial investments in China rising exponentially since 2000, totalling nearly USD40
billion by 2003 (Yahuda 2006:164). Even the spectre of rising anti-Japanese nationalism
during the April 2005 demonstrations failed to deter the buoyant mood of Japanese firms,
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with some 54.8% enunciating commitments to expand their investments and presence in
China, soon after (JETRO 07/06/2005; cf. Tok 2005:299; Anonymous interview G).38
Overall, post-Cold War relations have expanded, but the fragility that continues to
eulogise their bilateral ties since 1972, does not promote optimism of a genuine Japanese-
Chinese reconciliation. According to Yang Jian, contemporary Japan-China relations are still
very much “in the shadow of the past” (2003:308). Historical residues remain a chief culprit
invoking mutual prejudice and distrust amongst policy-makers and public, which have
hitherto undermined their political will to seek resolution to both endemic and new bilateral
issues. Self construes that their over-reliance on the existing mechanism of “friendship
diplomacy” to mediate problems and preserve “a mirage of good relations” (2002:77), have
thus far “accomplished no more than a façade of friendship” (2002:78). Furthermore,
structural changes in both international and domestic environments, and rising nationalism,
have magnified divisions between the two countries. Although elements to enthuse a more
sanguine outlook exist, the negative by-products of such changes are “crowding out the
positive aspects of bilateral ties” (Self 2002:77).
3.3. External and Domestic Dynamics Shaping Japanese-Chinese Relations
The overview of the two defining eras reveals the shaping of Japanese-Chinese affairs by
both external and domestic dynamics. Whilst the constraints/opportunities imposed by the
international system, and one’s relative material and discursive capabilities vis-à-vis the
other have largely defined the parameters of bilateral interaction, the overview also
highlights the salience of domestic determinants that periodically influenced and dominated
the course of their foreign policy-behaviour/responses. This reflects NCR’s dictum that
stipulates the primacy of external/structural-material variables in limiting the boundaries of
state behaviour, and the mediating/intervening role of domestic variables in dispensing the
specific preference-of-action. Japan’s relations with China, is therefore, comprehensible,
38 This opinion is shared by a senior METI official from the Trade Policy Bureau (Anonymous interview G).
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when both sets of variables are systematically analysed via the NCR framework, to explicate
their functions and dynamic interplay in shaping its China policy, and the bilateral trends.
3.3.1. External Dynamics
Japanese-Chinese relations have always been, and will continue to be, shaped by external
circumstances, which “define the room for manoeuvre and the responses of the two
governments in their mutual relations” (Austin and Harris 2001:2).39 The above overview
shows that the external dynamics are similar to those identified as the “independent”
external variable in the NCR framework, namely the international/systemic environment,
one’s diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the other, the US-Japan alliance commitment/resolve
and the correlating US-Japan-China triangular politics, and economic interdependence. As
described, the post-1945 international structure/system spawned constraints/opportunities
that facilitated as well as impeded bilateral ties. Particularly, the rigid bipolarity of the
nascent Cold War system and “alliance commitments”, hindered opportunities for an early
Japanese-Chinese reconciliation, insofar as both countries, being “proxy states” in
adversarial camps, had to subordinate their respective foreign policies to the overarching
bipolar international order. Whilst the US-Japan security treaty restricted Japan’s China
policy, the Chinese were, constricted by their alliance with the USSR, a major structural
constraint that impeded formal diplomatic interactions in the 1950s and 1960s.
Interestingly, bilateral interactions remained manageable during the height of the
Cold War, despite the given context of regional bipolar hostility. The prospects of a renewed
Japanese-Chinese conflict did not materialise in the form of direct military engagements,
other than the episodic tensions caused by the indirect impact of Sino-American hostility
during the Korean War, Taiwan Strait crises, and Vietnam War, where Japan was implicated
by “alliance commitment” to help contain communist expansionism (Austin and Harris 2001:
14-15). Indeed, rather than totally subordinating the bilateral relationship to the logic of
39 Austin and Harris observe that external factors define the trends and developments in Japanese-Chinese
relations more than “any factors under the direct influence of either governments” (2001:2), while Whiting
(1989:200-1) suggested the prevalence of relative capabilities and external posture of key regional actors,
namely the US and the Soviet Union in drawing the boundaries of the relationship.
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confrontation and non-engagement, pragmatism and mutual interests saw both states
nurturing limited economic engagements at the unofficial level (Taylor 1996:2; Iriye
1996:48). Considering the Cold War’s structural determinacy, such deviating state behaviour
indicates NCR’s assumption regarding the mitigating role of economic interdependence, and
plausible intervention of domestic political and economic imperatives/actors in Japanese
(and Chinese) policy-making.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that both countries’ prerogative to partially
circumvent the structural imperatives, i.e. evading direct military confrontations and keeping
informal channels of economic interaction opened amidst sporadic regional conflagrations,
was arguably abetted by the tacit acquiescence of the US, and the USSR, to a lesser extent.
Indeed, their informal trade relations were dependent on American sanction over Japanese
proposition of the “separation of politics from economics” formula (seikei bunri), which
allowed Japan to promote economic interactions with China in the absence of formal political
ties (Iriye 1996:53). Even then, Japanese-Chinese commerce was negligible, partly due to
export restrictions imposed by their respective economic blocs.40 Systemic pressures
appeared more salient in the political realm, where persistent Chinese overtures to resume
formal diplomatic interactions were, matched by enduring resistance from successive
postwar Japanese administrations, from Yoshida to Sato, presumably the outcome of
intense American pressure/gaiatsu.
Conversely, the deepening Sino-Soviet rift, and eventual fallout following their border
skirmishes in the late 1960s engendered a strategic transformation in the regional security
architecture that ultimately provided the window of opportunity for Japan and China to
normalise diplomatic relations. Specifically, it brought a confluence of strategic interests that
provided the impetus for a Sino-American rapprochement (Zhao 1997:132). This strategic
shift correspondingly nullified the major constraint in Japan’s China policy that saw Tokyo
outdoing its American ally to establish official relations with Beijing. Developments in the
40 Among the “bloc-imposed” trade barriers included the China Committee (CHINCOM) and Coordinating
Committee (COCOM) restrictions, enacted following the outbreak of the Korean War (Iriye 1996:52-53; Drifte
2003:21; Taylor 1996; Burns 2000).
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international environment equally facilitated the signing of the PFT. On China’s part, the
threat of Soviet expansionism and urgent need to incorporate Japan into a tacit strategic
alliance against the USSR saw Beijing pushing for its early conclusion, and the inclusion of
the “anti-hegemony” clause. Japan’s signing of the PFT, despite “domestic” reservations,
was also, dynamically influenced by external considerations. They included what Bedeski
reckons as Japanese concerns over a possible drawdown in US military presence under
Carter’s regional disengagement policy, Soviet hardline policy on the Northern Territory
impasse, and more significantly, intention to harmonise with US diplomatic trends, following
Washington’s momentum towards normalising relations with Beijing (1983:4 & 40).
The decline in contemporary bilateral relations also reflects their manoeuvring and
policy-responses towards the post-Cold War international environment. The Cold War’s
demise has immensely transformed the East Asian strategic landscape, and Japanese-
Chinese ties have been duly affected by the fluidity and new configuration of power relations
in the region (Zhao 2002:32). Not only did it render the US-Japan-China “strategic-triangle”
obsolete, the post-Cold War order precipitated the emergence of a relatively low-
pressure/ambivalent external environment, which according to NCR’s interpretation, gave
both Japan and China newfound foreign policy flexibility, not mentioning, domestic leverage
in policy-making. The period also saw their relative power position undergoing significant
shifts. “Diverging fortunes” since the early 1990s – China’s rapid economic growth against
the protracted “post-bubble” recession suffered by Japan – have altered the regional power
balance.41 Compounded by China’s wherewithal vis-a-vis Japan’s ambivalence in the
politico-security realm, these asymmetrical developments in their relative strategic and
economic positions have created considerable unease, leading to mutual policy
readjustments that in ways contributed to a renewal of Japanese-Chinese animosities (Pei
and Swaine 2005:3).
41 Mentioned in Chapter 2, the term “diverging fortune” derives from Pei and Swaine (2005). Zhao (2002:33)
characterises this asymmetrical development and regional power reconfiguration in the post-Cold War era as the
“two ups” and “two-downs”, referring the former to the US and China, while Russia and Japan as the latter.
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In the security dimension, their respective policy-shifts, undertaken as much in
response to the fluid international strategic environment, as to one’s changing security
perception vis-à-vis another, have aggravated mutual insecurities. The incremental shifts in
Japan’s security policy have been partly a response to the international community’s call for
more substantial Japanese contribution following the first Gulf War, where Tokyo was
heavily criticised for “free-riding” and overly depending on its “cheque-book diplomacy”
(Miller 2000:5). Notwithstanding North Korea’s mounting security threat, i.e. Taepodong
missile test, fushinsen (mystery ship) incursion, and abduction of Japanese citizens,
sustained Chinese military build-up and occasional belligerence in managing regional
security issues equally encouraged a thorough review of Japan’s post-Cold War security
policy. Furthermore, the fundamentality of the US-Japan alliance to Japanese overall
security conception required Tokyo to continue calibrating its national defence guidelines to
complement its ally. Such developments have concomitantly influenced China’s strategic
perceptions and sense of insecurity in a largely American-dominated “unipolar” international
system.42 With US foreign policy becoming increasingly unilateral in approach (Dieter and
Higgott 2007),43 and Sino-US relations deteriorating amid a series of impasses, ranging from
human rights to Taiwan, Japan’s newfound assertiveness and renewal of “alliance
commitment” have heightened Chinese anxiety regarding Japanese security ambitions,
specifically its remilitarisation under American auspices, in a perceived, joint effort to hedge
China’s rise (Christensen 1999:59-63; Wu 2000:301; McCormack 2004; Johnson 2005).
Indeed, the US’ shifting position in the context of the US-Japan-China “triangularity”
(Soerensen 2006) has profoundly affected Japanese-Chinese diplomacy. Zhao Quansheng
rightly observes that the US is “the most significant external actor/factor, and has had a
tremendous influence on the direction of Sino-Japanese relations” ever since the PRC’s
establishment (2002:32). Particularly, developments in US-Japan relations/alliance have
42 According to Zhao, Chinese observers describe the new global structure as yi chao duo qiang – which means
the US assuming the sole superpower role, surrounded by multiple powers in the EU, China, Russia, and Japan
(2002:33). They believe the current unipolarity is a transitional phase toward the emergence of a multipolar
world order, but fear its rise would be hindered by the US-Japan alliance (Drife 2003:37; Zhao 1997:Chp.10).
43 For an interesting work on the impact of US securitisation of its economic policy in Asia, as a possible means
to contain China, see Dieter and Higgott (2007).
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prevalently affected Japan’s China policy and the general trends in Japanese-Chinese
relationship. Most noticeable are the downturns throughout the two defining epochs, which
have retrospectively coincided with the periods of strengthened US-Japan relations and
renewed Japanese obligations towards the American-led security arrangement. The nadirs
in pre-1972 relations occurred when Tokyo sought to redefine the US-Japan security treaty,
despite vociferous objections from Beijing and domestic pacifist forces within Japan.
Likewise, the deterioration in post-Cold War diplomacy reflects China’s apprehension
towards Japanese decision to enhance US-Japan security cooperation, and uneasiness
regarding the inequidistant nature of the “triangular relationship” that increasingly portrays
China as the target, in a “two-against-one” context,44 especially since the mid-1990s (Zhao
2002:47: Drifte 2003:10). Complicating matters is “Taiwan”, a dilemma in Japan’s relations
with China, with regard to Tokyo’s alliance commitment that connotes an obligation to
support US military intervention, in the event of a Chinese “forceful reunification” of the
island. Tokyo’s cautious attitude vis-à-vis Taiwan, exemplified by its measured response to
the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and what Drifte (2003:97) sees as Japan’s “interpretational
somersaults”, or preferred ambiguity regarding the scope of the revised US-Japan
Guidelines (Wang 2000:364-372),45 has been diluted by its subsequent participation in TMD
development, and its 2005 joint declaration with Washington on Taiwan’s future security.
Such mixed signals have had Beijing becoming ever more suspicious of Tokyo and
Washington’s commitment to the “One-China” principle. China’s passing of the Anti-
Secession Law in March 2005 underscores such concerns (Christensen 2005), a move
which further complicates the “Taiwan question” in the US-Japan-China relationship.
44 The Chinese fear of being isolated in a “two-against-one” scenario is also noted in Christensen (1999: 73).
45 According to Wang, Tokyo voiced its disapproval of Chinese belligerent actions during the 1996 Taiwan
Strait crisis, but refrained from officially endorsing the US aircraft carrier battle groups’ deployment from its
bases in Japan, to avoid aggravating Chinese suspicion of a US-Japan collusion to intervene in the Taiwan issue
(2000:364). Likewise, fierce debate took place in the Japanese Diet regarding the definition of the revised scope
of the US-Japan Security Guidelines. According to Wang, Japanese policy-makers were concerned that it could
violate the Article IX and draw Japan into an unwanted military confrontation with China (2000:369-372). The
enactment of the three security bills in 1999 were apparently meant to give Japan the “strategic ambiguity” with
regard to the provision of logistical support to US military operation in Taiwan (2000:371; Green 2001:90-92).
This diplomatic manoeuvre was apparently, aimed at alleviating the alliance dilemma of “entrapment and
abandonment”, and maintaining the Taiwan status quo (see Green 2001:90-92; 106).
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Additionally, the general atmosphere governing Japanese-Chinese interactions had
been affected by one’s diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis another during specific external
conditions and time periods, their relative material capabilities notwithstanding. Although
somewhat ambivalent during the pre- and immediate normalisation period, their Cold War
ties recorded superficial progress in the decade following the PFT’s conclusion, regardless
of sporadic problems concerning war history, and the continuous political recrimination and
manipulation of related issues by Chinese leaders to draw economic concessions from their
Japanese counterparts. This generally upbeat political climate was, partly facilitated by
external-structural pressures that necessitated mutual efforts, and political will, to
consciously promote warmer ties and subordinate bilateral differences for their common
strategic interests in containing the Soviets. It was also, largely fostered by what scholars
deemed as Japan’s “deference” to a structured and asymmetrical pattern in their post-
normalisation relationship that saw China consistently adopting a “high-posture”, while the
Japanese, due to their war-guilt and moral inferiority complexes, always responded with the
“low-posture” attitude of mollifying the Chinese (Ijiri 1996:61,69; Drifte 2003:18).46 Barring
the “logic-of-reassurance” thesis (Midford 2002), this so-called “friendship framework”, which
operated on such tacit understanding, and on an impromptu basis of removing “immediate
obstacles” to promote continuous, “superficial friendship” (Ijiri 1996:64; Self 2002), was
responsible for skewing the perception of one’s diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis another that
affected the lopsided management of the said bilateral issues during the 1970s-1980s.
Conversely, the unfavourable ambiance governing their post-Cold War relations
reflects the change in perception of diplomatic leverage, especially in Japan’s case.
Underpinning this climate has been the emergence of a low-pressure, ambiguous
international strategic environment that encouraged the expansion of one’s foreign/security
policy scope and ambition, which, compounded by their shifting power relations, have
aggravated mutual insecurities. Together with domestic political developments, i.e.
generational shift in leadership and masses, and changing political mood amid rising
46 Drifte (2003:18) calls such Japanese behaviour as “deferential” policy or “deference to China”. Both terms
are utilised intermittently in this thesis to describe the stipulated Japanese behaviour.
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nationalism, these dynamics have instigated a shift in Japanese attitude and perception of
diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the Chinese. Specifically, attitudes have hardened, bringing
Japanese perception to more “realist-ic” levels that, concomitantly, led to the obsolescence
of the “kowtow” diplomacy, when managing their bilateral affairs.
Economic interdependence is another bilateral dynamic that serves as a key
mitigating factor in the international context and vanguard of amiable Japanese-Chinese
relations. It was economic considerations, which provided the basis for unofficial relations
during the early Cold War decades, laying the groundwork for the normalisation of political
relations in 1972. Since then, their flourishing economic interactions and deepening
interdependence have become a significant constraint against politically induced
deterioration in overall ties. Besides being the most positive feature, Drifte contends that
Japan’s economic interactions with China “has had a soothing influence on bilateral
disputes” (2002:62). Both governments have been acutely cognisant of its benefits, not only
in boosting the performance of their respective national economies, but also in promoting a
positive “spill-over” effect into other dimensions of their relationship (Yahuda 2006:166).
Japan, especially, according to experts, has vigorously used its economic strength as a key
China policy instrument, in view of its “global civilian power” status (Drifte 2003:28; Yahuda
2006).47 Successive Japanese administrations have expanded trade and investments with,
and disbursement of ODA to China, as the fulcrum of postwar reconciliation, besides serving
Japan’s own economic interests. Pledges to promote economic ties are thus, a favoured
official intergovernmental rhetoric, considering its fundamentality to the realisation of a
durable relationship.
As political ties suffer in the post-Cold War period, economic interdependence has
become ever more critical in preventing a free-fall in overall bilateral relations. With their
economies increasingly intertwined, one can reasonably argue that both governments have
shown remarkable resilience in sustaining a working relationship, despite intensified
47 Inoguchi and Bacon (2006) suggest Japan is moving from “global civilian power” to “global ordinary power”.
See also Hughes (1999) for Japan’s economic power as a foreign policy tool vis-à-vis North Korea.
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diplomatic altercations, to safeguard their mutual economic interests (Anonymous interview
F). Like their predecessors, the Hu-Wen leadership has continued prioritising China’s
modernisation and development, where a robust economic relationship with Japan remains
fundamental in realising such aspirations.48 Similarly, the Koizumi administration, despite its
unparalleled assertiveness towards China, equally calibrated its engagement policies to
avoid alienating its neighbour, considering the intractable importance of Chinese commerce
to Japan’s own economic vitality (Lam 2005:286-289; Drifte 2003). Although
interdependence has proliferated new problems, with signs of friction already apparent, it
remains a strong rallying point for stable relations. Interestingly, as Japan and China find
themselves being “uneasy bedfellows” (Zhang and Drysdale 2000) in the contemporary
“cold politics, hot economics” scenario, a sense of déjà vu reminiscent to the “seikei bunri”
era can be felt, as both governments strive to prevent their politico-diplomatic differences
from festering into the economic realm. Nonetheless, as Yahuda (2006) noted, the
restraining effects of economic interdependence and globalisation remain questionable,
under thriving domestic socio-political dynamics that also shape their bilateral affairs.
3.3.2. Domestic Dynamics
The above description highlighted the external dynamics that define the parameters of the
bilateral interactions between Japan and China. However, NCR also stipulates the salience
of domestic dynamics, which have consistently affected Japanese-Chinese diplomacy, with
variables from domestic political competition/elite politics to nationalism having, to varying
degree, determined one’s policy and management of their bilateral problems. Domestic
determinants have, especially, become efficacious in the post-Cold War period, following the
lessening of structural pressures, and corresponding emergence of a fluid/indeterminate
international environment. The rekindling and frequency of the aforementioned bilateral
48 Since the 1980s, China’s strategy to develop “comprehensive national power”, which included economic
power, has made economic ties with Japan essential to realising such aspirations (Yang 2003:313).
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disputes underscores NCR’s assumption regarding the potency of domestic variables in
foreign policy-making, under such external circumstances.49
Particularly, domestic political imperatives have incessantly influenced one’s policy
towards the other, of which the “highs-and-lows” in Japanese-Chinese relations arguably
transpired. Kojima rightly observes that Japan’s China policy has become “intertwined” with
Japanese domestic politics, especially since 1972, following the domestication of diplomatic
issues by contending political factions, divided by their “pro-Beijing” and “pro-Taipei”
sentiments (2000:41). Indeed, scholars commonly agree that one cannot adequately explain
many bilateral issues that inflamed their relationship without referring to domestic political
competition (Kojima 2000; Whiting 1989; Ijiri 1996). Some were primarily domestic-centred
issues, only to be internationalised, owing to political pressure and elite manipulations for
domestic political expediency. Besides territorial disputes and Taiwan, the constant
resurrection of history-related problems needs to be understood in the context of internal
political dynamics, which have occasionally forced Japanese and Chinese leaders to take
assertive stances, to bolster their power positions and political incumbency. From history
textbook to Yasukuni, the periodic diplomatic rows over history in the 1980s coincided with
key developments in domestic politics, and were linked to elite power competition (Kojima
2000:41; Murata 2006).50 Its contemporary rekindling amid similar circumstances,
underscores NCR’s assumption regarding the linkage between, and “intervening” function of
domestic politics on external relations.
Japanese-Chinese relations have been, similarly affected by correlated domestic
political developments, i.e. shifting political terrain, and leadership transition/change-of-
administration. Evidently, the “highs-and-lows” coincided with the waxing and waning of
political elites and parties that held favourable perceptions of each other, and were
49 The resurrection of the “Taiwan issue” is a case in point. Unlike the Cold War’s determinative environment
that helped kept it relatively quiet, the fragility of contemporary Japanese-Chinese diplomacy has been induced
by the low-pressure, ambivalent external environment (Wang 2000:362-363; Takahara 2004:161), which
according to NCR, allows “pro-Taipei” forces in Japan to exert their policy-making influence.
50 The history textbook, Yasukuni Shrine and Kyoto dormitory controversies coincided with major events and
developments in Chinese domestic politics in the 1980s, i.e. the 12th and 13th CCP Congresses in 1982 and
1987, respectively, and the reshuffling of top leadership in 1985 (Kojima 2000:41; Whiting 2000:17-18).
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principally committed to promoting friendly relations. Especially in Japan, the emergence of
“China-friendly” administrations since 1972 (i.e. Tanaka, Ohira, Takeshita, Hosokawa),
precipitated periods of remarkably affable relations (Murata 2006). Likewise, “China school”
MOFA bureaucrats (Drifte 2003:19), and “pro-China” politicians that hailed from the
influential LDP’s keisei-kai faction, and generally, the “normalisation” generation, with few
exceptions, had played important roles in cementing the “friendship framework” (Self 2002)
that governed bilateral ties until the early 1990s. Despite the occasional challenges from
“pro-Taiwan” and hawkish elements, the dominant sentiment within the Japanese political
circle had been arguably geared towards appeasing, and enhancing ties with China, partly
because of their war-guilt complex and sense of moral debt, and also, due to pragmatic
considerations. Moreover, the formidable leftwing/pacifist presence i.e. the Japan
Communist Party (JCP) and Japan Socialist Party (JSP) [now the Socialist Democratic Party
of Japan (SDPJ)] during the Cold War successfully neutralised ultra-nationalist-rightwing
and “anti-China” influences within the Japanese political arena, whilst exerting political
pressures on successive LDP administrations to improve ties with Beijing.
However, domestic political transformations since mid-1990s, marked by
generational change in leadership, and the weakening of leftist/pacifist institutions, have
begun negatively affecting Japanese-Chinese relations. Specifically, these “structural
changes” have altered the power balance and affected the customary competition between
“pro-Beijing” and “pro-Taipei” forces in China policy-making (Kokubun 2003; Mori 2007).
According to Drifte (2002:53), the passing of powerful “pro-China” politicians and
bureaucrats responsible in mustering political support for warmer bilateral ties saw their
replacements by a new generation of more independent, assertive, and less “China-
sympathetic” leaders. The increased political frictions in recent times suggest the reluctance
of contemporary Japanese state-elites to placate China, notably on traditionally sensitive
issues.51 Unlike their predecessors, leaders, like Obuchi and particularly, Koizumi, were
51 Apart from being commonly acknowledged by most Japan-China observers, the comments and opinions on
China and Japanese-Chinese relations during my interview with of one of the LDP’s “rising stars” and Diet-
members, Suzuki Keisuke confirm this observation (Suzuki interview).
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more defiant and willing to challenge, and “offend the Chinese, if necessary” (Self 2002:80;
Soerensen 2006:114). Obuchi’s disregard of the Chinese “war apology” demand during
Jiang’s visit, and the obstinate posture adopted by Koizumi and his Cabinet members on the
Yasukuni and textbook issues, are noteworthy elucidations of this domestic “wind of change”
in Japan’s China policy-making.
Specifically to this thesis, the arrival of Koizumi Junichiro, a dynamic, but allegedly
nationalistic Japanese PM, had saliently affected Japan-China relations. According to Lam,
the “Koizumi factor”, referring to his “combative” personality and assertive policy, contributed
immensely to the “abysmal state of relations between the two neighbours” (2005:275).52
Indeed, Koizumi’s apparent abandonment of “friendship diplomacy” proved to be a principal
source of bilateral friction. Since his anointment in April 2001, Koizumi’s reluctance to
succumb to Chinese pressure had provoked the contempt of China’s leadership and
masses. Particularly, his annual Yasukuni pilgrimages, and insistence regarding his right to
do so, irked Beijing, who considered such callous acts by Japanese leaders as tantamount
to repudiating Japan’s militaristic past (Rose 2005). The worsening ties had also to do with
Koizumi’s cabinet appointments and their politico-ideological affiliations, which according to
Johnson (2005), comprised several “hard-line, anti-Chinese, pro-Taiwanese politicians”.
Lam shared Johnson’s observation that there were no “China-friendly” politicians appointed
to his cabinets [prior to October 2005], since the firing of Tanaka Makiko, ex-FM and
daughter of Tanaka Kakuei, in January 2002 (2005:285 fn.21). Furthermore, Koizumi is said
to have had marginalised not only keisei-kai, but factional politics, as a whole, by personally
determining his cabinet line-up, and not depending on factional patronage, but instead,
rallied support “directly from the LDP rank-and-file and Japanese public opinion” (Lam
2005:285 fn.22; Taniguchi 2005:452; Park 2001:458). Koizumi’s political independence and
popularity, coupled with political and administrative reforms in 2001 that enhance the PM’s
52 A former Senior Vice-Minister at the Cabinet Office claims that Japan’s basic policy stance towards China
remained unchanged, but opines that the “Koizumi factor” made the difference (Anonymous interview D).
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authority at the expense of bureaucratic influence, provided his Administration with greater
levers on China policy-making53 (Pei and Swaine 2005:3-4, Tanaka 2001).
Meanwhile, within the ruling LDP, the correlated decline of keisei-kai, following
corruption scandals and retirement of “China-Hands” like Nonaka Hiromu (Taniguchi
2005:452-453), precipitated the ascendancy of the hawkish and “China-sceptical” seiwa-kai
(ex-Fukuda/Mori) faction (Pei and Swaine 2005:4; Kato interview/1).54 Paralleling such
developments has been the waning influence of leftist/pacifist opposition parties and the
concomitant shift of Japanese politics to the centre-right position (Yahuda 2006:168).
Altogether, these domestic transformations have hastened the meltdown of “pro-China”
political forces in Japan (Lam 2005; Drifte 2002).
The negative impact of Japan’s political transformation on Japanese-Chinese
relations, though, has a mitigating domestic factor in the zaikai, which has been traditionally
influential in pressuring Tokyo to adjust its overall China policy to advance Japanese
commercial interests in the Chinese mainland (Hook et.al 2001:55-56). It was the zaikai that
provided dynamic input to the seikei bunri policy that facilitated informal economic links with
China during the pre-normalisation period, and since 1972, has continued preserving the
most prosperous dimension of Japanese-Chinese relationship, while keeping politico-
diplomatic ties in check against serious erosion.55 It is true that the zaikai’s policy-making
influence has somewhat diminished along with the demise of Japan’s traditional “pork-
barrel” politics, following electoral reforms in 1994 (Anonymous interview G). Yet, one
should not under-estimate its role in deterring the Koizumi cabinet from overly intimidating
Beijing, since economic considerations remain fundamental to Japan’s overall China policy-
calculations.
53 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed elaboration of the PM’s foreign policy-making influence.
54 According to a senior “pro-China” LDP politician, Kato Koichi, the seiwa-kai, which both Koizumi and Abe
belong, is predominantly “anti-China” and “pro-US”. This faction contends that good ties with the latter do not
co-exist well with the former, which necessitates a trade-off. (Kato interview/1). See also Chapter 5 for further
discussions on nationalism, factional politics and China policy-making.
55 The zaikai was instrumental in overcoming economic setbacks, i.e. the ‘Baoshan’ episode (Hughes 1999:
181), and political uncertainties following the Tiananmen tragedy that threatened Japanese-Chinese ties.
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Nonetheless, the braking effect of economic factors can be dampened by an equally,
pervasive, domestic, socio-political dynamic in nationalism. Evidently, nationalism had
undermined Japanese-Chinese relations during the Cold War. On China’s part, diplomatic
tensions arising from Senkaku/Diaoyudao, history textbook, and Yasukuni controversies,
among others, were as much manifestations of domestic nationalist impulses, as Beijing’s
political manipulations to obtain politico-economic concessions from Tokyo. Similarly, these
issues gained salience in the Japanese domestic political discourse and agenda, following
manipulations by elements from the political left and right in Japan, as well as the rise of
“confident nationalism” during the era of “miraculous” economic growth in the 1970s-1980s
(Sasaki 2001). However, both governments’ pragmatism in shelving the related disputes
suggests the prevalence of the Cold War-imposed external-structural constraints in negating
excessive domestic nationalist influence in the policy-making process.
Importantly to this study, nationalism has apparently, gained salience in post-Cold
War Japanese-Chinese diplomacy. Indeed, resurgent nationalism in Japan and China in the
1990s has conceived a political climate detrimental to their fragile relationship. Besides
undermining their mutual societal images and attitude, flourishing domestic nationalist forces
have had, to various degrees, affected one another’s policy-orientation, contributing to the
recent proliferation of diplomatic discords over a plethora of bilateral issues. For instance,
the aforementioned history-related problems were indubitably, manifestations of nationalism
in Japanese and Chinese politics that have arguably influenced their mutually assertive
responses, when managing these disputes. The rekindling of the ECS territorial/maritime
disputes and Taiwan, and their shifting mutual security perceptions/policies that seemingly
target each other as potential threats, underscore nationalism’s impact on the bilateral ties.
Especially in Japan, thriving anti-Chinese nationalist sentiment, compounded by the other
mentioned political developments, are partly, responsible for reinventing contemporary
Japanese-Chinese diplomacy.
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3.4. Conclusion
The above overview of Japanese-Chinese relations highlights a relationship persistently
shaped by a compendium of structural-material and ideational dynamics deriving from both
external and domestic realms. It also illustrates the primacy of external imperatives in
defining the scope of bilateral interactions, and salience of domestic factors in dispensing
one’s policy-preferences. In the post-Cold War period, domestic variables, particularly
nationalism, has seemingly emerged as a key foreign policy driver that contributed to their
worsening relationship. This leads to the impending questions posed by this thesis, namely
how, in what manner and conditions, and to what extent nationalism affects foreign policy-
making, particularly in the Japanese context, when managing issues endemic in their
problematic ties. This warrants an analysis of Japanese nationalism, followed by an impact
assessment of nationalism in shaping Japan’s China policy and the bilateral relations, which
are the themes of subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THEORIES OF NATIONALISM AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN JAPAN
Transformations in both international and domestic realms have markedly affected
contemporary Japanese-Chinese relations. Domestically, structural and ideational changes
have triggered coalescing political shifts that saw nationalism apparently regaining salience
in their domestic and external agendas. Highlighted in Chapter 3, domestic nationalist
pressure constitutes a growing constraint that can affect and limit foreign policy-options,
especially when managing nationalistic-nuanced bilateral issues. In Japan’s case, the
frequent resurrection of diplomatic impasses vis-à-vis China, and their correlations with
domestic nationalist politics, reflects this policy-making scenario. This chapter analyses
nationalism, and its so-called “resurgence” in post-Cold War Japan. It begins with a brief
discussion on the definitions, concepts, and roles of nationalism in modern international
relations. Next, the intricacies of Japanese nationalism are elaborated, via a brief account of
its genesis and historical developments, followed by an examination of the driving forces
and manifestations behind its contemporary revitalisation. Special attention is allocated to
defining state/elite-driven and popular nationalisms. Questions regarding the “state-popular”
relationship, notably their points of convergence/divergence and correlated influence on
state behaviour/policy-options are, addressed, accordingly.
4.1. Defining and Understanding Nationalism
The term “nationalism” is among the most difficult to define and clarify with accuracy
(Ozkirimli 2000; Guibernau 1996; Smith and Hutchinson 1994). The plethora of definitions
accompanying nationalism’s extensive literature suggests the lack of an all-encompassing
meaning to this nebulous phenomenon (Zheng 1999:ix; Alter 1989). Hans Kohn, one of the
“twin founding fathers”1 of the intellectual discourse on nationalism (Kemilainen 1964 cf.
Ozkirimli 2000:13) defines it as “a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the
1 Although nationalism has implicitly emerged in the discourse and writings of renaissance thinkers, such as
Renan, Rosseau, Kant, Weber, and Durkheim, most scholars on nationalism consider Hans Kohn and Carleton
Hayes as arguably the “twin founding fathers” (term derives from Kemilainen 1964) of the academic
scholarship of nationalism. For further discussion, see Kemilainen (1964); Ozkirimli (2000); and Alter (1989).
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individual is felt to be due to the nation-state” (Kohn 1965:9). Ernest Gellner, another
prominent scholar of nationalism sees it as “primarily a political principle, which holds that
the political (state) and national (nation) unit should be in congruent” (1983:1). Meanwhile,
Anthony Smith contends that nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its
members to constitute an actual or potential nation” (1991:73). These “textbook” definitions
exemplify nationalism’s multi-dimensional nature – it is political, socio-cultural, and
psychological – making it a powerful and pervasive, yet enigmatic force in the modern world.
Predominantly viewed as a product of modernity emanating from 18th century
European history (Smith 1995; Breuilly 1982), nationalism is synonymous with, and
inseparable from the concepts of “nation”, “nation-state”, and “national identity”(Baycroft
1998:3). Nationalism fundamentally concerns the “nation”, another puzzling term to define,
due to its ambiguous relationship with other kindred concepts, i.e. race and ethnicity
(Ozkirimli 2000:58), and its tendency of being widely, but mistakenly equated with the
concept of “state” (Connor 1994:92). Apparently, the terms “nation” and “state” are not
identical, as argued by Arthur Waldron, who saw the former possessing substance not
inherent in the latter, namely “a feeling, a passion, a legitimating power that the word
‘nationalism’ possesses to an unequalled degree” (1985:417; cf. Zheng 1999:x).2
Nationalism also co-exists with the “nation-state” concept. Modernist views on nationalism’s
genesis highlight the political, economic and socio-cultural transformations, and the state’s
role in engendering nationalism and the formation of nation. Eric Hobsbawm sees nation
and nationalism as “invented traditions”, a product of “social engineering” by states
2 Guibernau defines “nation” as “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture,
attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and common project for the future, and
claiming the right to rule itself” (1996:47). Conversely, a “state” in Max Weber’s contention refers to “a human
community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (1948:78).
Whilst these definitions highlight the nation as possessing multi-dimensional characteristics: it is psychological,
cultural, territorial, political, and historical; the state, with its primarily political and territorial features, appears
much more limited in substance. This vindicates Waldron’s observation, illustrating a marked distinction
between the two concepts; the former espousing a socio-cultural and psychological dimension the latter does
not possess, namely the objective features of language, culture, religion, and common descent that form the
basis of a collective identity, and the subjective element of consciousness and affection towards the perceived
shared identity (Kellas 1991:2; cf. Zheng 1999:x; Ozkirimli 2000:58).
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(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983 cf. Ozikirimli 2000:121), while Gellner (1983) associates the
formation of “high culture” in industrial societies, and the consequent emergence of nations
through state fostering of nationalist sentiments via mass education and communication.
Both perspectives, Guibernau asserts, emphasise the state’s utilisation of nationalism to
create a nation-state that is “coextensive” and identifies with it, where state-
society/citizen/nation relation is not merely a political association, but also “an expression of
the multidimensional relation which derives from the idea of nation formation” (1996:59).
Moreover, according to Zheng Yongnian, nationalism comprises “institution” and “identity”,
two crucial components of the nation-state (1999:x). Zheng opines that nationalism is not
salient when expressed by individuals in its raw and disorganised form, especially in the
context of international relations (1999:x). It becomes credible only after it is organised and
expressed collectively by institutions (1999:x). In modern international society, its successful
expression is unequivocally through the “state”, the foremost institution in the Westphalian
world order (Young 1976:72; cf. Zheng 1999:x).
Next, nationalism emphasises the individuality and distinctiveness of a nation-state,
specifically its “national identity” (Zheng 1999:x). Identity, by definition, refers to “an
interpretation of the self that establishes what and where the person is in both social and
psychological terms” (Guibernau 1996:72). Guibernau construes that “when one has identity
one is situated”, and that “identities exist only in societies, which define and organize them”,
and it exists and defines only in relations to other identities (1996:72). At the individual level,
identity reflects “the need to belong to a community”, and in the modern world where “nation”
is one such community, “national identity is its product” (1996:72-73). National identity thus,
refers to the collective sentiment shared by members of a perceived nation, or an “imagined
community” (Anderson 1991) that distinguishes and situates them from other national
communities. As the “creator” of national identity (Guibernau 1996), nationalism situates a
nation-state vis-à-vis other national actors within the modern international society/system.
National identity usually derives its essence from more basic forms of identity. It is
typical for nation-states with near homogenous societies to forge national identity based on
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elements like shared culture and common descent. Conversely, such primordial features
tend to be divisive and obstructive to its formation in nation-states with heterogeneous and
polarised societies. However, “national identity” can transcend these objective-cum-divisive
features, if they are, superseded by the intersubjectivity of what Kellas opines as, a people’s
conciousness of, and devotion/affection for its nationality, and sense of belonging to the
nation-state (1991:2 cf. Zheng 1999:x; Ozkirimli 2000:58). This is where the symbolic-
mythical content of nationalism, fundamentally the use of myths, symbols, and rituals,
becomes essential in national identity creation, serving as both unification and divisive
“markers” to cloak differences, while highlighting commonalities within a nation, and
differentiate members of one nation from others3 (Guibernau 1996:80-82; Farrands 1996:17;
Van Evera 1994:30). Guibernau concurs that these “markers” are able to generate within
individuals a feeling of extraordinary emotional intensity that emanates from their
identification with the nation, a transcending entity that provides sentiment of belonging,
from which they derive “strength and resilience”, and under whose name they participate in
“heroic as well as barbaric actions” to defend its interests (1996:83). Crawford Young
therefore, credibly asserts that nationalism is “an ideological formulation of identity”, of which
the nation is stipulated as “a terminal community” with “transcendent moral sanction and
authority”, to whom “active obligation” is mandatory, and “ultimate loyalty is owned” (1976:71
cf. Zheng 1999:x). In its radical manifestation, national identity is “the supreme loyalty for
people who are prepared to die for their nation” (Kellas 1991:3 cf. Zheng 1999:x).
In the international context, nationalism legitimises the Westphalian “society of
nation-states” doctrine, where the “state”, as the sovereign authority, represents and links
nation/society to the international system (Zheng 1999:xi; Mayall 1990:Chp.2). According to
Mayall, the principles of national self-determination and sovereignty espoused by
nationalism recognise nation-states as independent, equal, and separate political entities
3 Guibernau concurs that national consciousness is created and sensitised through symbolism and rituals, i.e.
flying the national flag and singing the national anthem, of which specific values and meanings serve as
“markers” that unite members of a nation, while differentiating it from others (1996: 82). He argues that these
“markers” masks the diversities within a nation, “transforming the reality of difference into the appearance of
similarity, thus allowing people to invest the ‘community’ with ideological integrity”, and inculcating a sense of
unity, despite their diverging economic, and socio-cultural backgrounds (1996:82). See also Van Evera (1994).
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that interact on the basis of acknowledging each other’s: i) sovereignty, ii) autonomy and
monopoly of jurisdiction within their own political boundaries, iii) territorial integrity, and iv)
non-interference in domestic affairs (1990:19-20). Indeed, its particularistic feature of
defining the “self” from the “other” drives nations towards striving for, and maintaining “the
political notion of territorial self-determination, the cultural notion of national identity, and the
moral notion of national self-defense in an anarchical [nation-state system]” (Zhao 2000:3).
Interestingly, these principles mirror the realist conception of the anarchic condition of the
modern international system, which underscores “survival” as the overarching goal of nation-
states, and the plausible utility of force/war to realise the national interests that are primarily
defined in terms of national survival (Mayall 1990).
Nationalism is inherently “Janus-faced” (Guibernau 1996:45). Depending on
expression, it “can be either a powerfully constructive or destructive force” (Nester 1995:74).
Nationalism has been effervescent throughout modern history, playing a fundamentally
positive role in the decolonisation and nation-building processes, and domestic economic
development (Posen 1993:80). Then again, its malignant nature has often prevailed, fuelling
numerous international conflicts and “human tragedies” (Zhao 2000:1). Presumably, its
promotion of “particularism” tends to invoke ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, and chauvinism
that become the driving force behind such belligerent behaviour (Zhao 2000:3; Van Evera
1994).4 As history has repeated itself on many occasions, nationalism, when not prudently
managed, always perpetuates violent outcomes.
To summarise, nationalism as a “modern” phenomenon with perennial roots attached
to primordial elements (Smith 1986), is a profound force. It is socio-psychological and
political, in both form and essence. Deriving intrinsically from members of particular social
groupings who (perceive to) share distinctive dispositions, heritage, and sentiments of
4 Scholars generally agree that nationalism and national consciousness are intimately linked to the idea and
experiences of war, and share a mutually reinforcing relationship (Fujiwara 2001:37; Howard 1991:39-43;
Posen 1993; Van Evera 1994; Farrands 1996). Throughout the 20th century, nationalism’s malevolent and
destructive manifestation was associated with imperialistic expansionism, the outbreak of two world wars, and
violent “independence and separatist movements” (Chen 1995:4 cf. Zhao 2000:3). It was also blamed for
precipitating an epidemic of ethno-religious and genocidal conflicts in the post-Cold War era (see Howard
1991). For a discussion on “particularistic nationalisms”, see Greenfeld (1992:8-9).
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belonging towards their collective identities, nationalism can be organised and emphatically
expressed via the state to realise political ends. Its “particularism” and advocacy of the
principles of self-determination, sovereignty, and equality between nations, underscore the
basis of modern international relations. Meanwhile, its instrumental value allows state/elite
manipulation for popular mobilisation towards various political goals, both domestic and
international. Yet, nationalism, for all its instrumentality, is unpredictable, and has the
tendency to undermine the agencies that promote it.
Stipulated in Chapter 1, this thesis’ triple-pronged definition of nationalism represents
its fundamental underpinnings and multi-dimensional characteristics. The first reflects the
cultural-ideational dimension, one which emphasises the socio-cultural and psychological
attributes that intrinsically drive most, if not all forms of nationalist sentiments, and imbues
the nation and its members with a “national identity”.5 Focusing on grassroots-level national
consciousness, this definition suggests a “bottom-up” view of nationalism that emphasises
the role of ordinary people, non-state actors, and populist emotions/passion in shaping the
nationalist discourse/agenda of a nation-state (Gries 2004:20). Conversely, the second and
third meanings draw on the political notion and state-centric character of nationalism.
Aforesaid, nationalism is political in essence and generally associated with the state. From
its basic form, represented by individual and popular sentiment, nationalism can be
remarkably political, when expressed through the state and its apparatuses. The second
definition underscores the link, or “co-extensiveness” between nation and state (Guibernau
1996), where socio-cultural identity overlaps/interwines with political identity. Here, a “top-
down” perspective of nationalism is emphasised, whereby the state, viewed as the
embodiment and political representation of the nation, has the power to mould, although not
dictate the content of domestic nationalist discourse (Gries 2004). Meanwhile, the third
definition represents nationalism’s instrumental value that encourages its utilisation for
political expediency (Brass 1991). To reiterate, nationalism’s ultility function is not limited to
5 Here, I borrow Gries’ interpretation of “national identity”, which he loosely defined as “that aspect of
individual’s self-image that is tied to their nation, together with the value and emotional significance they attach
to membership in the national community” (2004:9). And, “nationalism”, he contends, refers to “any behaviour
designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images of that national community” (2004:9).
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the state/state-elite, as commonly but narrowly understood in mainstream IR literature. Non-
state actors, namely nationalist pressure groups and the masses also politicise it to
influence governmental policies and decision-making (Gries 2004).
Altogether, these definitions classify nationalism, commonly, into two distinctive yet
correlated, and at times, mutually embracing typologies, namely i) official/state/elite-driven
nationalism and ii) popular nationalism. Although nationalism is largely, seen as state-
engendered, and under the government’s purview, the state does not necessarily
monopolise the domestic nationalist agenda (Gries 2004; Seckington 2005; McVeigh 2004;
Stronach 1995; Guibernau 1996). In nationalistically effervescent countries, popular/mass-
oriented nationalism may feature prominently in the domestic nationalist discourse.
State/official nationalism tends to be pragmatic, rational, affirmative and instrumental (Zhao
2000; 2004; 2005; Downs and Saunders 1998/9). It is also moderate, national interest-
driven (based on state’s calculation of costs and benefits), and reactive rather than proactive
(Zhao 2000:2). Meanwhile, popular nationalism is generally more diversified, robust,
emotional, spontaneous, and potentially virulent, xenophobic and aggressive (Seckington
2005). It is, driven by the collective consciousness of individuals, who identify themselves as
members of a nation, under whose name, they seek to defend its interests, and champion its
causes. It draws strength from nationalism’s intrinsic values, possesses a more critical
intellectual debate (Seckington 2005:27), is largely independent of, and “should not be
conflated with…official nationalism” (Gries 2004:20; Chen 2005; Deans 2000).
That said, popular nationalism is, to an extent, abetted by state nationalism, which
arguably provides an environment conducive for it to flourish (Rose 2000:174). Also, popular
nationalist discourse does overlap with official rhetoric and identifies with the state, when
there exists a confluence of interests, like advocating for dynamic and assertive foreign/
security policies, and more decisive actions in defence of the national interests (Seckington
2005:27), or against perceived external pressures/threats. Both types of nationalism may
share certain objectives, while diverging in others. Popular nationalism forms the bulwark of
support for the state’s nationalist agenda, when their objectives are mutually
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complementary. However, competition for dominance over the domestic nationalist agenda
may prevail, if conflicting interests and nationalist goals arise between these two domains
(Gries 2004). “Popular nationalism can be critical of official policy” (Seckington 2005:27),
especially when the state is perceived as having failed to live up to its nationalist credentials.
Aforementioned, popular nationalist pressure emanating from pressure groups and public
opinion can effectively constrain state behaviour. It can be especially salient, if state-elites
are politically dependent on nationalism, and strong elite-mass linkage characterises the
domestic political system.
The incorporation of these definitions and typologies generates better understanding,
compared to the conventional, mono-dimensional perspective that views nationalism as
predominantly state-led, and merely a power instrument/political tool to bolster social
cohesion and political legitimacy. Such a view, as Gries opines, is only partially correct, but it
cannot fully grasp the depth of nationalism and the significance of “emotion and passion” in
nationalist politics, which is by no means, under the state’s exclusive control, and presided
by purely rational pursuit of national interests (2004:18-20; 87-90). Moreover, one should
understand nationalism via a combination of definitions, and view it from both “top-down”
and “bottom-up” perspectives, since state/state-elites and popular nationalists “participate in
nationalist politics, and both emotional and instrumental concerns drive their behaviour”
(Gries 2004:87). Simply put, nationalism’s rational-utility and emotive dispositions should be,
simultaneously considered, since both “sense/passion” and “sensibility/reason” matter in
international relations and foreign policy-making (Gries 2004:20; 87-90). Most importantly,
these classifications are relevant to interpreting nationalism in Japan, and its impact on
contemporary Japanese-Chinese ties. The following section demonstrates that Japanese
nationalism professes most of these meanings, and exhibits the stipulated attributes.
4.2. The Genesis, Evolution, and Meanings of Nationalism in Japan
The Cold War’s passing and the burst of Japan’s “economic bubble” triggered socio-
economic and political malaise that saw the crisis of national identity and purpose deepened
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amongst Japanese in the so-called “Lost Decade” of the 1990s (McCormack 2000:247).
Against this backdrop, the desire for “national regeneration” has led to the reckoning of a
series of socio-political developments that is symptomatic of a new national mood in Japan
(McCormack 2000:247-248), with nationalism apparently regaining currency after being a
“taboo” for decades, following its dreadful manifestation in WWII (McVeigh 2004:3; Rose
2000).6 Understandably, the nationalistic endeavours and expressions in recent times have
raised both international and domestic concerns. Debates regarding its future direction have
generated contrasting opinions; pessimists within and outside Japan perceive it as
representing the potential resurrection of prewar ultra-nationalism, whereas optimists
denounce such observations as misunderstandings out of ignorance, suggesting the so-
called “neo-nationalism” as simply a benign and inevitable development as Japan seeks to
re-establish a “normal” nation-state identity. An overview of prewar and postwar Japanese
nationalism is thus necessary to comprehend as much, the contending debate, as the
driving forces, characteristics, and international orientations of its contemporary
manifestations.
4.2.1. Overview of prewar nationalism
Generally, most scholars identify the roots of Japanese nationalism to the Meiji epoch,
during which its reform-minded oligarchs borrowed the Western concepts of nationalism and
nation-state, together with their institutional and technological efficacies to rebuild feudal
Japan into a modern nation-state. They also largely agree that the essence of nationalism
and national identity primarily derived from Japanese traditional culture and symbols, and
perceived common ethno-religious bond that Meiji state-elites reinvented to inculcate the
nationalist ideology, via education, media, military conscriptions, and other state
apparatuses, under a centralised polity (Gluck 1985:17-23; Pyle 1971:11 Brown 1955:Chp.5;
Conroy 1955; Stronach 1995; McVeigh 2004). Notwithstanding the “nativist-based”, pre-
modern nationalistic expressions throughout Japan’s mediaeval history, i.e. “elitist-proto-
6 According to McVeigh, it is apparently normal for the mass media and the average Japanese to claim that
“Japanese “nationalism” died in 1945”, which he believes is one of the myths of postwar Japan, especially since
nationalism has continued to permeate Japanese daily life under the cloak of euphemisms such as “culture”,
“tradition” or “custom” (2004:xi).
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nationalism” (McVeigh 2004:42), and semblance of a centralised political system under the
Tokugawa Shogunate, nationalism, as an organised socio-political movement espousing
national identity and nation-statehood, was in Conroy’s opinion, non-existent in pre-1868
Japan, due to traditionally divisive “horizontal (feudal classes) and vertical [forces] (the fiefs)”
that impeded its development (1955:821; Brown 1955).7 That said, these nascent
expressions/movements laid the ideological groundwork, which together with external
pressure during the mid-19th century, gave rise to modern Japanese nationalism (McVeigh
2004; Stronach 1995; Yoshino 1992).
Scholars generally acknowledge that Japanese national consciousness was fostered
by external factors, namely the knowledge of China’s “Opium War” experiences, and more
so, through Japan’s own encounter with foreign pressures after two centuries of isolationism
(sakoku) (Matsumoto 1971:51), beginning with the arrival of Commodore Perry’s “black
ships” (1853), and the subsequent imposition of “unequal treaties” and Western powers’
bombardment of Kagoshima (1863) and Shimonoseki (1864) (Pyle 1971; Hasegawa 1985;
Nish 2000:82). Before this, Japanese had held an ethnocentric, Confucian-based
“culturalist” worldview that regarded Japan as a culturally and morally superior entity, while
dismissing the West as barbaric and culturally inept (Matsumoto 1971:51). This worldview
was, nevertheless, discredited in the wake of Western imperialism in East Asia, which saw
the Japanese re-evaluating and acknowledging their backwardness compared to the
politically and militarily-advanced Western nations (Matsumoto 1971:51). According to
Stronach, unlike the Chinese, who got “suffocated by the weight” of their great civilisation,
the Japanese were more flexible in adopting foreign ideas, due to their past tradition of
7 Conroy concedes “there was at most “national consciousness” in Japan before 1868” (1955:821), while
McVeigh suggests the existence of an “elitist proto-nationalism” promoted by “Nativist Studies (Kokugaku)”
and “Mito School” intellectuals that sought to divorce Japan’s past from Chinese influences by emphasising
“the uniqueness of the Japanese imperial lineage”, and which also initiated the nascent discourse on reform and
defence against Western encroachment (2004:42). Similarly, Yoshino saw Kokugaku as “a prototype cultural
nationalist ideology”, which was essentially a “nativist reaction” against “Sinophilism” in Tokugawa Japan, and
“an affirmation of indigenous [Japanese] culture” by intellectual elites, who strove to revive the ancient
literature, the practice of kodo or Shinto (the ancient way), and the centrality of the Emperor (1992:46; 49).
These “proto-nationalist” elites were responsible for inspiring the domestic-oriented sonno (revere the emperor)
movement, which, later on, incorporated the externally-directed and xenophobic joii (expel the barbarian)
slogan that eventually led to the successful coup d’etat of the Tokugawa bakufu and the restoration of the
Imperial political system in 1868 (Brown 1955:58-61, 76-90 ; Stronach 1995:36; McVeigh 2004:42).
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borrowing from other cultures (especially from China), and therefore had lesser problems
opening itself to, and vigorously learning from the West (1995:32-34). The fear of
succumbing to Western “gunboat diplomacy” motivated the Meiji government to embark on
an expansive modernisation-cum-westernisation programme, to reinvent the Japanese state
and nation. During the initial stages, campaigns to eradicate Japanese feudal traditions were
launched by Meiji oligarchs committed to the wholesale emulation of Western ideals,
institutions, and know-how.8 Whilst nationalism and nation-state-building of the Western
genre were officially sanctioned, “culturalism” was vilified as the source of degeneration, and
an obstacle to reinventing a modern Japan. A centralised bureaucracy in Tokyo, and the use
of state instruments, i.e. national education system, military services, communication/
transportation networks, an influential media, and bureaucratically-controlled local
organisations, facilitated the mass-level penetration of the nationalist ideology (Conroy
1955:823; Pyle 1971:11).
However, the intensive state-led policy provoked a “nativist” reprisal, due to rising
internal tension between Western-centred modernisation and nativist traditions that created
deep social fissures and identity crises, while externally, continuous Western pressure and
unequal treatment, despite Japan’s achievement of modern nation-statehood disenchanted
many within the Japanese society (Stronach 1995:38-39, 41-42; Conroy 1955:827; Pyle
1971).9 Calls for the revival of Japanese traditions and culture in the face of Western
onslaught by intellectual groups and conservative elites stirred popular discontent. This
prompted the embattled Meiji state-elites to, instrumentally, recreate the cultural component
of the nationalist ideology, based upon key traditional symbols and myths, namely the
8 The development of nationalism and Japan’s national identity was undertaken by the Sat-Cho oligarchy, who
besides intending to secure its domestic power position, realised that Japan had no choice but to develop at par
with the Western powers, while maintaining a distinctive national identity, in order to survive and successfully
compete under the Darwinian logic of the international system (Stronach 1995:36-39).
9 Stronach construes that “By the late 1880s, the nativist nationalism began to manifest itself as a reaction
against Westernisation and the control of Western powers over Japan” (1995:39). The Meiji oligarchy was
becoming unpopular, accused of betraying the roots and essence of the Japanese people, and for its overly
Western orientations and consistent capitulation to foreign demands (Conroy 1955:827; Stronach 1995:41-42).
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“State-Shinto” religion and the tennosei (emperor) system,10 while simultaneously sustaining
the modernisation agenda as the basis for Japan’s national renewal, their own political
survival, notwithstanding (McVeigh 2004:42-43; Stronach 1995:40; Tamamoto 2001).11
Imperial Japan’s successful initial experiments with expansionism, notably in the
Japanese-Chinese and Russo-Japanese wars, boosted Japanese nationalism, and national
pride and confidence, considerably (Nish 2000:84; Pyle 1971; Conroy 1955).12 National
consciousness was also heightened by the disproportionate recognition and increased
external pressures from Western powers that accompanied the resulting peace treaties’
negotiations, namely the Triple Intervention in 1895 and the “lopsided” US-negotiated peace
accord in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese conflict (Stronach 1995:42; Pyle 1971:8).
According to Stronach, the Western powers’ persistent disregard of Japan on equal terms
aggravated popular anti-Western and anti-government sentiments that propagated the
“siege mentality” and “nativist” resurgence in Japanese nationalist discourse (1995:42; 49-
50). These attributes were, further strengthened by the outcomes of international events
following the end of WWI, where Japan was again, pressured into accepting unequal terms
under the Treaty of Versailles and several other international disarmament accords during
10 The Emperor became the divine embodiment of the Japanese nation and state, and was placed at the centre of
Japanese life, serving as both spiritual and political leader that required ultimate devotion from, and undying
loyalty of its subjects (Stronach 1995:40). The centrality of the emperor and the promulgation of state Shinto
were formalised in the Meiji Constitution of 1889, indicating the nativist turn in the evolution of Japanese
nationalism (Stronach 1995:40). Indeed, the “invented” mysticism surrounding the Emperor status and its
preponderance in the Japanese consciousness was a vital element of modern Japanese identity, and “a key
renovationist symbol” (McVeigh 2004:42-43) of the Meiji state that served as the rallying point for Japan’s
emergence as a modern, powerful and yet distinctive nation-state.
11 According to McVeigh, to mobilise the masses for political loyalty and national regeneration via a state-
oriented nationalism (kokka shugi) (2004:34), the Sat-Cho oligarchs also introduced the mythical yet practical
idea of kokutai (a continuous national historical essence) (cf. Najita 1980:47) to indicate Japan’s “immutable”
and “national character” (cf. Goto 1988:32-33). It served along with other concepts and ideals like minzoku
(nation), tanitsu minzoku (homogenous nation) (2004:28), seikyo itchi (unity of politics and religion), and
kokumin dotoku (national morals) as “key conceptual building blocks” of prewar nationalism (2004:43).
12 Kenneth Pyle suggests the first Japanese-Chinese war of 1894-95 as perhaps “the most impressive in this
regard”, for the stunning Japanese victory not only “drowned the doubts and dissensions of the preceding
decades in a flood of national exhilaration”, but equally ushered in a confident national mood and self-
perception of Japan as the strongest East Asian state, and a rising power in the international community
(1971:8). Indeed, the Meiji government enjoyed unprecedented popularity during the war, “as popular
enthusiasm fired official nationalism” (Conroy 1955:826). The function of war in promoting Japanese national
pride and conciousness could also be seen during the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war that followed, when Japan
became the first Asian state to defeat a Western power (see Shimazu 2006:Chp.2). Besides quashing the
perceived invincibility of the West, which inspired the birth of anti-colonial nationalisms across Asia, scholars
agree that victory over Russia served as further testament to the viability of the government’s nationalist policy
to build a strong nation-state, and as such, provided major latitude for the continuous mobilisation of the
Japanese population under the banner of state nationalism (Shimazu 2006; McVeigh 2004; Nish 2000).
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the interwar years.13 The continuous perception of external bullying played a significant role
mobilising national loyalty under an increasingly parochial Japanese state, and encouraging
the rise of militarist ultra-nationalism (Stronach 1995:43; Matsumoto 1971:51).14
Ultra-nationalism in the 1930s, was likewise, driven by the radicalisation of the
nationalist discourse in response to growing domestic socio-economic discontentment.
Ultra-nationalists deplored the Western liberal-democratic values that corrupted the
traditional mores of the Japanese society, and were critical of the government’s
incompetence in alleviating economic sufferings, and reducing urban-rural disparities,
besides its failure to tackle corruption in the Japanese political economy and bureaucracy
(Stronach 1995:43-44). Perceiving these appalling trends as signs of a Japanese nation in
peril, radical ideologues and nationalist groups called for “a second revolutionary renovation,
a “Showa Renovation””(McVeigh 2004:46), reminiscent to the all-encompassing Meiji-
reforms, to reconstruct the domestic order and unshackle Japan from its malaise (Najita
1980:129-30 cf. McVeigh 2004:46; Large 2006). Yet, unlike the Meiji nationalists, they were
more fundamentalistic and unabashedly xenophobic. McVeigh saw these so-called “Showa
patriots” revolting “against interests politics and the industrial and bureaucratic elitism
enmeshed in the constitutional system” (cf. Najita 1980:127) and advocating the return to
“direct imperial rule” in place of democracy, and “a militarily-based, spiritual revival”
(2004:46-47). As ultra-nationalism brewed in domestic politics, political coups were staged,
culminating in the 1936 “February 26 Incident” that saw the beleaguered Japanese state
succumbing to ultra-nationalist pressure, where parochial ideals were eventually
incorporated, and radical figures like Araki Sadao and Tojo Hideki embraced as part of the
“new bureaucracy”(Conroy 1955:828; McVeigh 2004:47).
13 For a discussion of these issues and attributes of Japanese nationalism, see Stronach (1995:43; 49-52).
14 According to Matsumoto, not only did it make Japan acutely conscious of the “qualitative difference”
between itself and the West, an awareness that became “an incurable source of the Japanese sense of crisis and
threat vis-à-vis the Western world”, such a negative perception of the “self” and “other” was also the central
reason behind prewar nationalism’s preoccupation with the quest of building a ““militarily powerful Japan”
(fukoku kyohei)”, and its inclination towards militarism (1971:51).
118
With the militarists/ultra-nationalists gaining political power, greater emphasis was
placed on promoting national solidarity and reinforcing state-society linkage, as well as
securing nationwide support for official political, economic, and military objectives, under the
domestic-centred “New Order Movement” (McVeigh 2004:47). Externally, the state
promoted Japanese-led Pan-Asianism under the “East Asia New Order”, which
subsequently metamorphosed into the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (McVeigh
2004:47). Whether truly liberationist, or expansionist in essence, this external policy led the
Japanese state to mobilise the populace under the aegis of an official nationalism that was
skewed towards militarism. Japan’s colonisation of Manchuria and subsequent invasions of
China and French Indo-China provoked serious Western retributions that exacerbated the
Japanese “siege-mentality” and anti-western sentiment (Stronach 1995:44). It also led to the
launching of the “National Spiritual Mobilisation Campaign” and the autocratic Imperial Rule
Assistance Association (Kinoshita 1971:32-50 cf. McVeigh 2004:108), as Japan geared itself
for general mobilisation towards its ill-conceived involvement in WWII.
In sum, nationalism in prewar Japan was primarily elite-inspired, fostered in reaction
to gaiatsu, and manifested in the form of state-sponsored nationalism that aspired for
national renewal and a unified, strong and prideful Japanese nation. Nationalism was also,
inculcated to create a unique national identity, and enhance Japan’s competitiveness and
survival in the international system (Stronach 1995:35). Although state nationalism was
predominant, popular nationalist sentiment was equally effervescent. As Gluck suggests,
“the strongest views – the hard line – often came from outside the government, from the
minkan [people]” (1985:9-10). Popular nationalist discourse and activities were influential in
constraining and, at times, even flavouring the official nationalist agenda. Yet, these populist
movements were not genuinely grassroots, but elite-driven, often by individuals of noble
descent (samurai), the intelligentsia, journalists, and public personalities (Gluck 1985:10;
McVeigh 2004:48). Another noted element of prewar nationalism was its inclination towards
militarism and expansionism. These characteristics were driven by Japan’s fear of foreign
oppression that, according to Matsumoto, made the “preservation of national polity” through
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“self-perpetuation and self-expansion” the ultimate national mission (1971:53), and by the
wellspring of popular disaffection that saw state-elites advocating expansionist-cum-
diversionary policies as a solution to domestic discontentment (Conroy 1955).
4.2.2. The persistence and evolution of nationalism in postwar Japan
Japan’s traumatic WWII experience altered the Japanese view of nationalism and national
identity. According to Sasaki, nationalism was blamed for precipitating the war, and Japan’s
defeat saw a temporary hiatus in its development, only to subsequently reappear in distorted
forms, as postwar Japanese struggled to re-embrace nationalism in a “natural”, open and
“straightforward” fashion (2001). The common observation was that the Japanese were
facing an acute identity crisis, since the symbols/markers and institutions they ardently
identified with, and endeared themselves to, were no longer a source of national pride.
Apparently, besides the rejection of prewar institutions, the traditional notions of nation-state,
also dissipated, following the war defeat, American occupation, disarmament, and the
embrace of pacifism, democracy and Westernisation/Americanisation (Matsumoto 1971:55;
Stronach 1995:45). However, nationalism did not totally disappear, but instead, has
permeated, albeit in different, and mostly “banal” forms (Billig 1995), i.e. cultural, economic,
and peace nationalisms, among others (McVeigh 2001; 2004; Rose 2000). Even prewar
ultra-nationalism has survived, manifesting in numerically fringed, non-official, ultra-rightwing
movements that draw limited mass appeal (McVeigh 2001). Other notable characteristics of
postwar nationalism include the perpetuation of discourses that sought national renewal and
independence via different strategies, and its depoliticisation that saw the weakening of
state-sponsored nationalism and state-society linkage, and the rise of political apathy
(McVeigh 2004; Stronach 1995; Matsumoto 1971).
Scholars generally divide postwar nationalism into three defining periods; i) early
Cold War decades; ii) between 1960s-1980s, when Japan enjoyed miraculous economic
growth; and iii) “post-bubble” malaise from the early 1990s till present (Sasaki 2001;
McVeigh 2004). Interestingly, these periods coincided with the aforementioned structural
shifts in the international system that affected Japan’s foreign/China policy-directions and
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Japanese-Chinese diplomacy, suggesting the influence of external imperatives on
nationalism’s manifestations. Like Gao (1997), Sasaki contends there were two diverging
expressions of nationalism during the first phase (1945-1960); the first being the restoration
of “official” nationalism and a conservative, rightwing-oriented polity that sought alliance with
the Americans, while simultaneously harbouring the reinstallation of Japan’s defence
capabilities and diplomatic autonomy (Sasaki 2001). The second came in the form of
promoting military pacifism, and an independent, neutralist position that opposed the
subordination of Japan into the Western bloc, advocated mainly by the political left/centre-
left, and popularly embraced by the Japanese society (Sasaki 2001; Gao 1997).
The reinstatement of official nationalism amid attempts to disengage Japan from its
nationalistic-cum-militaristic past, was indirectly the result of what Chapter 3 decribed as the
emerging Cold War security architecture that saw postwar Japan gaining strategic
importance in Washington’s regional containment policy (Dower 1996:155-156). Fearing the
communist threat from within and outside Japan, the US ended its occupation, and
encouraged the re-establishment of a conservative, rightwing Japanese government that
was incorporated into its alliance framework, to fight a common enemy (Dower 1996:Chp.5;
Kingston 2004). Not only did it hamper the pacification process, the American policy-shift
sponsored the restoration of prewar nationalistic elements, which included, among others,
an “Emperor-system democracy” (Dower 1999b), the military, albeit under a US-sponsored,
limited self-defence framework, an entrenched bureaucracy, and wartime figures, convicted
but eventually released and encouraged to revive their political careers within mainstream
politics (McCormack 2000:250; Berger 2007:191). The establishment of the “conservative-
rightwing” LDP in 1955 reflected the influence of rehabilitated ex-wartime politicians and
bureaucrats, like Hatoyama Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke (Pyle 1996:57-58), whose respective
appointments to the premiership position indicated not only the continuities of prewar
nationalism in postwar Japanese politics, but also the budding of an official nationalism that
121
was “dependent” on American encouragement and acquiescence.15 Indeed, Washington
was behind Kishi’s attempt to remilitarise Japan via a revision of the Article IX, and his
resolve to renew the US-Japan security treaty in 1960, despite severe public backlash
(Miyazawa 1997:12; Conachy 2001:5).
Conversely, leftwing political organisations, i.e. the JSP and JCP, promoted a so-
called “peace nationalism” that sought to distance Japan from the Western bloc, and kept
vigil against ultra-nationalism resurrecting within the Diet, considering the ominous presence
of far-right LDP elements that intermittently wielded their influence in postwar politics (Orr
2001). Peace nationalism became influential, and synonymous with non-official nationalism
embraced by the postwar Japanese society, who was generally suspicious of “official”
nationalism, owing to the popular notion that the Japanese state was responsible for the
war, and that the people were victims of its nationalist-cum-expansionist policies (McVeigh
2001; 2004:77; 207).16 Despite the apparent official-popular dichotomy, there was a
confluence between popular and state nationalism via depoliticised expressions, namely
economic and cultural, which characterised Japanese nationalism between 1960s-1980s.
The second phase coincided with the period that saw a reduction of bipolar hostility
and Japan’s accelerated economic growth (Sasaki 2001). A “new consensus” on a
nationalist discourse centred on economic endeavours and culturalism, rather than defence
and foreign policies, led to the convergence of state/official and popular nationalisms, and
public acquiescence of state-sponsored nationalist agendas to promote economic
advancement, and inculcate ideas of “Japanese-ness” (Sasaki 2001; McVeigh 2004:Chp.6).
Postwar economic nationalism has its roots in prewar ideals of building a strong Japanese
nation-state via national mobilisation, and implementations of state-guided
“developmentalist” policies and economic projects, to amass economic power for national
self-preservation and survival (McVeigh 2001). During the early postwar period, similar
15 The “dependent” nature of Japan’s postwar nationalism has been noted in several works, i.e. McCormack
(2000; 2007), Kingston (2004), and Tsunekawa 2006). This term is utilised throughout the thesis.
16 Popular “peace” nationalism is non-partisan, though often exhibiting an anti-state slant in postwar Japan, and
“expressing itself as political apathy, dislike of explicit displays of national power…or a general suspicion
towards the political authorities” (McVeigh 2004:77). For a discussion of peace nationalism, see Orr (2001).
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nationalist agendas and practices “became the direct starting point for postwar recovery”
(Nakamura 1994:124 cf. McVeigh 2004:110) as official nationalism was purposefully,
redirected towards the reconstruction of Japan. With the US-Japan security framework
guaranteeing national security, Dower saw the Japanese state concentrating its efforts on
economic development, “mobilizing [the national] population and resources resolutely
behind productivity and economic nationalism”, to transform a defeated nation-state into an
economic powerhouse (1993:31). Predictably, the mutually reinforcing effect of state
developmentalism and nationalism became the driving force catapulting the Japanese
economy to miraculous heights in the 1960s-1980s (Sasaki 2001; Gao 1997:296). Japan not
only emerged relatively unscathed from the global oil crises and economic recession, its
admission into the G-7 epitomised the success of economic-centred nationalism that helped
revitalise Japanese national pride and identity (Sasaki 2001). The so-called “GNP
nationalism”17 peaked in the 1980s, when Japan gained economic superpower status
(McCormack 2000:248), and the Japanese “developmental state” model was widely
borrowed and applied in the developing world (Hook et.al.2001:198-201; Vogel 1979; 1986).
This brand of confident economic nationalism also facilitated the development of
ethno-cultural nationalist discourses, where a mounting desire existed to associate Japan’s
economic achievements with Japanese cultural uniqueness and social system (Crawcour
1980:186-187 cf. Yoshino 1992:189). The proliferation of the nihonjinron (theories of
Japanese) discourse in the 1970s-1980s clearly reflected this buoyant national mood, where
the notions of cultural “exceptionalism” and homogeneity were popularly contrived to, as
much, define Japanese identity, as explain Japan’s economic success (Chan and Bridges
2006:136). Like economic nationalism, nihonjinron nationalism has roots in prewar Japan,
where the bureaucratic state and intellectual elites employed Japanese traditions and
cultural distinctiveness to “reconstruct national identity [that was] threatened by
Westernisation and rapid industrialisation” (Yoshino 1992:186; see also Crawcour 1980;
17 This is a commonly used term to describe Japan’s economic nationalism. See McVeigh (2001; 2004:40).
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Befu 1992).18 And, like prewar nihonjinron, its popular-oriented, postwar manifestation was,
according to McVeigh, duly appropriated by the Japanese state as an “officially sanctioned
ideology” (cf. Befu 1993:118), enmeshed into the national cultural policy to promote
sentiments of community and myth of common descent among its citizenry, for the purpose
of motivating the postwar society towards realising national objectives (2004:194; Morris-
Suzuki 1998:156).
Indeed, cultural nationalism thrived at the height of Japan’s economic prowess in the
1980s. Scholars like Befu and Yoshino claim that national confidence and pride drove the
Japanese to challenge the hegemony of Western/American culture and lifestyle that has
significantly penetrated both “public” and “private” domains of the postwar society, by re-
affirming the essence of Japanese identity through their supposedly unique “culture, society
and national character” (cf. Yoshino 1992:187; Befu 1984:64-66). Economic affluence also
stimulated political nationalism that saw the Nakasone administration advocating a review of
Japan’s political and military roles commensurate with its economic strength (Pyle 1996:101-
103; Rose 2000:171). Nonetheless, strong domestic anti-revisionist forces in the Diet,
together with public apprehension and external pressures from Japan’s neighbours, stymied
the agenda (Saeki 2001).
The confident nationalism underpinning postwar Japanese identity and pride
permeated the “bubble economy” period. However, when the “bubble” burst in early 1990s,
18 The “cultural determinism” (McVeigh 2004:194) that nihonjinron espoused was, according to Yoshino, in
many ways, “invented” to rescue the Japanese identity by defining the “symbolic boundary” between nihonjin
(Japanese) and gaijin (foreigners), as well as “reestablishing and maintaining a sense of historical continuity
with the traditions of Japan” (1992:186). Despite its elitist and statist-orientations in the prewar era, the
nihonjinron genre, and to a wider extent, cultural nationalism originated as a popular-level expression
(McVeigh 2004). During the early postwar years, it re-emerged as a popular ideology, serving as a flexible
substitute for “primary nationalism” (McVeigh 2001) that permitted the Japanese notion of identity to persist, in
times of significant socio-political and economic transformation (Crawcour 1980:186 cf. Yoshino 1992:187).
According to McVeigh, being a form of “passive”, “secondary nationalism” consumed by the masses, the
nihonjinron genre eventually became an “intellectual hegemony” (cf.Befu 1993:117), or what he construes as “a
national-level meditation” with “trans-war continuities” (2004:193). Indeed, Befu confirms “What is common
to the wartime Nihonjinron and postwar neo-Nihonjinron is that both rely heavily on primordial sentiments
inherent in the presumed ‘ethnic essence’ of the Japanese – blood, purity of race, language, mystique – which
are the basic ‘stuff’ of Nihonjinron, pre- and post-war” (1992:43-44 cf. McVeigh 2004:193).
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the Japanese economy collapsed into a protracted recession.19 Postwar nationalism met a
similar fate, since it derived its vitality from Japan’s economic success. Facing serious
structural problems, the public again, query the Japanese-style political economy and
bureaucratic-state system that symbolise the uniqueness of cultural traditions and societal
norms, basically, the very tenets that personified Japan’s postwar national identity (Sasaki
2001). The dramatic “reversal of fortune” saw the Japanese society suffering a general loss
of confidence and bearing, leading to soul-searching for a renewal of the national “self”.
4.3. Contemporary Japanese Nationalism: Driving Forces and Manifestations
4.3.1. Driving forces
The rise of “neo-nationalism” in contemporary Japan, in many respects, reflects the need to
address the deepening national identity crisis resulting from socio-economic malaise and
persistent political helplessness that have fed a desire for national renewal (McCormack
2000:247; Kingston 2004:251-252; Fujiwara 2001:40). For one, the debilitating conditions in
the decade following the end of the “economic miracle” have had a demoralising impact on
the Japanese psyche. Annual GDP growth throughout the “post-bubble” period staggered
along recessionary rates, the Nikkei stock exchange suffered from prolonged lean spells,
while corporate insolvencies and unemployment reached unprecedented levels (Matthews
2003:80; Kingston 2004:242-243). Public debts were the highest amongst industrialised
nations following the cumulative effects of mismanagement of public funds, government
bailouts, and spending to bolster structural reforms and public works packages (McCormack
2006:45; McNeill 2000; Conachy 2001; Bix 29/05/2001). The economic depression also
aggravated social problems,20 and endemic corruption was “eroding confidence in
government and business alike” (McCormack 2000:248). Domestic political stability suffered
from public disaffection, underscored by the rapid successions of state leadership, and the
19 As Jameson puts it, “By 1995, an economic machine that once produced incessant growth has sputtered to its
fourth year of virtually no growth in the biggest, longest and broadest period of stagnation in Japan’s post-
World War II history” (1997:1).
20 During this period, McCormack observes that “the ranks of the homeless grew, schools were rent by violence,
rising levels of suicide and truancy, and social and spiritual unease in the society at large fed support for new
religions and cults” (2000:247).
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temporary loss of political power by the LDP, which had dominated Japanese politics since
1955 (Jameson 1997).21
The so-called “Lost Decade” not only saw Japan losing economic prosperity and
political cohesion, but also its international status (McCormack 2000:248). In the politico-
diplomatic dimension, the 1991 Gulf War “humiliation” reinforced its reputation as a “political
dwarf” (Ito 2001; Miyashita 2002:144-145). Meanwhile, continuous subordination to the US
has had Japan yielding to American pressure on various policy-matters, besides being
marginalised on international issues (McCormack 2000:248), and increasingly subjected to
“Japan bashing” and “Japan passing” by its “senior partner” and neighbours, alike (Shibata
19/09/1995; Kingston 2004:229-230). Furthermore, despite being a leading donor of
international organisations, and having contributed substantially to East Asia’s economic
dynamism through foreign investments and aid, Japan has rarely, been accorded the level
of international/regional recognition and agenda-setting influence commensurate with its
contribution, a status that has further dissipated with the recession-induced contraction of its
economic resources (Matthews 2003:80-83). The domestic morass and fading international
prestige have inevitably instigated calls for national regeneration (Cronin 2007). Neo-
nationalism is thus, principally a reflection of the popular mood, and state/elite responses to
alleviate the “psychological-emotional” distress of perceived Japanese weakness, and to
reinvigorate national pride and reaffirm the Japanese identity (Sasaki 2001; Kase
09/08/2001). According to Kingston, it also reflects dissatisfaction with Japan’s “prolonged
subordination” and “deferential adherence to the US”, and the desire to establish a more
independent policy-stance, if not symmetrical US-Japan relationship (2004:229; Muto
2001:188). Such responses are, equally directed against China, to whom Japan has
accorded deferential treatment that resulted in its “kowtow” diplomacy since normalisation.
Likewise, the neo-nationalist agendas for rearmament and international pro-activism are,
steadily accepted by the Japanese public as viable solutions to accrue the international
respect that has thus far, eluded their country (Matthews 2003:83).
21 By 1997, Japan saw three changes of government, five premiers, and the sharing of power by eleven political
parties, all since the LDP temporarily lost its power in 1993 (Jameson 1997:1)
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Historical grievances and their impact on Japanese pride and identity is another
factor fundamentally related to the flourishing neo-nationalist discourse. During the 1990s,
Japanese were hounded by the excesses of war history, as information and records
pertaining to atrocities and abuses committed by Imperial Japan were revealed by the
archives, ex-servicemen, and the MOE/MEXT, via more “open” history treatment, following
the demise of Emperor Showa (Kingston 2004:231; Benfell 2002). Compounding the
revelation of this “national shame” was the sustained external pressure for the redress and
proper accounting of Japan’s war responsibility, besides renewed domestic political efforts,
i.e. by state-elites like Kono Yohei to PM Muruyama, to acknowledge, express remorse, and
seek judicial resolution for war-related issues (Kingston 2004:231; McCormack 2000:250;
Chung 2004). The sudden disclosure disconcerted many Japanese, who due to a “diluted”
and “victim-oriented” postwar history education were largely unaware of the true extent of
Japan’s disreputable wartime record (Ogawa 2000; Benfell 2002; Kitaoka interview). This
unflattering past further dented national pride and identity, already undermined by socio-
economic gloom. Neo-nationalism’s related agenda for historical revisionism is thus, another
nationalist response to restore national pride through the promotion of a “less-masochistic”
view of history (Mori 2007:57-58), and to engender a sense of unity, and strength against
perceived national vulnerability and foreign pressure.
The neo-nationalist appeal is also closely associated with public perception
regarding national insecurities, generational change, and the related domestic political
transformation mentioned in Chapter 3 that have significantly affected Japanese-Chinese
relations. Indeed, looming security concerns and “threat perceptions” vis-à-vis China and
North Korea have fuelled Japanese public support for a more assertive foreign/security
policy-orientation (Sasada 2006:115). They have led to Japan’s gradual remilitarisation and
enhanced security cooperation with the US, and openness about the nuclear armament
debate (McCormack 2007:Chp.8), all of which previously considered “taboo” issues, but now
publicly accepted and regularly debated in the Japanese media (Sasada 2006:115-116;
Cronin 2007). Specifically to this study, China’s rise has contributed significantly to Japan’s
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growing insecurity. Japanese are aware of the shifting power distributions and economic
fortunes between the two countries since the mid-1990s. Resentment of this power shift,
coupled with strategic tensions and concerns over sustained Chinese military build-up have
exacerbated their “China threat” perception (Matthews 2003:81). Meanwhile, fervent history
quarrels and anti-Japanese-flavoured Chinese nationalism have triggered a nationalist
backlash within Japan that fuelled negative perceptions/images and attitudes towards China
in recent years (Cunningham 2005; Kaneko 2005). This aforementioned shift in the
Japanese national psyche reflects a growing realism about national security in a fluid post-
Cold War external environment (Green 2000: 42-43; Green and Self 1996; Tsunekawa
2006), a shift, which is interestingly, facilitated by Washington’s encouragement under the
pretext of strengthening the US-Japan alliance.
Back at the domestic front, demographic and generational changes have subtly
altered Japanese expression of nationalism. Aforementioned, nationalism became taboo
after 1945 (Rose 2000:171), emerging in distorted forms and unrealistic expressions due to
apprehension of the postwar generation. According to Matthews, “nationalism was relegated
to the fringes of Japan’s popular debate”, as the postwar Japanese society suffered from the
so-called “fear of itself” syndrome, namely the fear that nationalism may again mislead the
nation towards militarism (2003:76). The war generation’s passing has since, diluted such
apprehension, and together with it, the fear of nationalism’s perils (Matthews 2003:80). The
present generation, raised in the era of economic success, is prideful and less encumbered
by war-guilt, and hence, more prepared to express nationalist sentiment, without fear or
favour. Contributing to the “aloofness” has been their superficial knowledge of Japan’s
militaristic past deriving through history education, of which contents are subject to revisions
and alleged “sanitisation” (Kingston 2004:230). To be fair, many Japanese are not ignorant,
or in denial of the war history, an awareness deriving from as much education, as the
periodic reminders by Japan’s neighbours and war victims. Yet, they also long for closure,
and to become normal citizens that can freely express devotion to, and identify with their
national state and symbols.
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In the political realm, younger leaders more comfortable on the world stage and less
retrospective of the national past have emerged, inspiring foreign/security policy-shifts that
are geared towards national interests and enhancing Japan’s role in the international
community (Green 2000). These leaders also espouse a different external posture from that
of their predecessors, when dealing with problematic interstate relationships. As previously
described, Japan’s diplomacy was passive, characterised by “deference” towards
neighbours, like China and Korea (Drifte 2003; Ijiri 1996), a posture criticised by nationalists
as humiliating, and lacking national self-assertion (Sasaki 2001). Today, however, the
transfer of power to a generation spared from the traumas of history has led to present
leaders becoming assertive and less-tolerant, especially toward foreign criticisms of Japan’s
imperial legacies, perceiving them as purposive acts “to unsettle the Japanese” (Sasaki
2001; Self 2002). The attitudinal change reflecting this new wisdom in the Japanese society
is also apparent amongst ordinary folks, who are increasingly defensive/resentful towards
gaiatsu and foreign interference on issues they considered as Japan’s domestic affairs.
Another correlating factor refers to the decline of pacifist/leftwing forces in Japanese
politics, which had previously constrained and neutralised nationalistic-rightwing overtures
that periodically challenged the postwar pacifist norms (Sasada 2006). The change in
national mood has seen pressure groups like the Nikkyoso fading,22 and the popularity of the
JSP/SDPJ and JCP concurrently diminishing with their Diet representations since the mid-
1990s. These so-called “neutralising forces” have not only weakened, but also suffered a
loss of political will and direction that even saw the JSP/SDPJ accepting a “political marriage
of convenience” (Miyashita 2002:154) with the LDP in 1994, and relocating to the “centre-
right” on previously divisive issues (Sasada 2006:117-118). Consistently dismal election
results marginalised their influence as these leftwing parties failed to muster sufficient
political support to prevent “the drift towards accommodation with the right on an axis of
nationalism, or neo-nationalism” (McCormack 2000:262; 2005).
22 The Nikkyoso, or Japan Teacher’s Union, once the staunchest opposition against nationalist indoctrination in
the postwar education system and curriculum, has seen its influence gradually weakened, especially in the battle
for control over textbook content and the national flag and anthem issue (McNeill 2001; Itoh 2001; Rose 2006).
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Lastly, according to Sasada (2006), the “conservatisation” of Japan’s mainstream
media and intellectual community, together with the emerging popularity of alternative
channels to foster and disseminate the neo-nationalist message, i.e. internet, mangas, and
international sporting events, have contributed to rising nationalism, especially among
Japanese youth (see also Tanimichi 2005:33-34).23 Indeed, most observers, including senior
Japanese officials see Japan’s ideologically-slanted media as a driver of nationalistic
sentiments, especially via biased/“sensationalised” reportings and sustained criticisms on
“nationalist” issues that fuel pre-conceived/stereotyped (mis)perceptions and images vis-à-
vis states like China and North Korea (Takahata interview; Anonymous interviews B and D;
Johnston 2007). These factors have affectively shaped political views that are facilitating
Japan’s contemporary ideological shift from pacifism towards nationalism (Sasada 2006).
4.3.2. Fault-lines and manifestations of the neo-nationalist discourse
Changes are evident with regard to nationalism, as Japan inches towards a more
“nationalistic/normal” outlook. Most notable has been the drift of the political debate and
public consensus to the right, and growing support for the neo-nationalist cause (Kingston
2004; Kaneko 2005). Observers generally agree that the fault-lines of Japanese nationalism
have remained relatively unchanged, although the power balance has (Samuels 2007a:128).
The contemporary nationalist discourse on history and security has drifted according to the
prevalent trend, where the leftist-oriented, “peace” nationalism’s advocacy of historical
responsibility and military pacifism is being gradually, overshadowed by the rightist/neo-
nationalist’s revisionist history and remilitarisation agenda. Samuels (2007a) construes that
agenda-setting within the neo-nationalist camp is shaped by the “neo-autonomist” (ultra-
nationalist) versus “normal nation-alist” debate that generally converges on history
revisionism and the reintroduction of the “use of force” as a foreign policy instrument (see
23 The cyberspace has become a major disseminator of neo-nationalist ideas, especially among Japanese youth,
whereby “revisionist” websites like Channel-2 (ni-channeru) (see http://www.2ch.net/) score an average 7
million monthly hits (Tanimichi 2005:35), while Channel Sakura is another popular site for nationalistic
bloggers (Johnston 2007:114). Manga or Japanese comic are also hugely popular and influential. Among the
revisionist manga included Sensoron (On War) by Kobayashi Yoshinori, which sold more than 700,000 copies,
George Akiyama and Huang Wen-Hsiung’s Chugoku Nyumon (Introduction to China) that sold 180,000 copies,
and Yamano Sharin’s Kenkanryu (Hating the “Korean Boom”) 450,000 copies (Sasada 2006:118).
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also Tamamoto 2005a:14), but diverging on their support for the US-Japan alliance. Neo-
autonomists like politician Ishihara Shintaro, academics Nishibe Susumu and Nakanishi
Terumasa, and manga-artist Kobayashi Yoshinori, among others, advocates a
remilitarisation independent from the US, while “normal nation-alists” prefer one that remains
under a strengthened US-Japan alliance (Samuels 2007a:128-129;138). Samuels, however,
sees a split between “realists” and “neo-conservatives” within the “normal nation-alist” camp
regarding “history”; leading realists like ex-premier Nakasone, politicians Ishiba Shigeru and
Ozawa Ichiro, and opinion leader Okazaki Hisahiko espouse a moderate-pragmatic view
aimed at reconciliation with neighbours to advance Japan’s broader national interests, while
Cabinet members, Abe Shinzo, Aso Taro, Hiranuma Takeo, Nakagawa Shoichi, Machimura
Nobutaka, and Koizumi himself to an unclear extent, are amongst “mainstream” neo-
conservatives, whom are more ideologically/revisionist-inclined, and less apologetic about
history (2007a:144-145; Taniguchi 2005:451; Mori 2007).
Several of my Japanese interviewees, who seem to equate nationalists with ultra-
rightwing personalities, have questioned Koizumi’s nationalistic disposition. They saw
Koizumi as a progressive, and believed that his Yasukuni policy was due to personal
convictions, political gamesmanship, and disinterest in diplomacy, rather than nationalism
(Sasajima interview, Soeya interview, Anonymous interview H). Conversely, Rozman opined
that although Koizumi may be less nationalistic compared to the ultra-nationalists, his
actions and policies actually made him no different from them, since he was as much a
protagonist that helped advance the “revisionist/nationalist” agenda in Japan (Rozman
interview). This thesis shares Samuels (2007a) and Takahata’s (interview) categorisation of
Koizumi as a “normal nationalist”, but locates him in between the “realist” and “neo-
conservative” camps because of his ambiguous/non-committal stance on the more hardcore
“history” issues.24
24 I borrow Samuels’ categorisations of Japanese nationalists, eg. “neo-autonomists”, “normal-nationalist”,
“neo-conservatives” and “realist”, all of which will be used intermittently, throughout the thesis. I, however,
query his classification of Okazaki Hisahiko as a moderate-realist, whose views appears to be quite “China-
unfriendly”, based on his past remarks (see DY 04/03/2001; Okazaki interview). The rise of neo-conservatism
in Japanese politics is also noted by Wu (2005/6) as key to Japan-China problems.
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Indeed, the neo-conservatives and Koizumi have consistently provoked controversy
with their nationalistic posture, exemplified by their support for Yasukuni pilgrimage,
acquiescence to historical revisionism, and advocacy for constitutional reform of the Article
IX. Expectedly, their political influence has broadened under his premiership, prevailing in
attitudinal and policy-shifts that affected Japan’s regional relations. The Koizumi
administration definitely unnerved Japan’s neighbours, particularly China, for its assertive
stance on nationalist-flavoured bilateral issues, and its effort to redefine Japanese security
outlook has had many observers citing this administration as among the most nationalistic
since prewar Japan (Kaneko 2005; Matthews 2003; Clark 18/01/2005).25 Their brand of
“revisionist-ideological nationalism” (Cronin 2007; Dean 2007) became more overt under the
administration led by Koizumi’s protégé, Abe Shinzo. Renowned for his nationalistic
disposition, Abe’s policy-pledge to create “a beautiful Japan” by restoring patriotism
indubitably helped advance the neo-nationalist agenda, despite his short-lived premiership
(Cronin 2007:1).
Neo-nationalism has also gained support within the National Diet, manifesting,
among others, in efforts to reinterpret history, promote constitutional, educational, and
security policy reforms, and restore national pride and prestige based on the archetypal
Japanese identity (McCormack 2000:251, 253; Cronin 2007). Japan watchers opine that
Diet support for the neo-nationalist cause has flourished under groups like the Diet-members
League for a Bright Japan and the Diet-members League for Passing on Correct History
(McCormack 2007:10; Rose 2006:139-140). Meanwhile, over 200 Diet-members were
affiliated to the influential rightwing-nationalist “umbrella” organisation, Nippon Kaigi (Japan
Council), via the Japan Council Diet-members Group, established in 1997 to promote these
agendas (Rose 2006:139; Mori 2007:57-58). Their active presence and support have
influenced the course of events that saw postwar taboos gradually lifted, laws enacted, and
national symbols reinstated, all without the usual Diet encumbrance (Itoh 2001). One can
25 Former premiers, like Obuchi and Mori are considered by Western observers as other nationalistic-oriented
post-Cold War Japanese leaders, the former notably responsible for lifting nationalist taboos during his tenure
that saw the passing of the national flag-anthem legislation and defence bills in 1999, while the latter was
infamously known for his “divine nation” gaffe (Green 2000:42: Symonds 1999).
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infer the neo-nationalist influence from the quick passage of defence bills to expand Japan’s
security role, and overwhelming support for the official sanctioning of the Hinomaru and
Kimigayo in July 1999, both “taboo” issues that could have previously “paralysed the Diet”
(Itoh 2001).26 Yet, McCormack claims that these legislations were “bulldozed” through
together with other “apparently innocuous” bills that “subtly shifted the boundaries of private
and public, individual and state, in favour of the state”, not mentioning the reinstatement of
constitutional reforms on the political agenda (2000:248).27 Similarly, bi-partisan support and
solidarity among Diet-members on Yasukuni visits, underscores this nationalistic drift.28
Outside the Diet, nationalist forces have reorganised from a primarily fringe pressure
group movement to becoming popular-based in recent years, as the neo-nationalist cause
gained the interest of, and support from the professional middle-class, intellectual, artists,
business elites, and even powerful corporate, publishing and media groups (McCormack
2000:251-252). During the postwar period, nationalist causes were championed by rightwing
organisations, like Jinja honcho (National Shrine Association), Nihon Izokukai (Japan
Association of War-Bereaved Families), Shinto seiji renmei, Seicho no ie (McCormack
2000:251; 2007:10-11; Shibuichi 2005:200), Seirankai (Blue-Storm Group), and Nihon
Seinensha (Japan Youth Federation) (Chung 2004:36-41), among others. Most uyoku (ultra-
right) outfits also overlapped with the yakuza (Japanese mafia) (Greenfeld 1994:206;
Shibuichi 2005:201), and were allegedly connected to political-elites and LDP factions,
through which their influence was imposed, and interests advocated in the Japanese body
politics (McNeill 2001:4). However, since the mid-1990s, a more articulate, ideological-
driven, and politically committed movement has flourished, represented by the likes of
Tsukurukai and Nippon Kaigi that draw strength from popular resentment towards the
relentless external vilification of Japan’s wartime record, and Tokyo’s “apology diplomacy” to
26 For a comprehensive analysis on the flag-anthem legislation, see Itoh Mayumi (2001).
27 Ozawa Ichiro referred to the 145th Regular Session of the National Diet in 1999 as a “bloodless revolution”
(quoted in Takada 17/09/1999:32-33; cf. McCormack 2000:248)
28 See Chapter 6 for the details of popular nationalist and Diet support for Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits.
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entertain such “Japan bashing” (McCormack 2000:251; Rose 2000:175; McNeill 2005).29 It
also taps into the deep-rooted, popular fear of a waning Japanese state and debilitating
national economy, and driven by the “nostalgia for a strong Japan” (McCormack 2000:252).
The movement enjoys corporate sponsorship and endorsement from leading Japanese
companies, while major media groups, like Yomiuri, Fuji-Sankei, Bungei Shunju, and
media/internet sources, i.e. Shokun!, Seiron, Sapio, Spa, Brutus, Channel-2, Channel-
Sakura, among others, actively promote its causes (McCormack 2000:252; Yoshimi
1998:195-212 cf. Rose 2000:175; Johnston 2007:113-115). Interestingly, a confluence of
interests in promoting “healthy” nationalism and the “national cause” also saw some
Japanese liberal/progressive intelligentsia acquiecsing to the neo-nationalist discourse
(McCormack 2000:253).30
The “nationalistic” drift in public mood is equally conspicuous, albeit one that is more
emotionally reactive-defensive rather than ideologically driven. This is observeable from
recent public reactions towards perceived external threats, pressure, and slight, which
arouse their defensive mechanism vis-à-vis the “perpetrators”, and encourage acquiescence
towards neo-nationalist agendas concerning Japanese identity and national security. For
example, despite the controversy surrounding their symbolism and meanings, PM Koizumi’s
visits to Yasukuni-jinja received favourable public support, not for his, or Yasukuni’s
ideological convictions, but predominantly a defensive-reaction against external/Chinese
pressure.31 The prevailing mood has also stimulated interest in, and facilitated the
circulation/access of “revisionist” publications/media/internet sources that project neo-
nationalist views to the ordinary Japanese (McCormack 2000; McNeill 2005).32
29 Nationalist intelligentsia like Fujioka Nobukatsu and Nishio Kanji, were behind the formation of the “Liberal
View of History Study Group” and Tsukurukai (Japan Society for History Textbook Reforms) that campaigned
for the “correct view” of history to rejuvenate Japanese national pride.
30 This is exemplified by the recent “neo-nationalistic” writings of prominent liberal/progressive scholars like
Kato Norihiro, that were published by liberal-oriented publishers i.e. Iwanami, Kodansha and Heibonsha
(McCormack 2000:253).
31 See Chapter 6 for the case-study on the Yasukuni Shrine dispute.
32 Besides the spread of neo-nationalist views via alternative media sources mentioned earlier (i.e. internet,
manga), efforts to promote the use of the controversial New History Textbook (Kokumin no rekishi) in junior
high schools have regained ground since its initial failure in 2001, with more neo-nationalist sympathisers
elected to district education boards, lobbying for its acceptance, including the Tokyo Metropolitan
government’s recent sanctioning of its usage in Tokyo schools (McNeill 2005). The history textbook, together
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Public pacifism has likewise, eroded on national security matters. In 1999, Japan
launched a first-ever “unilateral exercise of force” against a North Korean fushinsen, a
constitutionally infringing action that ironically received popular approval of over 80%
(Midford 2002:13; McCormack 2007:59). The repeat of a similar incident in 2001, ultimately
led to the Japan Coast Guard’s (JCG) historic sinking of a foreign vessel (Samuels
2007/8:96). Similarly, there was a distinct lack of public uproar over the gradual expansion of
Japan’s security role, via legislations in 1999 and the aftermath of “9/11” that saw Maritime-
SDF (MSDF) ships sent to foreign waters on active duty for the first time since 1945, and
peacekeepers to Iraq, in the US-led war on terrorism (Samuel 2007b:119). The public was
also relatively mute on other defense-related issues, i.e. controversial debates for a nuclear-
armed Japan, the right of pre-emptive attack, plausible revision of Article-IX, and the JDA’s
upgrading to ministry status.33 These developments suggest that neo-nationalism has
become a pervasive force, “which seems steadily to weigh with both left and right of
Japanese politics” (McCormack 2000:256), and is embraced by a broad spectrum of the
society. Interestingly reminiscent of the 1950s, its contemporary manifestation is again
dependent on, and facilitated by American support/acquiescence of such agenda, following
their mutual need to strengthen the alliance in anticipation of the shifting external security
environment (Rozman interview). Some observers have come to define this as Japan’s
“dependent nationalism” (McCormack 2000:263; 2007; Tsunekawa 2006).
More importantly to this study, the neo-nationalist discourse brewing in Japan has an
essentially “anti-China” manifestation (Hanai 24/10/2005; cf. Samuels 2007a:133;
Tamamoto 2005b; Togo 2006:14), shaped by as much, Japanese desire for national self-
assertion, as their pride and prejudices over the changing power relations vis-à-vis China,
and indignation towards perceived Chinese arrogance, bullying, and pressure (Anonymous
with its companion, The New Civic Textbook (Atarashii komin kyokasho) were also commercially available in
bookstores nationwide, where both have since sold 700,000 and 200,000 copies, respectively (McNeill 2005).
33 Opinion polls by Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun show public opposition towards constitutional revision
(especially Article IX) has fallen to less than 40% since 1995, while those supporting have gradually risen to
over 50% (Iokibe 2006:108 cf. Mori 2007:46-47). The January 2000 establishment of Constitutional Research
Committees and formal debate of the issue in the National Diet, which ended in 2005, suggests the plausibility
of constitutional revision becoming a reality in the not too distant future (see Matthews 2003).
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interview F). Elaborated in Chapter 5, these dynamics have triggered a perceptional and
attitudinal shift towards China, which enhances nationalism’s efficacy in Japan’s China
policy-making.
4.4. State and Popular Nationalism in Contemporary Japan
The above analysis highlights Japanese nationalism’s state/elite-centric nature, and populist
drive behind its discourses, agenda, and manifestations. State-oriented nationalism,
discredited since 1945, may be “the weakest form of nationalism in Japan” (Stronach
1995:166), whilst popular modes of nationalism have flourished. Indeed, the “official”
nationalist discourse no longer exudes the kind of “prewar” popular influence, and the state
does not appear to dictate the highly diffused nationalist forces in postwar Japan (Morris
1960:40; McVeigh 2004:10). Yet, it is also evident that state nationalism has continued to
subtly permeate, and indirectly affect the Japanese daily life, via innocuous state-society
channels. McVeigh construes that although the state does not determine popular modes of
nationalism, “it certainly has enough institutional points of contact with them [to challenge]
the nation/state dichotomy” in contemporary Japan (2004:84). This suggests the Japanese
state’s persistency as a “primary agent” behind nationalism’s omnipresence (2004:180). It
also illustrates the “state-popular” axis, where the former remains stealthily influential in
engendering and abetting the popular nationalist discourse, through education, ethno-
cultural-historical mythmaking, “media cartelisation”, and “developmentalist” economic
policies, among others (McVeigh 2004:90-91; Chp.6-7). Conversely, popular nationalism,
while appearing to be either apolitical and/or periodically anti-state, does find a convergence
of interests, and identify with the official nationalist aspirations on the agenda of national
regeneration/renaissance (McVeigh 2004; Rose 2000).
Contemporary state/elite-inspired nationalism is pragmatic, national interest-driven,
instrumental, and meant for domestic consumption.34 Similar to the Meiji and postwar eras,
the present official nationalist discourse has been, pragmatically centred on the neo-
34 These features of state/official nationalism are noted in Zhao (2000) and Chen (2005), in their descriptions of
Chinese nationalism. They are equally applicable to explaining state/official nationalism in Japan.
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nationalist agenda of rebuilding a strong, affluent nation-state, and reinstating the Japanese
identity, amid denigrating internal adversities, and mounting external pressures. Core to
these aspirations is none other than a return to “normal” statehood after decades of postwar
identity discrepancies/incongruities. Externally, state nationalism has a reactive, assertive,
and yet adaptive international orientation geared towards defending and maximising the
broader national interest (see Zhao 2000; 2005; Matthews 2003). Whilst Japan has begun
projecting a more reactive-cum-assertive external disposition, diplomatic and decision-
making prudence remain generally, the modus vivendi of Japanese foreign policy, especially
when managing bilateral quandaries with key regional states like China and both Koreas.
Tokyo has also sought to redefine the national security outlook and expand Japan’s
international role, albeit under the US-Japan alliance framework. Overall, the official
nationalist discourse remains moderate, yet steadfastly advocating the assertion of a
prideful Japanese history and identity, constitutional revision, and the rearmament of Japan
(McCormack 2000:262). Undoubtedly, the quest for national security, “healthy” nationalism,
and the possession of an indigenously crafted constitution to resurrect a “normal state”
identity, belie the Japanese state’s/state-elites’ cajoling of these neo-nationalist causes
(Tamamoto 2001:39; interview).
State nationalism is instrumental. Like its predecessors, the contemporary Japanese
state has promoted nationalism as the unifying and motivational force behind the public
support for its implementation of demanding structural reforms to revive the country’s ailing
economy (Matthews 2003; Tamamoto 2001). It is also, meant to provide psychological-
emotional support, or what Kingston (2004) calls “feelgood nationalism” for the Japanese
nation, during such testing times. Likewise, nationalism functions as a tool to bolster the
legitimacy of, and restore public confidence towards the Japanese bureaucratic-state,
eroded by endemic corruption, inefficiency, and malpractices. Its instrumentality is equally,
represented by state manipulation of its fluid content, where state-elites have sought to
reinstate the military and past national symbols, and acquiesce to neo-nationalist advocacy
of a “revisionist” history, to facilitate the restoration of national pride and prestige. Its utility-
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function is, perhaps, most vividly reflected by Japanese state-elites’ manipulation/
politicisation of its symbolism for personal political expediency.
Popular nationalism identifies with the official nationalist discourse on key national
goals, although they may differ in the approaches/strategies to realise them. The diversity of
popular expressions, from “peace” and “cultural nationalisms” to ultra-rightwing and
contemporary neo-nationalist discourses, means that some forms are bound to dovetail with
the official line, while others critical of the state on issues of nationalist persuasions.
However, McVeigh sees most non-official nationalist movements as having linkage with, and
receive the support of the officialdom through various state-society channels. These
popular-based organisations also seek to exert pressure, and political influence, by
providing financial backing to established “power-cliques” and state-elites (McVeigh
2004:53). Notwithstanding their differences on specific issues, this intricate matrix concurs
with Rose’s assertion of the “symbiotic relationship” between state-oriented and popular
nationalisms (2000:174); the former attempts to establish common grounds by appropriating
the richness of the popular discourse, for mass-mobilisation behind state endeavours; the
latter finds the state a “vehicle” to channel its manifestations and institutionalise its causes.
The “neo-nationalist” undercurrent highlights this state-official/popular-non-official linkage,
where common interests have seen both nationalisms mutually reinforcing each other.
That said, the popular neo-nationalist discourse, passionately driven by an enduring
sense of “victimhood” and/or indignation towards external pressures, and a longing for
independence, prestige, and international recognition, can be critical of the Japanese state’s
pragmatic convictions (Rose 2000:174).35 Popular “neo-autonomists” have often chastised
the state’s inability to severe its postwar dependency on the US, while others have been
critical towards its inadequate responses in defending Japanese interests pertaining to
territorial, history, and other nationalist-flavoured issues, particularly when dealing with
35 I share this opinion of popular nationalism in Japan with Gries’ observation of popular Chinese nationalism.
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China (Samuels 2007a; Fujiwara 2001).36 Although not incessantly radical in their views,
these neo-nationalists have demanded an autonomous and more forceful foreign policy that
runs counter to Tokyo’s calculated considerations. Similarly, the Japanese government has
been, “reluctantly” dragged into occasional diplomatic disputes vis-à-vis China over
Senkaku/Diaoyudao by the provocative actions of ultra-nationalist groups. However, the
evolving domestic power dynamics and political ascendancy of mainstream neo-nationalists,
e.g. neo-conservatives/realists suggest that the state may remain pragmatic, yet more
willing to pander to nationalist ideals (Samuels 2007a/b), and thus increasingly constrained
by related pressures to embrace a nationalistic-assertive external orientation, albeit under
American auspices. This aforementioned mainstream manifestation of “dependent
nationalism” is theoretically consistent with the NCR dictum espoused by this thesis,
whereby nationalism’s salience in Japan’s China policy is relatively dependent on state-
elites’ perception/calculation of a favourable “allied resolve/commitment” via the US-Japan
alliance.
4.5. Conclusion
Nationalism remains salient, permeating and manifesting in various, albeit atypical forms in
postwar Japan. The advent of neo-nationalism is largely, seen as the re-embracing of a
more orthodox nationalism, where after decades of self-doubting behaviour, a broad
consensus has emerged that Japan should reassert its national interests and priorities, and
move from its past to embrace the future as a “normal” nation-state (Muto 2001:187). The
present manifestations have not exuded the virulence/malevolence that typified prewar
nationalism, and appear unlikely to do so, considering the different external-domestic
conditions that perpetuated them.37 Besides the ageing demographics38 (Green 2001:43; Ito
36 According to Fujiwara, popular neo-nationalist movements like the Tsukurukai are “not some conspiracy of
the state…to manipulate public opinion”, but borne from “popular call to resurrect – in defiance of the
government”, the supposedly marginalised “story of the Japanese nation” (2001:36)
37 According to Pyle (1996:62-64), the external-domestic conditions that shaped prewar and contemporary
nationalism are fundamentally different. They include differences in the level of development/modernisation,
limited tendency of contemporary state/elite in fostering narrow political nationalism, generational change and
detachment of contemporary Japanese from traditional institutions i.e. cultures/religion/symbols that fuelled
prewar nationalism, transformation of the postwar social structure, and “internationalisation” and increased
international exposure of ordinary Japanese (Pyle 1996:62-64). See also Muto (2001:184-186).
139
2001), Japan’s embrace of liberal democracy, in many respects, has made it a transparent,
liberal, and civil society, which in principle, does not warrant overreactions, unscrupulous
decision-making or indiscriminate actions, on the part of the Japanese state, when handling
issues of nationalistic persuasions. Finally, the US-Japan alliance and economic
interdependence remain the major external constraints against the rise of chauvinistic-
aggressive nationalism, although both may abet the current mainstream manifestations.
Nonetheless, this “neo-nationalist” renaissance has generated unease.
Internationally, the efforts of Japanese state-elites and popular nationalists, alike, to foster
nationalism, by encouraging historical revisionism and reviving past national symbols, as
well as advancing a more dynamic and assertive external/security orientation are driving a
wedge between Japan and its Asian neighbours (McCormack 2000:263; Kaneko 2005). This
division has been compounded by resurgent nationalism in countries like China and Korea,
where Japan is a key ingredient flavouring their nationalistic sentiments. The deteriorating
Japanese-Chinese ties are a particular case in point. Specifically, the dynamics of both state
and popular nationalisms are reinventing Japan’s policy-behaviour vis-à-vis China. Against
the backdrop of rising Chinese nationalism, this apparent “clash of nationalisms” (Chan and
Bridges 2006) has spawned misperceptions, negative images and attitudes that magnify
their differences, perpetuating mutual animosity and mistrust that threaten to destabilise the
bilateral relationship. The crucial questions of how, when, and to what extent nationalism
affects Japan’s China policy and Japanese-Chinese ties are therefore, the undertakings of
the following chapters.
38 According to the government census as of November 1, 2007, citizens aged 65 and above constitute 21.5% of
the total Japanese population, while those aged 14 years and below have shrunk to 13.5% (JT 22/11/2007).
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CHAPTER FIVE
NATIONALISM, JAPAN’S CHINA POLICY-MAKING, AND
JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS
Resurgent nationalism has ostensibly contributed to Japan’s increasingly assertive external
behaviour, especially when managing problematic bilateral ties and issues of nationalist
persuasions. Japanese-Chinese diplomacy is undoubtedly among the most affected, given
the burden of their unsettled past, unresolved disputes, and unrelenting mutual enmity that
have periodically undermined relations. This chapter explicates nationalism’s causal role in
defining Japan’s China policy, via a neoclassical realist perspective. It undertakes to shed
light on whether rising nationalism necessarily indicates a nationalistic policy vis-à-vis China,
and how, and under what conditions it affects Japanese policy-making. An examination of
how nationalism exacerbates the problems of perceptions, images, and attitudes, and the
corresponding impact on the bilateral relationship, sets the overtone of the chapter. This is,
followed by a brief overview of Japanese foreign policy-making, namely the actors and
process involved, with emphasis given to exploring the linkage between domestic nationalist
pressure and these policy-making apparatus/actors. The chapter concludes with a general
observation of the reality of nationalism’s impact on Japanese attitude vis-à-vis China
concerning “history” and security, and Tokyo’s policy-orientations that affected Japanese-
Chinese diplomacy.
5.1. Nationalism and the Problems of Perceptions, Images, and Attitudes in
Japanese-Chinese Relations
As previously elaborated, nationalism has seemingly reorientated Japan’s China policy that
underscores their declining bilateral relations. This unfavourable development is expected,
since nationalism promotes “particularism” and accentuates the differences between the
“self” and “other” (Greenfeld 1992; Zhao 2000), and when the kind of nationalism evolving in
Japan, is reactive, and driven by popular angst and threat perceptions (Stronach 1995).
Furthermore, nationalism tends to invoke xenophobia, and/or chauvinism that target other
nations (Zhao 2000). Such nationalistic expressions, compounded by the act of
“demonising” the “other”, not only widen the perceptual chasm and aggravate distrust, they
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reinforce stereotypically negative images and unconstructive attitudes (Druckman 1994:50-
52; Van Evera 1994) that may detrimentally affect one’s policy vis-à-vis the “other”. If the
policy-action is perceived to be provocative, a vicious cycle of reactive nationalism could
manifest policy-responses that may escalate, and ultimately, cause bilateral tension to spiral
out of rational control (Deutsch 1983 cf. Druckman 1994:53).1 Simply put, nationalism
commonly aggravates the problems of perception, images, and attitudes that can undermine
international relations.
Although the “burden of history” (Miller 2002; Shirk 2007:153)2 has not subverted a
functional relationship from materialising, contemporary Japanese-Chinese ties appear to
have worsened during a time when nationalism is regaining currency in Japan (and China).
Diplomatic rows have become frequent amid nationalism’s debilitating impact on how one
perceives the other (Rozman 2002).3 At the grassroots level, opinion polls cited in Chapter 3
suggest that nationalism has adversely affected the mutual images and attitudes of both
citizenries. The statistical trend largely reflects nationalism’s influence on the changing
public mood and opinions that are reinventing their intergovernmental ties. Especially in
Japan, generational change, and the appeal to nationalism to redefine a national identity
that typifies a “normal state”, have gradually altered Japanese perception/opinion regarding
their relationship with neighbouring states, and role as citizens of the international
community (Wan 2006:161). It has undoubtedly affected Japanese public opinion of China,
which has swung from a previously superficial and over-enthusiastic outlook, to a more
sceptical/cautious view over the last decade. Also, “Sinophobia” is permeating the
contemporary Japanese psyche, with the conservative-rightwing media and neo-nationalists
“demonising” China amid fears of a Chinese economic and security “threat” to Japan (Clark
18/01/2005; 2006; Chan and Bridges 2006:139-140; Johnston 2007).4 Indeed, Self
1 According to Rozman, the Chinese leadership’s stoking of anti-Japanese nationalism, though boosting their
legitimacy, has “come at a cost to Japan’s image in China and China’s image in Japan” (2002:108), fuelling
reactive Japanese nationalism that in turn, has led to a “vicious cycle” that is spiraling out of control.
2 This term derives from the title of Miller (2002).
3 Whiting (1989; 1998) is noted for his pioneering works on perceptions and images in Japanese-Chinese
relations. For a contemporary account of China’s changing images of Japan, see Rozman (2001; 2002).
4 Johnston (2007) provides an analysis of contemporary Japanese media perceptions of China.
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construes that “agitated reporting” about China’s military modernisation, maritime
encroachments, and anti-Japanese education, coupled with concerns over Chinese triads
and illegal workers operating in Japan at the expense of public security, “have collectively
produced a tinderbox of irritation” (2002:80). Recent anti-Japanese demonstrations in
Chinese cities have further damaged Japanese public opinion, fuelling reactive, popular anti-
Chinese nationalism to unprecedented levels. Since neo-nationalism derives its strength in
reaction to perceived internal weaknesses and external bullying, such unfavourable public
images and attitudes are likely to exacerbate as China continues to outpace Japan
politically, militarily, and economically, whilst maintaining its anti-Japanese attitude.5
Meanwhile, the aforementioned generational change in Japan’s leadership saw the
so-called “friendship” generation replaced by a more nationalistic cohort of state-elites,
whom are less willing to appease China. These leaders, including Koizumi and some of his
cabinet members, presumably suffer from “apology and kowtow diplomacy” fatigue, and
resent the Chinese government for insisting on Japan’s continuous deference (Austin and
Harris 2001:58; Miller 2005/6:41). Indeed, revelation by a former top Japanese diplomat to
China that Koizumi had personally told him that Japan “has to do something…and cannot
always say “yes” to China”(Anonymous interview I), indicate this prevalent attitude, shaped
by their changing images of the Chinese. There are also opinion leaders, (i.e. Tokyo
Governor Ishihara) who are unabashedly anti-Chinese in their outlook (Samuels 2007a;
Hood 1999; Chau 2001).6 Although most Japanese may not share their extreme sentiments,
their rhetorical antics during a time of depleting goodwill, tend to fuel popular “Sinophobia”.
Interestingly, there are observations that the recent shift in Japanese perception of
China reflects the restoration of a “normal” mode of viewing the Chinese. It is arguable that
past Japanese public affection ratings were unrealistic due to limited grassroots-level
interactions during the earlier periods. Such favourable perceptions were partly the product
5 This opinion is, commonly shared by scholars/observers, and my Japanese interviewees.
6 Ishihara Shintaro, renowned for his anti-China stance, has blamed Chinese citizens for Tokyo’s rising crime
rates, and used the derogatory terms Shina and sangokujin to refer to China and Chinese residents in Japan. His
explicit “pro-Taiwan” position, denouncement of the Nanjing massacre as a Chinese historical fabrication, and
calls of “China threat” also underline his anti-Chinese sentiment (Hood 1999:4; Chau 2001).
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of intergovernmental efforts to promote “friendship”, and Japan’s over-exuberance in
embracing the so-called “China-boom” sentiments (Kokubun 2003). It was also plausibly a
manifestation of Japanese war-guilt complex, which prompted the war generation to be
more sympathetic and receptive towards the Chinese. However, generational shift and
intensified popular-level exchanges have produced new dynamics that expose their flawed
images. Nationalism has cultivated awareness amongst the current generation of Japanese
regarding the need to redeem national pride and self-assertion, when dealing with the
Chinese. This “return to normalcy” has, inevitably brought Japanese opinion of China back
to more “realistic” levels. Unfortunately, this “new realism” in Japanese perception also
indicates the worsening of China’s images. According to Self, “stronger warning signals
have emerged in Japanese political circles and popular opinion than they have in China, but
shifts on both sides indicate that change – more likely for the worse – is building” (2002:78).
With Japan becoming less responsive towards China’s demands, it has made the
Chinese even more forthright in professing their instinctively anti-Japanese sentiment. This
“perceptional readjustment” has been, further complicated by what observers labelled as
“the burden of double-expectations” (Glosserman 10/09/2003; Konishi 2003). Because of
their socio-cultural similarities, both Chinese and Japanese expect each to behave like, and
even over-compensate the other for the differences that emerge, and, when that fails to
materialise, the sense of indignation becomes deeper (Glosserman 10/09/2003). According
to Glosserman, Chinese over-expectation of Japan to continue assuaging their demands as
a form of “moral redemption” has made them incensed towards perceived Japanese
insensitivities. Meanwhile, Japan’s over-expectation of the Chinese to “exorcise the ghost” of
its past aggression has made Japanese weary and annoyed towards perceived Chinese
ungratefulness, and their taking advantage of Japan’s previously obliging attitude
(Glosserman 10/09/2003). Their lack of ““intersubjectively shared” ideas, norms and values”
(Yang 2005:7) is another drawback, which has subverted a confluence of understanding that
could help bridge differences. Most obvious is their contrasting political norms and culture,
with Japan, largely a liberal democracy, while China, an authoritarian state. This “ideological
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gulf” has obstructed the promotion of mutual trust (Glosserman 10/09/2003). It has also
apparently encouraged an ideologically-centred superiority complex amongst ordinary
Japanese that made them reluctant to trust, or comprehend, less negotiate with the Chinese
(Matsuda interview; Wan 2006:163).
Ultimately, the clashing nationalisms evolving in Japan and China are widening
differences in interpretations of their past, present, and future (Gong 2001b:41; Chan and
Bridges 2006). According to Gong, “divergence between domestic pressure for Japan to
establish itself as a “normal country” and domestic pressures for China to replace a faded
ideology with rising nationalism” that targets Japan, is fostering a potentially destabilising
scenario (2001b:41). Since Beijing has fanned anti-Japanese sentiment as a partial strategy
to sustain political legitimacy, Chinese nationalism is bound to react to shifts in Japan’s
China policy. The Chinese would preferably deal with the Japan that was “penitent over the
war and basically distrustful of itself” (Self 2002:82). However, neo-nationalism that calls for
a prideful national identity has had the Japanese distancing themselves from the self-
imposed, postwar pacifism and deferential attitude (Self 2002:82), a development that runs
counter to Chinese penchant and expectations. Hence, an assertive and less remorseful
Japan is bound to fuel Chinese nationalism. Conversely, a “wounded” Japanese nationalism
caused by the aforementioned degenerations, is reactive and apprehensive towards a
rapidly rising China, whose rejuvenated national confidence has made the Chinese more
nationalistic and feisty in advancing their national interests, some of which are at Japan’s
expense (Self 2002:82). Their “diverging fortunes” (Pei and Swaine 2005) have certainly
accentuated Japanese insecurity and distrust, which, against the backdrop of such “reactive-
confrontational” nationalisms, are widely believed to be straining recent bilateral relations.
This study therefore, raises important questions regarding the extent to which
nationalism, real or perceived, is shaping their deteriorating relationship, notably from the
Japanese side, and also how, in what manner, and under what conditions domestic
nationalist pressure affect Japanese foreign policy-making. This warrants an analysis of the
actors and processes, and an examination of the linkage between nationalism and policy-
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making, as well as the constraints/opportunities arising from domestic nationalist sentiment
and other external-internal restrictions that concomitantly influence Japanese policy-options
pertaining to the bilateral relations.
5.2. Japanese Foreign Policy-making: An Overview
This section provides a general idea of Japanese foreign policy-making, focusing particularly
on the basic framework for Japan’s China policy, and the actors involved in the decision-
making process. This includes an analysis of the connection between nationalism and
policy-making, notably the manner and conditions in which it exerts influence, in the
presence of other variables that equally matter, as perceived/calculated by state-elites.
5.2.1. Actors and process7
Japanese foreign policy-making is, commonly noted for the “elitist” and/or “pluralist” nature
of the principal actors and structures involved in its process. Various terminologies have
been coined to describe the Japanese model, according to the number and emphasis of key
actors, which includes “elitist” (Johnson 1995), and “pluralist” (Curtis 1995; Zhao 1993), to
the more elaborate “elite-led pluralist” (Lehmann 1997; Hughes 1999) and “patterned
pluralism” (Muramatsu and Krauss 1987) (cf. Hagstrom 2003:84). Notwithstanding the
differences, scholars tend to identify a similar cohort of principal actors constituting the
policy-making structure, and share a common description of their interwoven relationships,
which have been metaphorically described as an “iron triangle” (Collignon and Usui 2001); a
“tripartite elite model” (Hook et.al 2001:41); or “tripartite power elite” (Fukui 1977a:22); a
“tripod” (Zhao 1993:22); and the “Japan Incorporated” thesis (Abegglen 1970:35 cf.
Collignon and Usui 2001:867). These metaphors illustrate a network of interdependent, and
generally collaborative relationship between the principal actors, namely the central
bureaucracy, incumbent ruling party (predominantly the LDP), and the zaikai (Tanaka 2000).
Whilst collaboration for exclusive political influence has been their prevailing modus
operandi, it is widely acknowledged that these policy-making elites are “subject to infighting
and factionalism within themselves as well as between each other” (Hook et.al 2001:41).
7 This section’s elaborations are mainly inspired by Hagstrom (2003), Hook et.al (2001), and Tanaka (2000).
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Although earlier studies mostly portray Japanese policy-making as inherently elitist,
monolithic, and coherent, contemporary works seem to highlight its pluralistic and
fragmented feature, where decision-making is subjected to, not only intense competition
amongst policy-making elites, but also pressure from other relevant domestic and external
actors/factors, as well as informal policy-making mechanisms (Zhao 1993; Hughes
1999:161-162). Furthermore, Japan’s policy-making regime has been deemed “enigmatic”,
“highly diffuse” and indeterminable, in terms of power distribution and actor dominance in
decision-making (van Wolferen 1993; Drifte 1996:5,28; cf. Hagstrom 2003:84-85).
Regardless of the contending debate, it remains credible to view contemporary Japanese
foreign policy-making as essentially “elite-led”, yet “increasingly pluralistic, with various
groups exercising different degrees of influence” (Hughes 1999:162), depending on the
specific time context and issue addressed (Hook et.al 2001:42; Calder 1997). Hence,
according to Hook et.al, rather than over-emphasising the “tripartite elite” structure, and the
supremacy of one elite vis-à-vis another, i.e. bureaucracy (Pempel 1979; Johnson 1995);
zaikai (Samuels 1987; Calder 1993); or the ruling LDP (Sakakibara 2004:xiii; Park 2001);
present analytical models should simultaneously account for a compendium of political
actors/determinants that directly/indirectly influence the policy-making process (2001:42).
The following is a description of the principal actors and mechanisms identified as
influential, to varying degrees, in Japanese foreign, and specifically, China policy-making. As
stipulated, the “tripartite-elite/iron-triangle” forms the core of the general foreign policy-
making structure. However, a specific analysis of the executive role of the PM and the
cabinet, which are intertwined with the bureaucracy and ruling LDP, serves as an important
starting point, to address a key question regarding the prevalence of state-elites’ (central
decision-makers) domestic political resolve and nationalistic disposition in shaping foreign
policy-choices.
Prime Minister and the Cabinet. As the head-of-government, the PM wields significant
foreign policy influence, though “executive power” is, constitutionally “vested in the Cabinet”,
which is “collectively responsible to the Diet” (cf. Tanaka 2000:4). Theoretically, the PM has
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the authority to appoint/determine the Cabinet line-up, allowing him the prerogative to form
an Executive branch that unanimously, or at least in principle, agree with his policy-
directions (Tanaka 2001:4). Yet, in practice, there are structural/politico-institutional
limitations that tend to curtail the power of a Japanese premier (Mulgan 2004:7; Tanaka
2000:4-5). This include, among others, the traditionally-entrenched and divisive ruling party
politics that usually makes him comparatively weaker than his counterparts, in exerting
influence over party members in the Diet, and the organisational constraint of a relatively
small support staff under the PMO, often seconded from key ministries (Tanaka 2000-4-6;
Hook et.al 2001:49; Drifte 1998:21-22). Another related and well-known shortcoming is the
rapid premiership changes that undermine “continuity in executive leadership in Japan’s
international relations” (Stockwin 1998 cf. Hook et.al 2001:49). These politico-institutional
constraints and their ambiguous power position suggest that Japanese PMs tend to put
more emphasis on domestic politics, where securing domestic political support/leverage
often outweighs their interest in foreign policy-making (Hook et.al 2001:50).
Despite such limitations, Tanaka sees the PM wielding enough power to
mobilise/channel bureaucratic resources for common/national goals, and officially serving,
under the cabinet’s auspices, as the final arbiter of policy-decisions (see Rose 1998:164),
making him “the single most important player in the game that is Japan’s domestic politics,
and particularly in the [‘two-level’] games of complex domestic/foreign policy interaction”
(2000:7). This is especially so, when managing key bilateral relationships and/or foreign
policy crises (NCR’s assumption), during which the PM’s role becomes paramount, a
position in which he can “make a difference both positively and negatively” (Tanaka 2000:7;
see also Hagstrom 2003:86; Taliaferro 2000/1). Perhaps, crucially, Japanese premiers also
command what Hook et.al calls sufficient “moral authority”, which enables them to mobilise
the domestic political apparatus and public towards specific foreign policy objectives
(2001:50). Moreover, prime ministerial powers have grown since the administrative reforms
in 2001, enabling him to circumvent cumbersome bureaucratic constraints in decision-
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making.8 Indeed, Hagstrom, in citing Tanaka (1991:191), sees the PM playing a central role
with regard to the formulation of Japan’s China policy, where “no important decision is taken,
and no substantial policy is implemented, without his consent” (2003:86 fn.191). Sasajima
shares a similar view, suggesting that political decision-making at the PM-level has
“tremendous influence on diplomacy with China”, especially under the leadership of a
strong-willed premier (2002:83), i.e. Tanaka, Nakasone, Takeshita, and Koizumi (Hook et.al
2001:54; Lam 2005).9
Next, cabinet members, specifically the FM, and others, to varying extent, affect
decision-making at the apex. The Cabinet secretariat (naikaku kanbo) also plays an
increasingly important, albeit mostly supportive and coordinating role in policy-making
(Shinoda 2005). Among the protagonists are the CCS (kanbochokan)10 and his deputies,11
who serve as higher-level mechanisms of foreign policy coordination and decision-making,
notably when the process is stifled by unresolved disputes and inter-ministerial “turf battles”
(Ahn 1998:53). There are also the Cabinet Councilors’ Office for External Affairs12 (naikaku
gaisei shingishitsu) and the Cabinet Security Affairs Office (anzen hoshoshitsu), established
in 1986 to improve foreign and security policy coordination between the Cabinet and
ministries (Drifte 1998:22; Hook et.al 2001:49). Apparently, the former plays a key role in
8 The Diet passed the Basic Law for the Reform of Central Government Ministries and Agencies in March 1998
that carried out the restructuring of ministries and agencies, and strengthening of executive powers of the prime
minister and cabinet secretariat (Tanaka 2000:7). The law officially came into effect on January 1, 2001.
9 PM Tanaka’s leadership was instrumental in the rapid normalisation of Japan-China relations in September
1972, while both Nakasone and Takeshita have devoted years to building up “pro-China” support within the
LDP, and establishing formal and informal networks with Chinese state-elites (Hook et.al 2001:54; Zhao 1993).
Conversely, Koizumi was arguably a key factor to the deterioration of contemporary Sino-Japanese diplomacy
(Lam 2005; McCormack 2005; Kaneko 2005).
10 Tanaka sees the CCS as the most important figure in the PM’s support staff, usually appointed from the same
LDP faction as the presiding PM. Although assign with primarily domestic-oriented tasks, the likes of Gotoda
Masaharu , Fukuda Yasuo and Abe Shinzo have been influential in foreign policy (2000:5; Lam 2005).
11 There are three deputies, one for administrative affairs, and two others for political affairs. The latter two do
not normally assume an important role in foreign affairs, but recent appointees have acted as general advisors of
external affairs to the PM, i.e. Yosano Kaoru and Nukaga Fukushiro in the Hashimoto Cabinet, Suzuki Muneo
in the Obuchi administration (Tanaka 2000:5).
12 The Cabinet Councilors’ Office for External Affairs (CCOEA), usually headed by a senior MOFA official is
“essentially a MOFA branch in the Cabinet” (Tanaka 2000:6). It functions as a coordination mechanism that
manages foreign policy-related issues involving other ministries, a role similar to the regular inter-ministry
mechanism for foreign policy coordination, invoked when “an issue transcends the jurisdiction of one single
organisation” (Hagstrom 2003:86). Ahn, however, argues that the secondment of staff from other ministries
encourages the replication of “existing forms of interministry competition and sectionalism...within the
CCOEA” (1998:44).
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China policy-making; the unit head, together with the MOFA, are responsible in furnishing
the PM with information on China (Sasajima 2002:83). Moreover, officials previously
appointed to that position were mostly from the so-called “China school” cohort, and usually
former director-generals of the MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (AOAB)
(Sasajima 2002:83), giving their information and advice much credibility. However, ex-North
American Bureau officials have seemingly taken over these offices during Koizumi’s
premiership, which explains his Administration’s increasingly “pro-US” policy-direction, at the
expense of Japanese-Chinese ties.13
Bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, comprising ministries (sho) and agencies (cho), is
traditionally influential, and remains crucial in the formulation and implementation of
contemporary Japanese foreign policy, despite its subordinate position to the Cabinet, and
the LDP’s growing role in policy-making (Ahn 1997:379; Nester 1990:167; cf. Hagstrom
2003:85; Hughes 1999:162). The MOFA is the chief bureaucratic protagonist responsible for
Japan’s foreign policy-making and diplomatic affairs, while other regular actors include the
METI,14 the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the JDA/MOD. Among others that occasionally
get involved over specific issues in China policy-making are the MOE/MEXT and the JCG.15
Within the MOFA framework, the AOAB, and the China and Mongolia Division are central in
the formulation of China policy. Both sections are traditionally headed, and/or dominated by
“China school” bureaucrats that staunchly believe in “good-neighbourly friendship”
(Sasajima 2003:83), and advocate policy of appeasement and low-posturing, when dealing
with China (Takamine 2006:79). However, a younger generation of less-partisan, (or pro-
US)16 officials now forms the MOFA core, bringing an inevitable shift to its China policy-
13 This is an opinion shared by several interviewees. Also, for instance, former MOFA Director of North
American Bureau, Okamoto Yukio, was promoted from his position at the CCO for External Affairs to being
Koizumi’s top diplomatic aide in April 2003. See “Koizumi promotes Okamoto Yukio to top diplomatic aide,”
Japan Policy & Politics, 21 April 2003.
14 The METI was formerly Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) before the 2001reform.
15 The JCG, formerly the Japan Maritime Safety Agency (J-MSA) gets directly involved in the Senkaku/
Diaoyudao dispute with China (Samuels 2007/8), while the MOE has been implicated in the textbook rows
since 1982, notably for its alleged acquiescence to historical revisionism (Hook et.al 2001:48; Caroline Rose
1998; 2005).
16 As opined by Murata Koji, Sasajima Masahiko, and a senior MOFA official (Anonymous interview C) in
their respective interviews. Indeed, even the China Division is no longer headed by “China school” bureaucrats,
i.e. Akiba Takeo is American-trained and served previously in the MOFA’s North American Affairs Bureau.
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orientation that prioritises Japan’s (pro-American) national interests (Sasajima 2002:83;
Murata 2006:45). Furthermore, the MOFA’s China policy-making influence has been
gradually eroded by the ruling LDP since mid-1990s, following “structural-functional”
adjustments that shifted the power balance in policy-making between the two actors, not
mentioning the latter’s enhanced foreign policy expertise (Takamine 2006:80).
Generally, the key bureaucratic-level personnel in China policy-making are the China
Division director (kacho), and the AOAB’s director-general (Ajia kyokucho), both of whom
can make decisions that “directly influence the course of policy” (Sasajima 2002:83;
Hagstrom 2003:85). However, decisions over specific/major bilateral issues may require the
deliberations of higher-ranking “political” actors, i.e. the MOFA vice-minister, and cabinet
members, such as the CCS, FM, and ultimately the PM, during which policy-making
assumes a more “top-down”-orientation (Tanaka 1991:194-96 cf. Hagstrom 2003:86;
Sasajima 2002:83). This means that MOFA bureaucrats exercise more independent
decision-making on routine and general affairs, but their influence becomes restricted, when
critical bilateral issues/problems arise (Hagstrom 2003:86). Even so, policy decision-making
at the highest level remains relatively dependent on information/advice deriving from the
MOFA, or other ministries (Tanaka 1991:192 cf. Hagstrom 2003:86-87), underscoring the
bureaucracy’s fundamental role in the overall policy-making structure.
Political Parties and Diet. The LDP, as the largest and most dominant political party in
postwar Japan, is a principal foreign policy actor, owing to its political control over the
executive and legislature. Previous studies have asserted the influential role of LDP
politicians in the policy-making process, in view of growing (foreign) policy expertise deriving
from the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) and other intra-party committees
(Takamine 2006:83; Hughes 1999:162), as well as the LDP’s dominance in Japan’s political
system (cf. Hook et.al 2001:42). Despite a temporary lost of power between 1993-1995, the
LDP has survived, rebounded, and restored its political clout through power-sharing and
decisive electoral majorities in recent years. The LDP foreign policy-making initiative is,
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engendered by formal and informal actors. The president,17 secretary-general, and
chairpersons of the PARC and Executive Council, respectively, constitute the former,
whereas the latter comprises top-level kuromaku (i.e. former senior bureaucrats/politicians),
habatsu (party factions),18 zoku (policy tribes/caucuses with specialised interests in
particular issue-areas), and koenkai (constituency-based/decentralised organisations)
(Hagstrom 2003:86-87; Hiwatari 2005:35; Zhao 1993). These internal decision-making
mechanisms are particularly influential, when the LDP commands comfortable majorities in
both Houses of the Diet, notably on important foreign policy initiatives and management of
controversial issues (Tanaka 2000:11).
The deliberations within the LDP have profound bearing on Japan’s China policy.19
There exists an intra-party division/polarisation of interests and attitude towards China,
along the line of the so-called “pro-China” and “pro-Taiwan” groups (Zhao 1993:67;
Hagstrom 2003:87). Membership within these contending groups derives from across
political factions, and apparently does not coincide with factional politics, making habatsu’s
influence on China policy, or foreign policy in general, minimal/negligible (Tanaka 1991:200,
202; cf. Hagstrom 2003:87). Similarly, informal actors, i.e. zoku and koenkai tend to focus
predominantly on domestic issues, hence their presumed limited interests in external affairs,
especially before the 1990s (Takamine 2006:84). However, such presumptions are
deceptive since Japanese-Chinese relations have been quintessentially shaped by domestic
issues, suggesting an under-estimation of these informal actors’ influence on China policy-
making. In fact, certain factions (i.e. keisei-kai, kochi-kai) have exhibited profound influence
in promoting good relations with China, although their clout is presently diminishing (Hook
17 The LDP president normally assumes the PM position, when the LDP serves as the dominant ruling party.
18 Among the current LDP factions are Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai (Seiwa-kai), KeiseiKenkyukai (Keisei-kai),
Shisuikai, Kochikai, Kinmirai Seiji Kenkyukai, Taiyukai, and a few smaller factions. The Seiwa-kai (ex-
Fukuda/Mori and now, Machimura faction) is known to be more hawkish, rightwing and pro-US/Taiwan and
anti-China. It has replaced the moderate and “pro-China” Keisei-kai (ex-Tanaka/Takeshita/Hashimoto and now,
Tsushima faction) as the most powerful/influential LDP faction. See “Liberal Democratic Party”, Wikipedia
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Democratic_Party_(Japan)#Seiwa_Seisaku_Kenky.C5.ABkai_.28Machim
ura_Faction.29 (accessed on 13/12/2007)]. See also Park (2001).
19 This observation is confirmed by a senior “pro-China” LDP politician, Kato Koichi, who contends that the
LDP’s influence in Japan’s China policy-making is especially significant due to the special nature of the
bilateral relationship (Kato interview/1).
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et.al 2001:53-54; Lam 2002:5). Conversely, the “Fukuda-Mori”(seiwa-kai) faction that
Koizumi belongs, and headed before his premiership appointment, has been traditionally
sympathetic to Taiwan. Its political ascendancy is not unrelated to the decline in Japanese-
Chinese ties, thus challenging suggestions regarding habatsu’s negligible influence. Also,
the rise of gaiko-zoku (diplomatic tribe/caucuses), whose membership includes MOFA’s ex-
ministers/vice-ministers deeply knowledgeable on Japanese-Chinese relations underscores
its prominence in China policy-making (Takamine 2006:84).20 It is nonetheless, commonly
agreed that kuromaku’s “behind-the-scenes” role has been traditionally vital, especially in
mediating and seeking diplomatic resolutions via informal/personal channels during crisis
period (Sasajima 2002:84; Zhao 1993). Taken together, these LDP policy-making actors/
apparatus can profoundly influence the China policy-direction, especially considering the bi-
partisan split, and overall hardening of attitude towards China. Since mid-1990s, “anti-China”
LDP hardliners have often criticised the government and MOFA’s “soft” policy towards
China, and successfully pressured Tokyo for more assertive management of their bilateral
affairs (Sasajima 2002:85; Murata 2006).
The foreign policy-making influence of other political parties has been noted,
especially in exerting domestic political pressure, and gaiatsu on the government, via
unofficial and personal diplomatic channels to improve relations with specific countries.
Relations with China have traditionally received significant attention from Japanese political
parties, where the likes of the JSP/SDPJ, JCP, and notably Komeito (presently called Shin-
Komeito), played key roles in Japanese-Chinese normalisation (Zhao 1993:19-40; Hughes
1999:163; Hook et.al 2001:166). Although the transformation of Japan’s political landscape
in the 1990s has weakened their political convictions and influence, not mentioning, their
acquiescence to the general drift to the right, these parties, together with the DPJ remain
important mitigators in contemporary Japanese-Chinese relations. That said, bi-partisan
20 According to Takamine (2006), the LDP foreign policy expertise has been enhanced by LDP Diet-members
who previously served as foreign minister/vice-ministers. Specifically, ex-Upper House and gaiko-zoku
member, Takemi Keizo, was arguably amongst the most influential LDP politician during the Koizumi era in
the area of China policy-making, due to his vast knowledge on China and Taiwan, and strong influence/personal
connection with MOFA bureaucrats (Takamine 2006:84). Other influential gaiko-zoku members include Kono
Taro, Shiozaki Yasuhisa, Eto Seishiro, Aso Taro and Abe Shinzo (cf. Takamine 2006:85).
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treatment of China also exists within the opposition, specifically amongst the DPJ members,
and indeed, across the Diet. At the Diet-level, the Japan-China Parliamentarians’ Friendship
League,21 whose members span across party divides, advocates for amicable Japanese-
Chinese ties, while “pro-Taiwan” organisations established by both LDP and DPJ members
serve to sway Diet influence on China policy (Sasajima 2002:86). Although the Diet’s foreign
policy-making role is generally passive considering Japan’s parliamentary system, where the
PM, theoretically, has majority support (Tanaka 2000:11), ongoing power shifts have risen
its profile, notably in directing policy towards major powers/issues, including China policy
(Cooney 2007:95, 181-183).
Business Organisations. The zaikai comprises the Keidanren (Federation of Economic
Organisations), Nissho (Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and Keizai Doyukai
(Council for Economic Development).22 Amongst the most influential of non-governmental
entities, zaikai is renowned for its informal foreign policy-making role, and even conducts its
own diplomacy (Calder 1997:2, 17; cf. Hagstrom 2003:88). Lobbying is essentially its modus
operandi to affect the Japanese state’s foreign policy direction, although they also commonly
utilise informal channels of communication to promote relations with foreign states.
According to Tanaka, the Keidanren, especially, has long been influential due to its “close
formal and informal relations with political leaders” (2000:14) and its function as “a conduit
for the distribution of funds to political parties” (2000:13). Similarly, Doyukai has become
vocal on foreign policy issues under the stewardship of Ushio Jiro (1995-99) and Kobayashi
Yotaro (1999-) (Tanaka 2000:14). In the era of economic interdependence, they assume an
important role in mediating Tokyo’s foreign policy, and mitigating relations with countries like
China to protect Japanese business interests. Chapter 3 has described the zaikai’s
historically crucial roles in advancing Japanese-Chinese relations (Hughes 1999:181).
21 The league is one of the seven “Japan-China friendship” organisations, which include the Japan-China
Friendship Association, the Japan-China Society, and the Japan-China Friendhip Centre, Japanese Council for
the Promotion of International Trade, Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association, Japan-China Association on
Economy and Trade (Sasajima 2002:86 Xinhua Online 30/03/2006).
22 The zaikai previously included the Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employees’ Association), which officially
merged with Keidanren in May 2002, and is now a part of the “new” Keidanren (Japanese) or Japan Business
Federation (English) (Hagstrom 2003:87; see also Hook et.al. 2001:55).
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Recently, its has been noted for pressuring against prime ministerial Yasukuni visits, and
helping sustain the informal channels of economic diplomacy with China against the decline
in political relations.
Other actors. There are other actors in the domestic context that influence policy-making,
albeit mostly indirectly, through “agenda-setting and/or participation in various formal and
informal settings” (Hagstrom 2003:88). They include, among others, the mass media,
academic community and think-tanks, sub-national governments (SNGs), pressure groups,
and public opinion (see Hook et.al. 2001:61-65).
The mass media significantly influences the domestic discourse on, and the agenda
of Japanese foreign policy, due to the avid consumption of newspapers and other media
products by the domestic society (Pharr and Krauss 1996 cf. Hook et.al 2001:61; Johnston
2007:113; Sasajima interview). However, its influence on the policy-making process is
limited by the exclusive and heavily regulated kisha system (press club), which challenges
the impartiality of the news information provided (Takahara 30/01/2007; Shimoyachi 2007).23
In general, the major national newspapers are politically opinionated and lopsided to a
degree, with the Yomiuri, Sankei, and Nikkei holding the pro-establishment, conservative
and nationalistic line, while the Asahi and Mainichi tend to align with discourse from the
opposite of the political divide (Tanaka 2000:14). With regard to media opinion towards
China, the latter two are generally more sympathetic, and pro-China, while the former group,
especially Sankei, has been “poisoning the atmosphere” with its vocal criticisms of the
Chinese and Tokyo’s generally conciliatory policy towards Beijing (Johnston 2007).24
Additionally, government/non-government think-tanks and the intellectual/academic
community also affect foreign policy-making, notably through the furnishing of information
and expertise, as well as in generating debates on general and specific issue-areas.
Prominent scholars sitting on the government’s special advisory committees are especially,
23 Press members normally obtain heavily regulated news information via attachment to a particular government
agency/political party, thus potentially undermining the impartiality of the news (Hook et.al 2001:61).
24 The media’s role in “poisoning the atmosphere” of contemporary Japanese-Chinese ties was also noted in my
interviews with Tamamoto Masaru, Gilbert Rozman, Shimoyachi Nao, Takahara Akio and Takahata Akio.
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well positioned to exert influence through policy briefings and advice to policy-makers (Hook
et.al 2001:62). For instance, the joint research efforts of Japanese intellectuals within the
New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century play a crucial role in seeking a
reconciliation of their bilateral history (Kokubun interview/2). Meanwhile, SNGs are
considered emerging foreign policy actors, through their external relations and activities with
counteparts abroad (Jain 2000; 2006). In the realm of Japanese-Chinese ties, Japanese
SNGs are actively promoting economic cooperation zones, sister-city programmes, and
other cultural exchanges with their Chinese counterparts, which are beneficial to improving
overall bilateral relations.25 Conversely, their actions/remarks can challenge the national
government’s diplomatic position and undermine ties, i.e. strident criticisms and “anti-China”
remarks by the Tokyo governor, Ishihara Shintaro, have intermittently dented bilateral
goodwill (Jain 2000:26).26
Pressure groups, or non-profit organisations (NPO), are another credible civil society
channel to exert political pressure on the government’s foreign policy position, especially on
specific issue-areas that overlap with domestic interests (Hook et.al 2001:64). Among the
issue-areas that draw their interests include agriculture, fisheries, and the environment, to
the more contentious issues of anti-militarism, constitutional revision, and nationalist
education reforms. Their modus operandi and ability to affect the policy-making process can
be best summarised by Hook et.al, who opine that:
Whatever the case, these actors will try to influence the policy-making process through a
wide range of tactics, such as financial contributions to political parties, personal contacts,
appeals in the media and grassroots education, although their success….is dependent on the
timescale and nature of the issue addressed (2001:64).
In China policy-making, some pressure groups are relatively capable of exerting political
pressure on a range of domestic issues that remain as barriers to genuine improvement in
Japanese-Chinese ties. From Yasukuni to textbook rows, “nationalist” groups like Izokukai,
25 Accounts of SNG’s “bridge-building” role in Japanese-Chinese ties can be found in Hook’s article on
Kyushu’s role in forging the so-called pan-Yellow Sea Zone with Dalian, and SNGs from the two Koreas, and
Jain’s works on Japan-China cooperation at the sub-national level (see Hook 2006; Jain 2006).
26 Apparently, under Ishihara, the Tokyo Metropolitan government has substantially scaled down activities of its
sister-city relations with Beijing (Jain 2006:129).
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Tsukurukai, and Nippon Kaigi have relentlessly pursued the rewriting of a “positive” national
history, venerating the war dead, and rebuilding a “normal” Japan (McCormack 2000).
Similarly, Nihon Seinensha has actively exerted Japan’s claims over Senkaku/Diaoyudao
that periodically triggered diplomatic rows with China. The occasionally uncompromising
stance exhibited by recent Japanese administrations on these issue-areas, imply the salient,
albeit indirect influence of such pressure groups on the policy-making apparatus.
Lastly, public opinion on foreign policy issues is, regularly gauged via surveys
conducted by government agencies and mass media, i.e. the PMO’s related annual polls.
Public opinion reflects the interests of the Japanese people, which the democratic
government of Japan is accountable for, and required to take into consideration in policy-
making. Indeed, public opinion has been significant in shaping what Miyashita calls the “core
values” or “opinion moods” that define the “parameters” within which postwar Japanese
policy-makers have operated, such as Japan’s pacifist, anti-militarist norm in international
and security affairs (2002:155). However, its influence is essentially indirect, and restricted
to establishing “the general background against which policy-making agents reach decisions
on [foreign policy issues]” (Hook et.al 2001:65). Previously described, the shift in Japanese
public opinion of China has concurred with shifts in Japan’s China policy and the overall
mood of their bilateral relations, reflecting its “ambiance-setting” role in China policy-making.
5.2.2. Nationalism and foreign policy-making in Japan
The above description identifies areas where nationalism can intersect and influence
Japanese policy-making. For a start, nationalism can influence top-level decision-making
through the cohort of state-elites, namely the cabinet headed by the PM. Since they act as
the final arbiter of policy decision-making, the personality and political dispositions/
affiliations, and perceptions of these key elites, especially the PM, tend to shape their policy-
preferences, and influence their decisions. Previously mentioned, generational change has
seen the arrival of more nationalistic-oriented Japanese leaders, who are eager and
prepared to pursue both domestic and external policies that further Japan’s national
interests, even at the cost of aggravating traditionally sensitive bilateral relations. Post-Cold
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War Japanese premiers, i.e. Hashimoto, Obuchi, Koizumi and, especially Abe, have
exhibited nationalist dispositions, and their alleged political affiliations with nationalist groups
within and outside the government, not mentioning the LDP’s conservative slant underscore
nationalism’s potential salience in affecting decision-making at the apex of Japanese foreign
policy apparatus (Shibuichi 2005:200-1). Concomitantly, nationalism’s influence pervades
the LDP-dominated Cabinet of the respective administrations, whose membership would
have derived from related factions, and/or had a convergence of ideological/political outlook
and interests with the presiding premier.27 Moreover, with the LDP’s policy-making clout,
nationalism can exert its influence through habatsu, zoku, and increasingly, the new group
of non-faction legislators dubbed the “Koizumi Children” that has emerged dominant in the
LDP following the 2005 election (Hiwatari 2005:34). Notwithstanding their personal political
preferences, nationalism’s salience in top-level policy-making is also determined by the
domestic political resolve of these principal elites vis-à-vis nationalist and moderate forces in
domestic politics, where increased dependence/vulnerability on either side for political
power/survival could plausibly lead to lopsided decision-making (Anonymous interview D).28
At the bureaucratic-level, nationalism can in similar ways, affect policy-making, via
power-wielding individuals and related institutional interests. At the MOFA, the new
generation of bureaucrats is expectedly more confident in their external outlook, and in
advancing Japanese national interests in the international arena. Although MOFA’s policy-
direction/approach has been traditionally moderate rather than nationalistic, its assertive
diplomatic posturing in recent times suggests nationalism’s gradual redefinition of its policy-
making structure and process. Institutionally, the MOFA’s operational behaviour is
essentially pragmatic and “rational-utility”-oriented, when managing Japan’s diplomacy.
However, its jurisdiction tends to be affected by the political affiliation/disposition of the
27 Aforementioned, observers deemed the Koizumi administration as amongst the most hawkish and
nationalistic in postwar Japan, with many cabinet members such as CCS Abe Shinzo, FM Aso Taro, Defence
chief Nukaga Fukuhiro, and METI ministers, Hiranuma Takeo and Nakagawa Shoichi,, among others,
identified as nationalist-inclined, or sympathetic towards domestic nationalist movements, due to their common
political stance, and/or familial background.
28 With these forces at work, and even more significantly, the related public sentiment, a former Senior Vice-
Minister went as far to assert that efforts by Japanese politicians that run counter to the prevailing public
opinion, i.e. defending China’s position, would be “some sort of a political suicide” (Anonymous interview D).
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presiding FM, not mentioning decision-making at the higher-level, as demonstrated by the
overarching PMO, which may ultimately determine its diplomatic options.
Likewise, the JDA/MOD, JCG, METI, and MOE/MEXT, among others, may share a
more nationalistic outlook owing to similar impetus, as well as their respective institutional
interests, the former two on national security, while the latter two on national economic
interests and patriotic society-building through education, respectively. Despite their
domestic-oriented interests, these institutions have occasionally found themselves
entangled in foreign policy-making due to the “internationalisation” of related issues, and
thus, were required to advance their interests within the policy-making framework.
Understandably, it would be in the interests of the JDA/MOD and MOE/MEXT to support
neo-nationalist goals, i.e. constitutional revision of the Article IX, and the promotion of
revisionist history/patriotic education, respectively, two domestic issues that constantly
impinge on Japan’s foreign policy towards neighbour-states, generally, and China,
specifically. Moreover, in the JDA/MOD’s case, strong nationalist pressure in foreign policy-
making would expectedly transpire through its institutional interests in defending Japanese
sovereignty and territorial integrity, besides competing for policy-making influence on
security matters vis-à-vis MOFA, and justifying for a larger budgetary allocation.
Domestic nationalist pressure can equally affect foreign policy-making, via non-state
actors described earlier. The key protagonists are the nationalist-oriented mass media,
pressure groups, intellectuals, and public opinion. The intimate ties between nationalist-
rightwing groups and the ruling LDP, where their “patron-client” relationship serves to secure
political support/votes for the latter, and where group-party membership tends to overlap,
underscore their capacity in affecting the LDP-state’s external policy related to domestic
nationalist concerns (Shibuichi 2005:200-1). Meanwhile, media agencies/sources mentioned
in Chapter 4 are convenient “mouthpieces” and advocates of neo-nationalist goals that,
together with “revisionist” intellectual support, can set the nationalist discourse and agenda
in Japan’s international relations (Hook et.al 2001; Kato interview/1). Similarly, nationalism’s
influence have been exerted through the activities and modus operandi of aforementioned
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pressure groups, while the general drift in public opinion towards the right is another avenue,
which increasingly has to be accounted for in Japanese policy-making. In fact, both the
media and public opinion have gained extended policy-making influence under recent
Japanese administrations, as contemporary leaders, especially Koizumi, and Abe, to a
lesser extent, are widely perceived to be “populist” and “image-dependent”, making them
responsive to media and public pressure (Iida 2003).
5.2.3. Other variables in foreign policy-making
The above section infers the plausible agency connecting nationalism and foreign policy-
making. However, nationalism is just one of the several key variables influencing Japan’s
policy-making, particularly its China policy. In Chapter 3, it is argued that contemporary
Japanese-Chinese relations have been consistently defined by a combination of interrelated,
external-domestic determinants. Besides factoring into the key policy-makers’ calculation,
these variables are also areas that intercede with the interests of other mentioned actors,
who can exert their moderating influence vis-à-vis domestic nationalist forces in foreign
policy-making. For instance, the significance of interdependence to Japan’s economic
agenda means that Japanese policy-makers are inclined to demonstrate pragmatism and
restraint in managing their difficult relationship with China, to safeguard their economic ties.
To this end, domestic pressures from zaikai could constrain Japan’s China policy. Moreover,
the purported “politics-business linkage” also possibly influences state-elites’ decision-
making, pertaining to advancing their vested interests in the bilateral relationship.
Meanwhile, “moderate” forces participating in domestic political competition, i.e. opposition
parties, and pacifist pressure groups, like Heiwa izokukai zenkoku renrakukai (National
Organisation of Pacifist Bereaved Families) etc., and leftwing media, i.e. Asahi Shimbun,
Shukan Kinyobi, and Sekai, may curtail nationalistic tendencies within the foreign policy
decision-making circle (Shibuichi 2005:203-204). Externally, powerful levers like the US and
the US-Japan alliance, can pressure Japan (and China) into adopting moderate policy-
options, although US policies can equally exacerbate nationalist impulses. Simply put,
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nationalism’s policy-making salience is mediated by, and dependent, to an extent, on its
interactions with other determinants.
Hence, the extent to which nationalism becomes dominant in Japan’s China policy-
making generally boils down to conditions related to state-elites’ domestic political resolve
vis-à-vis nationalist and moderate forces, and Japan’s relative power position vis-à-vis
China, as perceived/calculated at a particular time context. Subscribing to this thesis’ NCR
framework, domestic nationalist pressure may likely influence Japan’s China policy-making,
under conditions of relatively favourable/ambiguous structural/external pressure, and
suppressed, when Japanese state-elites perceive the external condition to be unfavourable.
Particularly, nationalist-assertive policy-options could prevail, when Japan enjoys favourable
“allied resolve/commitment” (US support) and diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China.
Conversely, a Japanese state suffering from perceptively unfavourable relative power
position (i.e. alliance commitment and diplomatic leverage) may opt for a moderate-
conciliatory/non-action policy-option, when managing nationalist-flavoured bilateral disputes.
By the same token, nationalism may manifest under the condition, where state-elites, weak
in domestic political resolve and susceptible to nationalist pressure, find it necessary to
adopt nationalist-assertive policy-options to enhance political survival/standing. Then again,
nationalism would be less significant, when state-elites enjoy favourable domestic political
resolve, which allows them to risk moderate-conciliatory policies without fearing the brunt of
domestic nationalist backlashes.29 In sum, although not discounting the potential irrationality
of nationalist passion, these assumptions are based on; i) “rationality” of Japanese state-
elites’ perception of the external-domestic nexus, at a specific time context, and ii)
Schweller’s aforesaid NCR notion that states respond (or not) to constraints/opportunities in
ways determined by state-elites’ consideration of this nexus, against the backdrop of a
dynamic, competitive, and decentralised political process (2004:164; Gideon Rose 1998).
29 Aforesaid in Chapter 2, these NCR assumptions, though sharing similarities with Bong’s (2002) “two-level-
game”-oriented hypotheses, or other mid-range theories of FP, do differ in terms of i) its espousal of the
primacy of external factors; ii) nationalism’s “intervening” role on state-elites’ intersubjective perception of the
external-domestic conditions; iii) assumption regarding the potential irrationally of state behaviour; iv) the
ontological positioning of the “external” as environment-based rather than process-based variables; and iv)
conceptualisation of analytical framework. See Bong (2002:18-23).
161
5.3. Balancing between Nationalist and Pragmatic Goals in Contemporary
Japanese-Chinese Diplomacy
The analysis of Japanese policy-making highlights the linkage between domestic nationalist
pressure and foreign policy behaviour, emphasising nationalism’s interaction with other
external and domestic imperatives in the decision-making process, which the policy-making
protagonists have to consider, when managing Japan’s problematic relations with China.
Particularly, their political dispositions/affiliations and outlook towards nationalist and
pragmatic foreign policy-goals, their domestic political resolve vis-à-vis nationalist/moderate
elements, and dependence on nationalism as a power instrument, not mentioning, the
“alliance” factor, and Japan’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis China, all serve to formulate, to
various degrees, their policy-options. This begs a further answer as to whether rising
nationalism necessarily leads to a distinctively nationalistic China policy and its
consequential impact on current Japanese-Chinese affairs.
The following overview of the manner Japan has thus far, managed “history” and
security-related issues, generates a somewhat different impression from that of the
conventional wisdom regarding nationalism’s efficacy in post-Cold War Japanese-Chinese
diplomacy. Nationalism has certainly prevailed in sensitising and engendering the diplomatic
ambiance that made the resolution of these issues difficult. It has also prevailed under less
deterministic conditions and mainly on symbolic issues, to satisfy domestic passion and
safeguard state-elites’ political incumbency and parochial interests. Yet, pragmatic
considerations for their deepening economic interdependence, the mitigating roles of
moderate elements in both government and private spheres, and external pressures from
Washington, have appeared to carry equal, if not more weight in determining Japan’s actual
foreign policy-options. This impression concurs with the thesis’ central arguments, which
state that nationalism’s salience in affecting foreign policy-choices, i.e. choosing between
assertive-nationalistic or moderate-conciliatory policy-options, is dependent on state-elites’
perception/calculation of its interaction with other “power” variables that concurrently affect
foreign policy-making, during a given time/situational context. It also depends on their ability
to balance, or trade-off between achieving nationalist and pragmatic goals (Bong 2002).
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5.3.1. Nationalism and the “history” problem
“History” has become the major irritant in recent Japanese-Chinese relations, against the
backdrop of rejuvenated nationalism30 and “elite historical mythmaking” (He 2006:69).
According to Gong (2001b/c), the “selective remembering and forgetting” of the war history
has as much, reinforced nationalism, as the conscious efforts to foster nationalist sentiment
have made “history” an intractable bilateral impasse. Undoubtedly, Japan’s flourishing neo-
nationalist movement for history revisionism has contributed to magnifying differences, and
intensifying the “history” row since the mid-1990s. Notable disputes over “war apology” and
sequels of the history textbook and Yasukuni debacles, as well as a series of unresolved
war legacies, were, related to, and partly perpetuated by neo-nationalism’s influence on
Japanese changing attitude towards history, and their relations with China. This has resulted
in Beijing frequently reprimanding Tokyo for allegedly acquiescing to the revisionist agenda,
and chastising neo-nationalists, especially those of neo-autonomist and neo-conservative
leanings (Samuels 2007a), for their reluctance in accepting the war judgment31 and
downplaying of Japan’s military role in China and Asia (Okabe 2001:57: Ogawa 2000).
The fundamental problem concerning history is that both countries appear to
promote contending interpretations of what happened in the past. Underlying this
conundrum in contemporary Japan has been the popularisation and gradual mainstreaming
of the (neo-) nationalist war history discourse that exacerbates “the unresolved problems of
historical responsibility” (Morris-Suzuki 2006 cf Samuels 2007a:130). According to Samuels,
neo-autonomists and, to an extent, normal-nationalists, have demonstrated disdain towards
the so-called “victor justice” handed by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (He 2006:77), which
underscores their contestation of the conventional wisdom regarding Japan’s war
responsibilities found in the “victor narrative” (2007a:139, 144-146) subscribed by the
Chinese, and their resultant agenda for history revisionism. Neo-nationalists/revisionists
generally share the view that Japan was fighting a war of liberation, on behalf of the
30 Miller sees the “clash of rival nationalisms” as the “principal driver of the history quarrel” (2002:1).
31 For a description of Japanese neo-autonomist and neo-conservative elites, and their views of history, see
Samuels (2007a). For an account of Japanese-Chinese’s divergent views, see Austin and Harris (2001:47-66).
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colonised Asian nations, to free them from the yoke of Western imperialism (Gluck 1993:84).
They also contend that the “Pacific War”32 was, essentially a war in which the Japanese
were compelled to fight for national interests and survival, against ominous US/Western
encroachment in the Asia-Pacific, where Japan was inasmuch a victim, as America were the
perpetrator (Hasegawa 1985). Henceforth, many are neither prepared to internalise, nor
acknowledge Japan’s war guilt, which explains their opposition against apologising to
countries like China (Austin and Harris 2001:52), and sentimentalism towards what their
Asian/Chinese neighbour deemed as “whitewashing”, or “glorification” of Japan’s war past.
Although previously marginalised, this “revisionist” view has regained currency under neo-
nationalism’s auspices, and the political empowerment of mainstream neo-conservative
elites, which therein, underlies the perpetuation of the Japanese-Chinese history quarrel.
Another related problem is their conflicting interests in, and treatment of the war
history. Austin and Harris construe that China for various reasons, prefers to remember, and
in doing so, obtain an apology and/or other concessions from Japan. Conversely, the
Japanese, for reasons of national pride and identity, yearn for closure, and look to the
present and future (2001:61). Also, Japanese “cultural tradition/norms” are cited as
reasons,33 although the neo-nationalist agenda for a prideful national history appears to be
the driving force behind the “selective amnesia” and revisionist treatment of Japan’s war
history (Rose 2005; Samuels 2007a). Furthermore, the current generation of Japanese
tends to view the (re)interpretation of history from one’s national perspective as normal, and
in accordance to Japan’s national interests and sovereign rights (Miller 2002:3). Indeed,
“revisionist” neo-nationalism has partly made them feel less responsible for, or reflective of
their country’s past conduct, besides detachment from, and what Drifte opines as their
“astonishing degree of insensitivity and ignorance about the [increasingly distant] past”
(2003:16). Expectedly, such developments have led to Chinese accusations of Japan’s
enduring reluctance to face history squarely, and insincerity in acknowledging historical
32 It was also known by Japanese as the Fifteen Year War, Greater East Asia War, and recently the Showa War
as renamed by the Yomiuri Shimbun (Hosaka 2006; cf. Samuels 2007a:130).
33 See Chapter 2 for the discussion on Japanese cultural traditions/norms in treatment of history.
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responsibility, not mentioning failure to atone for past atrocities in China. Conversely, the
Japanese perceive China’s obsession with history as amounting to self-indulgence, and a
self-serving act to unsettle them (van Kemenade 2006:42; Sasaki 2001). Moreover, Japan’s
leaders are acutely aware of, and no longer willing to play to China’s “history card”, although
they themselves manipulate it for domestic expediency (Soerensen 2006:114).
Additionally, major nationalist-rightwing pressure groups have wielded indirect
influence over LDP politicians/policy-makers, through a complex nexus of politico-business
funding and networking that helps keep such nationalist agendas alive. Others resort to
activities, ranging from booming martial anthems/nationalist rhetoric on gaisensha (sound
van/trucks) around Tokyo, to more extreme measures like political intimidation and violence,
which are the uyoku’s quintessential modus operandi (McNeill 2001; Prideaux 22/10/2006).
Although ultra-nationalism remains unappealing to many Japanese, McNeill finds extremist
political violence in Japan carrying distinctive features, owing to its high ratio that ranges
from general intimidations, to attempted “high-profile assassinations of political figures”,34
besides the alleged connections of these uyoku groups with the “underworld” (yakuza), and
power brokers (2001). He even suggested that “the relationship between the yakuza-uyoku,
the neo-nationalists, and established political figures is a complex matrix of financial,
political, and personal ties, with conflicting and contradictory elements” (2001), while
Stronach (1995:101) identifies this “special relationship” as the “Black Nexus”. Such
activities and linkages, together with an obliging media sympathetic to the neo-nationalist
causes, undoubtedly contribute to the persistency of historical revisionism, and the enduring
reluctance of some quarters in Japan to reconcile with the conventional interpretation of the
war history, let alone accepting China’s “moral judgement” (Austin and Harris 2001:65).
The “war apology” issue offers a sterling example of nationalism’s propensity in
undermining Japanese-Chinese historical reconciliation.35 When diplomatic relations
34 Recent examples include the Molotov cocktail attack on the residence of Doyukai’s head, Kobayashi Yotaro,
and the arson attack on “pro-China” LDP politician, Kato Koichi’s house by uyokus, following their respective
criticisms of Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits (McCormack 2007:24; AS 19/08/2006 cf. van Kemenade 2006:39).
35 For an insightful discussion on Japan’s reluctance to apologise for the war, see Benfell (2002).
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resumed in 1972, the “Tanaka-Zhou” joint communiqué noted a statement from Japan
expressing responsibility and remorse for its role in the Japanese-Chinese war (Kawashima
2005:17). Since then, the Japanese government has periodically conveyed numerous
expressions of “apology” to promote reconciliation, but apparently to no avail, as the
Chinese continued demanding for a more “sincere apology”, which in their opinion, has yet
to be offered by Japan (Shambaugh 1996b:91). However, the arrival of nationalistically
motivated Japanese leaders have made it difficult for Beijing to keep drawing the “history
card” as levers over bilateral negotiations, let alone, demanding for more apologies.
Contemporary Japanese political elites are decreasingly prepared to subscribe to the
conventional wisdom of Japan’s war responsibilities, as they are psychologically, feeling less
burdened by the need to apologise. For instance, Abe Shinzo and other Koizumi allies
staged a walk-out from the Diet chamber in 1995, in protest against the issuance of what
critics deemed as a “diluted” apology to Japan’s neighbours, in conjunction with the 60th
anniversary of the end of WWII36 (Samuels 2007a:145). Interestingly, these neo-
conservative elites have gone on to dominate the apex of Japanese policy-making, which
explains the salience of nationalism and history in recent Japan-China diplomacy. Apart
from the power-wielders, politicians championing the “just war” perspective and firmly
opposing “apology diplomacy” derive from the Diet-groups mentioned previously.37
Other related reasons for the reluctance to apologise to China include the view that
Japan’s policy-behaviour resembles that of other imperialist powers of that era,38 and that
the atrocities committed were “collateral damage” of a protracted campaign in China (Austin
and Harris 2001:53), which were obscured in postwar Japan’s narrative of the Pacific War
(Satoh 2006a:7-8). Likewise, the Japanese have reasons to believe that “history” is often,
36 PM Muruyama’s intention to obtain a Diet resolution of a “clearly-worded” formal war apology was not only
staunchly opposed by half of his coalition cabinet (Austin and Harris 2001:51), but also five million Japanese
and a quarter of Diet-members who petitioned against the resolution (Yang 2002:18). Although he made the
apology personally on August 15, 1995, he failed to persuade the Diet to adopt it as a resolution. Instead, a
“watered down” version was motioned (Austin and Harris 2001:51; Miller 2002: 3; Dower 1996).
37 According to Benfell, the persistency of the ‘revisionist’ view is due to “a specific set” of post-1945
institutions, i.e. a redefined emperor system, Tokyo war tribunal, cultural institutions of commemorating the
war dead, and history education, all of which have kept the alternative discourse alive (Benfell 2002).
38 Japanese neo-nationalists claim that Japan was merely imitating the imperialist policies of great powers of
Europe in Africa and Asia (Austin and Harris 2001:53; Miller 2002:3).
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manipulated for political purposes (He 2006; Nakanishi 2005). For instance, both Japanese
and Chinese see each other fiddling with the China war casualty statistics, particularly and
most contentiously in the Nanjing Massacre, where the overwhelming variances in their
reported figures have hindered any realistic judgement of the issue (Austin and Harris
2001:54; McNeill 06/12/2007).39 Although an anticipated norm in such politicised issues,
nationalism has more often than not transformed such distortions into national myths (He
2006) that subverted reconciliation. Expectedly, the commonly held view that “history” is
simply an instrument the Chinese government uses to exert pressure on Japan, has not only
made Japanese decreasingly sympathetic, and unsupportive of any concessions to their
neighbour (Austin and Harris 2001:55),40 but also induces a nationalist backlash regarding
the apology issue, and generally, the war history (Miller 2002:8).
Neo-nationalism’s influence on the shifting Japanese discourse on history is likewise,
responsible for the outbreak of other history issues, and related rhetorical faux pas by
political-elites that marred contemporary Japanese-Chinese diplomacy. Among the
controversies, include history textbooks revision that allegedly “sanitised” Imperial Japan’s
wartime actions. The first such allegation triggered the 1982 textbook row mentioned in
Chapter 3. The following incident in 1986, saw the high-school Japanese history textbook,
Shinpen Nihonshi, edited by the rightwing group Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (National
Conference for Defending Japan) passing the MOE textbook screening to become the first
such publication in postwar Japan (Nozaki 2001:178; Rose 2005:56). The controversy re-
emerged in April 2001, when China accused Tsukurukai’s Atarashii rekishi kyokasho (New
History Textbook) of portraying Japanese imperialism as a liberating force in Asia (Rose
2006:138). Especially, the original draft’s attempt to downscale the Nanjing Massacre by
defining it as an “Incident” not amounting to a holocaust, infuriated the Chinese (BBC
03/04/2001). Although the MOE/MEXT-approved version referred to the “Massacre”, the
textbook’s content doubted its reality, and the validity of the Tokyo Tribunal’s verdict (Yang
39 For a recent except of the “Nanjing Massacre” debate, see McNeill (06/12/2007).
40 There are, however, analysts who consider Japan giving a formal apology as the better option, since it would
close the issue indefinitely by negating accusations of insincerity on Japan’s part, and making it more irrelevant
for China to persist with such accusations in the future (Mochizuki 07/12/1998; cf. Austin and Harris 2001:55).
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2001:182). Beijing responded belatedly by seeking specific changes to the textbook (BBC
10/07/2001). The Koizumi administration, however, refused to bow to Chinese (and Korean)
pressure, prompting the Chinese MFA to express “regrets and strong outrage”, and
denounce Tokyo’s position as “unacceptable” (BBC 10/07/2001). In 2005, the MOE/MEXT’s
passing of a revised edition of Tsukurukai’s textbook reignited the controversy.41
Undoubtedly, the textbook issue occurred against the backdrop of rising nationalism
in Japan. The first two incidents were unmistakably an outgrowth of the undercurrents of
confident-economic nationalism during the 1980s. Meanwhile, Tsukurukai’s textbook reflects
the contemporary neo-nationalist revisionist agenda, which has manifested in a variety of
other media, including films, mangas, and magazines.42 Not surprisingly, its publication
triggered Chinese outrage. Although China probably used it to manipulate Japanese politics
and foreign policy, its criticism of Japan’s attitude towards history has also much, if not
more, to do with nationalistic impulses in Chinese domestic politics (Miller 2002:8).
Further dampening relations are the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni, which will be
case-studied in the following chapter, the bio-chemical warfare research of the Unit 731 and
abandoned weapons of the Imperial Japanese Army, “comfort women”, and the Nanjing
Massacre. Likewise, one-off incidents related to the war legacy include the alleged Zhuhai
sex-orgy involving Japanese tourists, and the insulting play by Japanese exchange students
in Xian. It is not this chapter’s intention to discuss each of these incidents/issues, but rather
to extrapolate the complexity and sensitivity of history in Japanese-Chinese relations, and
the reality of nationalism fuelling such incidents into diplomatic impasses. Indeed, “history”
may continue to subvert a genuine reconciliation between the two states and societies,
despite mutual efforts to subordinate war memories for more wide-ranging goals of “peaceful
cooperation” (Austin and Harris 2001:64). With nationalism gaining currency, it is equally
hard to see mutual public opinion reconciling over history. Rather more obviously, it reveals
41 Its passing of the screening process together with other “revisionist” books plausibly indicated MOE/MEXT
tacit acquiescence, and political support from the Diet, notably the Diet-members League for the Passing on of a
Correct History, led by the likes of Nakagawa Shoichi and Abe Shinzo (McCormack 2000:250, Mori 2007).
42 See Sasada (2006) for examples of mass media channels promoting the revisionist history agenda.
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the Japanese (and Chinese) government’s “vulnerability to nationalist pressures of any
attempt at a comprehensive settlement of the history quarrel” (Miller 2002:8).
The perpetuation of “history” disputes in post-Cold War Japanese-Chinese
diplomacy reflects the NCR assumption regarding domestic variables gaining salience in
foreign policy-making, especially under low-pressure/ambiguous international conditions/
structural pressures. The Cold War’s demise induced such an environment, which permitted
domestic political calculus to feature more prominently in Japan’s (and China’s) external
decision-making, and hence, the constant resurrection of, and nationalism’s exacerbating
role in the history quarrel.43 Also, internal pressures, namely the need to foster nationalism
for domestic objectives, and the parochial motivations of nationalistic elites and/or
institutions appear to have greater leverage in shaping Japanese external behaviour. Since
Japanese-Chinese relations have been, traditionally most affected by domestic issues
(Tanaka 2000:3), the deteriorating trend is somewhat anticipated in light of rising domestic
nationalist pressures and prevailing structural conditions.
Retrospectively, however, nationalism’s impact on the “history” problem, though
intermittently triggering bilateral tensions, has not totally derailed overall ties. According to
Wang Jianwei, the history quarrel “has seldom caused substantial damages to the
relationship since 1972. While both sides could be quite emotional and vocal on the issue, in
practical policy, they rarely let the animosity over history carry the day” (2002:116). It is true
“history” has affectively dented politico-diplomatic ties. Yet, the “cold politics, hot economics”
dialectic suggests that there are determinants, besides nationalistic considerations, which
“rational” policy-makers in Tokyo have to consider, when managing their bilateral affairs.
More importantly, rising domestic nationalist pressure does not necessarily translate into a
nationalist foreign policy per se, where “sense and passion” override “sensibility and
reason”44 in the pursuit of Japan’s broader national interests.
43 He Yinan opines the Cold War’s demise as having “weakened the political incentive for both nations to cap
private memories and restrain disputes over history” (2006:76).
44 Aforementioned, the terms “sense and passion” and “sensibility and reason” are taken from Gries (2004).
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Indeed, Japan’s overall management of the aforementioned history-related disputes
offers an indication of how substantial nationalism is, or otherwise, in shaping its China
policy, notwithstanding the hardline posture and rhetoric that dominated the initial stages of
the controversies. For instance, Japanese nationalism’s manifestation in both the war
apology and textbook debacles is indisputable, and Tokyo’s obstinacy in not mollifying
Chinese demands may well be the makings of a nationalistic-assertive China policy. Yet, it
has not prevented Japanese leaders from exercising “post-crisis damage control” to stabilise
the bilateral relationship (Roy 2005:191). Among them were PM Obuchi’s July 1999 summit
meeting in Beijing with China’s leaders, and Premier Zhu Rongji’s Japan visit in 2000, where
mutual efforts to bring a diplomatic thaw were apparent after the 1998 “war apology” fiasco.
They included the planned establishment of a leadership hotline, bilateral security
talks/exchanges, elaborate celebrations to commemorate the 30th anniversary of diplomatic
normalisation, and using “partnership” to describe the new direction of Japanese-Chinese
relations, with the Chinese going even further by unilaterally advancing the term “strategic
partnership” to emphasise their fresh approach towards the bilateral ties (Sasajima
2002:101; Rozman 2002:117).
Similarly, the Koizumi administration’s defiance on the textbook and Yasukuni rows
that undermined China’s “smile diplomacy” (Rozman 2002), was arguably, offset by
Koizumi’s subsequent efforts to revive communication between the two countries (Wang
2002).45 This suggests Tokyo’s balancing act between realising nationalist and pragmatic
goals under the perceived external-internal conditions, and the plausibility of both
leaderships’ tolerance and willingness to make allowances for each other’s domestic
nationalist agenda (Down and Saunders 1998/9:123). The following chapter’s empirical
study of Japan’s management of the Yasukuni controversy helps gauge nationalism’s
impact vis-à-vis other determinants in shaping its policy-options, when managing this highly
symbolic “history” issue in Japanese-Chinese affairs.
45 See Chapter 6 for Koizumi’s conciliatory gestures after the 2001 history debacles.
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5.3.2. Nationalism and shifting security perceptions and policies
Nationalism’s saliency can also be seen in the manner Japan manages its security relations
with China. Amidst shifting power dynamics, rising nationalism has instigated one another’s
re-evaluation of strategic perceptions, and security concerns in recent years. Specifically,
Japan’s neo-nationalist agenda for a “normal nation”, which “stripped to its essence…simply
means a nation that can go to war” (Samuels 2007a:128), has fuelled Chinese concerns
about Japan’s ever-expanding security role, and occasional paranoia regarding the revival of
Japanese militarism. Conversely, neo-nationalism, borne from feelings of insecurity, has
made Japan wary of China’s spectacular economic and military development (Soerensen
2006:117), with Japanese defence planners increasingly echoing, albeit subtly, the “China
threat” notion, popularly contrived by their hawkish Western counterparts, media, and
commentators.46 One can construe that China’s military modernisation plausibly reflects
vigilance, and counter-balancing against Japan’s evolving security agenda, while Japanese
security policy-shifts are, partly driven by growing concerns over the emerging Chinese
security challenge. Compounding their caginess are the unresolved ECS territorial/maritime
disputes, the “Taiwan” dilemma in US-Japanese security arrangements, and nationalism’s
exacerbation of mutual mistrust. Regionally, their rising defence budgets and renewed
rivalry are increasing the stakes in East Asian security, as they could undesirably escalate
into a Japanese-Chinese arms race (Christensen 1999:69-71). As Green noted, these are
“ingredients for a classic defense dilemma” between Japan and China (2001:93).47
Again, such developments echo NCR’s assumption that domestic-ideational
variables, i.e. historical grievances and nationalism, have the potency of aggravating
security dilemmas under changing relative power dynamics and fluid external environment,
such as the case of Japan’s post-Cold War relations with China (Christensen 1999). As
highlighted, neo-nationalism’s impact on the shifting Japanese security discourse and
policies have brought a reconceptualisation of mainstream Chinese strategic thinking that
46 The so-called “China Threat” theory refers to China’s potential “rise”, and “fall” as a destabilising factor to
regional security. For a detailed discussion, see Gurtov (1994); Roy (1996); and Bernstein and Munro (1997).
47 For a recent opinion regarding the possibility of a Sino-Japanese security dilemma, see “Will Beijing’s
military spending lead to ‘security dilemma’?”, Japan Times, 7 February 2008.
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perceives Japan as China’s chief future security concern (Shambaugh 1994:6; Whiting
1996:609-611).48 Indeed, the Chinese are aware that contemporary Japan has become
more powerful and militarily prepared than it appears to be, or project, despite the
constitutional constraints (Yang 2003:308). This include having among the world’s largest
military budgets, notwithstanding the SDF’s disposition as a strictly self-defence force, and
its reputation as a modern, highly sophisticated military boasting top-of-the-range hardware
that technically allow Japan to project power far beyond its constitutional rights49 (Yang
2003:308; Wang 2002:110-111). Aforementioned in Chapter 3, the SDF’s continuous
redefinition under a strengthened US-Japanese security alliance (Drifte 2003; Singh 2002;
Soerensen 2006) has aggravated Chinese security analysts’ suspicion regarding Japan’s
intention to resurrect its military power status (Wang 2002:110). The Chinese also saw the
US “war on terror”50 as an event that has facilitated Japan’s rearmament and pursuance of a
“normal state” identity (Yang 2003:309; Gill 2002:43-44). They perceive Japan’s rising
security profile, and recent joint restructuring of US-Japanese forces as a move that
ultimately targets China, with Tokyo becoming what Yu (1999:10) contends as the fulcrum of
Washington’s “containment by stealth” policy and grand strategy in East Asia, via their
revitalised alliance (Christensen 1996:41; Wu 2005/6; Tamamoto 2005/6).
Conversely, the Japanese saw their renewed security orientation as inevitable in
view of the challenges imposed by the fluid post-Cold War environment. From the more
48 Indeed, over 60% of China’s security planners foresaw Japan to be a potential major rival, as noted by David
Shambaugh, back in the mid-1990s (1994:6; cf. Yang 2003:307).
49 Japan’s defence budget of over USD41 billion in FY2006 was “one of the five largest in the world” (Samuels
2007b:63). The SDF also possesses power-projection capabilities that include what essentially is, a blue-water
navy comprising submarines and Aegis-class destroyers at Yokosuka, Sasebo and Kobe, and an airforce of
medium/long-range air-superiority fighter-aircrafts and airborne refueling capabilities (Roy 2003:2; Drifte
2003). Observers see such offensive-based weaponry as contradicting the SDF’s definition as a “self-defence
force”, and the Article IX (Wu 2000; Roy 2003; Yang 2003). For analyses of Japan’s gradual “remilitarisation”,
see Hughes (2005) and Lind (2004).
50 Japan’s security role has expanded unprecedentedly since the “9/11” incident. This includes the introduction
of so-called “emergency legislations” like the “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law” and the “Bill to Respond
to Armed Attacks”, which give Japan the flexibility to participate in military activities in conjunction with the
US, and to initiate the use of force in respond to armed attacks (NIDS 2003). The subsequent dispatch of MSDF
refuelling vessels to the Indian Ocean under Operation Enduring Freedom represented Japan’s active
participation in overseas military operations, for the first time since WWII (Gill 2002:43-44). Tokyo also
dispatched Ground-SDF (GSDF) personnel to support the US “coalition of the willing” in the postwar
reconstruction of Iraq.
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immediate North Korean “threat” factor51 and global terrorism, to growing concerns
regarding China’s military development, and related ambitions in the Taiwan Strait and ECS,
these uncertainties have driven Japan to rethink its national security, not mentioning, the
relentless “allied” pressure to assume a more prominent international security role (Drifte
2003:43-60; Soerensen 2006:111). Another reason is that Japan seeks to become a “normal
state”, not only because of the need to be able to act normally in defending its national
security interests, but also domestic nationalist pressure to redress national identity and
international prestige, which have galvanised the transformation of the Japanese security
agenda towards “normalisation” (Singh 2002:88; Tamamoto 2005b: Soerensen 2006:114-
115). However, the issue is not so much about Japan becoming a “normal state”, but
whether China can accept a “normal”, rearmed, and internationally pro-active Japan that
would directly challenge its emerging regional influence, and possibly lead to power
competition and rivalry for regional dominance (Wu 2000). Some Chinese observers even
perceive Japan’s drive towards “normalcy” as a nationalist pretext for reviving Japanese
militarism (Roy 2003:4). Ideally, the Chinese would prefer Japan to be continuously
“abnormal” (Tomoda interview), or what Yahuda observes as a Japan that is, “politically and
strategically quiescent until such time as presumably it would be overshadowed by China”
(2006:169).
While Beijing worries about a nationalistic and assertive Japan, Japanese security
analysts are wary of China’s rise52 and emergence as “the security issue of the 21st century”
(Glaser and Garrett 1997; JFIR 1995; Sato 1998). Tokyo’s interest, according to observers,
is to devise an adequate strategy to manage a rising, but unpredictable China. This includes
developing durable ties, and helping the Chinese, avert potential domestic instability that
could be detrimental to Japan’s own security (Roy 2003; Drifte 2003). Indeed, “China threat”
51 North Korea’s security “threats” to Japan include its nuclear weapons programme, missile tests that expose
Japan’s lacklustre and inadequate security measures, incursions of fushinsen, and the emotionally-charged
abduction issue, not mentioning Pyongyang’s reputed anti-Japanese stance, belligerence, and lack of
comformity to international norms and practices.
52 China’s rise has generated debates regarding its implications for East Asian security, with observations
ranging from moderate assumptions like the emergence of a strong, status quo observing superpower China, to
hawkish views of “China threat” in the form of a revisionist power (Bernstein and Munro 1997; Roy 1996).
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to Japan is as much about China becoming a strong military anti-status quo power, as a
weak China spawning regional instability53 (Shirk 2007; Segal 1994; Roy 2005:206). Hence,
Japan’s contemporary China policy has been to engage, while maintaining sufficient
hedging measures to facilitate its emergence as a responsible power and stakeholder in
regional security (Drifte 2003).
Nonetheless, domestic support for a policy of engagement has weakened following
the worsening of Japanese perceptions/attitudes towards China resulting from rising
nationalism, and apprehensions regarding Chinese emerging capabilities and intentions.
Specifically, heightened anxiety over Chinese power, influence, and ambitions have elicited
vocal complaints from nationalists/politicians regarding Japan’s overly accommodative
posture, and decreased Japanese confidence on the logic of economic interdependence
engendering improved politico-security relations with the Chinese (Roy 2003:3; Yahuda
2006). According to Samuels, Japanese neo-nationalists of all hues, commonly view China
as a “potential threat”; the realists focusing on the PLA’s rising military challenge, whereas
the neo-conservatives and neo-autonomists spice up the debate with a distinctively anti-
Chinese flavour (2007a:146). Underpinning their security concerns have been the steady
augmentation of Chinese military capabilities, marked by sustained double-digit annual
defence expenditures,54 and the related lack of transparency in military decision-making and
tendency to under-report actual spending (Drifte 2003:43; Bitzinger 2003:2-3; JT
07/02/2008). Bitzinger notes that most US assessments share the view that “China’s official
defense budget greatly under-represents actual military expenditure by a factor of two to
three” (2003:1).55 The Chinese argue that their defence budget is comparatively lower to
53 Japanese observers are generally concerned with the prospect of China’s unsustainable economic growth
under an authoritarian political system (Shirk 2007:18) triggering serious internal socio-political and economic
upheavals that may undermine the CCP regime’s survival (see also Breslin 2007b:Chp.6). The collapse of the
PRC could spawn regional instability reminiscent of the Soviet disintegration, i.e. emergence of more unstable,
anti-Japanese states, and exodus of refugees, etc. (Shambaugh 1996b:86; see also Segal 1994). Similarly, a
weak Chinese state may manipulate anti-Japanese nationalism, and adopt an aggressive posture in the
Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute and Taiwan, to bolster national unity and political legitimacy (Roy 2005:206).
54 In 2002, China reported annual increase in military expenditure of approximately 19.4% compared to the
defense budget the year before, marking the highest jump in recent years (NIDS 2003:185). In 2006, the annual
budget is set to increase by another 14.7% (PD 05/03/2006; Shirk 2007:73)
55 According to the US Department of Defense estimates, China’s annual military spending totals around
USD65 billion, over three times more than the Chinese government announcement (Bitzinger 2003:3).
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other developed countries, including Japan, and that the annual increase is mainly for the
replacement of outdated hardware, and basic operating expenditure of its sizeable standing
army (PD 05/03/2006). However, Japanese and US defence planners, alike, are aware that
China is gradually shifting the military balance with its mass purchasing of sophisticated,
power-projection weaponry and defence technologies from Russia, ranging from fighter-
aircrafts, to submarines and destroyers, besides the development of indigenous defence
production capacity (Drifte 2003:41-48; Bitzinger 2003; NIDS 2003). Complemented by the
world’s third largest nuclear arsenal (Moore 2000:1-3) and a rapidly advancing aerospace
industry, China’s defence spending trajectories have raised concerns regarding its
intentions, as consistently noted in recent Japanese defence white papers (JDA 2004; 2005;
2006). Ironically, Japanese concerns, as Drifte contends, “would have been much less
pronounced”, if not for China’s rapid economic growth (2003:43).
China’s propensity to use force to advance its security interests, i.e. Vietnam (1979),
the South China Sea archipelagos of Paracel (1975) and Spratly (1995), and most glaringly,
during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis also fuelled Japanese anxiety regarding potential
Chinese belligerence, when managing their territorial/maritime disputes in the ECS. Beijing’s
forceful handling of the 2002 “Shenyang” incident further aggravated such concerns (Fouse
2003:3). Additionally, Japan is wary of China’s intention to control sea-lanes crucial to its
economic prosperity (Roy 2003:3). The PLA-Navy’s metamorphosis into a blue-water navy
and increased naval activities indicate Chinese ambition to achieve operational capacity in
the South and East China Seas, where it may be able “to interdict shipping inbound to, or
outbound from Japanese ports” (Roy 2003:3). Besides prioritising the development of its
submarine force (Golstein and Murray 2004), the PLA-Navy’s repeated vessel incursions
into Japanese territorial waters for maritime/oceanographic research and alleged naval
intelligence gathering operations since the late 1990s were, plausibly related to such
ambitions (Roy 2003:3; Drifte 2003:56-57; NIDS 2002). Japan’s security transformation is
therefore, as much a response to alleviate anxieties about the strategic uncertainties posed
by China, as to counter North Korea’s cavalier attitude (Funabashi 2000:136). Japanese
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nationalists are also drumming up “China threat” to justify remilitarisation, and even the
prospects of a nuclear-armed Japan to counter Chinese security challenges (Oros 2003:51;
Nakanishi 2003 cf. Samuels 2007a:fn.51).56
Equally fuelling Japanese unease is the brazenly anti-Japanese nationalism
flourishing in China. Tokyo is aware of Beijing’s conspicuous promotion of anti-Japanese
sentiment through education (Kawashima 2005:19-21) and other propaganda channels for
domestic political expedience. Although the Chinese regime is prudent and pragmatic in
stoking nationalism, and has had occasionally reined in popular sentiments, the decades of
indoctrination and reminder of Japanese misdeeds have cultivated virulent anti-Japanese
passion among China’s younger generations. Such sentiment has manifested in popular
anti-Japanese discourse, and demonstrations, like those in April 2005. Indeed,
contemporary Chinese public opinion reflects a zealously nationalistic generation, whose
frustrations are predominantly directed against Japan (Shirk 2007:151-152), exacerbating
Japanese concerns regarding the perils of unrestrained Chinese nationalism, and Beijing’s
ability to maintain a pragmatic Japan policy. It is rather ironic that contemporary Japanese
insecurities vis-à-vis the Chinese mirror that of the Chinese towards their neighbour. While
the Japanese are concerned about the potential security challenges of resurgent Chinese
nationalism and a militarily powerful China, the Chinese are paranoid about the revived
threats of Japanese nationalism and remilitarisation to their security interests (Roy 2003).
The Chinese have taken measures to soothe Japanese and neighbouring concerns,
especially regarding the “China threat” perception. Besides publishing defence white
papers,57 Beijing has actively recited the mantra of “peaceful rise” to reassure neighbours of
its intention (Zheng 2005; Guo 2006). Chinese officials and media also fervently refuted
56 Ozawa Ichiro typified this back in April 2002, when he argued that China’s burgeoning military development
could possibly drive Japan towards nuclear armament (Roy 2005:197). Ozawa, who is now the DPJ leader,
allegedly said “Japan can easily have thousands of nuclear warheads….In fact, we have enough plutonium in
use at nuclear power plants for three to four thousands warheads. If that should happen, Japan would not lose
[to China] even in military terms” (SS 07/04/2002:2; quoted in Oros 2003:51, cf. Roy 2003:5). Nakanishi
Terumasa also advocates acquiring nuclear weapons to defend Okinawa and Senkaku/Diaoyudao against a
credible Chinese naval threat (2003: 35, 36-37; cf. Samuels 2007a: fn.51).
57 China started publishing defence white papers, biennially, since 1998. For example, see State Council
Information Office (SCIO) (2004) China’s National Defense in 2004, Beijing: SCIO, Government of the PRC.
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Japanese perception, claiming that Japan’s defence white papers are misleadingly
portraying China as a source of regional instability by exaggerating its military strength/
spending (CD 18/07/2001; PD 03/08/2005; Wang 2002:115). Many of China’s “Japan”
scholars/commentators perceive it as Japanese intention to sidetrack international attention
from, and provide excuses for their own military development. They also place the blame of
Japanese fixation with the “China threat” notion mostly on the workings of nationalists (CD
18/07/2001). There is an element of truth to such claims, as Japanese nationalists have
indeed, sought to exploit worsening images of China in Japan to advance their agendas
(Rozman 2002; Whiting 1998), and that contemporary Japanese nationalism is directed
mainly at China. Such developments have undoubtedly encouraged a policy-shift vis-à-vis
China “from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism” (Green and Self 1996:36).
The above analysis demonstrates nationalism’s aggravation of mutual security
(mis)perceptions and concerns that encourage the reassessment of one another’s security
policy, which serves to accentuate mutual suspicion and tension. However, it has not led
Tokyo (and Beijing) to ruthlessly, pursue narrow, nationalist-oriented security goals
irrespective of the broader national interests, or at the expense of the bilateral relationship.
Moreover, in the age of interdependence, the traditional notions of security have broadened
to include more holistic definitions, i.e. economic and environmental security, both of which
are crucial to their respective conceptualisation of comprehensive national security (Drifte
1990:29-31; SCIO 2004).
Japan, specifically, has sought to promote Chinese confidence, regarding its shifting
security orientation. Although domestic nationalist demands have made Japan’s
transformation into a “normal” state inevitable, rational Japanese policy-makers are cautious
about letting nationalist agendas dominate their foreign/security policy deliberations, to the
detriment of Japanese-Chinese ties. Understandably, pragmatic considerations for Japan’s
economic vitality, and China’s moderate posturing in the regional security equation, and
cooperation in both conventional and non-traditional security issues (i.e. environmental
security) are high on Japanese comprehensive security calculus (Drifte 2003:70-76; Arase
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2007). Additionally, domestic pacifist forces, though relatively weakened, remain sound in
checking against, and moderating ultra-nationalist/militarist tendencies within the
government. Furthermore, despite their apparent nationalistic dispositions, Japanese state-
elites have exhibited political will to balance and maintain a degree of pragmatism in their
management of sensitive bilateral security issues. Lastly, Japanese security policies remain
constrained by the US-Japan alliance, and Washington’s overarching security agenda, a
position that Beijing is, perhaps, more willing to countenance than a unilateral Japanese re-
militarisation. Hence, Japan has been treading cautiously, pushing the national security
reform agenda incrementally, while simultaneously reassuring China of its intentions. Tokyo
has also been prudent in its official statements regarding China’s security developments,
and has not openly subscribed to the “China threat” notion, as reflected by the “non-
committal/carefully-worded” texts found in Japanese defence documents. Indeed,
notwithstanding longer-term concerns, the overall Japanese perception of China is more of
caution than actual fear, and security assessments consider the prospect of conflict with
China as ““entirely unlikely” in the immediate future” (Austin and Harris 2001:94).58
Japan’s cautious optimism, however, does not render the negative implications of
domestic nationalist pressure on Japanese-Chinese impasses baseless, especially when it
comes to the ECS territorial/maritime disputes, and more so regarding Taiwan. It is also
uncertain as to how long such pragmatism could last against the backdrop of confrontational
nationalisms that are expected to widen differences in their security interpretations,
perceptions, and interests.
5.4. Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the impact of rising nationalist impulses in Japan (and China)
on mutual perceptions/images and attitude that correspondingly affect bilateral relations. It
has also exhibited the “nationalism and foreign policy-making” linkage by identifying the
principal policy-makers and other actors that provide nationalism the agency to influence
58 According to Austin and Harris, Japanese security assessment of China has been cautiously optimistic, citing
that “China has not contemplated, or is likely in the near future to contemplate preparing its military forces for
conflict with Japan or for large-scale military operations against Japan” (2001:94).
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Japan’s China policy. However, nationalism’s salience is mediated by other variables that
Japanese state-elites have to account for under particular external-domestic environs and
processes, which reflects the NCR schema. Japan’s overall management of the issues of
history and security vis-à-vis China, reveals a plausible fallacy in the conventional wisdom
regarding nationalism’s efficacy in shaping its actual policy-options/responses that
underscore their worsening relationship. Notwithstanding the reality of nationalism’s
influence on Japanese attitude, Tokyo’s apparent balancing act, and noted efforts to
ameliorate ties following periodic diplomatic rows highlight the propensity of other
determinants appearing equally, and at times more prevalent in affecting Japanese decision-
making pertaining to the bilateral ties. By utilising the NCR framework, nationalism’s
salience vis-à-vis other external/domestic imperatives shall be systematically assessed via
the Yasukuni-jinja and ECS disputes, in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER SIX
CASE STUDY I:
NATIONALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE DISPUTE IN
JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS
The decline in post-Cold War Japanese-Chinese relations has been associated with rising
nationalism, which has apparently exacerbated their “history” enmity and undermined efforts
to seek a genuine reconciliation of their shared past. Amongst the history-related
grievances, prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni-jinja have become a major impasse,
perpetuating as much domestic popular indignations in China, as debate in contemporary
Japan regarding the need to address crucial questions concerning Japanese national
identity and wartime history. Specifically to this thesis, the debacle has raised concerns
regarding nationalism’s salience in undermining a fragile and historically tainted relationship,
as Japan seeks to reconcile its national past with its present aspirations to become a
“normal” state and fully-fledged player in international politics. Yet, as pointed out in the
preceding chapter, Tokyo’s ability to maintain a functional relationship, seeking timely and
calculated diplomatic measures to prevent a free-fall in overall bilateral ties, while promoting
dynamic economic interactions, suggest the potentiality of other determinants vis-à-vis
nationalism in affecting Japanese-Chinese diplomacy and Japan’s China policy-making.
This chapter draws on their diplomatic dispute over Yasukuni visits by Japanese
premiers against the backdrop of rising domestic nationalist undercurrents, particularly
during the Koizumi administration. A brief background of the contentious Shrine and the
origins of the dispute are addressed before elaborating on Koizumi’s annual pilgrimages,
which sent Japanese-Chinese political relations to arguably its lowest point since 1972. The
following sections delve on the bilateral dynamics involved during the periods of contention,
paying particular attention to the interactions between domestic nationalist pressure and
other external-internal variables, via the NCR framework, to assess the extent to which
nationalism saliently constrained Tokyo’s management of the dispute, and the consequential
impact on its relationship with Beijing.
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6.1. Background of the Yasukuni Issue
Before examining the origins of the Yasukuni debacle, a brief exploration of the historical
background, politico-religious meanings and pseudo-ideological connotations, or the raison
d’etre of this institution, is essential to understanding the controversies it has courted, both
domestically and internationally, for postwar Japan.
6.1.1. The origins of Yasukuni Shrine
Yasukuni-jinja is a Shinto establishment, located in Tokyo’s Kudan district, near the vicinity
of the Imperial Palace. It was formerly known as Tokyo Shokonsha,1 founded in June 1869,
under the auspices of the Imperial Meiji government, originally to commemorate “patriots”,
who died serving the Emperor and the Imperial cause, during the tumultuous period of
power transition from the Tokugawa bakufu to the Meiji Restoration of 1868 (Gardner
2002:666-669; Tokita 2003:48; Hashizume 2001:54). The present name “Yasukuni”, was
conferred by Emperor Meiji in June 1879, during which the Shrine gained its official
designation as bekkaku kampeisha (Special Government Shrine) (Deans 2007:271), and its
consequential role as the “central custodian of national memory and mourning
commemorating Japan’s war dead” (Harootunian 1999:144).2 Prior to WWII, Yasukuni-jinja
was a state institution, jointly managed by the Army, Navy, and Home ministries (Hashizume
2001:55). As the official ritual epicentre of the State-Shinto ideology, the Shrine, via the
ministries’ screening process, was responsible for enshrining fallen military personnel and
“those who died in the service of their country” (Curtin 2005b).3 Following Japan’s war
surrender, the US Occupation forces abolished State-Shintoism and Yasukuni-jinja for their
1 Tokyo Shokonsha, meaning “shrine for inviting the spirits” (Tokita 2003:48), was originally established to
console the souls of those perished during the crucial Boshin civil war, which paved the way for the birth of
modern Japan under the Meiji Restoration (Gardner 2002:666). It eventually included the enshrinement of those
who died devoting their lives for the nation, since 1853, notably during engagements with external forces to
prevent foreign encroachment, and domestic revolts in the immediate post-Tokugawa period, i.e. Saga incident,
Seinan War, and Satsuma rebellion (Gardner 2002:669: Breen 2007:13). For a comprehensive discussion of the
Yasukuni Shrine, see also “Yasukuni: Behind the torii/From government-run shrine for war heroes to bone of
contention,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 June 2005, and the edited volume by Breen (2007).
2 According to Hashizume, at its inception, Yasukuni-jinja was not meant to be a war-shrine honouring Japanese
military servicemen, but “a shrine to the heroes of the revolution”, namely the Meiji restoration of 1868
(2001:54). Yasukuni was also classified as a “gokoku-jinja” meaning “protector of the nation shrine”
(Harootunian 1999:148). For a historical account of Yasukuni-jinja, see Murukami (1971) and Hardacre (1991).
3 They included non-military personnel, i.e. those who died in the line of duty, such as nurses, volunteers, and
those drafted through the National General Mobilisation Law to serve directly and indirectly in Japan’s war
machinery, as well as children that died in the line of fire. (Breen 2004: 82; Gardner 2002: 669-670).
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ideological role in fostering militarism, but the latter was subsequently reinstated, albeit as a
private, religious organisation, under the new postwar Constitution (Deans 2007:271).
It may seem ironic that “Yasukuni”, literally meaning “for the country’s peace” (Tokita
2003:48), has unwittingly emerged from its inception more than a century later, as a major
source of Japan’s diplomatic contention with her East Asian neighbours. This predicament
has much to do with the Shrine’s widely acknowledged prewar function as a vital instrument
of the Imperial Japanese state to foster nationalism for nation-building, and symbolic driving
force behind the national mobilisation for the propagation of its much maligned, military
“adventurism” and “empire-building in Asia” (Lam 2006b:3; Wan 2006:235-236; Breen
2004:76; Harootunian 1999:144). Even more controversial is the fact that Yasukuni’s
ideological disposition has remained relatively unchanged, not mentioning, its continuous
linkage with, and influence on domestic politics, despite the pacific transformation
undertaken by postwar Japan, and the repudiation of its “official” status under the
constitutional provision regarding the separation of state and religion. It is due to such
legality, and its manifestation of elements of prewar continuity that have politicised Yasukuni
into becoming a domestic and diplomatic issue, where “official visits” and patronage by
Japanese heads-of-state are deemed unconstitutional and perceived as a beacon of
Japan’s unrepentant attitude towards its role in WWII. Simply put, the Yasukuni issue is
intricate in that it represents what Mikuriya sees as a “simultaneous equation” of correlated
and conflicting problems, ranging from religion and ideology, to perceptions of history,
identity, and foreign relations (Matsumoto, Mikuriya and Sakamoto 2005:3).
6.1.2. Nationalism and the politics of identity: the “Yasukuni problem” defined
One needs to explore the “sociology/genealogy” of Yasukuni,4 its ideological disposition, and
their correlations with nationalism and Japanese identity to understand the “Yasukuni
problematique”. For a start, Yasukuni-jinja is primarily “a ritual site” (Breen 2004:77), where
the spirit of Japan’s war dead are reposed, presumably based on the traditional Shinto
practice of venerating the dead, of which influence can be traced back to ancient Japanese,
4 These terms derive from Breen (2004; 2007). See both for a detailed sociological investigation of Yasukuni.
182
Buddhist, and Confucianist customs (Breen 2004:77-82; Yamaori 2003:45). To date, it has
enshrined approximately 2.47 million souls, the vast majority comprising fallen servicemen
during the Pacific War.5 Against such a religious and cultural backdrop, pilgrimage to, and
mourning the dead at Yasukuni would naturally, be seen as normal and common practice to
ordinary Japanese. As highlighted in Chapter 4, observations of such traditions and rituals
are considered an integral part of the cultural uniqueness that forms the crux of Japanese
national identity, prewar and postwar. Indeed, Yasukuni played a substantial role in
promoting such traditions during the prewar era. It was commonly, acknowledged back then,
that Japanese soldiers went to battle believing they would be, eventually venerated and
worshipped at the Shrine as “national gods of the ancestral land (sokoku kuni)”, if they
sacrifice their lives for the Emperor’s cause (Harootunian 1999:149). Meanwhile, family
members were consoled by the belief that they would be reunited with their perished loved
ones, who would be honoured as “national heroes” at Yasukuni (Harootunian 1999:149;
Shibuichi 2005). Such beliefs are still held mainly by war-bereaved families in contemporary
Japan and herein, underlie one of the main issues concerning the Yasukuni problem.6
Additionally, the concept of a “national war memorial” is a universally accepted norm,
and as such, Yasukuni Shrine, according to its advocates, fulfills such a role for Japan, as
the Arlington cemetery,7 or the Cenotaph does for the US and Britain, respectively
(Tamamoto 2001:34; Breen 2004:90-91). In this regard, official Shrine visit to commemorate
the war dead is not only a cultural matter, but also a moral duty ought to be fulfilled by
Japanese state leaders. To the Japanese rightists/nationalists who hold a romantic view,
Yasukuni is, in Shibuichi’s words, as much an embodiment of Japanese tradition, religion,
and culture, as a “heartwarming symbol of self-sacrifice and patriotism” that represents the
essence of “Japan’s historical identity as a modern nation-state” (2005:199). Such quixotic
perceptions are fundamentally behind their passionate calls for Japanese state-elites to pay
5 There were 2,466,427 war dead reposed at Yasukuni, based on the official list as of October 17, 2002, those
who died in the Pacific War accounting for the vast majority (more than 80% or approximately 2.1 million)
(Tokita 2003:49; see also Breen 2004: 82; Kingston 2004:236).
6 See Fukuda and Yamaori (2004) for a detailed discussion on the spiritual aspect of Yasukuni to Japanese.
7 For a comparative observation of Yasukuni and Arlington National Cemetery, see McGreevy (2005).
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tribute and recognise Yasukuni’s position at the heart of Japanese national consciousness.
Another reason for their unbridled support relates to Yasukuni’s symbolism in Japan’s war
history. The “revisionist” logic behind Japanese nationalists’ unwillingness to compromise to
the leftist and Chinese demands over Yasukuni is very much similar to their reasons for
rejecting the conventional interpretation of Japan’s role in the Pacific War, namely the fear of
undermining modern Japan’s historical identity, and castigating their forebears as war
criminals8 (Tamamoto 2001:35; Shibuichi 2005:200; Deans 2007).
Furthermore, some Japanese scholars argue that under the constitutional provision
of Article 20, freedom of expression of one’s religious belief/sentiment should also be
accrued to state leaders, and henceforth, prime ministerial visits in his private capacity
should not be defined as unconstitutional (Hashizume 2001:51; Matsumoto, Mikuriya and
Sakamoto 2005). Nationalist intellectuals also see Yasukuni as emblematic to Japan’s
national identity, of which the Japanese people can, and should rightfully assert, befitting a
sovereign nation (Hashizume 2001). Ultimately, ordinary Japanese regard the Yasukuni
issue as a domestic concern, and thus perceive the unrelenting emotional outburst and
diplomatic pressure by foreign governments, namely China and Korea as liable to interfering
in Japan’s internal affairs (Takashina 2004:35).
Nonetheless, from the perspective of Japan’s neighbours and war victims, as well as
its own pacifist-oriented citizenry, Yasukuni remains a contentious institution, a remnant of
the prewar system that continues to exude ideological aura and political influence in the
postwar Japanese society. According to Matsumoto, the problem with Yasukuni Shrine is
8 In my interview with Noda Takeshi, the senior LDP Diet-member opines that Yasukuni is important for Japan,
because of its relations to the acceptance and denial debate regarding Japan’s war responsibility, and the results
of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. According to him, despite Japan’s official acceptance of the Tribunal’s
judgment, many ordinary Japanese cannot fully do so, because, to them, the US was also, in some ways,
responsible for the war. Such popular perceptions are, closely related to the sentiment over Yasukuni, where the
executed war criminals are criminals because of the Tribunal’s “lopsided” judgment. Since the judgment is
perceived to be unfair, the so-called “war criminals”, in the eyes of these cohort of Japanese are not criminals
after all, and therefore, not a problem to be enshrined at Yasukuni. Indeed, those executed, were eventually
enshrined because of such opinions in Japan. In this sense, their enshrinement is symbolic of the challenge
against the conventional logic of the war (Noda is the former secretary-general of the New Conservative Party
(Hoshuto), who together with his LDP and Shin-Komeito counterparts, Yamasaki Taku and Fuyushiba Tetzuo,
visited China in July 2001, where they were believed to be heavily involved in the diplomatic negotiations,
prior to Koizumi’s first trip to Yasukuni).
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that it “still retains a distinct flavour of State-Shinto, the official cult of prewar Japan”, and
that “the element of political ideology is too strong”, which makes it “inappropriate for a
religious institution”, even without strong external criticisms (Matsumoto, Mikuriya and
Sakamaoto 2005:25). Not only is it the symbol of militaristic-nationalism synonymous to the
“belligerent” Japan of the prewar and wartime eras, Yasukuni is controversial precisely
because of its continuous propagation of such ideals, and its infallible advocacy of Imperial
Japan’s wartime actions as “just” and “divine”, notions that are backed by strong domestic
political support, notably from the ruling LDP (Harootunian 1999). This can be observed from
the Shrine’s “notorious” role in eulogising Japan’s war past, as reflected in its Yushukan “war
museum”, and perhaps, even more so, by its decision to secretly enshrine fourteen Class-A
war criminals in October 1978, allegedly with the tacit acquiescence of the Japanese
authorities.9 In fact, their enshrinement has become arguably the centerpiece of the
Yasukuni debacle, since its revelation, back in spring 1979.
There are also scholarly opinions that the “unique” Yasukuni enshrinement rituals are
not genuinely rooted to ancient Japanese traditions, as commonly and superficially
understood by ordinary Japanese.10 Instead, such practices were mostly an “invented
tradition” undertaken by the Meiji administration to cultivate nationalism through pseudo-
religious beliefs, to meet the political needs of the modern Japanese state (Breen 2004;
Hashizume 2001; Harootunian 1999). Fukuda and Yamaori see the Yasukuni dispute as
being “inextricably caught up with the design of Japan’s transformation…in the nineteenth
century”, where the Meiji oligarchs “invented” the State-Shinto ideology, based on traditional
folklores, beliefs, and customs, to provide a spiritual foundation for the sustenance of
Japanese identity, as they strove to transform Japan into a modern nation-state (2004:37-
9 According to new documents on the Yasukuni Shrine problem released by the National Diet Library on 28
March 2007, the Japanese government did conduct discussion on the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals
with Yasukuni officials in 1969, some nine years before the “secret” enshrinement. Among the documents
released, include lists dated from 31 January 1969 presented during a meeting between the then Health and
Welfare Ministry and Shrine officials, containing names of Class-A war dead eligible for enshrinement,
highlighting the common view between the government and Yasukuni on this matter. Both the ministry and the
Shrine also agreed not to publicly reveal the idea, a decision apparently linked to the constitutional issue
regarding the separation of religion and state (KN 29/03/2007; JT 29/03/2007).
10 Although it is a Japanese custom to mourn the dead, the Yasukuni rituals, concepts, and doctrines are
apparently, qualitatively different from those observed in traditional Shinto shrines (Breen 2004:82).
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38). Yasukuni thus, unmistakably represents the essence of modern Japanese prewar
identity, and nationalist ideology that was employed by the State to mobilise the
“unsuspecting population” (Harootunian 1999:144) towards war and conquests in the Asian
continent. In this light, its conspicuous presence in postwar Japan, and more significantly,
official visits by Japanese leaders and senior government personnel have drawn both
domestic and international criticisms, condemning such homage as inappropriate, due to the
Shrine’s historical legacy and parochial ideals. Some critics associated such visits to the
revival of chauvinistic nationalism and Japanese militarism (cf. Shibuichi 2005:198), while
others perceived them as a sign of “historical amnesia” representing Japan’s enduring
inability to reflect on its wartime responsibility and actions (Dolven 2002:60-61; Miller 2002).
According to scholars, the Yasukuni problem is double-edged in that it involves
contending participants from both Japanese domestic politics and foreign relations, with the
nationalist-rightists vying against their leftwing counterparts in the domestic arena, and
China and two Koreas as the external disputants (Shibuichi 2005:199; Wan 2006:236;
Deans 2007). Domestically, the staunch supporters of prime ministerial visits derive mainly
from three broad nationalist groupings, namely major nationalist-rightwing pressure groups,
smaller uyoku organisations, and nationalist intelligentsia that disseminate their ideas via the
mass media (Shibuichi 2005:200-203). The former is commonly acknowledged as the most
powerful and influential, politically, with key organisations, like Nihon Izokukai wielding
financial and electoral clout via its sizeable membership (Shibuichi 2001:200; Breen 2007:5).
Together with Jinja Honcho, Nippon Kaigi, Issuikai, and veterans’ associations like the
Military Pension Federation (gunjin onkyu renmei), Association to Commemorate the Spirit
of Fallen Heroes (Eirei ni kotaeru kai)11 and the Yasukuni Worship and Tribute Society,12
11 There are different English translations of the name of this Organisation, i.e. Shibuichi (2005) calls it as
above, while it is known as “Society for Answering the Heroic Spirits” and “Glorious War Dead Society” in
Harootunian’s (1999) and Breen’s (2004), respectively. This organisation claims a 1.2 million-strong
membership across Japan (Breen 2004: 87).
12 According to Breen, the Yasukuni Worship and Tribute Society was established in 1999 to mark the 130th
anniversary of Yasukuni Shrine. Membership derives mostly from other rightwing organisations. The society is
responsible for several Shrine development projects, deemed crucial to its long-term strategy of “laying the
foundation of new believers, and ensuring the transmission to successive generations of the lessons of the war
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these “nationalist” organisations have employed sustained pressure on Japanese politicians
to pay tribute at, and restore state patronage of Yasukuni-jinja (Shibuichi 2005:200; Breen
2004:85-87; Harootunian 1999:157). Shibuichi (2005:200-201) opines that their political
influence lies in the fact that these groupings have close ties and overlapping memberships
with the LDP, with some serving as LDP Diet-members, while senior LDP politicians often
chair these organisations. Since the LDP is widely noted as a “catchall party” for
conservative/ultra-nationalist groups and individual politicians, the intimate connection and
dependence on electoral support, compel LDP politicians/state-elites to satisfy the demands
of these organisations (Shibuichi 2005:200-201; Lam 2006b). Indeed, Japanese premiers
from the LDP are, like any LDP politicians, susceptible to domestic nationalist pressures to
visit Yasukuni13 (Shibuichi 2005:201).
Conversely, the domestic participants from opposite ideological spectrums comprise
leftist political parties, i.e. JSP/SDPJ, JCP, and pacifist NGOs and leftwing media mentioned
in Chapter 5. The leftists/pacifists repudiate the idea of Yasukuni’s relationship to Japanese
identity, perceiving it as the symbol of a militaristic, Imperial Japan, responsible for the war
sufferings of its neighbours and its own people, which was, ultimately buried in the ashes of
WWII defeat (Tanaka, Tanaka and Hata 1995 cf. Shibuichi 2005:203). Meanwhile, China
and Korea represent the key external disputants. From the viewpoint of the Chinese
government and people, specifically, Yasukuni-jinja induces memories of past humiliations
and sufferings under the yoke of Japanese imperialism and military aggression, which
conceivably provoke popular resentment and official displeasure towards the Shrine (Deans
2007:285-289). With a nationalistic Chinese population fed on decades of patriotic education
of distinctly anti-Japanese colouration, and the ideologically defunct CCP state’s
dead” (2004:87). Among the key development projects included the refurbishment and expansion of the
Yushukan museum that was completed in 2002 (Breen 2004:87).
13 Japan’s postwar premiers who paid homage at Yasukuni were Shihedara, Yoshida, Kishi, Ikeda, Sato,
Tanaka, Miki, Fukuda, Ohira, Suzuki, Nakasone, Hashimoto, and Koizumi (see Deans 2007:273; Table 1). All
LDP PMs before 1985, from Kishi to Nakasone visited the shrine (Shibuichi 2005:205). Following strong
international protests, Nakasone’s successors from the LDP, i.e. Takeshita, Uno, and Kaifu shied away from
Yasukuni. The post-Cold War era has seen three LDP premiers (Miyazawa, Hashimoto, and Koizumi) visiting
the Shrine. Those who did not visit were mainly non-LDP premiers, i.e. Hosokawa, Hata, and Muruyama
(Shibuichi 2005:205). For an analysis of the number, frequency, trends, and patterns of PM visits to Yasukuni,
see Deans (2007:272-276).
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dependence on nationalism as a legitimisation tool, one would expect popular Chinese
indignation, accompanied by strong diplomatic protests from Beijing, in reaction to Japanese
prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni.14
Obviously, Yasukuni evokes contending meanings and images to the actors involved
in the dispute. With each disputant’s identity defined by the respective image and meaning
held by them of this Shrine, Shibuichi concurs that Yasukuni unavoidably serves as “a
catalyst for a clash of identities”, which is fundamental to understanding the problem itself
(2005:199; Tamamoto 2001; Satoh 2006a). Scholars also stress the need to consider the
Shrine’s instrumentality in the context of domestic ideological and political competition, and
its worth as a diplomatic card in Japan’s relations with the disputant-states (Rose 2007;
Deans 2007). As shall be demonstrated, the Yasukuni debacle in Japanese-Chinese ties is
not merely the case of clashing nationalisms/identities, but also a tool utilised by state-elites
for domestic political and diplomatic expediency. It illustrates the manifestation of both
psychological/emotional and political/instrumental properties of nationalism, where state-
elites’ external perceptions and calculations are influenced by as much sense/passion, as
sensibility/reason, with one prevailing over the other, during particular time and conditions.
6.1.3. Yasukuni Shrine as a domestic issue
Domestically, Yasukuni Shrine first emerged as a political issue in the early 1950s, when
Nihon Izokukai15 staunchly advocated for its re-nationalisation, as a means to secure state
tribute to the war dead, and pension for the bereaved families (Breen 2004:86). Its cause
was championed by the LDP, which on five occasions between 1969 and 1974, had sought,
albeit unsuccessfully, to submit bills to the Diet calling for Yasukuni to be granted special
14 Noda Takeshi sees Yasukuni as a big issue for the Chinese leadership, because of its link to Chinese
nationalism and the legitimacy of the CCP. According to him, China’s understanding of the war is very much
focused on the view of Japan being the aggressor and China its victim. The Chinese views the war criminals
enshrined in Yasukuni as the major problem, and therefore, any Japanese PM visit to Yasukuni, would trigger
Chinese perceptions that Japan is trying to justify its role in the war (Noda Interview).
15 The organisation was originally called the Japan Welfare Federation of War-Bereaved Families in the English
language, but was later re-named as the JABF. According to Tamamoto Masaru, the real motivation and
original objective behind Izokukai’s formation was economic, namely to seek war pension rather than
venerating the war dead. This suggests pressure groups utilizing nationalism as a political tool to pressure the
Japanese government, for their own political/economic agenda/goals (Tamamoto interview).
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status and placed under state patronage (Tokita 2003:48; Harootunian 1999:155-157).
Strong resistance from leftwing bodies eventually forced the LDP to abandon the
nationalisation bill, compelling the Shrine’s proponents to recalibrate their focus towards
realising official visits by Japanese premiers and cabinet members as their major political
agenda (Tokita 2003:49; Rose 2007:26). In fact, the term “official” has since, become diluted
to simply being “prime ministerial visits”, at present (Tanaka 2003). Interestingly, prime
ministerial visits never elicited much contention before 1975, with most postwar premiers,
from Shidehara Kijuro onwards, having paid homage, while annual visits by the Emperor16
during auspicious festivals were considered a norm. However, the declaration of the “private
nature” of his April 1975 visit by then PM Miki Takeo (Deans 2007:272), triggered fierce,
“left-versus-right” debate within Japanese politics, in the context of the constitutional
separation of religion and the state, which has since, transformed Yasukuni into a highly
politicised domestic issue (Tokita 2003:49). Core to the debate is the constitutionality of
such visits in both private and official capacities, and the definition of, and differences
between them (Sono 2005). Previous homages by Japanese premiers had been, largely
interpreted as private, as indicated explicitly beforehand, or implicitly, by their quiet visitation,
and their eschewing of the use of any symbols of official trappings and subtle changes in
ceremonial rituals during such visits (Wan 2006:236-237). Nonetheless, critics argue that
what constitutes as being “official”, and “private” is subjective, ambiguous, and tend to
overlap, and that it is difficult, to objectively distinguish the two categories (Sono 2005:52). In
view of such ambiguity, state leaders should thus, refrain from visiting Yasukuni to avoid the
possibility of infringing the related constitutional provision (Umehara 2004).
The Shrine courted more domestic controversy in 1979, when Asahi Shimbun
revealed its secret enshrinement of Class-A war criminals, a year before, sparking further
debates on the legality of the decision, and possible government involvement and
contravention of the related constitutional provision (Lam 2006b:3). According to Tokita, the
Yasukuni authorities defended their action, citing the 1953 Law for Relief of War Victims and
16 The late Emperor Hirohito, posthumously known as Emperor Showa visited Yasukuni eight times in the
postwar period (Deans 2007:273), but stopped after the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in 1978.
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Survivor as having granted equal status to the deceased war criminals, which allowed them
to be treated like other war dead, and that their castigation was “an act of arbitrary
condemnation” of the vanquished, based on victor’s justice (2003:49). Meanwhile, the
Japanese state denied any involvement in the controversy. In responding to calls for the
removal of the war criminals, the government stipulated that it had no legal authority to order
the Shrine to do so, given the provision on Article 20 of the Constitution (Lam 2006b:3).
6.1.4. Internationalisation of the Yasukuni dispute
Notwithstanding the fervent Diet debates, Yasukuni remained essentially a domestic issue
until the mid-1980s. Visits by Japanese premiers following the mentioned controversies did
not provoke significant international criticisms. In the context of Japanese-Chinese relations,
the Chinese authorities had never taken offence with prime ministerial visits, prior to 1985
(Deans 2007:274-275). Although veiled protests were apparent in response to homages
between 1982-1984, none escalated into diplomatic standoffs (Shibuichi 2005:207).17
However, the publicised “official” visit by Nakasone Yasuhiro on August 15, 1985,
unexpectedly triggered international opposition, mainly from China and South Korea. The
Chinese took offence and vehemently protested the visit, albeit unofficially through state and
popular channels (Rose 2007:29-30). A self-professed nationalist, Nakasone declared the
visit “official”, despite strong domestic protests from leftist/pacifist groups (Shibuichi
2005:207). His decision was apparently, based on an independent consultative committee’s
conclusion that “an official visit would not be unconstitutional if carried out in a manner
relatively free of religious elements” (cf. Tokita 2003:49). The underlying reasons were both,
political and personal, namely strong pressure from Izokukai, and his experience as a
military officer during WWII (Nakasone 2001:100-111 cf. Shibuichi 2005:206),18 which
underscored his sentiment, and arguably, dependence on nationalist-based political support
17 For instance, Beijing did not reprimand Suzuki for his August 15, 1982 visit, despite coinciding with the
history textbook row (Wan 2006:237). It did express “mild” displeasure during Nakasone’s 1982 visit, via the
official mouthpiece, Renmin Ribao, followed by similar “soft” protests in 1983 and 1984 (Shibuichi 2005:207).
18 According to his personal account, Nakasone cited two reasons: i) he was pressured by Izokukai members,
who reportedly resorted to large-scale hunger strike in demand for his paying an official visit to Yasukuni on
August 15, and ii) his personal experience as a naval officer in WWII influenced his decision to pay tribute to
those who lost their lives under his command (Nakasone 2001:100-111 cf. Shibuichi 2005:206).
190
that required living up to his nationalist reputation. Nonetheless, the Chinese reaction forced
Tokyo to seek remedial measures to pacify Beijing, and Nakasone to reconsider future
Shrine visits. Taking the Chinese protest seriously, he did not visit Yasukuni again during his
premiership,19 despite severe criticisms and character attacks from nationalist groups and
rightwing intellectuals, as well as threats of assassination by uyoku for allegedly “kowtowing”
to Chinese pressure (AS 03/08/2001 cf. Shibuichi 2005:209). Nakasone’s successors
followed suit, establishing a temporary moratorium of prime ministerial visits, amid strong
nationalist pressure, presumably to avoid further internationalisation of the dispute (Kingston
2004:238; Shibuichi 2005:209).
The Yasukuni issue remained dormant in Japanese-Chinese diplomacy throughout
the early 1990s, but resurrected in July 1996, by then PM Hashimoto Ryutaro’s “private”
visit.20 Apparently, it was not Hashimoto, but Miyazawa Kiichi, who first broke the
moratorium by secretly visiting Yasukuni during his tenure (KN 25/07/2001). China strongly
protested against Hashimoto’s pilgrimage, which coincided with the period of rising Chinese
nationalism, and worsening ties caused by bilateral problems highlighted in the preceding
chapters.21 It is widely construed that Hashimoto made the visit to appease Izokukai, of
which he was its former chairperson before securing the PM position, ostensibly via
Izokukai’s clout in LDP politics. Nevertheless, like Nakasone, Beijing’s protestation
“effectively prevented him from making another visit [during his premiership]” (Wan 2006:
237). Subsequent premiers, from Obuchi to Mori, avoided the debacle by keeping Yasukuni
at arms-length. The Obuchi administration rekindled the call for the removal of Class-A war
criminals and purging of Yasukuni’s religious nuances, and even proposed the creation of an
alternative site in 1999 (Breen 2004:88).
19 Nakasone explained in his memoirs that he stopped his Shrine visits in response to a personal request from
Hu Yaobang, the Japan-friendly CCP General Secretary, with whom he developed personal ties. Apparently,
Nakasone’s visit in 1985 had forced Hu into a tight corner (Nakasone 2004: 135-139; cf. Kokubun 2007:153).
20 Hashimoto, however, insisted that his homage to Yasukuni in 1996 was “official”, not “private” as many had
believed, when queried by the press, prior to the April 2001 LDP presidential election (KN 17/04/2001).
21 Japanese-Chinese ties in 1996 were undermined by bilateral quarrels, ranging from the Taiwan Straits crisis
and the “Hashimoto-Clinton declaration” on the renewed Guideline for the US-Japan Alliance, to China’s
nuclear tests and the Senkaku/Diaoyudao disputes. See Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 for details.
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However, the coming of Koizumi Junichiro in 2001, triggered what was to become
the most debilitating period of Japanese-Chinese political relations since 1972, with his
Yasukuni pilgrimages at the heart of their diplomatic conundrums. Koizumi became the first
post-Cold War Japanese PM to have visited the controversial Shrine, annually during his
tenure. These visits were, carried out, despite fervent protests from China and Korea, and a
chorus of international criticisms, domestic consternations, notwithstanding. In regard to
Japanese-Chinese relations, Koizumi’s visits forced the infuriated Chinese government to
freeze leader summits and top-level exchanges, turning what was merely a symbolic issue
into a “diplomatic faux pas” (Satoh 2006a:2; Okazaki 02/09/2006).
Koizumi’s nonchalance towards the Yasukuni issue distinguished him from his
predecessors, i.e. Nakasone and Hashimoto, who unlike Koizumi, had crumbled under
staunch domestic and international pressure that saw them shying away from subsequent
Shrine visits. Interestingly, such distinction has been, closely linked to resurgent Japanese
nationalism, and the apparent national fatigue towards Japan’s “kowtow diplomacy” and
desire to establish a “normal-cum-equal” relationship with China. This raises crucial
questions regarding the extent to which domestic nationalist pressure intervenes, and
affects Japanese leaders’ perception and management of the Yasukuni dispute, and
whether such assertiveness is directly induced by the emotional properties of nationalism/
identity politics, and/or calculated responses for domestic and diplomatic expediency.
6.2. The Yasukuni Problem in Contemporary Japanese-Chinese Diplomacy:
Nationalism and the External-Domestic Nexus in Japan’s China Policy-making
Yasukuni Shrine re-emerged as a serious point of contention in Japanese-Chinese ties
during the Koizumi administration, at a time when nationalism and the question of identity
resonated increasingly loudly within the Japanese domestic political debate and popular
consciousness. It also coincided with the changing power relations between the two resident
powers of East Asia, in a fluid post-Cold War international environment that has perpetuated
Japanese sense of insecurity, notably towards China’s rise, and its flourishing nationalism
that seemingly targeted Japan. The juxtaposition and interactions between nationalism and
192
these shifting external-domestic dynamics were responsible for fuelling the “China threat”
perception, and redefining Japanese external behaviour, when dealing with the Chinese, as
illustrated by Tokyo’s tough posturing over the Yasukuni issue.
The following sections analyse the international and domestic environments, and the
related processes that affected Japanese state-elites’ perception and calculation, to
explicate nationalism’s salience vis-à-vis other variables in shaping Tokyo’s policy-options
and diplomatic manoeuvres during Koizumi’s Shrine visits. His defiance and Japan’s
diplomatic responses to Chinese challenges during each visit between 2001 and 2006 offer
an opportunity to analyse the interaction between domestic nationalist pressure and foreign
policy-behaviour/preferences, under particular external-domestic conditions, as perceived/
calculated by Japanese state-elites. Many Japanese observers share the opinion that
Koizumi’s stubbornness, maverick personality, and personal conviction (nationalistic or
otherwise) are central to understanding his persistence in visiting Yasukuni.22 However, a
critical examination of the prevailing environs leading to his Shrine visits, and the manner in
which they were carefully choreographed and executed, not mentioning, the diplomatic
manoeuvring thereafter, suggest that shrewd calculations involving the use of nationalism
for domestic political objectives, and its delicate balancing and trade-off with other factors,
were also at play. Moreover, a comparative observation on the ambiguous position taken by
his successor, Abe Shinzo and his Cabinet on the issue, despite their overtly nationalistic
disposition23 (Lam 2006c), implies that emotional nationalism and domestic nationalist
pressure may not necessarily be the driver of Japan’s China policy, or the overarching
feature of post-Cold War Japanese-Chinese diplomacy, after all.
22 Kato Koichi, Koizumi’s ex-political ally, described him as “a politician who depends much on emotions and
intuition, instead of logic and reason when making decisions…and also not one to listen to the advice of others”
(Yoshida 28/05/2005 cf. van Kemenade 2006:49). This was reiterated by Kato during my interview with him,
an opinion that was equally shared by many Japanese “China” experts, i.e Takagi Seiichiro, Kokubun Ryosei,
Soeya Yoshihide, and Mori Kazuko, interviewed between January -March 2007 and May-June 2008.
23 For a description of the “nationalistic” disposition of Abe’s cabinet, see “Hawkishness is watchword for Abe
team: Cabinet ministers are seen as staunch supporters of traditional values”, Japan Times, 27 September 2006.
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6.2.1. Koizumi and the Yasukuni disputes (2001-2006)
From the outset, Koizumi’s rise to the apex of Japanese politics occurred amid the structural
transformation in Japanese-Chinese relations, which saw both governments readjusting to
the changing bilateral dynamics since the mid-1990s. His appointment also reflected the
shift in Japan’s domestic politics, where he became principally, the first Japanese premier
elected based on popularity and mass support, instead of the usual backroom negotiations
between the LDP habatsu/factions that saw relatively obscure/weak politicians appointed to
the office, previously (Anderson 2004:152; Hashizume 2001:53). Against the milieu of rising
domestic nationalist impulses, and being a popularly elected leader who relied heavily on
mass sentiment and media appeal (Iida 2003), Koizumi would have been responsive to
nationalist pressure during his premiership. In the context of Japan-China ties, his
Administration would have been vulnerable, to an extent, to pressures from the mentioned
nationalist groups, conservative media coverage, and an increasingly sceptical, anti-Chinese
public opinion, especially when it came to dealing with Beijing over the Yasukuni problem.
That said, mitigating domestic forces, and pragmatism in maintaining friendly ties with China
to facilitate Japan’s broader national interests could have similarly affected Koizumi’s policy-
considerations. This external-domestic nexus in foreign policy decision-making was
apparent in the circumstances surrounding Koizumi’s inaugural visit in August 2001.
Externally, Japanese-Chinese relations were showing signs of improvement since
early 1999, as both governments took damage control initiatives to improve ties, which had
been hitherto, undermined by a series of bilateral disputes that culminated in the diplomatic
fiasco during Jiang Zemin’s 1998 visit. As elaborated, the Chinese leadership resorted to a
diplomatic “charm offensive” after realising the damage caused by their excessive
manipulation of the history issue and stoking of popular anti-Japanese nationalism, which
had undermined Japanese-Chinese goodwill since the mid-1990s (Rozman 2002). The
Obuchi and Mori governments reciprocated China’s so-called “smile diplomacy” (Rozman
2001), bringing a thaw in political ties that complemented their increasingly robust economic
relationship. Despite the positive development, Japan remained cautiously optimistic,
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adopting a so-called “reluctant realist” policy of containment-cum-engagement to hedge
against potential belligerence from a powerful China (Green 2001), as demonstrated by its
incremental security policy-shifts under the auspices of an enhanced US-Japan alliance.
The domestic environment in Japan was less sanguine, due to growing public
scepticism regarding China’s benign rise, and their unfavourable images of, and unabated
resentment towards the Chinese. Undoubtedly, Japanese nationalists/media have exploited
this “thriving” domestic condition, “demonising” and fuelling the “China threat” perception to
advance their parochial agenda (Rozman 2002; Satoh 2006b), with prime ministerial
Yasukuni visit high on their priority list. Expectedly, Yasukuni became a key issue during the
run-up to the 2001 LDP presidential election, occupying the campaigns of the two leading
candidates: Koizumi and Hashimoto. It was ironic that Hashimoto, the former Izokukai chief,
and also, being the most recent of ex-premiers to have visited Yasukuni during his time in
office, declared that he will not be repeating this feat, if elected this time around. Meanwhile,
Koizumi, who had never before visited the Shrine, pledged to pay annual homage on August
15, and made this promise an integral part of his manifesto, during his LDP presidency
campaign. It is believed that he made the pledge on 15 April 2001 to Morita Tsuguo,
Izokukai’s vice-chairman (Yoshida 28/05/2005), in a calculated attempt to distinguish himself
from, and cash in on Hashimoto’s earlier decision (Anonymous interview A). This timely
move, made a week before the election, would have given Koizumi the opportunity to
undercut Hashimoto’s power base within Izokukai, alienate the latter from other
nationalist/rightwing groups, and consequentially benefit from their electoral support.24
Koizumi’s decision to woo nationalist support may have proven decisive, as he outpolled
Hashimoto 51% to 40% at the parliamentary level, while gaining an 87% to 11% victory
24 According to several of my interviewees, Hashimoto’s decision was probably due to, among others: i) the
negative experience and repercussions he faced following his previous Yasukuni visit as PM; ii) his knowledge
and experience on the intricacies of foreign affairs and diplomacy, which may have prompted his statesman-like
considerations for maintaining the thawing relationship with China; and perhaps, iii) a “miscalculation” of his
domestic power base and influence. Hashimoto may have thought that his declaration would not have any
damaging impact, since he had already visited Yasukuni during his premiership, and that he could count on his
personal affiliation with Izokukai and support from military veterans/pensioners organisations, considering his
influential position as then Welfare Minister. This “miscalculation” was strategically exploited by Koizumi
(Nakai interview; Tomoda interview; Kim interview; Yoshida interview; Anonymous interview A).
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margin at the prefectural level (Anderson 2004:153). Koizumi’s pledge drew Chinese (and
Korean) concerns, and his election, and consequent anointment as PM saw the Japanese
and Chinese governments locked in a protracted diplomatic “tug-of-war” over the Yasukuni
issue, culminating in his inaugural visit on 13 August 2001.
Retrospectively, Koizumi’s Yasukuni pledge was ill-timed, as April 2001 also saw a
resurrection of the history textbook controversy,25 Li Denghui’s controversial visit to Japan,26
and trade dispute over agricultural produce,27 which were already straining their relationship
(Wan 2006:237). On the day he assumed the LDP presidency, Koizumi reiterated his
intention to fulfill his pledge, much to Beijing’s dismay (KN 24/04/2001). The Chinese MFA
immediately responded with a statement imploring the PM-elect to act responsibly to restore
damaged ties and reconsider his plan to visit Yasukuni (Reuters 24/04/2001; KN
24/04/2001). This was followed by intensified Chinese pressure during the next few months
to dissuade Koizumi from his Shrine agenda. During his meeting with South Korea’s ruling
party delegation on May 28, President Jiang Zemin criticised Koizumi over the Yasukuni
issue, and his management of the textbook controversy (Jiji 28/05/2001). A Chinese MFA
spokesperson kept up the pressure days later, by questioning Japan’s commitment towards
promoting friendly relations, citing that Koizumi would be sending a mixed signal to Japan’s
neighbours with his Shrine visit (XNA 31/05/2001). On June 25, the Chinese ambassador to
Japan purportedly urged Koizumi to rethink his plan (Jiji 25/06/2001), while Jiang again
expressed concern in a July 10 meeting with the secretaries-general of Japan’s ruling
coalition, during their visit to Beijing (DY/YS 11/07/2001). It was believed that this inaugural
trip by Japan’s new coalition government to China and South Korea came with a correlated
errand to placate its hosts, and explain Japanese position concerning the history textbook
25 Aforementioned in Chapter 5, the Japanese government (MOE) had on 3 April 2001, approved the junior
high history textbook published by the neo-nationalist intellectual group, Tsukurukai that ostensibly contained
“sanitised” information on Japan’s war history, drawing strong protests from South Korea and China.
26 Despite strong pressure from Beijing, Tokyo allowed the former Taiwanese president to visit Japan between
22-26 April 2001, under the pretext of seeking medical treatment. China retaliated by cancelling the planned
visit to Japan in May 2001, by Li Peng, the NPC Chairman and former Chinese premier (see JT 26/04/2001).
27 A bilateral trade dispute broke out when Japan imposed temporary safeguard measures on shitake
mushrooms, leeks and tatami straws imported from China, on 23 April 2001, provoking Beijing to retaliate by
raising tariffs on imports of Japanese automobiles, air-conditioners, and mobile phone on 19 June 2001
(Przystup 2001b:93-94).
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and Yasukuni visit.28 Predictably, the Chinese rebuffed such efforts and remained adamant
that Japan should carefully manage the “history” problem, implying their displeasure on
Koizumi’s insensitivity towards both issues (JT 11/07/2001).29 Upon their return, Koizumi
was briefed, and urged by the secretaries-general to carefully reconsider his plan (AS
11/07/2001 cf. Wan 2006:238), but the PM reaffirmed his resolve to visit during a pre-Upper
House election debate with the opposition (JT 12/07/2001). China pressed on during the
mid-July ASEAN-Plus-Three meeting in Hanoi, when Tanaka Makiko was told by China’s
FM, Tang Jiaxuan, that the visit “must be cancelled” (KN 24/07/2001; Jiji 24/07/2001).30 The
Japanese FM agreed to relay Chinese concerns, and advise Koizumi (DowJones
25/06/2001; KN 26/07/2001), while categorically, expressing her personal opposition to the
planned homage (MDN 31/07/2001). The Chinese leadership also relied on “China Hand”,
Nonaka Hiromu to intervene and persuade Koizumi to cancel his pilgrimage, during the LDP
stalwart’s trip to China in early August 2001 (Jiji 25/07/2001; JT 03/08/2001).
Besides external pressures, Koizumi encountered domestic opposition, from within
and outside the LDP, and ambiguous public support towards his Yasukuni visit. All the
opposition parties were against it, while moderate LDP elites/lawmakers, i.e. current and ex-
secretary-generals, Yamasaki Taku and Kato Koichi urged Koizumi to be prudent, and
suggested changing the date of the visit (Wan 2006:240; KN 07/08/2001). In fact, during the
cabinet meeting on August 7, most members wanted the PM to exercise caution, while
stating their own apprehension towards visiting Yasukuni on the symbolic August 15 (XNA
07/08/2001 cf. Wan 2006:240). However, Yamasaki had confirmed earlier that the
pilgrimage “will certainly be made”, pending decision on the date by Koizumi (JT
06/01/2001). Public opinion surveys by Asahi Shimbun also revealed a shift towards a more
28 The secretaries-general were Yamasaki Taku of LDP; Fuyushiba Tetsuzo of Shin-Komeito; and Noda
Takeshi of Hoshuto. The trio reportedly carried with them Koizumi’s personal letters to the Chinese and Korean
leaders expressing his commitment to maintaining friendly ties with the two countries (Jiji 02/07/01; 06/07/01).
29 During the July 10, 2001 meeting, Chinese FM Tang Jiaxuan told the ruling coalition trio that China will not
accept Koizumi’s plans to visit Yasukuni. He also insisted that Japan should properly manage the history
textbook issue, in response to Tokyo’s recent rejection of Chinese demands for changes to Tsukurukai’s
controversial history textbook (see JT 11/07/2001).
30 Meanwhile, the Korean government joined in by issuing its first official protest against the planned Yasukuni
visit, through its ambassador in Tokyo (Shibuichi 2005:211; see also Reuters 24/07/2001).
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cautious position by early August, in light of intense media scrutiny and debate on the issue,
with those supporting the visit declining to 26% from 42%, a month before31 (Takashina
2001:50).
Despite the opposition, Koizumi stood by his decision and visited Yasukuni, albeit
two days earlier from the promised date. The visit received blanket international and
domestic media coverage, with commentators associating it and other recent “taboo-
breaking” developments to rising nationalism in Japan. Specifically to Japanese-Chinese
ties, Koizumi’s uncompromising posture towards Chinese demands suggests increasing
domestic nationalist constraint on state-elites in China policy-making. That said, one could
equally contend that the “change-of-date” strategy represented a political compromise by
Koizumi to appease the contending participants located at the opposite ends of the
Yasukuni dispute. This brings us to question nationalism’s salience vis-à-vis other
factors/actors, and their roles in determining the particular policy-option taken by the
Koizumi administration.
Not surprisingly, Beijing issued a strongly worded official statement in protest of the
visit (BBC 13/08/2001). Stronger diplomatic reactions ensued, such as Chinese refusal to
grant a bilateral summit with Koizumi, and Jiang’s intention to cancel his meeting with the
Japanese premier come October’s APEC convention in Shanghai (ST 18/08/2001).
Conversely, the Japanese government was, surprisingly keen to mend relations in the
aftermath of the standoff, with Koizumi repeatedly indicating his desire to visit China, before
the APEC summit (JT 27/08/2001; 05/09/2001).32 Tokyo’s “fence-mending” efforts were
subsequently, albeit ironically facilitated by the “9/11” incident, which dramatically altered
“the parameters of Sino-Japanese relations”(Wan 2006:244). With both sides eager to
shelve the Yasukuni issue to smoothen the path for cooperation in the US-led “campaign
against terrorism” (Bezlova 09/10/2001), Koizumi seized this window of opportunity to make
31 The Asahi Shimbun public opinion poll’s questionnaire on August 4, 2001 was allegedly skewed, causing the
results to be inaccurate. This argument by Takashina (2001:50) is elaborated in the next sub-chapter.
32 On 24 August 2001, Koizumi instructed the MOFA to arrange his visit to China before the APEC summit in
Shanghai (JT 27/08/2001). He reiterated his desire to visit China and Korea “at an earliest possible opportunity,
if the situation permits” during an interview with the Japan Times (JT 05/09/2001; see also KN 24/08/2001).
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amends during his October 8 working visit to Beijing (AFP 08/10/2001). His widely reported
“friendly” gestures during the trip drew favourable Chinese remarks, which helped lessen
political tension (XNA 08/10/2001; KN 12/10/2001). Japan-China ties regained traction,
following further cordial exchanges at the sideline of regional multilateral fora. Despite these
diplomatic efforts, and the “benefit of the doubt” given to him by the Chinese government
(Wan 2006:245), Koizumi refused to rule out future Yasukuni visits, as demonstrated by his
“non-committal” press statements during his high-profile China trip (JT 09/10/2001).
Beijing was clearly infuriated, when Koizumi decided to make it a routine with his
second Yasukuni trip on 21 April 2002. The “Spring Festival” visit took the Chinese by
surprise, for they probably did not expect Koizumi to be that indecorous, after having only
recently made positive remarks about Japan-China ties, during the Boao Forum in Hainan
(JT 13/04/2002).33 Moreover, both sides were planning an elaborate celebration in
September to mark the 30th anniversary of diplomatic normalisation. The Chinese response
was ritualistic, with the Vice-FM summoning the Japanese ambassador (XNA 21/04/2002),
while the MFA swiftly issued an official statement denouncing the visit (AFP 21/04/2002).
Beijing also postponed scheduled defence exchanges, namely the April visit to China by
JDA chief, Nakatani Gen, and the inaugural port calling of a Chinese warship to Japan in
mid-May 2002 (AFP 23/04/2002), but, surprisingly, proceeded with senior CCP leader Zeng
Qinghong’s Japan visit (AFP 25/04/2002). Nonetheless, Chinese indignation ultimately saw
the cancellation of Koizumi’s state visit to China, and postponement of the summit,
scheduled to coincide with the anniversary celebration34 (AS 09/08/2002; Curtin 2003b).
Koizumi appeared unfazed by the adverse impact his shrine visits had on the political
atmosphere of the bilateral ties. With political relations worsening amid fresh Chinese
33 In his keynote speech at the Boao Forum, Koizumi stressed that China is not an economic threat to Japan but
an opportunity. For a similar report, see “Koizumi says China no economic threat,” Reuters, 11 April 2002.
34 Asahi Shimbun reported on 9 August 2002 the postponement of Koizumi’s scheduled China trip to mark the
30th anniversary celebration of diplomatic normalisation, apparently following Beijing’s recommendation to
avoid a visit during the 16th CCP Congress, and Tokyo’s intention to arrange one after the event to enable him
to meet China’s new leadership (AS 09/08/2002; Wan 2006:247). However, observers see Koizumi’s
unwillingness to satisfy Chinese demand to declare a halt to his Yasukuni visits as central to the suspension of
this symbolically important trip (AS 09/08/2002; Wan 2006:247).
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protest over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyudao in early January 2003, the “maverick” premier
paid another visit to Yasukuni on January 14, making it his third in as many years. Again, the
Chinese seemed unable to do anything more than lodging official protests.35 However, it
became clear by then, that Koizumi was unwilling to yield to Chinese pressure, while the
new Hu-Wen leadership was not in a favourable position, domestically, to compromise over
the Yasukuni diplomatic faux pas,36 for fear of domestic nationalist retribution. The Chinese
government thus had to maintain an assertive stance, by repeatedly rejecting Japanese
proposal for a bilateral summit between their state leaders, and making a halt to Yasukuni
visits the pre-requisite for any top-level exchanges to materialise. China’s hardened posture
was demonstrated by FM Kawaguchi’s repeated failures to arrange Koizumi a state visit to
meet President Hu Jintao, during her trips to China, and Premier Wen Jiabao’s lukewarm
response to Koizumi’s invitation to visit Japan (KN 07/04/2003; 07/10/2003). Indeed, Wan
(2006:249) thought it was probably Chinese intention to snub Koizumi by choosing Kan
Naoto, the DPJ leader, for Hu’s first meeting with Japanese political elites, in his capacity as
China’s new head-of-state (see also AS 17/04/2003). That said, Koizumi was able to meet
Hu in St. Petersburg on 31 May 2003, on the sidelines of the Russian city’s tri-centennial
celebration, where amiable exchanges transpired between the two leaders and foreign
ministers (Nikkei 31/05/2003; Wan 2006:249).
Whilst Hu’s pragmatic approach towards Japan, ostensibly influenced by the so-
called “new thinking on Sino-Japanese ties” discourse (Lam 2004:9), provided opportunity to
improve relations, it was Koizumi yet again, who decided to rankle and second-guess the
Chinese, by reiterating on June 19, that Yasukuni visit would remain in his agenda (KN
19/06/2003).37 The previously highlighted history-related quarrels during the second half of
2003 threatened to strain bilateral ties further. Despite that, China’s new leadership
35 Japan’s ambassador to China was, again, immediately summoned by Chinese Vice-FM, Yang Wenchang to
protest the visit, while Chinese ambassador to Tokyo, Wu Dawei called on Japanese Vice-FM, Takeuchi Yukio
for a similar purpose (China Daily (CD) 15/03/2003; Przystup 2003b:102; 108).
36 In my interview with Okazaki Hisahiko, the well-known hawk and opinion leader, and advisor of ex-PM Abe
and the Yushukan Museum, opined that the Yasukuni issue has become China’s diplomatic faux pas.
37 Koizumi told reporters of his intention to continue visiting Yasukuni, and that he did not believe the shrine
was the key issue in Japanese-Chinese relations, eliciting a rebuke from the Chinese MFA on the next day (KN
19/06/2003; see also JT 22/06/2003).
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appeared less emotional in its handling of those problems, possibly demonstrating
eagerness to improve relations, in hope of a reciprocal response from the Koizumi
administration over the Yasukuni issue. Beijing also utilised other levels of bilateral
interaction, and meetings on the sidelines of multilateral platforms to continue stressing the
need for Japan to manage “history” carefully, and restore “favourable” conditions to facilitate
top-level exchanges, in a veiled attempt to pressure Koizumi against further Yasukuni
visits.38 To China’s dismay, Koizumi remained adamant to the point of mocking Chinese
efforts by insisting that they understood his intention, and that Shrine visits will not damage
bilateral relations (KN 13/10/2003).39
The Japanese PM kept to his words by paying his fourth Yasukuni homage on New
Year’s Day of 2004, thwarting any realistic opportunity to improve relations with China that
year. The Chinese MFA reacted with the usual diplomatic protests (MDN 02/01/2004), and
again, postponed the much awaited, mutual navy visit, despite having only been recently
rekindled, during the resumption of high-level defence exchanges that saw JDA chief, Ishiba
Shigeru visiting Beijing in September 2003 (Jiji 09/01/2004; AS/IHT 05/09/2004). Meanwhile,
the LDP maintained its staunch support, stating that Yasukuni visits would be declared as
part of its political platform, on 16 January 2004, together with constitutional revision and
several other nationalist-oriented issues that were once considered taboo (JT 07/01/2004).
The Yasukuni debacle remained unabated throughout 2004, compounded by the
ECS territorial/maritime disputes, anti-Japanese incidents during the July Asia Cup football
tournament, and Chinese submarine incursion in November, among the grievances. Beijing
nonetheless, pragmatically maintained relations at other levels, while continuously shunning
Koizumi, i.e. Wen’s “cold-shoulder” at the October ASEM summit in Hanoi (SCMP
11/10/2004). Conversely, Tokyo reaffirmed its willingness to improve ties, with Koizumi
38 For instance, Koizumi invited Wen Jiabao to visit Japan during their meeting at the 9th ASEAN summit in
Bali on 7 October 2003, but Wen diplomatically declined, citing the need for “good atmosphere” between the
two nations to prevail for resumption of summit visits (KN 07/10/2003; JT 08/10/2003).
39 During their meeting at Bali’s Asean-Plus-Three summit, Wen Jiabao hinted to Koizumi that the “history
issue” must be handled “appropriately”, without explicitly mentioning the Yasukuni issue (IHT 08/10/2003),
only to have the Japanese PM disregarding Chinese concerns by reiterating to the press his Shrine resolve, after
the meeting (Przystup 2004a:124).
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indicating keeness to meet the Chinese leaders, despite the Yasukuni conundrum (JT
11/10/2004). On November 21, 2004, Koizumi met Hu at the APEC summit in Chile, where
the latter, for the first time explicitly mentioned Yasukuni as the major issue stifling
Japanese-Chinese political ties, and reminded the Japanese premier of the sensitivity
surrounding the year 2005, in an attempt to dissuade another visit by him (MDN 22/11/2004;
JT 23/11/2004). Premier Wen raised a similar concern with Koizumi, at the ASEAN-Plus-
Three summit in Laos on 30 November 2004 (BBC 30/11/2004). Interestingly, unlike
previous occasions, Koizumi did not rebuff the Chinese leaders, when questioned by
Japanese reporters, after those meetings (Wan 2006:255), but somewhat maintained public
silence regarding his Yasukuni plan, although many expected him to continue his annual
pilgrimage (DY 22/12/2004; Curtin 2005a).
With the Shrine row still unresolved, the eruption of other contentious issues
mentioned in Chapter 3 saw Japanese-Chinese ties sinking to a nadir in 2005. Bilateral
tension ratcheted up when the Japanese government assumed ownership of the Seinensha-
built lighthouse in Senkaku/Diaoyudao. Then, Chinese concerns over the implications of the
February “Two-plus-Two” meeting on Taiwan saw Beijing responding with the Anti-
Secession Law, a month later (Kokubun 2007:145). Compounding the emerging Japanese-
Chinese strategic rivalry was Japan’s UNSC ambition, which triggered the noted internet
petition in China, in March. Tokyo’s declaration of China’s “graduation” from Japanese ODA
after the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games40 (YS 03/03/2005; DY 18/03/2005), also did not augur
well with the Chinese. The MOE/MEXT’s approval of a new edition of Tsukurukai’s
contentious textbook on April 5 drew further Chinese protests (Nakanishi 2005:19). All these
Chinese grievances resulted in the popular anti-Japanese demonstrations across China’s
major cities that lasted almost three weeks (Kokubun 2007:138-139). Tokyo demanded a
formal apology and compensation for the damage inflicted upon Japanese companies and
diplomatic missions, but Beijing refused to budge, and instead, blamed the Japanese
40 Koizumi had earlier hinted on ending ODA to China on 28 November 2004, which reflected Japanese public
sentiment. See Koizumi’s press statement at http://www.mofa.go.jp/reion/asiapaci/asean/pmv0411/ press.html.
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government entirely for the popular outburst (Zhu 2005:16; Kokubun 2007:139).41 Although
both sides eventually sought to stabilise relations, Tokyo was clearly annoyed, when Vice-
Premier Wu Yi, unceremoniously cancelled her scheduled “fence-mending” meeting with
Koizumi on 23 May 2005, apparently in reaction against the Japanese premier’s “untimely”
reiteration of his Yasukuni resolve, before the event42 (MDN 24/05/2005).
As political tension escalated in the following months over the ECS gas dispute and
China’s indiscreet opposition to Japan’s UNSC bid, there were growing calls for Koizumi to
visit Yasukuni on August 15, to show contempt and defiance towards the Chinese.
Meanwhile, speculations were abound that Koizumi might utilise Yasukuni to rally support
for the September 11 Lower House elections, which was crucial to his domestic reform
agenda. Eventually, Koizumi did not turn it into an election issue, nor did he visit Yasukuni
on August 15. Instead, he made his fifth visit during the Shrine’s Autumn Festival, on
October 17, following the LDP’s “landslide” electoral victory, which provided the political
mandate for him to do so, despite Chinese indignation (JT 18/10/2005; Funabashi
15/09/2005). The timing of the visit was deemed “a serious provocation” as it coincided with
the success of China’s second manned space flight (KN 18/10/2006). Beijing instantly
protested by summoning the Japanese ambassador, and then, postponing senior official-
level meetings scheduled later that week, which included FM Machimura’s meeting with his
Chinese counterpart (AFP 18/10/2005; JT 18/10/2005). As if to add further insult to injury, a
defiant Koizumi reshuffled his Cabinet on October 31, appointing well-known anti-China
hawks and staunch Yasukuni supporters to key Cabinet positions. They were Abe Shinzo,
the new CCS replacing the more moderate Fukuda, who were absent from the new line-up,
and Aso Taro as FM (AFP 31/10/2005). Interestingly, the “moderate” Tanigaki Sadakazu
41 According to Zhu, the Chinese authorities did tacitly accept responsibility for the damage to Japanese-related
facilities, when Vice-FM Qiao Zonghuai expressed regrets to Japanese ambassador Anami Koreshige, and
promised to compensate for the damages. However, Chinese FM Li Zhaoxing refused to apologise to his
Japanese counterpart, Machimura Nobutaka in a subsequent meeting on April 17 (2005:16). For a discussion on
the reasons behind the April 2005 anti-Japanese demonstration, see Zhu (2005). See Yayama (2005) for a
Japanese perception and view about the “real reason” behind Chinese contention.
42 Koizumi strongly hinted that he will continue visiting Yasukuni during a Lower House budget session on
May 16, 2005, a day before Wu Yi’s arrival (XNA 16/05/2005). The Chinese leadership initially remained cool,
hoping the trip would result in more conciliatory tone from Koizumi, but was subsequently offended, when
Koizumi made his intention clear a day before the schedule meeting (Curtin 2005a).
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was reappointed Finance Minister (JT 01/11/2005).43 Clearly bemused by Koizumi’s
audacity, China’s leaders ignored their Japanese counterparts at the November APEC
summit in Pusan, and together with South Korea, suspended the tripartite meeting under the
auspices of ASEAN-Plus-Three in December 2005, freezing all channels of high-level
exchanges, including those at the fringes of multilateral foras, as Japanese-Chinese political
relations worsened (Togo 2006:5).
Aware of their futility in changing Koizumi’s attitude, and realising his term would end
in September 2006, the Chinese shifted their attention to, and begun applying pressure on
the prospective LDP presidential/prime ministerial candidates by early 2006. During a
meeting with the heads of seven Japan-China friendship organisations on 31 March 2006,
President Hu “extended an olive branch” by indicating his readiness to resume talks with
Japanese leaders upon their clarification to halt future Yasukuni visits (cf. PD 01/04/2006).44
However, the Japanese leadership hopefuls were quick to rebuff Beijing, with Abe criticising
the Chinese for pinning the fate of their bilateral ties to a single issue, while Aso even
labelled China a military threat (JT 03/04/2006; Lam 2006b). Abe also suggested that he
would continue Koizumi’s shrine legacy, if elected (KN 12/01/2006). Indeed, Abe has been
known for his nationalistic disposition, and hawkishness towards North Korea, while Aso
was perhaps, seeking to bolster popular and rightwing support for his presidential campaign
by maintaining an anti-China stance (Ni 2006),45 and harping on nationalistic issues,
including calling for the Emperor to visit Yasukuni (Reuters 28/01/2006). Conversely,
Tanigaki was more prudent, espousing “strategic ambiguity” on the Yasukuni issue (KN
12/01/2006). Both former CCS Fukuda, and ex-LDP Secretary-General Yamasaki, opposed
prime ministerial visits, with Fukuda, as the “dark horse” in the presidential race, proposing a
secular war memorial as an alternative to Yasukuni (AS 20/01/2006; DY 11/01/2006).
Although Koizumi and Abe called for the exclusion of prime ministerial Yasukuni visit as an
43 For an analysis of the cabinet reshuffle, see Richardson (04/11/2005).
44 However, Chinese FM Li Zhaoxing describe Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit as “stupid and amoral” during a news
conference, earlier, on March 7, 2006, sparking counter-critcisms from Tokyo (BBC 08/03/2006).
45 This opinion was offered by Liu Jianyong, a Chinese expert on Japan-China relations, in an article by Ni
Yanshuo in a January 2006 edition of Beijing Review. See Ni (2006).
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issue in the LDP polls, it became clear that its “politicisation” would be unavoidable, with the
Japanese nation drawn unwittingly into the debate (BBC 11/01/2006).
Meanwhile, there were speculations that Koizumi would make his final visit on the
symbolic August 15, before stepping down. Pressure began to mount, both externally and
domestically, with nationalist groups and opinion leaders pressing for a continuation, while
moderate forces, including some conservatives, called for a moratorium on Shrine visits by
Koizumi’s eventual successor (Satoh 2006b:5). Externally, even the US, usually silent about
the Yasukuni issue, weighed into the debate, as American expert opinion and media began
calling for a review of Japan’s Asia and China policies, with the halt to Shrine visits
presumably at the heart of the debate.46 Apparently concerned about its ally’s increasing
political isolation in the region, which could undermine overall American interests, President
Bush purportedly hinted that Koizumi should stop visiting Yasukuni47 (MDN 02/01/2006).
Growing American opposition also ostensibly denied Koizumi his chance to address the US
Congress, during his farewell tour of the US in June 2006.
Similarly, public support began to erode, as the average Japanese started
questioning the wisdom of continuing such visits, in light of the searing images of massive
Chinese, anti-Japanese demonstrations, and widespread international criticisms that have
cost Japan dearly, in diplomatic terms (Satoh 2006b). A July 2006 Mainichi opinion poll
recorded decreasing public support for Yasukuni visits, from 47% in January to 33%, while
those opposing increased from 47% to 54% (cf. PD 28/07/2006). Even the rightwing Sankei
Shimbun’s public opinion survey conducted several months earlier showed 52.6% opposing
against 36.2% who supports the visit (SS 20/03/2006; cf. Lam 2006b:10). The zaikai also
voiced concerns over the potential negative impact of an antagonistic China policy on
Japan’s national interests, given the significance of their burgeoning economic ties in
sustaining Japanese economic recovery (ATO 19/10/2005). The Keizai Doyukai had, for the
46 See Michael Green’s remark on Yasukuni visits in “Simply stopping Yasukuni visits won’t solve problem:
ex-Bush aide” Kyodo News, 4 February 2006. For other expert opinion, see “US walks fine line on Japan shrine:
Response cautious to dispute among allies and trade partners,” International Herald Tribune, 21 October 2005.
47 Nonetheless, Koizumi reportedly told President Bush in November 2005 that he would not stop his Yasukuni
routine even if the US requested him to do so (see also KN 21/01/2006).
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first time, explicitly called for a halt to prime ministerial Yasukuni visit, and officially proposed
for an alternative national memorial, in May 2006 (DY 10/05/2006). Meanwhile, Keidanren
expressed hopes that the new premier would improve ties with China, and refrain from
visiting Yasukuni, as reflected by its chairman, Mitarai Fujio’s call for the PM to “respect
public opinion and use his political wisdom to solve the issue of the Yasukuni”, and be
“prudent on the issue” (quoted in PD 29/07/2006).
Pressure mounted on Koizumi and the LDP leadership hopefuls on July 19, following
Nikkei’s revelation of a former Imperial Palace aide’s memoir containing information
explaining the reason behind Emperor Showa’s sudden decision to stop visiting Yasukuni.
The memoir cited the Emperor’s displeasure over the enshrinement of the Class-A war
criminals, which was, ironically, the very reason that drew Chinese opposition towards
Yasukuni visits (MDN 20/07/2006). Perhaps, most significantly, the intense international
opposition and domestic commotion saw Yasukuni’s staunchest advocate, Izokukai,
uncharacteristically weighing in by proposing the separation of class-A war criminals as
possible solution to the impasse (MDN 02/08/2006).48
Despite the unprecedented opposition, Koizumi made good his 2001 election
promise by ultimately visiting Yasukuni on 15 August 2006. Many viewed his decision as an
intention to defend his “stubborn maverick” and “reformer” image, which were key
components of his popularity (Yoshida 16/08/2006; Noda interview/2). Although the Chinese
protested, it is believed that they had anticipated, and somewhat resigned themselves to the
idea that Koizumi would pay his last visit as premier on August 15, and thus had
concentrated on resuscitating the bilateral ties “on a clean slate” with Koizumi’s successor
(Tang 15/08/2006). With the LDP leadership race revving up and the Yasukuni issue
inextricably tied to the election agenda, the front runners – Abe, Aso, and Tanigaki – were
forced to declare their position under intense public scrutiny. Tanigaki made a concrete
48 In fact, Izokukai issued a statement on June 11, 2005, imploring Koizumi “to refrain from further visits out of
considerations for war victims in neighbouring countries”, and for the spirits of the war dead to rest in peace (cf.
van Kemenade 2006:48; KN 11/06/2005), only to later reaffirm its position in support of prime ministerial visits
(Przystup 2005c:131). For the different views within Izokukai, see Yoshida (12/08/2006).
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decision by declaring that he will not visit Yasukuni, if elected, while both Abe and Aso,
interestingly, shifted their initially assertive pro-Yasukuni posture to a more prudent stance.
Aso, who was uncharacteristically antagonistic towards China earlier in the year, decisively
mellowed down his opinion by opting to visit only when Yasukuni’s legal status is changed,
while the hardliner, Abe, chose a position of “strategic ambiguity” initially proposed by
Tanigaki (Lam 2006c).
After fulfilling his “Yasukuni obligation”, Koizumi stepped down in September, and
was succeeded by his protégé, Abe, who emerged victorious in the LDP presidential
election. The new PM wasted no time in mending Japanese-Chinese ties, choosing China,
instead of the US for his first official visit, shortly after his anointment, in October 2006. This
came as a surprise, since few expected a Japanese-Chinese reconciliation to materialise so
early into his premiership, especially in view of his previous “anti-China” stance and
nationalistic outlook. Whilst Beijing did not press him for a declaration of his Yasukuni policy,
Abe maintained an ambiguous position, and did not visit the Shrine during his short-lived
premiership. He did, however, pay a “secret” visit back in April 2006, months before his
appointment, and made a “sakaki” tree donation during the Spring Festival of 2007 (Nakata
09/05/2007).
6.3. Power Politics versus Nationalism and Identity Politics: A Neoclassical
Realist Assessment of Koizumi’s Yasukuni Policy
Why did Koizumi make those visits? Were they predominantly responses to domestic
nationalist pressure, and/or based on his political/ideological disposition and personal
conviction? More importantly, were they strategically calculated decisions and carefully
choreographed actions based on accurate/skewed perceptions of domestic and international
conditions that warranted an assertive-cum-conciliatory China policy, to fulfill both external
and internal expediency, without damaging overall bilateral ties? By utilising the NCR model
developed in Chapter 2, this section seeks to map the Koizumi administration’s position
during each Yasukuni visit within the four quadrants of the NCR diagram, via the
assessment of, and inference on the prevailing international-domestic conditions and
207
actors/factors, and their interactions, which influenced Japan’s China policy-making. Besides
the overarching international environment, Japan’s perceptions of its allied
resolve/commitment, and diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China shall be inferred along with the
Koizumi administration’s domestic political resolve vis-à-vis nationalist pressure and other
domestic constraints, to determine the perceived conditions that warranted the policy-
options pertaining to each visit.
6.3.1. The August 13, 2001 visit
The Koizumi administration came to power at a time when Japan was experiencing a
relatively indeterminate post-Cold War international environment. Notwithstanding North
Korea, the demise of the Soviet threat factor relieved Japan from any direct external security
threat, strategically altering the regional power balance, and rendering the “China card” in
the US-Japan-PRC “strategic-triangle” relationship, obsolete. Concomitantly, the changing
international, bilateral, and domestic dynamics have generated new challenges and
opportunities for Japanese foreign policy-makers. This brought a noticeable shift in Japan’s
China policy, from the traditional “deferential”49/“friendship” diplomacy, to a more assertive,
realist-oriented approach, especially when managing sensitive bilateral issues.
According to NCR’s assumptions, domestic considerations tend to gain foreign
policy-making salience, under an ambiguous/benign external environment. As such, the
obsolescence of China’s strategic value in balancing against the USSR, coupled with
resurgent nationalism’s impact on Japanese domestic politics, would expectedly, affect
Japan’s China policy-making, and specifically, Tokyo’s management of the Yasukuni dispute
in the bilateral ties. The concurrence of these factors probably explains why Japanese PMs
during the Cold War era, notably Nakasone and his successors, were “more prudent and
cautious” (Satoh 2006b:5) about visiting Yasukuni, especially after the 1985 diplomatic row
with China, while Koizumi and his post-Cold War predecessors, namely Miyazawa and
Hashimoto, were comparatively undeterred by Chinese pressure, to proceed with their
pilgrimages (Shibuichi 2005:212-213). For instance, it is believed that Nakasone gave
49 Aforementioned in Chapter 2, I borrow this term from Drifte (2003).
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priority to the “de facto strategic alliance” with China, and was thus, willing to incur domestic
nationalist wrath to appease Chinese demand, by terminating his Shrine visits (Shibuichi
2005:207-209). Given the structurally determinate external environment and significance of
the “China card”, it was unsurprising that the remaining Cold War premiers – Takeshita,
Uno, and Kaifu continued to observe the Yasukuni moratorium. Conversely, both Miyazawa
and Hashimoto were more willing to risk damaging relations with China to satisfy domestic
demands, in view of the relatively flexible international condition posited by the Cold War’s
demise. The prevailing environment also possibly established the parameter for Koizumi’s
calculated decisions to make his Yasukuni visits, and advance a more assertive China policy
during his tenure.50
Additionally, Japan enjoyed an increasingly favourable allied resolve/commitment
through the enhancement of the US-Japan security alliance, notably from April 1996
onwards, which saw the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration establishing new agendas for
bilateral security cooperation, with a rising China ostensibly their key strategic consideration.
Despite a period of uncertainty following Clinton’s so-called “Japan passing” in 1998 (Zhao
2002:39), Tokyo would have eventually, taken comfort in Washington’s hard-line posturing
against Beijing that became conspicuous during the nascent period of the “neo-
conservative” Bush administration.51 With the “China threat” theory gaining ground in the US
Congress since the mid-1990s, and against the milieu of rising diplomatic tensions in the
wake of the Belgrade embassy bombing and the EP-3 spy-plane incidents, the Bush
administration appeared to favour a “containment-cum-engagement” policy towards China,
with Japan serving as the fulcrum of the US grand strategy in Asia. The influential “Armitage
Report” of 1999 was well received in Tokyo, and enthusiastically embraced by the incoming
Koizumi government, who possibly foresaw opportunities to realise important foreign and
50 This paragraph’s NCR-oriented argument is similar to, and based on Shibuchi’s interpretation regarding the
plausible correlation between the Cold War/Soviet threat factor and the respective Japanese premiers’ attitude
towards Yasukuni visits. See Shibuichi (2005:207-209; 212-213).
51 The Bush administration’s hardline China policy was evidently, spelt out in Condoleeza Rice’s article in
Foreign Affairs (see Rice 2000). For a discussion of Bush’s “anti-China” posture, see Klare (2006).
209
domestic policy-goals, via a strengthened US-Japan security relationship.52 In the presence
of a presumably hawkish and “anti-China” US administration, it would not be exaggerative to
say that Koizumi’s decision to embrace a pro-American, instead of pro-Asian foreign policy,
provided Tokyo the perception of a sanguine external environment, in terms of favourable
allied resolve, to seek a nationalistic, “anti-status quo” China policy (Takahata interview;
Anonymous interview H). Koizumi’s resoluteness in visiting Yasukuni amid mounting
Chinese pressure partly reflected this bold policy.
However, Yasukuni is not an exclusively Japanese-Chinese issue, as it also involves
South Korea, another US ally in Northeast Asia. With Japan identified as the hub of its Asia
doctrine, it would not be in Washington’s interest to see Tokyo damaging ties with Seoul
over a symbolic issue, which could undermine its regional strategy (KN 03/08/2001).53 The
decision to shift the date of Koizumi’s first visit was believed to be partly influenced by such
considerations, besides Tokyo’s attempt to allay Chinese and domestic opposition. Indeed, it
was reportedly, engineered by then CCS Fukuda (Kitaoka interview), with the intention of
minimising Seoul’s response, and the visit’s impact on Japan-Korea ties within the
American-sponsored “allied diplomacy” framework, among others (Wan 2006:240).54
In the bilateral context, the aforementioned Chinese “smile diplomacy” since 1999
(Rozman 2001) provided “cautious optimism” for the Japanese government to pursue a
more normal-cum-equal relationship with Beijing. Anticipating diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis
China, Koizumi could have estimated that a Yasukuni visit would not trigger excessive
Chinese response, in view of Beijing’s recent efforts to tone down and reduce the use of
“history” as a diplomatic card. Indeed, a perceived Chinese concession over the “war
52 The “Armitage Report” emphasised the significance of the US-Japan security alliance, and Japan’s role as the
fulcrum to the new strategic approach in dealing with North Korea. For more details, see “The Armitage Report
on North Korea: Naval Blockade and Preemptive Strikes by Japanese Forces?” Congressional Record: March 4,
1999 [Extensions]: E341-E343 [http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/armitag.htm (accessed on 15/06/2007)].
53 A US administration official, speaking under the condition of anonymity, voiced concerns regarding the
negative repercussions of Koizumi’s planned visit on the Japan-ROK relations in early August 2001 (KN
03/08/2001). See also “Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit plan worries U.S.,” JijiPress, 11 August 2001.
54 Fukuda reportedly received guidance from Koga Makoto, Izokukai’s deputy chief, regarding the possible
option for Koizumi to visit between August 13-16 in conjunction with Obon, which apparently, critically helped
resolve Koizumi’s dilemma (YS 17/08/2001).
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apology” issue after the “Jiang fiasco” could have set a precedent for Tokyo to maintain its
assertiveness on other history-related problems. Japan’s confidence was bolstered by
unusually subdued Chinese reactions towards the history textbook row in April 2001, which
was reportedly milder than the South Koreans55(Yang 2001:183). To Japanese policy-
makers, China’s response implied pragmatism in handling the “history” issue. Similarly,
Beijing’s postponement of Li Peng’s Japan visit in May 2001 in protest against Tokyo’s
decision to allow Li Denghui to seek medical treatment in Japan was perceived by Japanese
sources as a low-intensity reaction (Przystup 2001b:97). In view of recent Chinese
pragmatism, a Shrine visit would probably trigger similar responses that would not adversely
affect Japan-China relations. Also, Japanese policy-makers tend to perceive popular
Chinese, anti-Japanese nationalism to be predominantly state abetted, and thus popular
protest against a Yasukuni visit would be manageable, pending on Beijing’s prerogative.56
Moreover, flourishing trade ties and China’s reliance on Japanese investments and ODA
would have dampened potential Chinese blowback over an issue of merely symbolic
significance (Page 14/08/2001).
Furthermore, the Chinese showed signs of tolerating a date change, not mentioning
Tokyo’s calculation that Beijing would perhaps give Koizumi the “benefit of the doubt”, as it
was his first visit (Wan 2006:245). Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Beijing had indicated to
the ruling coalition’s secretary-generals in July that it would tolerate a shrine visit on a date
other than August 15 (YS 08/08/2001). A similar claim was later made by Koizumi’s aide that
Beijing had made a “behind-the-scene” concession by accepting Koizumi’s visit, pending a
change of date (JT 29/12/2003; KN 28/12/2003). Koizumi’s ex-political ally, Kato Koichi,
ultimately confirmed this speculation, by revealing that the Chinese ambassador had
personally conveyed Beijing’s acquiescence, before his crucial “last-minute” meeting with
55 To compare the reactions between South Koreans and Chinese over the textbook controversy, see Beal,
Nozaki, and Yang (2001). See also the news coverage on Korean actions in “Japanese History Textbook Raises
Concerns” Asia Today, 10 July 2001.
56 This observation was confirmed by a majority of my Japanese interviewees.
211
Koizumi on August 11 (Kato interview/2).57 Hence, despite explicit Chinese pressure against
the visit, the prevailing bilateral conditions and mixed signals from Beijing would have had
Tokyo perceiving an ambiguous diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China.
On the domestic front, Japanese public sentiment towards China has deteriorated,
while nationalist demands for an assertive China policy has grown, requiring Koizumi to
adequately respond to public opinion. Besides nationalist pressure from within the LDP,
generational change across the domestic political spectrum saw the emergence of more
nationalistic politicians, who wanted to replace the traditional “kowtow” diplomacy with a
realistic and equidistant relationship with Beijing.58 According to Wan, “Koizumi’s insistence
on visiting the shrine illustrates Japan’s desire to reshape its relationship with China on its
terms and highlights the transformation of the bilateral relations from a “special” one to a
“normal” one at the top level” (2006:6). Although difficult to pinpoint his nationalist
convictions, observers identify Koizumi as a moderate, “normal-nationalist,”59 whom,
Tamamoto insists, like many in the political class, “see Japan as…a sort of “half-state””, and
long for its return to “normalcy” (2004:13; 2005a:14; Samuels 2007a). Both Hashizume
(2001) and Satoh (2006a) contend that Koizumi is a reformer, who understood the need for
Japan to resolve the history impasse in its postwar politics, which is responsible for the
longstanding Japanese identity crisis. By visiting Yasukuni, he confronts the history problem
straightforwardly, bringing it into scrutiny by exposing it to Chinese criticism (Satoh 2006a:7),
and in so doing, implicitly called on Japanese to face up and seek reconciliation of their
history and identity (Hashizume 2001:54). Seen in this light, Koizumi’s Yasukuni policy was
plausibly part of his agenda to reinstate Japan as a “normal” state, and an indication of his
resolve to realise other related moderate-nationalist/neo-conservative goals, namely a more
57 Kato Koichi revealed that he acted as the intermediary between the Chinese ambassador and Koizumi on
“negotiations” over the Yasukuni issue. Prior to his dinner-cum-discussion with Koizumi at the PM residence,
together with Yamasaki Taku on August 11, Kato spoke to the Chinese side several times. Finally, via a cell-
phone conversation with the Chinese ambassador, who was at Beidaihe (the resort for China’s leaders/VIPs), he
was told that the Chinese would tolerate, if Koizumi makes just one visit, and evades August 15 (Kato
interview/2).
58 Suzuki Keisuke, a young Diet-member and rising star in LDP, confirms this observation on the general
sentiment of the younger generation of Japanese politicians on China policy-making (Suzuki interview).
59 However, opinions do differ, with some observers such as Okazaki Shigenori branding Koizumi as “the most
hawkish, rightwing prime minister since the end of World War II” (2005:23).
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dynamic and assertive, albeit pro-US external orientation, constitutional revision, and the re-
establishment of the military as an instrument of Japanese foreign policy. Objectively,
Koizumi was an astute politician, who knew how to manipulate the symbolic and political
values of Yasukuni to his political advantage, to advance his policy agendas (Yoshida
interview; Kato interview/2).
Although attributing Koizumi’s single-mindedness on Yasukuni to his nationalistic
conviction is debatable, it is undeniable that he was under pressure from nationalist-
rightwing groups to fulfill his electoral promise. However, one would query his decision to
place himself in a politically vulnerable position, by making the initial deal with Izokukai, and
the visit, consequentially, despite commanding immense popular pre-election support, and
enjoying incredibly high approval ratings during the nascent months of his premiership.60
Observers cited personal convictions, either nationalist or otherwise,61 but a more objective
answer lies on the anticipated political drawback of his unprecedented domestic reform
agenda to transform Japan’s cumbersome, “developmental-state” political economy.
Koizumi’s quest to eradicate the entrenched political and business culture, and in so doing,
destroy the LDP’s modus operandi and traditional pillars, especially keisei-kai’s dominance,
created many political enemies and oppositions within the ruling party, and alienated zoku
support from traditional business sectors (Shibuichi 2005:210).62 In this sense, Koizumi’s
Yasukuni pledge may be attributed to a perceived need to rely on Izokukai’s political clout,
and rightwing support to gain an electoral edge over keisei-kai’s Hashimoto (Anonymous
interview H),63 and then, to ensure their continuous political backing for his domestic
reforms. According to a former top Japanese diplomat to China, there was no nationalist
60 Koizumi’s approval ratings during the early days of his premiership recorded unprecedented highs of above
80%, with Mainichi polls recording 85%, Nikkei 80%, and Kyodo 86.3% (KN 30/04/2001; 28/04/2001). See
also “Koizumi’s popularity hits fresh peak,” CNN.com, 12 June 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
BUSINESS/asia/06/11/japan.popularity/index.html (cf. Anderson 2004:150).
61 A significant majority of my Japanese interviewees contend that Koizumi’s resoluteness on visiting Yasukuni
was due to his personal conviction and personality, both of which, are not necessarily driven by nationalism.
62 Shibuichi opines that Koizumi’s pledge to reform the domestic economy antagonised many influential
pressure groups from sectors like construction, postal services, agriculture, and small-and-medium size
enterprises (SME) that traditionally supported the LDP (2005:210).
63 It is also plausible that Koizumi foresaw the need to rally nationalist-rightwing support in his desperation to
make what would be his third attempt at the LDP presidential post, a successful one.
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pressure on Koizumi to make the Yasukuni pledge, but he did it out of political
considerations. His decision to visit, as much, emboldened Japanese nationalist voices, as
fuelled Chinese nationalism that in turn, stimulated reactive popular anti-China sentiments in
Japan (Anonymous interview I).
Moreover, unlike his predecessors, Koizumi encountered insignificant domestic
political opposition over Yasukuni visits, following the weakening of the SDPJ, JCP and
other leftist/pacifist bastions (Shibuichi 2005:210). Meanwhile, Japan’s largest opposition
party, the DPJ, is conceivably another “catchall/umbrella party” comprising as many
progressive politicians, as right-leaning Diet-members that support Shrine visit, whilst
smaller parties like the Liberal Party, and the LDP coalition partners, Shin-Komeito and
Hoshuto, although apprehensive, were not vocally influential. As such, the aforementioned
domestic opposition, launched by the usually sympathetic and “pro-China” voices of the
Japanese progressives, was somewhat ineffective.64 Conversely, Koizumi received a timely
boost, when 105 lawmakers forged a nonpartisan group to support his decision, while three
ministers confirmed their intention to visit Yasukuni,65 on the same day a majority of his
Cabinet members expressed wariness towards his plan (JT 08/08/2001).
Koizumi also enjoyed strong public support for his planned pilgrimage based on
Mainichi Shimbun’s pre-visit opinion polls (Figure 2).66 Although the support figures declined
in the August 4 Asahi Shimbun poll, with only 26% supporting his visit “positively”, while 65%
wanted Koizumi to be “cautious”, the poll had apparently skewed the outcome by forcing
respondents to choose between the two alternatives, thus encouraging “neutral” or
undecided respondents to opt in favour of “caution” (cf. Takashina 2001:50). Moreover,
opinion polls by other broadcasting media agencies found the majority supporting the visit,
64 Although all the opposition parties were officially against the visit, the political pressure was not as intensed
as it used to be, as seen in their relatively subdued criticisms on the media. Koizumi did however, try to be
diplomatic, offering to consider the coalition partners’ “final plea” not to visit Yasukuni (BBC 10/08/2001).
65 The three Cabinet members were Finance Minister, Shiokawa Maajuro, METI chief, Hiranuma Takeo, and
Public Safety Commission chairman, Murai Jin. Five of the remaining 14 ministers decline to publicly state
their intentions (JT 08/08/2001).
66 For instance, according to a Mainichi poll on May 28, 44% of respondents saw nothing wrong with
Koizumi’s visit, while 46% thought that worshipping in a private capacity was acceptable, with only 7%
disagreeing with his planned visit (cf. Takashina 2001:50). See also Deans (2007: Table 4).
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i.e. Nippon Broadcasting System (August 3) found 76% supporting an August 15 homage;
TV Asahi (August 4) recorded a 59% support rate; and Fuji Television Network (August 10)
reported 48.8% (cf. Takashina 2001:50). These figures suggest most Japanese supported
Koizumi’s plan, giving him a favourable domestic condition to proceed with the visit.
Figure 2
Sources: Mainichi Daily News/Mainichi Shimbun; adapted and modified from Deans (2007: 278; Table 4)
The PMO also enjoyed decision-making leverage under the political and
administrative reforms law mentioned in Chapter 5, which saw a corresponding reduction of
MOFA’s bureaucratic influence on foreign policy-making, generally, and its China Division’s
traditionally strong foot-hole in shaping Japan’s China policy-orientation. Indeed, Wan noted
that the MOFA “was not central to Koizumi’s decision” (2006:243) as the PM appeared
undeterred by bureaucrats’ opposition, including FM Tanaka’s explicit disagreement over his
planned visit. Apparently, the MOFA was in turmoil over scandals involving senior
bureaucrats, and Tanaka’s allegedly inept management style, which affected public
confidence and created a rift between Koizumi and her (Nabeshima 14/08/2001). This
chasm led Koizumi to bypass the MOFA on the Yasukuni issue, and Tanaka was not even
informed of the decision to shift the date of visit, as decision-making ostensibly centred
around the PMO (YS 14/01/2001).67 The PM was equally unfazed by Nonaka Hiromu’s
67 Observers like Prof Kubo Fumiaki reportedly suggested that the rift between Koizumi and Tanaka would lead
the PM to depend on CCS Fukuda and his aides to manage Japan’s foreign policy, as Tanaka can no longer be
trusted over policy matters (JT 04/08/2001). Tanaka would eventually be forced to resign in January 2002.
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criticism, suggesting the waning influence of kuromaku in China policy-making (KN
05/08/2001). Incidentally, Koizumi and Nonaka had previous disagreement over his
domestic reform agenda, not mentioning the former being the “deal-maker” for his LDP
election rival, Hashimoto (JT 24/04/2001), which made Koizumi all the more dismissive of
the old “China Hand’s” suggestions (AS 30/07/2001; cf. Wan 2006:239).68 Nonetheless, it
was evident that internal pressure and advice from Cabinet members and trusted political
allies did have an impact on Koizumi’s decision-making, as his minimal “date-changing”
compromise suggests. Indeed, the decision transpired following the mentioned “eleventh-
hour”, “dinner-cum-discussion” with two of his closest political allies, Yamasaki Taku and
Kato Koichi (Kato interview/2)69 and Fukuda Yasuo’s advice (KN 11/08/2001; YS
14/08/2001). Koizumi also reportedly received the guidance and blessings of Izokukai’s
deputy president, Koga Makoto (ex-LDP secretary-general) (YS 17/08/2001), which cleared
a key domestic-“nationalist” obstacle for Koizumi to proceed with the altered arrangement.
Overall, it is fair to conclude that Koizumi’s decision to visit was based on the
perception/calculation of an ambiguous external environment (relative power position)
shaped by favourable allied resolve, but somewhat indeterminate diplomatic leverage vis-à-
vis China, following mixed signals from Beijing. However, his Administration did consider the
potential repercussions of China’s response, and had taken measures to seek Chinese
understanding before, and after the visit, which included the “change-of-date”, conciliatory
pre-visit press statement70 (BBC 13/08/2001), feasibility studies for a secular war memorial
68 According to observers, Nonaka was one of the LDP “Old Guards” i.e. defender of the old political-economic
system that Koizumi was hoping to destroy (see JT 24/02/2001; Anderson 2004; Hiwatari 2005). Nonaka’s
intervention in the Yasukuni issue therefore, bore limited results, as Koizumi apparently did not pay attention to
him (Wan 2006:239).
69 The close relations between Koizumi, Yamasaki, and Kato were popularly known as the “YKK” clique.
Indeed, Kato confirmed during interview that Koizumi requested a “dinner-cum-discussion” meeting with
Yamasaki and him at the PM’s official residence on 11 August 2001, where the “change-of-date” strategy was
deliberated (Kato interview/2).
70 Koizumi expressed his “profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of war” in a press
statement issued just before the visit, apparently in a final effort to soothe Chinese and other Asian neighbours
resentment, and cushion the negative external repercussions. The PM also provided reasons for his decision to
change the date of his visit, citing “I am in a position, where I have to handle various issues by assuming
responsibility as premier for the sake of broad national interests...I think from the bottom of my heart that I want
to promote friendship with China, South Korea and other neighbouring countries” (quoted in BBC 13/08/2001).
See also “Statement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi” (provisional translation), MOFA Japan, 13 Aug.
2001 [http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/ koizumi/state0108.html (accessed on 21/06/2007)].
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(JT 19/08/2001), and Koizumi’s much publicised “friendly” gesture during his October visit to
China. Domestically, Koizumi would have perceived himself to be in a less favourable
position, insofar as his dependence on nationalist/rightwing support made him vulnerable to
nationalist demands, his personal conviction notwithstanding.71 It could be that Koizumi felt
he had no choice, but to fulfill the promise, since his popularity depended on his reputation
as a reformer and a strong-willed leader. Also, Koizumi could have anticipated the need to
utilise Yasukuni as a leitmotif, or “litmus test” to demonstrate his resolve on domestic reform
programmes.72 Moreover, insignificant domestic opposition gave him political room to
manoeuvre, and make the visit, be it for political expediency, or nationalist conviction.
In view of the stipulated conditions, one could locate Koizumi’s position between
quadrant C and D in the NCR model (see Diagram 3). An ambiguous external environment,
taken together with unfavourable domestic political resolve vis-à-vis nationalist pressure,
required Koizumi to seek assertive-nationalist policy-options (visiting Yasukuni) to satisfy
nationalist demands, followed by those visible, conciliatory measures to reduce the negative
impact on bilateral ties.
6.3.2. The April 21, 2002 visit
In the NCR schematics, the international environment leading to the 2002 visit remained
relatively favourable for the Japanese government to maintain a high-posture vis-a-vis
China. For one, the “9/11” incident provided the basis for an intensified US-Japan security
cooperation, and Japan took advantage of the growing public fear of international insecurity
to answer its ally’s call for a “global war on terror”. The Afghanistan campaign, not only
provided the opportunity for Koizumi to strengthen US-Japan ties, but also gave Tokyo the
necessary justification to augment its international security role, under the pretext of
assisting its ally in the UN-sanctioned operation. The intensification of the US-Japan alliance
71 According to UCLA’s Ronald Morse, Koizumi’s visit may rest ultimately on his impulse for political
survival, as failure to do so may anger the nationalist cohorts and damage his political position (AP
03/08/2001). His expression of “deep shame” for not fulfilling his promise to visit on August 15, was an attempt
to appease domestic nationalist displeasure (AFP 13/08/2001).
72 This was suggested by Takagi Seiichiro and Sugawa Kiyoshi during my respective interviews with them.
Yasukuni being a “litmus test” for both Japan and China was also mentioned in Taniguchi (2005:449).
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would have Tokyo feeling confident of a favourable allied resolve/commitment, to proceed
with the repositioning of its bilateral relationship with Beijing. Moreover, Washington’s
silence over the previous Yasukuni row would have emboldened Koizumi’s resolve to
pursue his Shrine routine (KN 14/08/2001).73
Concurrently, Japanese-Chinese ties were on the mend, and mutual efforts to forge
constructive relations have gained momentum, since “9/11”. Although a reluctant partner in
the US “war on terror”, Beijing did not allow the speedy Diet passage of defence bills in
October 2001 that expanded Japanese security activities to sidetrack the improvement of
bilateral ties. Chinese pragmatism was also due to flourishing trade relations, and continued
dependence on Japanese investments and aid to fuel economic development. It is
reasonable to suggest that Beijing’s keenness to improve relations was partly to facilitate the
disbursement of Japanese ODA, which was delayed by strained ties over the 2001 Yasukuni
debacle (JT 06/08/2001). On Japan’s part, Koizumi took full advantage of the mentioned
October 8 visit to demonstrate his eagerness to reconcile with the Chinese. His symbolic
gestures of visiting Luguoqiao and the nearby war memorial hall, and expressing his
apology,74 followed by meetings with Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, managed to pacify and
convince the Chinese of his intention (Bezlova 09/10/2001). Indeed, a former top Japanese
diplomat who witnessed the events opines that Jiang was “very happy” and “almost
embraced Koizumi”(Anonymous interview I). Reportedly, a congenial atmosphere transpired
following the trip (Przystup 2002a:90-91).75
According to Japanese analysts, Koizumi’s China trip was, apparently timed to
coincide with the US’ first strike on Afghanistan, to put indirect pressure on the Chinese to
reciprocate Japan’s fence-mending efforts, for the sake of promoting stable bilateral ties to
73 Although there were initial voices of concern, Washington ultimately did not comment on Koizumi’s 2001
visit (KN 14/08/2001). For a similar view, see Lincoln, Edward, 15 August 2001. “The Sound of Silence,” New
Republic Online [http://www.thenewrepublic.com/express/lincoln081501.html (cf. Wan 2006: Chp.9, en.34)].
74 According to Wang Jianwei, Koizumi’s visit to the Memorial Museum of the Chinese People’s War of
Resistance against Japanese Aggression, was the first by a Japanese premier. He also laid a wreath at the
symbolic “Great Wall” that symbolises Chinese heroic resistance against the Japanese (2002:118).
75 For a confirmation of Chinese perception of an improved atmosphere, see the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s
statement at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/celt/eng/zt/zgfk/t125307.htm (accessed on 20/07/2007).
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facilitate cooperation with the US (cf. Wan 2006:244). The Japanese government
maintained the thrust of reconciliation after the successful visit with the mentioned bilateral
summits at the fringes of the APEC and ASEAN-Plus-Three meetings (Wakayama 2003).76
Beijing’s responsiveness in improving ties also convinced Tokyo of Chinese pragmatism in
managing their symbolic “history” disputes, which included the Yasukuni issue. Koizumi
could have therefore, calculated that future Shrine visits would not seriously impede on
Chinese sensibility towards maintaining a functional relationship with Japan.
Nonetheless, the timing of the second Yasukuni visit was, apparently calculated, with
China in the equation. China’s Japan experts like Wan Xinsheng and Lin Xiaoguang,
considered the April visit to be propitious, as it would have allowed ample time for criticisms
to subside by the fall of 2002, and minimise its harmful effects on the celebration of their 30th
anniversary of diplomatic normalisation (cf. Wan 2006:246). Also, Koizumi must have
thought that his positive exploits at the Boao Asia Forum, had won him sufficient Chinese
goodwill to mitigate the impact of his visit (Anonymous interview I).77 Tokyo would have
anticipated that Koizumi’s remark on “China as not a threat but an opportunity to Japan”
made during the Forum (CD 13/04/2002; JT 13/04/2002) could put Beijing in a fix, and
undercut the magnitude of Chinese response towards his subsequent Yasukuni visit, since it
would not be in China’s interest to overreact and prove him wrong, so soon. Indeed, Koizumi
told reporters before the homage that “it is the best timing” for a visit (JT 22/04/2002).
Moreover, from a region-wide perspective, Koizumi’s inaugural Shrine trip did not trigger
criticisms from ASEAN-states, whose officials were noticeably silent over the issue during
Yamasaki Taku’s diplomatic rendezvous to Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the visit (AS
22/08/2001 cf. Wan 2006:242). Notwithstanding Korean responses, the anticipated bilateral
position and prevalent regional climate vis-à-vis China and the ASEAN-states, respectively,
76 See the text of a 2003 speech by Wakayama Kyoichi, Consul-General of Japan in Guangzhou, China, entitled
“Actual International Circumstance and the relationship between Japan and China” (document received from
Wakayama during an interview on 2 March 2007).
77 Moreover, it was the Chinese who extended the invitation to Koizumi to attend the biennial Boao Forum in
2002, which somewhat suggested that Beijing was warming up to the Japanese premier after an inopportune
start (Drifte 2003:129). For a similar view on his Boao Forum exploit as a “cushion”, see Wan (2006:246).
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would have given Tokyo confidence to press on with future Shrine pilgrimage, without being
overly concerned about damaging Japan’s regional interests and cooperation.
Domestically, Koizumi may have continued perceiving a need to garner support from
nationalist groups, and maintain his “reformer” image in the eyes of the Japanese public, in
order to push forward his reform agenda. Since it was only his second year in office, and the
reform programme had barely taken shape due to strong anti-reform forces, Koizumi knew
he had to keep on portraying himself as the strong leader, different from his predecessors,
which so endeared him with the public. In fact, Koizumi faced severe opposition from within
the LDP regarding his postal privatisation policy during April 2002, and public scepticism
began to creep in about the prospect of, and his resolve towards the reform programme
(Anderson 2004:176; Koizumi and Shiroyama 2002:11). Compounding Koizumi’s domestic
problems was the scandal that hit his political ally, Kato Koichi, forced to briefly resign from
the LDP and Diet in April over improprieties involving his former aide (YS 09/03/2002). The
incident was a major embarrassment that somewhat undermined public confidence
regarding his Administration’s commitment toward political and economic reforms (BBC
08/04/2002). Growing public scepticism saw Koizumi’s personal approval ratings dropping
40% points, since taking office a year ago (BBC 08/04/2002). He also probably lost some
popular and political support after firing Tanaka Makiko in January 200278 (Murata 2006:44).
Feeling under-pressure, the timing of the second Yasukuni trip possibly reflects
Koizumi’s calculated intention to bolster faltering domestic support.79 By visiting Yasukuni
annually, and not botching under Chinese pressure, Koizumi intends to demonstrate
unwavering commitment to his pledges, since action speaks louder than words. Moreover,
maintaining an assertive China policy was in line with popular sentiment, and appreciated by
78 Tanaka Makiko was very popular, especially among women voters, besides being the daughter of former
premier, Tanaka Kakuei, whose faction once wielded the most power in LDP politics (Murata 2006:43-44). The
observation that Koizumi lost some popular support was also offered by several interviewees i.e. Kokubun
Ryosei, Kato Koichi, and Anonymous C. See also Mizoguchi (30/01/2002) and Anderson (2004:176).
79 Indeed, both Yomiuri and Mainichi public surveys conducted coincidentally between 20-21 April 2002
showed Koizumi’s support rate slipping to new lows of 47.9% and 42%, respectively, leading observers to view
the visit as being aimed at winning votes (especially from Izokukai) in two by-elections and a prefectural
governor election on April 28 (Reuters 23/04/2002; Kwan 23/04/2002).
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nationalists, both within and outside the political circle. Koizumi was obviously emboldened
to make another Shrine visit, since the previous trip did not hurt him politically in the
domestic arena, with the public largely supporting it, whilst the “change-of-date” strategy had
not adversely affected his reputation in the eyes of Japanese nationalists. A Mainichi
Shimbun opinion poll conducted soon after his first visit also revealed that 65% supported
his decision, with only 28% opposing it (MDN 21/08/2001).80
The manner in which Koizumi made his second Yasukuni trip also indicates a
calculated strategy for domestic political expediency. According to Tanaka (2003), although
superficially appearing to be a “surprise” and an “unofficial” visit, the large media presence
and coverage suggest that the PM had intended all along to utilise the event to impress on
the nationalist groups and general public. Tanaka noted that Koizumi reportedly arrived at
Yasukuni much earlier on the day of visit. However, the apparent “time wasting” by the
usually “schedule to the minute” premier before appearing at the main altar to perform the
rituals, was in Tanaka’s opinion, intentionally arranged to allow the media sufficient time to
converge and cover the event, to make it look like a “prime ministerial visit” (2003).81
Koizumi also signed the Shrine’s guestbook and presented a wreath in the name of the PM,
which further confirms the observation (Tanaka 2003). By making a consecutive visit and
making it appear “official”, Koizumi would have pleased nationalist organisations like
Izokukai, which have long campaigned for “official visits” by Japanese leaders (Tanaka
2003). Indeed, the second trip, made just after Izokukai established a new agenda to
regularise/institutionalise prime ministerial visits, received warm appraisals from Izokukai’s
chief, Koga Makoto, who characterised it as a “splendid and wonderful act” that “represented
a step forward toward regularisation of the visit” (quoted in Tanaka 2003; JT 22/04/2002).
80 Conversely, 49% of respondents said they “cannot understand” Chinese and Korean demands over Yasukuni,
and saw that as “unacceptable”, while 45% thought otherwise (MDN 21/08/2001; see also KN 20/08/2001).
81 Tanaka contends that Koizumi would have visited Yasukuni “quietly, without notifying the media” if it was
intended to be a private affair (2003). According to him, Koizumi arrived at Yasukuni at 8:30am, but only
proceeded with the ceremony after “wasting one hour waiting” for the media to arrive, suggesting that he
intended to publicly convey that it was a “prime ministerial visit” (2003) Moreover, Koizumi apparently
published “Thoughts on a visit to Yasukuni Shrine" after the visit, making clear that there had been “careful
preparations” (Tanaka 2003). For a similar observation, see “Maneuvering preceded visit,” Yomiuri Shimbun,
21 April 2002.
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The external-internal conditions leading to Koizumi’s second trip suggest the
salience of domestic considerations vis-à-vis international constraints in shaping his policy-
choice. Enjoying a perceived, favourable relative power position (external environment) in
terms of allied resolve and diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China, yet facing indeterminate
domestic leverage resulting from the aforementioned challenges and opportunities,
Koizumi’s position would have been located between Quadrant B and C, giving allowance to
the implementation of a nationalist-assertive foreign policy-option to facilitate domestic
political objectives. Appeasing the nationalists would gain Koizumi much needed political
support from certain LDP quarters to counter the “anti-reform” forces within the ruling party
itself. Furthermore, limited measures to appease China in the visit’s aftermath highlights a
calculated risk and trade-off by the Japanese government that saw domestic political
expediency supplanting the maintenance of friendly ties with China as the immediate
priority, at that given time.82
6.3.3. The January 14, 2003 visit
Japan continued to enjoy a relatively favourable external environment, in the run-up to
Koizumi’s third Shrine visit. In terms of allied resolve, the security alliance with the US
became fundamentally stronger as the “anti-terror” war progressed, with the Japanese
enthusiastically providing “rear support” to its ally. As Koizumi’s foreign policy became
indiscreetly pro-US, Washington further encouraged the rearmament, and expansion of
Japanese security policy, to the delight of normal-nationalists in Japan. The US also
remained conspicuously mute about Yasukuni and its debilitating impact on Japan’s Asia
policy. Indeed, opinions are abound, that “the Koizumi style of nationalism is only possible
with American encouragement” (Tamamoto 2005a:16). It is believed to be Koizumi’s grand
strategy to seek intimate ties with the US and utilise the alliance to facilitate Japan’s quest
for normal statehood (Huo 2005). To this end, Koizumi’s pro-US policy also gave Japan
82 Indeed, the only reported gesture by Koizumi soon after the visit was his decision to write a letter that would
be delivered by Shin-Komeito’s head Kanzaki Takenori to President Jiang Zemin, to reaffirm Japan’s intention
to strengthen ties with China (Jiji 23/04/2002).
222
leverage vis-à-vis China in the US-Japan-China “strategic triangularity” (Soerensen 2006),
and boosted Tokyo’s confidence in pursuing an assertive China policy.
Nevertheless, the North Korean nuclear proliferation and Japanese abduction issues
meant that Japan needed both China and South Korea, together with the US and Russia to
deal with Pyongyang’s belligerence. This would necessitate Tokyo to prudently, manage its
souring relationship with Beijing and Seoul, especially concerning their diplomatic rows over
Koizumi’s Shrine visits (Wan 2006:249). In the Japanese-Chinese context, ties have
deteriorated, underscored by visible Chinese reactions taken in protest of the second
Yasukuni trip. The “Shenyang Incident” in May 2002 that saw Chinese authorities storming
the Japanese consulate to retrieve North Korean refugees, further tested their relationship
(Kokubun 2007:144). The worsening bilateral atmosphere led Koizumi to cancel his planned
visit to China for the 30th anniversary celebration. Koizumi was, however, unperturbed by
Chinese reaction, nor was he upset by Beijing’s “cold shoulder”, thus far.83 Anyhow, the
suspension of top-level visits had not prevented Koizumi from meeting China’s leaders at
the fringes of multilateral summits,84 nor has it derailed other levels of bilateral exchanges
crucial for maintaining a functional day-to-day relationship (Anonymous interview A and B).
Indeed, he believed that a third Shrine visit would not damage Japanese-Chinese relations
(JT 15/01/2003).
Yet, Yomiuri’s editorial suggested his third visit, was apparently, timed to avoid
potential diplomatic clashes with the new leadership in Beijing and Seoul, respectively (DY
15/01/2003).85 Tokyo may have been optimistic about the coming of China’s “fourth
generation” leadership, perceived as more pragmatic, less consumed by “history”, and
certainly not tainted by personal experiences of Japanese war occupation (Pryzstup
83 According to Wan, Koizumi’s perception suggests that “he believed Chinese reactions to date had been in an
acceptable range of severity – strong discontent expressed in a symbolic manner without having an impact on
vital China-Japan bilateral interests” (2006:248).
84 Koizumi cordially met Zhu Rongji at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Copenhagen on 22 September
2002 (BBC 23/09/2002), and then Jiang at Mexico’s APEC summit on 27 October 2002 (XNA 28/10/2002).
85 Yomiuri subsequently reported from a source close to the PMO that the timing of the “surprise” visit had been
“elaborately orchestrated” since late 2002, to take into account key domestic and external political agendas (see
DY 16/01/2003). A similar observation can be found in Curtin (2003a).
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2003a:105). As mentioned, indications of a “new thinking on Japan” by the “Hu-Wen”
leadership were apparent from Ma Licheng’s December 2002 article, which triggered fierce
debates in China, but welcomed by the Japanese intellectual and foreign policy
communities, and Japan’s rightwing press, as well86 (Lam 2004:10; Kokubun 2006:30).
Since Koizumi intended to visit Yasukuni annually, an early trip before Hu Jintao’s official
anointment would have taken it out of the list of annual bilateral grievances and avoided
pushing the new Chinese leadership to a corner so early into office, while allowing more
time and opportunity for the perceived “new thinking” to materialise.
Domestically, Koizumi could have felt nationalist pressure increasing after his
diplomatic rendezvous to North Korea in September 2002 (Pilling 16/09/2002). Although
popularly accepted, the trip unwittingly “opened-up a can of worms”, in which Kim Jong-il’s
apparent goodwill gesture of returning several allegedly abducted Japanese nationals,
sparked public anger and nationalist rancour in Japan.87 The highly charged “abduction
issue” and the deadlock in diplomatic negotiations with Pyongyang could have compelled
Koizumi to make a “timely” visit to Yasukuni, to soothe swelling domestic nationalist
sentiment. Besides, Koizumi probably calculated that he could not afford to further
compromise his “nationalist” credentials by skipping his Shrine routine and appearing weak
vis-à-vis China. This is especially so, when the advisory group formed in August 2001 to
consider the idea of a less controversial national memorial for Japan’s war dead, concluded
its report in December 2002, recommending the establishment of a “non-religious” facility in
place of Yasukuni, which obviously incensed the nationalists (YS 24/12/2002; Yamaori
2003: 44, 47).
Additionally, observers saw the visit as shrewdly timed to bolster faltering support
within the LDP during the party’s annual convention held days later, following limited
progress in his domestic economic reform agenda (AP 15/01/2003). Moreover, Koizumi was
86 The rightwing Sankei Shimbun ran a full-page coverage of the “New Thinking” debate in China, and made
several proposals for the improvement of Japanese-Chinese ties (SS 10/01/2004 cf. Lam 2004:10).
87 The public and nationalists alike were incensed by Pyongyang’s belligerence, and the possibility of more
Japanese abductees held in North Korea (The Guardian 16/10/2002).
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optimistic that the diplomatic cost of another Shrine visit on Japan-China ties would not
outweigh the domestic political gains, based on his perception of Chinese reaction
mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the striking decline in Japanese public images of, and
confidence towards the Chinese shown in recent public opinion surveys would have
strengthened Tokyo’s resolve.88 Koizumi’s indication in December 2002 regarding his
intention to continue visiting Yasukuni, even in the presence of an alternative memorial,
demonstrated his confidence in maintaining a hardnosed China policy, partly to placate
nationalist concerns over Yasukuni’s fate, which could be, sealed by the advisory group’s
following report/proposal (KN 24/12/2002). That said, Koizumi reportedly did not fully
observe the traditional Shrine ritual during his third pilgrimage,89 apparently a symbolic
gesture to dilute Chinese and domestic consternations (Yamaori 2003:44).
The stipulated global and regional events prior to the third pilgrimage would have the
Koizumi government perceiving a relatively favourable external environment in terms of
allied resolve and bilateral leverage vis-à-vis China to maintain its current Yasukuni policy.
Conversely, a seemingly weaker domestic political resolve vis-à-vis nationalist pressure
required Tokyo to pursue a tougher foreign policy-option to boost domestic political support.
The international-domestic nexus thus locates Koizumi’s position within Quadrant C
(Diagram 3) that stipulated an assertive-nationalist policy-option regarding Yasukuni visits, in
the context of Japan-China relations.
6.3.4. The January 1, 2004 visit
Japanese-Chinese tension remained high throughout 2003 following several history-related
quarrels, but China’s new leadership appeared pragmatic in handling and suppressing them.
Although Koizumi decided in October against a visit to China that year, and Wen Jiabao had
been declining the invitation to visit Japan, citing the need for Tokyo to improve the
88 See Chapter 3 Figure 1 for the declining trend in annual Cabinet Office public opinion survey on
perception/images of China (especially October 2002). Meanwhile, a Yomiuri Shimbun survey carried out in the
fall of 2002 showed only 36% of respondents agreeing that “China can be trusted”, representing a significant
drop in public confidence from 1998, when 76% of respondents agreed to that statement (cf. Ma 2004:41).
89 Koizumi reportedly took a deep bow, instead of performing the usual two bows, two hand claps, and one final
bow of traditional Shinto worship, ostensibly hoping that it would be perceived by his domestic and external
detractors as a “non-religious” form of respect (Yamaori 2003:44).
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atmosphere to facilitate his trip, these high-level posturing did not impede other levels of
governmental exchanges. Koizumi was able to meet the Chinese leaders in a “third country”,
which reinforced his opinion that continual absence of top-level mutual visits would not be
detrimental to overall bilateral ties. Moreover, the Japanese government noticed Beijing’s
new flexibility in managing their bilateral problems, with less mentioning of history, and
harping on the Yasukuni issue by the Hu-Wen leadership90 (Fouse 2003). Despite
reservations on resuming normal bilateral summits, Hu Jintao appeared to encourage
exchanges between key officials of both states (Funabashi 01/07/2003). Increased bilateral
cooperation in various areas, i.e. combating the SARS epidemic, and disposal of bio-
chemical weapons left by the Imperial Japanese Army in China, gave further indications of
the resumption of amiable ties after the previous Yasukuni fallout. Japan also made a
conciliatory gesture by agreeing to Chinese demands for damages inflicted by the Qiqihar
poison gas incident, albeit as a form of cooperation and not compensation (JT 17/10/2003).
The Shrine rows did not appear to compromise their deepening economic ties either,
with China poised to overtake the US as Japan’s top trading partner in 2004, besides
becoming the driver of Japanese economic recovery.91 Japan was also appreciative of
China’s efforts in realising the first of several rounds of the Six-Party Talks in August 2003,
and understood the significance of Sino-Japanese cooperation in bringing to fruition the
event’s objectives. Tokyo’s emphasis on maintaining cordial relations with China can be
seen from the conciliatory measures taken soon after Koizumi’s New Year Shrine homage,
in which the PM reiterated his views of China as Japan’s most important partner and the
great importance he attached to Japanese-Chinese friendship (AS 06/01/2004). On January
9, Koizumi instructed the Japanese delegation to China comprising the chairs of the
respective ruling coalition’s PARC to convey his views to the Chinese side (Wan 2006:252).
This suggests the 2004 pilgrimage was made upon anticipation of an ambiguous diplomatic
90 For instance, during the St. Petersburg summit, Hu did not raise the Yasukuni issue in his talk with Koizumi,
although he did comment generally on the history issue (YS 31/05/2003).
91 China accounts for 80% of Japan’s export growth in 2003, with the total value of Japanese export to China
increasing 33.2% from the previous year, hitting a record high for the fifth consecutive year (DY 02/03/2004;
Glosserman 17/05/2004). China’s growing economic significance to Japan is elaborated in Chapter 3.
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position vis-à-vis China, and that Koizumi had been striking a delicate balance between
maintaining satisfactory relations with China for Japan’s broader national interests, and
satisfying domestic political/nationalist demands for personal political expediency, besides
advancing the longer-term goal of “normal” statehood.
The decision was expectedly, facilitated by Japan’s buoyancy about its allied resolve,
as the US-Japan alliance continued to strengthen under Koizumi’s pro-American foreign
policy. Japan was prepared to defy growing public disapproval to commit the SDF for the
reconstruction of postwar Iraq, much to US’ appreciation, but to China’s consternation.
Tokyo had earlier pledged USD1.5 billion to support the Iraq reconstruction agenda, prior to
President Bush’s visit to Japan in October 2003.92 The premier’s allegiance and
commitments to Washington’s cause endeared him to the Bush administration, which saw a
“special relationship”, reminiscent to that of the “Reagan-Yasu”93 era developing between
the two leaders (Daniels 2004:1), and its positive “spillover” on US-Japan ties (McCreedy
2004). Indeed, Bush appreciated Koizumi’s significance as a crucial ally, for he was
probably the only Japanese leader, who could successfully augment Japan’s security role to
support Washington’s unpopular Iraq policy and still survive unscathed, domestically
(Kokubun interview/3). Strategically, Koizumi’s foreign policy continued to give Japan the
perceived favourable external environment and diplomatic leverage over China, which
affected Tokyo’s China policy decision-making, and reinforced Koizumi’s determination to
stand up to China.
Japanese public approval remained generally strong, and the Yasukuni issue had
not undermined Koizumi’s political standing. Not only did Koizumi manage to get re-elected
as the LDP president on September 20, 2003, he went on to lead the party to electoral
victory in the November Lower House election, which secured the political mandate and
support necessary to advance his political agenda, including his annual Shrine routine.
92 The timing of the pledge, which came ahead of Bush’s visit, was apparently a move to demonstrate that it was
not made under US pressure (JT 16/10/2003).
93 This refers to the close relationship forged by Ronald Reagan and Nakasone Yasuhiro that saw a significant
warming of US-Japan relations during their tenures as head-of-state.
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Koizumi’s confidence was obviously, boosted by his re-election, and the degree of public
support for his Yasukuni visits, which did not dissipate, despite increased public awareness
of the controversy it has courted. However, Koizumi did feel the heat of public opposition
towards his plans to dispatch the SDF to Iraq, soon after the November election. A
November 29-30 Mainichi poll shows that the vast majority of Japanese were either directly
opposed, or reluctant to send troops, and were critical of US unilateralism in Iraq (Agawa
2004:7). A Yomiuri-Gallup public opinion poll in mid-December also saw those Japanese
who “do not trust the US” topping those who “trust” it, for the first time (cf. McCreedy
2004:1), highlighting growing apprehension towards Koizumi’s foreign and security policies.
The New Year Shrine visit, could possibly, be meant to divert public attention, and
mobilise support for the SDF dispatch, when the Diet session reconvenes on January 19,
2004. This is especially so, since Chinese hostility over Yasukuni could easily trigger
reactive nationalism and aggravate the “China threat” perception in Japan,94 giving weight to
the government’s argument for broadening its security policy, and the importance of the US-
Japan alliance in hedging against an unpredictable China that required Japanese to
continue supporting their ally. On the same note, it provided Tokyo justification to advance a
more fundamental nationalist agenda in the revision of the Article IX, and the reinstatement
of Japan’s normal military role. According to Tamamoto, “the symbolism of the Yasukuni
visits and the bravado associated with the Iraq expedition are not unrelated”, suggesting that
Koizumi was taking advantage of “a fabricated air of emergency…to fundamentally
transform Japanese national identity from a state of constitutional pacifism to a state than
can go to war” (2004:15). This view is shared by Hughes, who asserts that the domestically
unpopular SDF deployment to Iraq for postwar reconstruction purposes represents the
emergence of an increasingly “normal” Japan, where “vital precedents” for future overseas
dispatch have been established under the US-Japan pact that can effectively circumvent the
Article IX (2005:133-134), with China arguably part of such calculations.
94 Japanese public scepticism regarding China’s “peaceful rise” was equally fuelled by the success of Chinese
manned space mission in October 2003, which triggered concerns over China’s advanced military development.
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The timing and indications made before the visit also suggest ingenious statecraft by
the Koizumi administration. Koizumi’s aide publicly announced in December 2003 that the
PM was contemplating to visit Yasukuni on August 15, next year (KN 28/12/2003; JT
29/12/2003). However, he went on New Year’s day, instead, which according to a Chinese
observer, appeared to be a calculated move, since a January trip would be less contentious
compared to a visit on the date that was intentionally publicised, earlier (cf. Wan 2006:429,
en.94). If such was the case, then the crafty strategy could also, be meant to induce the
Chinese into believing the so-called “change-of-date” as a minor concession by Koizumi,
similar to his compromise in 2001. Furthermore, an early visit would end speculation over
the issue, and avoid further Chinese pressure (Nikkei 03/01/2004; Wan 2006:251). Likewise,
Koizumi could have anticipated more scepticism and criticisms towards his policies that
could compromise approval ratings, and put pressure on his Cabinet, later in the year.
Hence, an early visit, especially after the recent election, would be timely, with public
approval still relatively propitious.
Koizumi’s 2004 visit, was thus, plausibly made following perceptions/calculations of
the ambiguous external conditions, stipulated earlier, and a relatively favourable domestic
environment fostered by recent electoral victory and public support for an assertive China
policy. This external-domestic nexus places Koizumi between Quadrant A and B in the NCR
model, which allows a flexible China policy-option (visiting Yasukuni), supplemented by
moderate policy-measures to reduce the diplomatic cost of Chinese reactions.
6.3.5. The October 17, 2005 visit
Allied resolve remained positive throughout 2004-2005, as Japan enjoyed one of the best
periods of relations with the US. During the “Two-Plus-Two” talks in February 2005, both
allies established a “common strategic objective” in hedging against an increasingly powerful
China (Klare 2006). Washington, on it part, remained unusually quiet over Yasukuni and
Koizumi’s “aloof” policy towards China (and Korea). Amidst mounting international
opposition to its highly unpopular Iraq policy, the Bush administration would have treasured
the personal ties with Koizumi, and Tokyo’s unwavering support, and therefore, would
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understandably avoid interfering on issues sensitive to its ally. It has been suggested that
the “special relationship” between Bush and Koizumi had given Japan the kind of leverage
never before enjoyed by the junior partner, which under NCR’s hypothesis, allowed Koizumi
to advance his assertive, and somewhat reckless China policy.95
As US-Japan relations prospered, Japanese-Chinese ties worsened in 2004-2005,
due to the aforementioned bilateral disputes. This contrasting diplomatic outlook would have
Tokyo perceiving an ambivalent external environment that gives domestic politics saliency in
China policy-making. Although China maintained a pragmatic approach throughout 2004, it
became clear by 2005 that Koizumi’s nonchalance over Yasukuni, and Tokyo’s assertive
posturing and growing international ambition would be obstacles to improving relations (Zhu
2005:16-17). Ironically, Beijing’s pragmatism in maintaining a functional relationship, despite
the Shrine rows, allowed Koizumi to continue visiting Yasukuni with the same “aloof
optimism” that such visits would not adversely affect Japan-China ties.96
That said, Koizumi’s decision to delay his annual visit until late 2005 could be due to
diplomatic prudence, notably to avoid Japan from becoming increasingly isolated in the
region, and dodge criticisms during the run-up to the 60th anniversary of the end of WWII.
Media speculations were rife by early 2005 that Koizumi would visit at year’s end, since the
other prospective dates were considered untimely. Asahi Shimbun deduced that a visit in
either January (New Year), or April (Spring Festival) would be unwise, after having only
recently, re-established cordial exchanges with China’s leaders, and Tokyo’s intention to
invite Premier Wen to attend the World Expo in Aichi prefecture, in May (AS 01/01/2005).97
Moreover, with diplomatic rows concurrently brewing between Japan and two other
95 This observation was offered by several interviewees, including Young C. Kim, Kikuchi Tsutomu, Murata
Koji, Nakai Yoshifumi, Kato Koichi, and Noda Takeshi. Indeed, Kato recalled Bush saying that he did not want
to put Koizumi in an awkward position over Yasukuni, underscoring the contraint on Bush’s handling of the
issue (Kato interview/2).
96 High-level bilateral exchanges/consultations continued on, despite Beijing’s displeasure over Yasukuni, as
seen in the sideline meeting between the two foreign ministers in Hanoi’s ASEM summit in October 2004
(SCMP 10/10/2004). Similarly, the Hu-Koizumi and Wen-Koizumi summits at the November APEC and
ASEAN-Plus-Three gatherings in Chile and Laos, respectively, proceeded, even though relations were recently
strained by the Chinese submarine incident (AFP 22/11/2004; BBC 30/11/2004). See Chapter 7 for the case-
study on the submarine incident.
97 This media observation is also noted in Wan (2006:256). See also “Japan eyes inviting Chinese PM to Aichi
Expo,” Mainichi Daily News, 28 November 2004.
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neighbours, South Korea and Russia over territorial disputes (Korea Times 24/02/2005;
Nikkei 31/01/2005), avoiding another Shrine row with Beijing would clearly be in Tokyo’s
regional interest (Wan 2006:258). Likewise, an August 15 visit was ruled out in view of the
historical sensitivities concerning the date and the year, while paying homage during the
Autumn Festival would risk opportunities to arrange sideline meetings with the Chinese
leaders at the APEC summit in November (AS 01/01/2005).
Koizumi’s decision to take the risk, nevertheless, demonstrated his resolve, and
priorities in mollifying domestic sentiments, rather than soothing Chinese displeasure. One
reason for such foreign policy bravado would be that Koizumi was neither overly concerned
with the decline in Japanese-Chinese diplomacy, nor with Japan’s growing isolation in Asia,
as long as Washington-Tokyo relations continued to prosper and develop into a matured
and equal partnership. Some Japanese bureaucrats and observers suggest that Koizumi’s
“skewed” external perspective and his lack of diplomatic finesse were attributed to his limited
foreign policy know-how, and consequential indifference towards the policy-area, as well as
his lack of affinity with, and knowledge about China.98 Affected by these “limitations”,
Koizumi could have thus, (mis)perceived a pro-US foreign policy as sufficient in helping
realise Japan’s external goals. Moreover, Koizumi sees the deterioration of relations with
China (and Korea) as “temporary and not fatal while the [Yasukuni] visits promote the long-
term strategy of pushing Japan closer to normalcy in international relations” (Huo 2005).
Furthermore, Japanese public images of China were, severely dented by the anti-
Japanese demonstrations in July-August 2004 and April 2005, and Beijing’s endeavour to
derail Tokyo’s UNSC bid. The annual PMO polls in 2004-2005 saw unprecedented highs of
Japanese feeling no closeness to China, surging to 58.2% in 2004 from 48% the year
98 According to several of my interviewees, Koizumi was not particularly interested in foreign policy, and had
limited experience and knowledge in the field before assuming the premiership. This partly explains why
Koizumi had devoted his efforts predominantly to realising domestic policy-objectives, while hinging Japan’s
external strategy on the US-Japan ties. Also, his assertive China policy was possibly influenced by his political
and personal background, notably his affiliation with the pro-Taiwan Fukuda-Mori faction, and allegedly
limited knowledge and interests about China. Apparently, Koizumi’s 2001 trip was only his second visit to
China, which explains his limited affinity and lackadaisical attitude towards the Chinese (Anonymous interview
C). Opinion also shared by Kokubun Ryosei, Tomoda Seki, and Zhao Quansheng in their respective interviews.
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before, and then topping at 63.4% in 2005.99 Both the Asahi andYomiuri-Gallup polls in
November and December 2004 also recorded a similar trend, with a staggering 71.2% and
71% indicating distrust towards China, respectively (Przystup 2005a:126; DY 16/12/2004).
In light of the prevailing public sentiment, it would not be difficult for Tokyo to rally popular
support for an assertive China policy. Whilst public opinion favoured Koizumi standing tall
against China, opinions regarding his Yasukuni visit were more ambiguous, as seen in the
rather evenly divided Asahi poll in November, where 38% supported his Yasukuni routine as
opposed to 39%, who wanted Koizumi to stop (cf. Kokubun 2007:147). However, Mainichi’s
monthly opinion surveys between April-October 2005 showed signs of public wariness, with
higher percentages opposing than supporting his Shrine visits (cf. Deans 2007:278).100 A
June 2005 Nikkei poll also recorded declining public support, with 42% opposing a visit,
while those supporting dropped to 38%. Approximately 69% of those opposing cited
concerns over deteriorating ties with neighbouring countries as the main reason (Nikkei
20/06/2005), indicating the extent to which Chinese and Korean antagonisms have had
impacted on Japanese public awareness regarding the wisdom of Yasukuni visits.101
Similarly, domestic political opposition mounted after the fourth visit, with opposition
parties periodically attacking Koizumi over his Yasukuni antics (KN 01/01/2004a;
22/11/2004). Even the LDP’s coalition partner, Shin-Komeito expressed concerns over the
constitutionality of such visits (KN 01/01/2004b), and implore Koizumi to take the Chinese
protest seriously (JT 09/12/2004). During a Diet session in January 2004, DPJ’s Kan Naoto,
criticised Koizumi’s antagonistic China policy for undermining Japan’s broader national
interest, in view of Beijing’s importance as a Six-Party Talks partner to promote North
Korean denuclearisation (Wan 2006:253). China’s subsequent role in facilitating the
“abduction talks” between Pyongyang and Tokyo, before the February 2004 round of the
Six-Party summit, also broadened Japanese awareness of the significance of Chinese
99 See Figure 1 in Chapter 3. For similar information, see also “Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy by the
Cabinet Office of Japan” October 2005 [http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-gaikou/3.html cf. Mansfield
Foundation homepage at http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-05-12.htm (accessed on 03/06/2007)].
100 See also Figure 2 in this chapter for the trend of public support on Yasukuni visits.
101 However, another Nikkei poll in August 2005 saw 46% supporting compared to 38% opposing (Nikkei
12/08/ 2005), suggesting that public opinion can be fickle and thus remain ambiguous.
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cooperation, which increased the diplomatic cost of Japanese-Chinese conflict over future
Yasukuni visits (AS 16/02/2004; Daniels 2004:33).102 Apprehensions were growing within
LDP, as well, notably among senior party cadres and “pro-China” factions. In a highly
unusual act, Lower House Speaker Kono Yohei reportedly met with five former premiers on
June 1, 2005 to discuss relations with China, and subsequently made clear their unanimous
decision in discouraging Koizumi from continuing his Shrine visit (AFP 01/06/2005). Even
Nakasone weighed in, telling reporters that Koizumi should “think more about national
interests than personal beliefs” and stop his Yasukuni trips (Przystup 2005c:131).
The zaikai also began voicing concerns since the 2004 visit, regarding the negative
spillover effect of the Yasukuni problem on bilateral economic relations (KN 13/01/2004).
Indeed, Asahi Shimbun reported Chinese officials’ statements indicating that Japan would
lose its bid on a lucrative high-speed train project, purportedly due to the January 2004
Shrine visit (AS 18/02/2004; Daniels 2004:54).103 Fear of Chinese retribution in the
economic realm after the April 2005 anti-Japanese riots led to Keidanren and Keizai Doyukai
calling for the PM to exercise caution on future Yasukuni pilgrimages.104 In a mid-July Kyodo
poll, more than half of top Japanese companies surveyed fear that strained ties could
adversely affect their business in China (KN 02/08/2005). Domestic pressure came from the
legal front as well, when the Fukuoka District Court and Osaka High Court ruled against the
Shrine visits, in April 2004 and September 2005, respectively (JT 29/06/2006).105 However,
102 China’s Vice-FM, Wang Yi reportedly told LDP policy chief, Nukaga Fukushiro that China had approached
North Korea to open the avenue for resolving the abduction issue with Japan, before the February 2004 Six-
Party Talks (AS 16/02/2004).
103 The Asahi Shimbun also reported that the Chinese indicated their likely support for France, instead of Japan,
in their competing bids to host the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Project (ITER), in
retaliation against the New Year day visit in 2004 (AS 18/02/2004). For reports of Chinese economic retribution
in 2004, see “BUSINESS IN CHINA: Anti-Japan Sentiment Threatens to Thwart Deals,” Nikkei, 11 November
2004, and Curtin (2004a).
104 The main critics of Koizumi’s actions came from Okuda Hiroshi, Chairman of Keidanren and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Toyota, Yotaro Kobayashi, Chairman of Fuji Xerox, and Kitashiro Kakutaro,
Chairman of both Keizai Doyukai and IBM Japan (cf. Lam 2006b:10).
105 To be sure, there were mixed lower court rulings on the issue, with Osaka and Matsuyama District courts
dismissing the Yasukuni lawsuits on February 27 and March 16, 2004, respectively (MDN 27/02/2004;
16/03/2004). On May 13, 2004, the Osaka District Court also ruled Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit as private in
nature (MDN 13/05/2004), while the Chiba District Court ruled against plaintiffs seeking compensation for his
2001 shrine visit (Przystup 2004b:114-115; 2004c:127-128; 2005a:132).
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the other court rulings were inconsistent, and would be, eventually annulled by subsequent
deliberations at the Supreme Court, in favour of Koizumi and his Government.106
Koizumi appeared unmoved by the domestic apprehension, possibly due to his
assessment that his Yasukuni visits and China policy-orientation would not be detrimental to
his overall political position, considering the lack of consensus and fickle-mindedness of the
Japanese public on the policy-areas concerned. Furthermore, he knew that the public was
more concerned with his domestic reform agenda, which remained the “staple diet” that fed
his popularity and power base. Moreover, Koizumi could count on LDP Diet-members and
other conservative politicians for support, following the formation of a panel of 116 LDP
lawmakers on 28 June 2005 that backed his Shrine visit (JT 29/06/2005), and subsequent
statements by a non-partisan group of 235 conservative lawmakers urging him to visit on
August 15 (AFP 02/08/2005).107 The staunch LDP support was equally reflected earlier, in
the adoption of the Party’s policy platform during its 50th anniversary convention, on 18
January 2005, which included the call for a continuation of Yasukuni visit (Reuters
18/01/2005), an agenda that was first introduced in January 2004.
More importantly, it was Koizumi’s “landslide” victory in the September 11, 2005
Lower House election that saw the LDP gaining a significant majority, which emboldened
and gave him a clear mandate to visit Yasukuni soon after. The snap election was, in
Funabashi’s opinion, more of a referendum on Koizumi than his reform agenda. Although
difficult to detect since they were “discreetly under the radar” and “absent from the pre-
election debate”, Funabashi contends that the “China factor” and Yasukuni were amongst
“the largest (election) issues” (Funabashi 15/09/2005). With the context for the pre-election
debate set by the “agitating concern” of a rising China and its challenge to Japan, Koizumi’s
determination to resist Chinese pressure was in tune with the prevailing Japanese public
sentiment, and therefore, a decisive factor in forging the resounding electoral success
106 On June 23, 2006, Japan’s Supreme Court rejected the lawsuit filed against Koizumi’s 2001 Yasukuni visit,
without giving any judgement on the constitutionality of the visit (XNA 23/06/2006).
107 The statement was made by five Diet-member groups, namely a non-partisan group, an LDP group, and
three citizen’s groups, urging Koizumi to stand firm against Chinese/Korean pressure to visit Yasukuni on
August 15 (see also JT 03/08/2005).
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(Funabashi 15/09/2005; Anonymous interview I). Interestingly, Gerald Curtis predicted the
landslide win as giving Koizumi leeway to stop visiting Yasukuni (KN 12/09/2005). His
subsequent homage, nonetheless, indicates that he was not merely doing it for political
expedience, but also possibly to fulfill his “nationalist” conviction following propitious
conditions stipulated by NCR.
The 2005 visit therefore shared similarities with the previous year’s pilgrimage in
terms of the conditions that affected and fostered Koizumi’s decisions. Both trips were made
under an ambiguous external environment, shaped by favourable US-Japan relations, but
worsening bilateral ties with China. Also similar to 2004, Koizumi visited Yasukuni soon after
a successful Lower House election, which bestowed a relatively conducive, domestic
political condition that facilitated the visit. Hence, Koizumi’s position in 2005 would be in
between Quadrant A and B, which stipulates a similar foreign policy-option to that of the
previous year, in managing the Yasukuni issue vis-à-vis China.
6.3.6. The August 15, 2006 visit
By late 2005, the international environment had become relatively unfavourable for the
Koizumi administration to continue exploiting the Yasukuni issue in pursuit of an assertive
China policy and other nationalist agenda. Aforesaid, the Bush administration had for the
first time, “cautioned” against Koizumi’s future Shrine pilgrimage, considering its debilitating
impact on Japan’s ties with two key regional actors, which have undermined Tokyo’s
position regionally, and the US strategy in Asia (JT 12/08/2006). Indeed, from Bush’s
insinuation, and veiled disapproval by senior US administration officials, to Washington’s
signal for better US-China-Japan ties (Christensen 2006),108 the American dissonance
became obvious, to the extent that Koizumi was ostensibly denied his coveted address at
the joint sitting of the US Congress during his farewell US tour, following strong
108 For veiled comments from senior US officials, i.e. US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, and
Deputy National Security Adviser, Jack Crouch, see “U.S. official seeks March realignment plan, better Japan-
China ties.” Kyodo News, 24 January 2006. See also “US says frustrated over Japan’s strained Asian ties,”
Reuters, 19 Nov.2005, for Asst.US Secretary of State, William Hill’s voices of “frustration”. Indeed, observers
perceive Zoellick’s influential speech to the National Committee on US-China relations on 21 September 2005
calling for the engagement of China as a “signal” to Koizumi, and Tokyo to “reassess” Japan’s China policy-
direction (see Zoellick 2005; Takahata interview).
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congressional opposition towards his “Yasukuni bravado” (Nikkei 01/06/2006; Lim
02/06/2007).109
From a bilateral perspective, Japan-China political ties could not have got any worst,
as tensions escalated amid the ECS quandary, while bilateral negotiations and dialogues at
various levels failed to progress, due to dissipating political will caused by the prolonged
absence of top-level interactions.110 Although the Chinese kept the pressure on Koizumi
over Yasukuni, Beijing appeared to have allocated greater attention to his prospective
successors, to ensure that the Shrine routine would not continue under the post-Koizumi
administration. This suggests the Chinese government, having contemplated, and accepted
the worst-case scenario, namely Koizumi visiting on August 15, has decided to wait out on
him (ST 16/03/2006; Lam 2006b:1). Ironically, Koizumi’s decision to make his final Shrine
visit on the controversial date could have stemmed from his anticipation of this shift in
Chinese focus and diplomatic pragmatism, which would mean the visit itself carrying limited
impact on Japanese-Chinese diplomacy after his departure.
The domestic condition was equally disadvantageous, with the strongest opposition
yet towards his Yasukuni exploits deriving from across Japan’s political spectrum. There
were growing unrest within the LDP ranks, with senior members like Kato Koichi, Kono
Yohei and Yamasaki Taku urging for a rethinking of the Yasukuni policy, while anti-Shrine
LDP Diet-members forged a study group in March 2006 to improve Tokyo’s regional
relations (IHT 17/03/2006; Lam 2006b:8). In fact, a supra-partisan group of 130 Diet-
members from the LDP, Shin-Komeito, and the opposition DPJ was established, last
October, to advocate for an alternative, non-religious war memorial in place of Yasukuni (JT
28/11/2005; cf. Lam 2006b:8). Differences apparently reappeared between the PMO and
MOFA regarding Yasukuni, as reflected by an article in the MOFA-affiliated Gaiko Forum
109 The strongest opposition came from the Chairman of the House’s International Relations Committee,
Congressman Henry Hyde. In a leaked letter to House Speaker, Dennis Hastert, Hyde cited that if the PM
visited Yasukuni as expected, after he were to address the Congress, “Mr. Koizumi would dishonor the place
where President Franklin Roosevelt made his ‘Day of Infamy’ speech after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor”
(quoted in IHT 24/06/2006). In fact, Congressman Hyde had voiced concern back in October 2005 regarding a
regional Yasukuni fallout vis-à-vis Japan following Koizumi’s 2005 visit (IHT 28/10/2005).
110 This is the opinion shared by senior MOFA officials interviewed (Anonymous interview A and B).
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that was critical of the visits (KN 10/12/2005).111 Even the Japanese conservatives have
spoken against a continuation of Koizumi’s actions, due to increasingly strong international
and domestic repercussions since his last visit. In an unprecedented development,
Watanabe Tsuneo, head of Japan’s largest conservative, centre-right newspaper, Yomiuri
Shimbun, and one of the most influential public opinion leaders, openly criticised the PM’s
shrine visits during a New York Times interview, and in a leftist journal, Ronza, in February
2006 (NYT 11/02/2006; KBS 13/02/2006; IHT 18/02/2006). More significantly, Watanabe
forged an unlikely alliance with his counterpart from Yomiuri’s ideological archrival,
Wakamiya Yoshibumi of the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun, to call for a moratorium on future
prime ministerial visit (Lam 2006b:10).112 Both Yomiuri and Asahi also agreed on a joint
project to delve into the question of Japan’s war responsibility, which is inextricably related
to the Yasukuni ideology (van Kemenade 2006:51; JT 29/03/2006). As highlighted earlier,
public support for the visit also declined considerably,113 while the zaikai had officially made
clear their opposition (YS 10/06/2006). Most ironic of all was Izokukai’s appeal to Koizumi to
refrain from visiting their sacrosanct site, while proposing for a solution amenable to China.
So, why did Koizumi proceed with his plan, despite facing somewhat unfavourable
international and domestic conditions? The answer to this “anomaly” insofar as the NCR
framework is concerned, would lie on his judgment that the visit would not matter, or carry
any significant political risk, since he was already at the twilight of his premiership.
111 The article, written by former Japanese ambassador to the US, Kuriyama Takakazu, ostensibly reflects a
more conciliatory attitude within MOFA towards China. It triggered a nationalist backlash, with the rightwing
Sankei Shimbun chastising it as representative of MOFA’s enduring “kowtow” diplomacy towards China. See
Kuriyama Takakazu, Jan. 2006. “Wakai: Nihon gaiko no kadai: hansei o kodo de shimesu doryoku o”
[Reconciliation: Japan’s diplomatic challenges: working to translate regrets into action] Part 1, Gaiko Forumu,
No.210:8-15, and Feb. 2006. “Nihon gaiko no kadai: wakai no jitsugen o mezashite” [Reconciliation: Japan’s
diplomatic challenges: Aiming to realize reconciliation], Part 2, Gaiko Forumu No.211:63-69. See also “Taichu
gaiko: tsuyoki kantei yowaki gaimusho” [Diplomacy towards China: Strong-spirited Prime Minister’s Office,
fainthearted Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, Sankei Shimbun, 6 January 2006 (details and translations derived
from Lam 2006b:11).
112 See “Yasukuni o kataru, gaiko o kataru” [Talk about Yasukuni, talk about foreign relations], Ronza, No.2,
February 2006: 26-39 (cf. Lam 2006b:11). For a abridged version of the discussion between the two media
chiefs in Ronza, see “Yomiuri and Asahi Editors Call for a National Memorial to Replace Yasukuni”, Japan
Focus, Article 524 [http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=524 (accessed on 12/05/2006)].
113 Besides the polls cited earlier, see also “Poll: Japanese increasingly oppose shrine visits”, People’s Daily, 25
July 2006.
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Realistically, the Chinese had “written him off” 114 and begun concentrating their efforts on
the incoming Japanese leadership (JT 20/02/2006), while other sources of external and
internal pressure would recede, if his successor observes the proposed moratorium.
Koizumi was also no longer, unduly concerned about securing domestic political support for
his reform agenda, since he had successfully achieved some of his targeted programmes,
and set in motion the forces of change in the Japanese political economy. More so, instead
of harming his popularity, a visit on the promised date would have cemented his “kizen”
(Funabashi 15/09/2005) or “lionheart” image (Anderson 2004), and reputation as a steadfast
leader, in the hearts of millions of Japanese.115 In this regard, Koizumi could have reckoned
the international conditions and domestic processes to be indeterminative rather than
determinately unfavourable (Diagram 3), due to circumstances surrounding the anticipated
leadership transition, which gave him the policy flexibility that led to his “final” visit. His
“nationalistic” action thus conforms to NCR’s dictum that state-elites do not necessarily
respond effectively to the prevailing decision-making constraints, due to “intervening”
elements i.e. (mis)perceptions and/or personal disposition/interests.
6.4 Conclusion
Japan’s management of the Yasukuni dispute during the Koizumi administration
demonstrates to an extent, the salience of domestic nationalist pressure, notwithstanding
Koizumi’s so-called “normal-nationalist” disposition, in affecting Tokyo’s policy-decision to
sustain the annual Shrine routine. That said, the timing and manner in which they were
executed between 2001-2006, and the diplomatic manoeuvring, before and after the
pilgrimages, also suggest the prevalence of shrewd and rational, rather than purely
114 On February 8, 2006, China’s State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan told the visiting Japan-China Association head,
Noda Takeshi that the Chinese has “written off” Koizumi and expected nothing from him during the remainder
of his office (Przystup 2006b:124).
115 An emergency public opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun after Koizumi’s 2006 visit shows 49% of respondents
agreeing to the statement that “it was good that he visited” Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 2006, while 37%
answered that he “should not have visited”, indicating commendable public support for his decision [cf.
Mansfield Foundation homepage http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-06-6.htm (accessed on 12/06/2007)].
The regular Asahi poll on August 26-27, 2006 also recorded a rise of 3% point in Koizumi’s cabinet approval
rating, from 44% in July to 47%, while those who disapprove fell from 40% to 36%. Overall, 68% of
respondents evaluated Koizumi’s achievement between “very positively” (12%) and “somewhat positively”
(56%), as a whole [cf. Mansfield Foundation homepage at http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-06-7.htm
(accessed on 12/06/2007)]. See also “Last shrine trip OK, but not next: poll”, Japan Times, 17 August 2006.
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emotionally-laden policy-calculation, and external-internal balancing, on Tokyo’s part, in an
effort to simultaneously promote foreign and domestic policy-goals. This concurs with NCR’s
assumptions regarding the extent to which nationalism determines Japan’s China policy-
making, which under particular international-domestic conditions, as perceived by Japanese
state-elites during specific time periods, can be more, or less salient in shaping their policy-
options.
Diagram 3
NCR MODEL OF NATIONALISM AND JAPANESE STATE BEHAVIOUR/CHINA POLICY PREFERENCES ON
THE YASUKUNI SHRINE ISSUE
Y favourable
C B
Assertive-Nationalist FP Freedom of FP Choices
X
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CASE STUDY II:
NATIONALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND JAPANESE-CHINESE TERRITORIAL/MARITIME
DISPUTES IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
The preceding chapter has demonstrated the extent to which resurgent nationalism
exacerbates the Japanese-Chinese “history” problem that manifested most emphatically in
their diplomatic quarrels over Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni-jinja. Similarly, bilateral issues
concerning territorial integrity and sovereignty are extremely delicate and potentially
explosive, as they often arouse nationalistic impulses that galvanise societal and
governmental responses “disproportionate to the material stakes involved” (Roy 2003:3).
Indeed, nationalism is widely perceived to have increased the stakes and retarded possible
resolutions of their competing sovereignty and resource claims over the ECS islands and
surrounding waters, turning the dispute into a key diplomatic quandary. Utilising the NCR
framework, this second case-study attempts to evaluate nationalism’s role vis-à-vis other
policy-determinants affecting the Koizumi administration’s perception/calculations and
policy-options, when dealing with China over the ECS territorial/maritime disputes. The
focus of analysis is on their competing claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao archipelago, and
quarrels regarding natural gas exploration and Chinese violations of Japanese maritime
boundary within ECS. This chapter begins with a background study of the dispute, before
delving on the specific issues and periods of contention. Particular attention is given to
analysing the interactions between domestic nationalist pressure and other external-internal
variables within the matrix of Japan’s China policy-making, to assess the extent to which
nationalism constrains Tokyo’s management of this potentially destabilising bilateral dispute.
7.1. Background of the ECS Territorial/Maritime Disputes
Before addressing nationalism’s role in Japan’s China policy-making pertaining to the ECS
quandary, it is essential to elaborate the dispute’s origins and multi-dimensional nature, and
the contesting legal interpretations involved, as well as its significance to nationalism, to
comprehend the intricacies surrounding what is considered to be a perilous set of issues in
Japanese-Chinese relations.
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7.1.1. Origins and nature of the ECS disputes
The bitter disputes over the ECS comprises several correlated issues, namely their
contending territorial claims over Senkaku/Diaoyudao,1 competition for energy resources
and unilateral exploration activities in the adjacent waters, and incursions by Chinese naval
and research vessels into the disputed maritime boundaries claimed by Japan. Central to
the conundrum is the longstanding territorial dispute over a group of five islets and three
barren rocks called the Senkaku/Diaoyudao archipelago.2 These relatively small and
uninhabited insular formations are located at the edge of ECS continental shelf,
approximately midway between Taiwan and the southernmost island of the Japanese
Ryukyu chain, and separated from the latter and Japan’s continental shelf by the Okinawa
Trough (Su 2005:46; Shaw 1999:10-11; Chiu 1999:2-3; Hagstrom 2003:80; Suganuma
2000:11; Schoenbaum 2005; Dai 2006:136; Drifte 2008b:29) (see Table 4).
Table 4
Senkaku/Diaoyudao Archipelago
Chinese Name Japanese Name Category Latitude (N) Longitude (E) Size
(sq.km)
Diaoyu Dao Uotsuri-shima Islet 25º 45’ 123º 29’ 4.319
Huangwei Dao Kuba-shima Islet 25º 58’ 123º 41’ 1.08
Nanxiao Dao Minami Kojima Islet 25º 44’ 123º 34’ 0.463
Beixiao Dao Kita Kojima Islet 25º 45’ 123º 33’ 0.302
Chiwei Dao Taisho-Kojima Islet 25º 55’ 124º 33’ 0.154
Dabeixiao Dao Okino Kitaiwa Rock
Dananxiao Dao Okino Minamiiwa Rock
Feilai Dao Tobise Rock
Sources: Adapted from Su (2005:46) and Suganuma (2000:12).
Before the 1970s, these “islands” were of limited “intrinsic value” (Shaw 1999:12), under-
appreciated and regarded by both Japan and China as “essentially “worthless land””
1 There are numerous studies of Japanese-Chinese dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyudao. Among the studies
analysing the dispute from the perspective of international law include Cheng (1974), Greenfield (1992),
Valencia (1996), Shaw (1999); Chiu (1999), Dzurek (2000), Heflin (2000), Suganuma (2000), Su (2005), and
Dai (2006). Meanwhile, studies by Downs and Saunders (1998/9), Drifte (2000; 2003; 2008a/b); Deans (2000),
Bong (2002), Hagstrom (2003; 2005), Blanchard (2006), and Chung (2004; 2007), among others, analyse the
dispute from the IR viewpoint. For an excellent and up-to-date work, see Drifte (2008a).
2 The geological terms “islets” and “barren rocks” are commonly noted (Drifte 2008a/b; Hagstrom 2003:80).
According to observers, the islands are called “Senkaku”, “Senkaku Shoto”, “Senkaku Retto”, “Senkaku
Gunto”, meaning “Pinnacle rocks” in Japanese. “Tiaoyu” or “Tiaoyu tai”, meaning “Fishing platform” is the
Chinese name for the islands, spelled in the Wade-Giles Pinyin system widely used in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
In the PRC, they are known as, and spelled “Diaoyu Dao” or “Diaoyu Tai” in the Hanyu Pinyin system (cf. Su
2005: fn.1; Narayanan 2005: fn.2; see also Suganuma 2000:93; Deans 1996:2). These islands are also called
“Pinnacle Islands” for convenience and neutrality sake by some Western scholars and can be found in recent
studies (see Hagstrom 2003; 2005). For the purpose of this study, the name shall be standardised and called
“Senkaku/Diaoyudao” or “Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” to avoid a biased slant towards either disputant-states.
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(Suganuma 2000:11). Traditionally serving as temporary fishing platforms and shelters, they
stirred limited, sustained interests from the eventual claimant states, and were essentially a
dormant issue during the early postwar decades. It was only after the publication of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE) report in 1969,
which optimistically predicted the potential existence of abundant hydrocarbon reserves
surrounding the archipelago that triggered the consciousness of the concerned parties, and
led to the bitter ownership contest between Japan and China (and Taiwan)3 (Su 2005:47;
Chiu 1999:4; Green 2001:84; Drifte 2008a). Since then, it has been identified in both
academic and official accounts as one of the most complicated and potentially explosive
issues in Japanese-Chinese relations (e.g. Cheng 1974:265; Whiting 1989:200; Zhao
1996:195; Nathan and Ross 1997:93; ; Kato 1999:2; Blanchard 2000:122-23; Suganuma
2000:151, 162; Valencia 2000:1; Yang 2002:11; cf. Hagstrom 2003:79-80; Drifte 2008a:2).4
The dispute was originally between Taiwan (ROC) and Japan over their overlapping
concession zones surrounding Senkaku/Diaoyudao, but eventually shifted to a contest
between the PRC and Japan following their diplomatic normalisation in September 1972,
and Taiwan’s de-recognition as a sovereign state (Su 2005:47). At first glance, economic
considerations, namely the discovery of natural resources, appear to be the catalyst and
driver of the islands dispute. Intense competition, especially over the exclusive control of the
potentially rich oil/gas deposits in the contested area is expected, since both countries are
dependent on foreign energy supplies to fuel their gargantuan economies (Calder 1996;
Drifte 2008b:33), not mentioning the prospects of these islands as future Chinese
lebensraum (Jencks 1994:91). However, the complexity and difficulties in reaching a
mutually equitable economic solution thus far, let alone seeking a political resolution to the
dispute, point to the significance of political, emotional, and strategic sensitivities, which are
equally, if not more salient in fuelling the periodic Japanese-Chinese diplomatic
confrontations over the islands and surrounding waters throughout the past decades.
3 This study considers Taiwan’s claims over Senkaku/Diaoyudao as similar and in tandem with those of the
PRC, and thus treats them as a single claim under the name of China.
4 The Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute in the ECS has been, likewise declared as “most worrying” by the UK House
of Common Foreign Affairs Committee’s Seventh Report (UK Parliament June 2005).
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The Senkaku/Diaoyudao controversy is inextricably, linked to nationalism, and has
been predominantly a nationalistic dispute (Shaw 1999:5; Chung 2004; Valencia 2007:166).
To the Chinese, these islands are China’s irredenta, territories historically belonging to
China that have been annexed and continuously occupied by Japan, owing to Japanese
imperialism in the past (Taira 2004; Suganuma 2000; Chung 2004:26-27). Accordingly, they
are symbols sine qua non to modern Chinese nationalism that not only reminded Chinese of
Japan’s past militaristic transgressions, persistent historical amnesia and skirting of war
responsibility, and possible resurgence of militarism (Shaw 1999:5), but also the need to
recover these “lost territories” as pre-requisite for the redemption of China’s incomplete
sovereignty (Suganuma 2000). Conversely, most ordinary Japanese, especially rightwing
nationalists, consider Senkaku/Diaoyudao to be an inalienable part of Japan, since their
initial discovery by a Japanese national (Chung 2004:29).
As shall be elaborated, symbolic and provocative activities undertaken by
nationalists from both sides were responsible in triggering past diplomatic disputes over the
islands. Interestingly, the various instances of clashes illustrate the propensity of popular
nationalism pressuring and eliciting nationalistic responses from the respective
governments, suggesting the vulnerability of state-elites to domestic nationalist pressure,
when managing this highly charged issue. That said, it is worth noting that pragmatism
appears to have thus far, governed both states’ management of past incidents, where
concerted efforts were taken to de-escalate bilateral tension arising from them. However,
with resurgent nationalism raising the stakes of competition for national pride and prestige
(Tamamoto 2005b), any resolution to the debacle, or compromise by way of joint
development appears bleak, if not almost impossible, as none of the disputant-states seem
willing to shelf their sovereignty claims (Shaw 1999:5), in light of rising domestic nationalist
pressure. Moreover, compromise by either claimant-state would set a precedent that could
undermine their bargaining position in other unresolved territorial disputes5 (Deans
5 Apart from the history-induced Chinese ultra-sensitivity towards issues concerning extraterritoriality, the PRC
is still engaged in a multitude of sovereignty disputes with neighbouring states such as the South China Sea
archipelagos of Paracels and Spratlys (Lam 1996; Garver 1992), and secessionist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang-
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2000:126; Hagstrom 2003:80). Further complicating the possibility of dispute settlement
between Japan and China is the geo-strategic value of the archipelago, straddling along key
international shipping lanes vital to commerce and energy security, where ownership could
carry strategic implications (Suganuma 2000:13), and affect the evolving regional power
dynamics. Suganuma best captures the complexity of the conflict, noting that:
The cornerstone of the Diaoyu [Senkaku] dispute sprouts from an intricate tapestry of
economic interests, geopolitical considerations, symbolic reasons, and historical rights
(2000:11).
There are three dimensions to the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute from the legal
perspective (Schoenbaum 2005). The most fundamental concerns sovereignty, which
directly affects their respective bargaining position on the subsequent two aspects, namely
their overlapping claims over the ECS continental shelf and maritime boundary, and the right
to ownership of the islands’ contiguous waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ),
stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Schoenbaum
2005; Dai 2006). Expectedly, the sovereignty issue is the most difficult to resolve
(Schoenbaum 2005; Drifte 2008a/b; Shaw 1999; Harrison 2005), not only because of the
historical-emotional sensitivities involved, but also due to the contrasting interpretations of
the sovereignty concept resulting from the vagueness of the UNCLOS.
China claims Senkaku/Diaoyudao based on two inter-related arguments; “historical
discovery” and utilisation documented as early as the Ming Dynasty; and “territorial cession”
along with Taiwan to Japan following Qing China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war (Su
2005:48; Chiu 1999:9-11; Blanchard 2000:101: Dai 2006:142).6 Conversely, Japan
establishes its claims via the principles of “discovery-occupation” and “effective control” in
the international law (Hagstrom 2003:141; 2005:168). The Chinese substantiate their claims
by drawing on historical records of early contacts with the Islands dating back to 1372, or
further (Blanchard 2000:101; Suganuma 2000:42-44; Wan 2005:19), citing their functions as
shelters for Chinese fishermen, and navigation aids for Chinese “tribunary” envoys to the
Uighur and Taiwan, among others (Hagstrom 2003:80). Likewise, Japan is involved in irredentist claims over
the Kuriles and Tokdo/Takeshima Islands, with Russia and South Korea, respectively (Hagstrom 2003:80).
6 For a description of the historical basis of China’s claims, see also Shaw (1999:43-69) and Chiu (1999).
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Ryukyu kingdom, as well as part of the coastal defence system against Japanese wako
(pirates) (Cheng 1974:253-60; Matsui 1997:11; Shaw 1999:38; Hagstrom 2003:140-141).
The islands’ historical ties with, and incorporation as part of Taiwan’s coastal defence
system by the Qing government during the 18th century are also alluded to verify the
“territorial cession” argument, where they are considered among the islands “appertaining or
belonging to” Taiwan (Formosa) that were forcefully ceded to Japan on April 17, 1895, under
the “unequal” Treaty of Shimonoseki (Shaw 1999:38; Su 2005:48). The Japanese reject the
Chinese arguments, asserting that Senkaku/Diaoyudao were terra nullius until their
subsequent discovery by Koga Tatsuhiro, a Japanese national, in 1884, which eventually led
to their formal incorporation into Japan’s territory in January 1895, ostensibly after more than
a decade of official Japanese survey, and several months before the cessation of Taiwan
(Chung 2004:28; Su 2005:49; Hagstrom 2003:140-141). Further validating Japan’s claims
have been its “effective jurisdiction/control” of the islands, since then, apart from the period
between 1945 and 1972, when they were grouped together with Okinawa, under American
occupation (Chung 2004:28).7 From the Japanese viewpoint, the islands were indisputably
incorporated with the Ryukyus into the “Nansei Shoto”8 under the US trusteeship system
(Narayanan 2005:14; Drifte 2008b:30), before their reversion to Japanese administration
under the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty (Lee 2002; Taira 2004).
Indeed, the contending interpretations of events leading to, and after Japan’s WWII
defeat, and the US administration of the Islands further complicated the sovereignty dispute.
As understood by the Chinese, the provisions of the 1943 Cairo Declaration and 1945
Potsdam Declaration, not mentioning, the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, effected the
return of all territories annexed by Imperial Japan, which included Taiwan and the
Pescadores, and supposedly by implication, Senkaku/Diaoyudao as an appurtenance of the
former (Shaw 1999:39-40; Taira 2004). The renunciation of Japanese claims to these
7 For an official position and statement on the Japanese claim, see “The Foreign Ministry’s View Concerning
the Rights to Ownership over the Senkaku Islands” on 8 March 1972 (AS 09/03/1972 cf. Chung 2004: Chp.3,
fn.4; see also Chiu 1999:11-12).
8 The term “Nansei Shoto”, which literally means “Southwestern islands”, is a geographic reference to “an arc
of islands lying between the southern end of Kyushu and Taiwan…[that] includes, from North to South, the
Tokara Islands, the Amami Islands, the Okinawa Islands, and the Yaeyama Islands” (cf. Taira 2004).
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territories was apparently, reaffirmed in the 1952 Japanese-Chinese Peace Treaty signed
between Japan and the ROC as then legitimate government of China (Chiu 1999:18; Su
2005:48). Accordingly, the Chinese argue that the American occupation of Senkaku/
Diaoyudao was in contravention of these international treaties, and therefore, neither
recognised Japan’s effective control of the islands, nor the US’ decision to revert their
administrative rights to the latter (Zhong 1996:14; Hu 21/05/2003; Chung 2004:29). In
contrast, the Japanese government maintains that the islands were not part the territories
ceded along with Taiwan in 1895, as there was no explicit reference to them under the terms
of the Shimonoseki Treaty (Suganuma 2000:118; Hagstrom 2003:142). Tokyo also asserts
that they were neither specifically mentioned in any of the above Declarations/Treaties, nor
did the Chinese government initially raise any objections to such omissions, let alone
challenge the postwar arrangement that placed them under US administration (Suganuma
2000:120-121; Matsui 1997:21-22; cf. Hagstrom 2003:142; Su 2005:48-49; Dai 2006:147).
To be sure, the ROC did express disagreement with Article 3 of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, while the PRC denounced it as illegal, since it was signed in the absence of
either representative of China, a point used by Beijing to refute Japanese claims of Chinese
non-objection to the placement of these islands under American control (Shaw 1999:41,
121-122; Cheng 1974:251-252; cf. Su 2005:fn.40; Taira 2004). However, the Chinese
contestations were mainly regarding the status of the Ryukyu and Okinawa islands, without
specifically referring to Senkaku/Diaoyudao, which according to observers, seems to
indicate that both Chinese governments were initially oblivious to their existence (Hagstrom
2003:fn.282; Shaw 1999:121; Downs and Saunders 1998/9:125).
Meanwhile, Washington’s policy was that Senkaku/Diaoyudao were part of its
Okinawa administration. Occasionally used by the US military for aerial bombardment
exercises (Suganuma 2000:121-122), the Americans initially grouped them together with
Okinawa and Ryukyu as an administrative unit (Blanchard 2000:121; cf. Hagstrom
2003:143; Drifte 2008b:29). However, Washington’s position concerning the island’s
sovereignty had become rather ambivalent by the time of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan
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(1971-1972), presumably due to the internationalisation of the dispute, and the Nixon
administration’s budding rapprochement policy towards Communist China that required a
more neutral American posture on the issue (Hagstrom 2003:143; Shoenbaum 2005).9
According to Chung, the Japanese-Chinese sovereignty contest over the archipelago
became even more “convoluted” by the 1970s, with both disputant-states vigorously
incorporating “the “law of the sea” language of continental shelves and exclusive economic
zones” to strengthen their respective claims (2004:29). The invocation of the UNCLOS
provisions invariably leads to quarrels over the other two correlated dimensions. The PRC
asserts its claims by concurrently invoking both the Continental Shelf Convention (CSC) and
EEZ provision, under the UNCLOS. As a coastal-state, Chung states that the basis of
China’s claims over the islands, and in fact, its “exclusive jurisdiction over the economic
resources in and under the entire ECS”, lie partly on the CSC-sanctioned argument that its
seabed is a “natural prolongation of the Chinese continent”, demarcated by the Okinawa
Trough (2004:29; Harrison 2005:6-7; Zhong 1996:10). Beijing also validates its claims using
the 1982 UNCLOS III provision, which allows a coastal- and maritime-state to exercise
jurisdiction over a 200 nautical-miles (nm) EEZ from its shore’s baseline (Chung 2004:31;
Dai 2006:136), via its 1992 “Territorial Waters Law” (TWL).10 Conversely, Japan’s position
as a maritime-state only entitles it to invoke the EEZ provision, which supports its claims of a
200nm EEZ spanning across the ECS from the Okinawa/Ryukyu shores that includes
Senkaku/Diaoyudao. Japan officially exercises its EEZ claims on July 20, 1996, via
legislation from the Japanese Diet (Green and Self 1996:37). Since the ECS is less than
400nm in width, Japan’s territorial and maritime claims overlap with those of China, thus
complicating a legal solution to the dispute (Su 2005:46: Drifte 2008b:31).11
9 The official US position is that the Okinawa Reversion Treaty “does not affect the legal status of those islands
at all” and Washington holds a neutral position with regard to the ownership status of the islands (Niksch 1996
cf. Narayanan 2005:15; fn.68; see also Drifte 2003:54).
10 The legislation is also officially translated as “Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone”, or “Law
on China’s Territorial Waters and Its Adjacent Areas” (Hagstrom 2003:82, fn.177).
11 According to Drifte (2008b:31), the delimitation of the ECS maritime border becomes more complicated, if
South Korea’s competing claims over the northern part of the ECS is taken into account.
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By virtue of the UNCLOS, Japan unilaterally limits its claims to a “median line”
equidistant between the Ryukyus and the Chinese mainland (Schoenbaum 2005), one
which China does not recognise, for fear of undermining its claims over Senkaku/Diaoyudao.
Interestingly, Japan’s successful claim to an extended median line in the ECS would depend
on the establishment of Japanese sovereignty over the Islands, a pre-condition that China is
acutely aware of. Since they are located significantly west of Japan, observers construe that
possession of Senkaku/Diaoyudao would enhance Tokyo’s bargaining position over the
location of an agreed median line, insofar as the islets (not rocks, though) are entitled to
their own continental shelf and EEZ (Harrison 2005; Schoenbaum 2005). Harrison claims
that they can be used “to demarcate the outermost extension of Japanese territory [which]
would push part of the median line westward, maximizing the Japanese share of the
seabed” (2005:6). Ferguson confirms that ownership entitles Japan to approximately “an
additional 40,000 square kilometers of EEZ” bringing extra resources to the Japanese
nation’s coffer (2004a). Such legal provisions not only make the possession of these
uninhabited islands all the more significant to both parties, but the legal ambiguity, in Drifte’s
opinion, promotes contending interpretations that complicate resolution to their sovereignty
claims over the archipelago, which correspondingly hinders the delimitation of the related
maritime border/zones (Drifte 2008b:31; Schoenbaum 2005).
Expectedly, both Japan and China hold a rigid position in the Senkaku/Diaoyudao
dispute. The Japanese government appears most reluctant to negotiate the issue, asserting
the islands as an “integral part” of Japanese territory, and even denies the existence of any
sovereignty dispute over them (MOFA 1996; Shaw 1999:27; Su 2005:49; Drifte 2008a:5).12
Apart from their economic values, these islands are important to Japanese geo-political and
strategic interests in that they straddle along sea-lanes vital to Japan’s economic, energy,
12 Indeed, most of my Japanese interviewees opined that Senkaku is a non-issue, and were reluctant to elaborate
on questions concerning the sovereignty dispute. For an official statement that denies the existence of the
Senkaku dispute, see MOFA, 23 July 1996. “Reported lighthouse construction on Kita-Kojima in the Senkaku
Islands” Press Conference by the Press Secretary [http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ press/1996/7/23.html#2
(accessed on 12/10/2007)]. See also related press statements, and Japan’s official position on Senkaku/
Diaoyudao, at MOFA’s website at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html. Meanwhile,
based on the official statements made over the years, Drifte opines that the Japanese position has evolved from
one of implicitly agreeing to shelving the dispute, to a denial of the existence of a territorial dispute (2008a:5).
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and military security (Suganuma 2000:13). Furthermore, Japan has unresolved territorial
disputes with Russia and South Korea over the Northern Territories/Kurile and Takeshima/
Tokdo Islands, respectively, and is understandably “reluctant to suspend Japanese territorial
claims to the Senkakus…for the sake of joint exploration and development with China, lest
this set a precedent that would jeopardize Japan’s position” (Harrison 2005:6) in these
disputes. Although both governments have taken a pragmatic stance and avoided military
conflicts over the ECS debacle, the intertwined notions of nationalism and territorial
sovereignty are increasingly constraining their policy-options, especially in the wake of
resurgent nationalism in both countries. In Japan’s case, domestic nationalist activities were
not only responsible for several bouts of diplomatic disputes with China over the Islands
since the 1970s, but rising Japanese nationalism has also ensured that they remain a highly
visible foreign policy issue, which limits Tokyo’s options when dealing with Beijing.
7.1.2. Domestic nationalist pressure and “internationalisation” of the ECS dispute
Aforementioned, the ECS was essentially a non-issue until the UNECAFE’s revelation of
potentially rich petroleum deposits in the waters off Senkaku/Diaoyudao. It reportedly
estimated the potential existence of an excess of “between 10 to 100 billion barrels” of oil in
and under the continental shelf between Japan and Taiwan, notably where the islands are
located (Park 1983:42-43, n.3; cf. Chung 2004:32; Downs and Saunders 1998/9:124). A
subsequent Japanese government survey strengthened the speculation, estimating “well
over 94.5 billion barrels of quality oil” trapped in the seabed to the northwest and south of
the archipelago (Harrison 2005:6). As major oil importers, the news predictably triggered
competing sovereignty claims by Taiwan and Japan.
The territorial dispute first manifested in September 1970, when Japanese police
evicted a group of Taiwanese reporters from one of the islets after their symbolic effort to
plant a Taiwanese flag, which elicited anti-Japanese protests and inspired the establishment
of oversea movements to defend Chinese interests in Senkaku/Diaoyudao (Downs and
Saunders 1998/9:126; Suganuma 2000:132; Chung 2004:34). The incident prompted Japan
to officially, reassert its sovereignty over the islands, but Tokyo ostensibly favoured the idea
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of deferring the ownership claims for joint exploration and development of the disputed
areas with Taipei, and even Seoul (Chiu 1999:7). This led to negotiations between
representatives from the three governments in November-December 1970, which saw the
formation of a “Liaison Committee” (Suganuma 2000:132) to facilitate discussions of a
tripartite “development cooperation” for the ECS (Chung 2004:32).
Despite its silence during the early stages of the sovereignty dispute, the PRC’s
exclusion from the joint development negotiations saw Beijing wasting no time in
denouncing the plans and thereafter, officially staking Communist China’s claims over the
islands13 (Blanchard 2006:214; Chiu 1999:9). China’s intervention virtually ceased all plans
for development cooperation in the disputed waters (Chung 2004:35), and brought the
“sovereignty question” back into the limelight, which erupted again in 1971-1972, following
the US decision to revert the Islands’ administrative rights to Japan. Washington’s neutrality
on the sovereignty issue notwithstanding, the Okinawa Reversion Treaty’s provision
triggered fierce public demonstrations across North America, Hong Kong and Taiwan, as
well as diplomatic protests from Beijing and Taipei (Shaw 1999:14-15). The controversy
subsided after Japan and China, in their capacity as the official claimant-states, agreed to
shelve the issue to facilitate diplomatic normalisation (see Drifte 2008a:4-5).
The next round of diplomatic contention occurred in April 1978, when the ultra-
nationalist group, Nihon Seinensha, erected a lighthouse on Uotsuri-shima, the largest of the
Senkaku/Diaoyudao islets, in an attempt to stake Japan’s claims over the disputed
archipelago (Huang 1997). The provocative action took place following sustained, albeit
unsuccessful efforts by rightwing, anti-China politicians to link the sovereignty issue to the
bilateral negotiations for the Japanese-Chinese PFT (Tretiak 1978:1241; Bedeski 1983:35-
37). Since the resumption of the talks in February 1978, pro-Taiwan and anti-PFT Diet-
members led by the LDP’s rightwing Seirankai had been pressuring the government to
13 According to Chiu (1999), The PRC was silent in the early stages of the dispute, only to join in the foray after
discovering Japanese proposal of shelving the ownership claims in favour of joint-development of the area with
Taiwan and South Korea. It began with a semi-official claim via an article in the Peking Review before the
Chinese MFA’s issuing of a statement of formal legal claim on 30 December 1971 (Chiu 1999:9).
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extract a favourable resolution to the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute from China as a pre-
condition for the inclusion of the so-called “anti-hegemony” clause in the PFT (Chung 2004:
36; Shaw 1999:16). Seeking for a “win-win” solution, the anti-PFT forces thought they could
“either scuttle the talks by adopting an intransigent posture over Senkaku, or at least exact
the islands as a price from the Chinese” (Chung 2004:36) for agreeing to the “clause”. China
forcefully remonstrated against the political affront by dispatching a fleet of more than 100
alledgedly armed fishing vessels to the disputed waters, to encircle the islands (Blanchard
2006:215).14 Instead of eliciting Japan’s conciliatory posture, the Chinese action galvanised
Japanese nationalist convictions that saw Seirankai members erecting a makeshift beacon,
before collaborating with Nihon Seinensha to construct the mentioned lighthouse (Chung
2004:41). A series of assertive diplomatic exchanges ensued before eventually abating, with
both governments agreeing “to shelve the sovereignty issue for future negotiations” to
facilitate the “more important” goal of realising the PFT (Takamine 2005:453-454).15
Following a twelve-years hiatus, the sovereignty dispute reignited in September
1990, when the J-MSA reportedly decided to recognise the Seinensha-built lighthouse as an
“official navigation mark” (Su 2005:47; Shaw 1999:17), and permitted its renovation (Chung
2004:42). The decision triggered instantaneous reaction from Taiwanese authorities, who
lodged an official complaint to the Japanese government before dispatching two fishing
boats filled with athletes carrying an Olympic torch to the islands to symbolise Taiwan’s
claims (Deans 1996:4-5; Hifumi 1996:21). Despite intense media scrutiny, the J-MSA
“forcefully” prevented their landing, eliciting more media criticisms and public demonstrations
in Taiwan and Hong Kong (Whiting 1992:48). Although largely a dispute between Taiwan
and Japan, the PRC did respond, albeit belatedly and reluctantly, by joining the chorus of
denunciation of Japan’s claims and demanded Japanese authorities to curtail activities of
14 The PLA-Navy also intended to launch a large-scale naval exercise, but was overruled by Deng Xiaoping, a
decision ostensibly made in assessment of the priority given to attaining the much sought after “anti-hegemony”
clause from the Japanese in the PFT (Bachman 1998:40-41 cf. Downs and Saunders 1998/9:126).
15 According to a Yomiuri Shimbun report on February 27, 1992, Deng Xiaoping allegedly told Japanese foreign
minister, Sonoda Sunao during the 1978 PFT negotiations that “China tacitly admitted Japan’s practical control
of the Senkaku Islands” (quoted in Takamine 2005:454).
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ultra-nationalist organisations (Downs and Saunders 1998/9:128-129).16 China’s low-profile
response probably reflected its gratitude and recognition towards Japanese support in the
aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, which saw Beijing employing mild rhetoric rather
than concrete actions to challenge Tokyo’s intransigence (Whiting 1992:48; Chung
2004:43). Following both sides’ reiterations of claims to the islands, the sovereignty issue
was, indecisively shelved again to prevent it from undermining the amicable atmosphere of
the bilateral ties (Weisman 31/10/1990:A7).
Controversy soon re-emerged in 1992 following the promulgation of China’s TWL,
which explicitly located Senkaku/Diaoyudao within Chinese territorial waters, much to
Japan’s consternation (Hagstrom 2003:82). Subsequent ratification to the UNCLOS and the
updating of continental shelf and EEZ claims by both governments in 1996, ratcheted up
bilateral tension (Su 2005:47). Fuelled by provocative nationalist actions and counteractions
from both sides, the already simmering dispute culminated in a protracted diplomatic crisis
that saw both governments initially playing to the nationalist tunes and taking assertive
stances, before scrambling to defuse the potentially explosive situation that threatened to
spiral out of rational control, after the dispute suffered its first casualty.
The 1996 incident17 started when Nihon Seinensha made yet another attempt to
assert Japan’s claim by constructing a lighthouse on Kita-Kojima, one of the smaller
Senkaku/Diaoyudao islets, days before the Japanese Diet ratified its EEZ claims, which
encompass the contested archipelago. Apparently timed to put pressure on, and influence
the Diet resolution (Chung 2004:43-44), Seinensha’s action and Tokyo’s assertiveness over
the issue, not mentioning, PM Hashimoto’s “timely” visit to Yasukuni, emboldened the
Japanese nationalists (Downs and Saunders 1998/9:133; Green 2001:86). Thereafter,
another uyoku organisation known as the Senkaku Islands Defense Association erected the
Hinomaru on Uotsuri-shima, while Seinensha continued testing Chinese patience with
16 For a detailed anecdotal coverage and IR theoretical assessment of the September 1990 Senkaku/Diaoyudao
incident, see Downs and Saunders (1998/9), Bong (2002), and Chung (2004).
17 For an interesting analysis of nationalism and the 1996 dispute from the Chinese perspective, see Downs and
Saunders (1998/9), and Deans (1996; 2000).
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further provocative activities on the islands (Chung 2004:44). Public demonstrations
reverberated from Hong Kong and Taiwan in response to the provocations (Kristof
16/09/1996). Unlike the previous incident, the Chinese government reacted more firmly this
time around, lodging diplomatic protests against Tokyo’s assertion of claims, and criticising
the Japanese authority for their alleged indifference in curtailing the nationalist activities.
Under pressure from domestic nationalist forces during the period of high
nationalism, both governments had to demonstrate their nationalist credentials by appearing
assertive and uncompromising, although “behind-the-scene” negotiations were made to
prevent further escalation of the dispute (Downs and Saunders 1998/9; Bong 2002; Chung
2004). Nonetheless, subsequent clashes between Chinese protesters attempting to land on
the islands and the J-MSA that tried to prevent their landing resulted in the death of a Hong
Kong activist, which led to more virulent popular anti-Japanese demonstrations across
Greater China (Bong 2002:81).18 The controversy receded after Beijing took measures to
rein in nationalist sentiments and settled for a diplomatic compromise, in which Tokyo,
though refusing to demolish the Kita-Kojima lighthouse, agreed not to recognise it.
These past disputes demonstrate the propensity of nationalist groups in Japan
manipulating the Senkaku/Diaoyudao issue to advance their parochial agenda, and in so
doing, trigger reactive popular Chinese nationalism that leads to diplomatic rows between
the two governments (Downs and Saunders 1998/9; Deans 2000; Bong 2002; Chung 2004).
They also suggest the salience of domestic nationalist pressure in constraining Japan’s
behaviour vis-à-vis China, where the Japanese state is inclined, to an extent, to assuage
nationalist demands by standing firm on the sovereignty dispute.
Nonetheless, the fact that none of these diplomatic crises led to military
engagements, and Tokyo’s willingness to settle for compromises to de-escalate bilateral
18 On September 26, David Chan, a Hong Kong activist drowned after reportedly jumping into the water with
four other activists when their freighter, Kien Hwa No.2 was blocked by J-MSA/JCG vessels from landing on
Senkaku/Diaoyudao. His death triggered popular demonstrations across Hong Kong and Taiwan, while Chinese
authorities scrambled to diffuse anti-Japanese sentiments and curb protest in Mainland China (see also CNN
World News 26/09/1996; SCMP 10/10/1996; YS 07/10/2006).
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tension suggest the prevalence of other determinants, and limits of nationalism in shaping
Japanese policy-options over the ECS dispute, and its overall China policy, for that matter.
For example, the prompt containment of the crises in the early 1970s can be attributed to
the prevailing Cold War international environment and US policy-shift toward the PRC that
drove Japan to prioritise Japanese-Chinese reconciliation. Similarly, the willingness of
Japanese state-elites to “dismiss” sustained domestic nationalist pressure during the 1978
crisis highlights the importance of securing the PFT to substantiate the de facto “strategic
alliance” with China against a common security threat in the Soviet Union (Bedeski 1983:37;
Whiting 1992:48; Zhao 1996:193-195). These instances reflect NCR’s assumptions
regarding the salience of external variables vis-à-vis domestic considerations, i.e. nationalist
pressure, in shaping state behaviour/preferences, under structurally determinate/high-
pressure international conditions. Conversely, the protracted diplomatic row and Japanese
assertiveness in managing the 1996 incident suggest increased domestic nationalist
leverage in China policy-making, under a relatively low-pressure post-Cold War international
environment. Furthermore, a perceptively favourable relative power position vis-à-vis China,
in terms of “allied resolve” and bilateral exchanges, allowed Tokyo to exercise rather more
nationalistic posturing during the dispute, which mirrors the NCR dictum.
This leads to the research question regarding the extent to which domestic
nationalist pressure affects Japan’s policy-options when managing the ECS problem
between 2001-2006, and whether they are directly induced by the emotional properties of
nationalism and identity politics, and/or calculated responses by the Koizumi administration
for domestic and diplomatic expediency. Indeed, the Japanese government has somewhat
displayed a more assertive attitude vis-à-vis China over the ECS issues since 2001,
following revitalised domestic nationalist impulses, and the advent of a widely regarded
nationalist-oriented leadership in Japan. The islands’ sovereignty dispute has also become
more complicated. Besides the occasional provocation by nationalists from both countries,
China’s growing physical presence in the contested waters via repeated ship incursions into
the area, and its unilateral decision to develop gas fields at the fringe, albeit Chinese side of
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the median line, have broadened the scope of the debacle, and increased the frequency of
diplomatic quarrels. Against the backdrop of a fluid external environment and regional power
shifts that perpetuated Japanese insecurity towards the Chinese, an NCR analysis of the
interactions between nationalism and these changing external dynamics can help explicate
nationalism’s salience in shaping Japan’s China policy over the ECS dispute.
7.2. Nationalism and the International-Domestic Nexus in Japan’s China
Policy-making over the ECS Dispute
In view of its three-pronged nature and constant recurrence throughout the period of
investigation, an overview of the ECS debacle is elaborated, before applying the NCR model
to assess nationalism’s salience vis-à-vis other variables in affecting Japan’s management
of the: 1) Senkaku/Diaoyudao sovereignty contest; 2) Chinese incursions into the disputed
waters; and 3) natural gas dispute.
7.2.1. An overview of the ECS conflict (2001-2006)
The ECS remained a “sea of simmering conflict” (Curtin 2005c) even after Japan and China
managed to rein in their strident diplomatic row in 1996, with occasional incidents involving
provocations by nationalists from both sides eliciting rhetorical exchanges between the two
governments throughout the twilight of the 20th century.19 Unlike before, the Chinese have
also increased their physical presence in the disputed waters off Senkaku/Diaoyudao since
1999, via the dispatch of scientific research vessels, under the pretext of conducting
maritime research (Su 2005:47). The frequency of Chinese vessel sighting in the area rose
spectacularly since 1998, including suspected PLA-Navy intelligence gathering activities to
map the sea floor for future Chinese submarine operations (Malik 2000:22; cf. Roy 2003:3;
Drifte 2003:56-57; Glosny 2004; Goldstein and Murray 2004).20
19 Among the incidents included the landing of Diet-member, Nishimura Shingo on a Senkaku/Diaoyudao islet
in May 1997, which triggred the usual “reaction-counteraction” dynamic that saw a Chinese diplomatic protest
and Japanese reiteration of their position and denial of official involvement (CNN Report 06/05/1997). This was
followed by clashes between Chinese protesters and the J-MSA/JCG in September 1998 that led to a Chinese
boat sinking. See “Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands,” GlobalSecurity.org [http://www/globalsecurity.org/military/
world/war/senkaku.htm (accessed on 09/08/2007)]. In 2000, a Japanese rightwing group made another landing
to build a shrine on one of the islets that brought further diplomatic exchanges (Su 2005:47).
20 Chinese research vessel incursions into Japanese EEZ rose from 4 in 1997 to 14 in 1998, and 30 in 1999 (YS
28/08/2000 cf. Takamine 2005:454). Drifte (2003:57) noted the number of incursions at 33 and 24, for 1999 and
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Viewed by Japan as a violation of the UNCLOS, these repeated Chinese forays into
Japanese-claimed EEZ has become a key diplomatic irritant, which led to bilateral
negotiations in September 2000 for the establishment of a mutual advanced notification
mechanism regarding maritime research activities (Przystup 2001a:93). Although both sides
reached an agreement in February 2001, the “prior notification” mechanism appeared vague
on the definition of research activities and geographical area involved (JT 14/02/2001; Drifte
2008a:18-20),21 which eventually saw China rescinding its obligation several months later,
with the “illegal” return of Chinese ships to the contested waters (Przystup 2001c:112; KN
18/07/2001).22 China’s failure to observe the agreement elicited strong criticism from Japan,
and growing security concerns regarding Chinese intentions in the ECS, let alone
capabilities, given the PLA-Navy’s rapid expansion/qualitative build-up (NIDS 2002:214).
Tokyo released an incriminating, five-year review of China’s maritime activities within
Japanese EEZ on 26 July 2001, soon after the Chinese violation, which highlighted possible
military intelligence operations in the areas concerned, while FM Tanaka took the matter up
with her Chinese counterpart during the ARF meeting in Hanoi, where the Yasukuni issue
was also raised (YS 26/07/2001; Przystup 2001c:112).
The incursions halted temporarily after August 2001, with no violations reported until
year’s end, when a fushinsen appeared in the disputed waters. Subsequently identified to be
North Korean, it was intercepted by, and exchanged fire with the JCG before sinking off the
Chinese EEZ (Samuels 2007/8:96). The incident triggered protracted diplomatic exchanges
between Japan and China that lasted well into 2002 concerning alleged Japanese
2000, respectively. However, there is a categorical difference between the number of Chinese research vessels
and warship sightings in Japan’s EEZ (see Drifte 2003:56-58). Regarding the latter, the figure also significantly
rose from two in 1998, to 27 and 31 in 1999 and 2001 (cf. Drifte 2003:58; Malik 2000:22 cf. Roy 2003:3). A
PLA-Navy vessel also successfully circumnavigated the Japanese archipelago in May 2000, an event which
heightened Japanese security planners concerns regarding implications of Chinese incursions on Japan’s
maritime security (Calder 2001:108-109).
21 The advanced notification framework agreement signed on February 13, 2001, stipulates the requirement for
both sides to provide at least two-months advanced notice, including details of the vessel and crew, as well as
the objective, period, and place of research activities (JT 14/02/2001). For a discussion on Chinese maritime
incursions, and the setup and weaknesses of the advanced notification mechanism, see Drifte (2008a:18-20)
22 Between July 9-16, 2001, the JCG discovered several Chinese ships operating near Senkaku/Diaoyudao in
Japan’s claimed EEZ, without prior notification, which contravened the February 2001 bilateral agreement on
advanced notification (Przystup 2001c:112).
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aggression, the prospect of raising the sunken ship, and speculations of Chinese
involvement in supplying the vessel, prior to meeting its fate (Przystup 2002b:99-101).
Although relatively quiet throughout 2001-2002, the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute
resurfaced early January 2003, when Japanese media reported that the government had
controversially leased three of the islets, Uotsuri-shima, Kita-Kojima, and Minami-Kojima,
from their Japanese owner (YS 31/12/2002), triggering diplomatic protests from the Chinese
MFA on January 3, and Vice-FM, Wang Yi, two days later (Reuters 03/01/2003; KN
05/01/2003).23 Japanese Vice-FM, Takeuchi Yukio, responded with the usual reiteration of
Japan’s rightful claims to the archipelago, but called for a “cool-headed approach” to avoid
damaging overall ties (cf. Przystup 2003b:101). Despite mutual governmental effort to
contain the issue, Chinese nationalists were not prepared to go silent without responding to
what was perceived as a move by Japan to strengthen its sovereignty claims (Roy 2003:3).
On 22 June 2003, a group of mainland Chinese and Hong Kong activists attempted to land
on the islands, but was “appropriately” repelled by the JCG (SCMP 23/06/2003; Reuters
23/06/2003)24. Japanese nationalist/rightwingers retaliated with a landing in August,
prompting protests from Beijing (KN 26/08/2003). The Chinese activists remained
undeterred as they regrouped and made further landing attempts in October (SCMP
10/10/2003). Meanwhile, Chinese naval/maritime incursions were limited in 2003, with the
JDA detecting only eight such “intrusions” (Przystup 2004b:109). Nonetheless, the spotting
of a Chinese Ming-class submarine in international waters close to Senkaku/Diaoyudao by a
MSDF P-3C on November 12, did raise Japanese concerns regarding China’s stealth-like
strategy in establishing a forceful presence in the ECS25 (JT 13/11/2003).
23 The Japanese government leasing of the islands began in April 2002 at a cost of JPY22 million annually. The
decision was apparently meant to prevent their sale, or block anyone from landing on the islands (BBC
03/01/2003; JT 06/01/2003).
24 For more details of Japanese actions, see also “Japanese gunboats foil protest attempt on disputed Diaoyutai
islands,” Agence France-Presse, 23 June 2003.
25 There were conflicting reports on the figure regarding Chinese naval incursion, with the Web Memo
published by the Heritage Foundation citing a declassified Japanese government report in January 2004,
numbering the intrusion to six occasions in 2003, which included two violations of Japanese territorial waters
by Ming-class submarines (Tkacik, Jr. 2004; see also JT 13/11/2003).
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On January 14, 2004, two fishing vessels carrying twenty Chinese activists sailed to
Senkaku/Diaoyudao in what was their third attempt since last June to land on the islands
(AFP 15/01/2004). The vessels subsequently turned back after being intercepted, and
denied by JCG ships on January 15 (JT 16/01/2004). The media reported that the Chinese
boats were attacked with water cannon by ten Japanese warships, causing injury to a
Chinese crew (BBC 15/01/2004).26 Interestingly though, the incident was not reported in the
Japanese media (Ferguson 2004a). The relatively inconspicuous incident, nonetheless,
served as the precursor to the next diplomatic clash over the islands in March 2004, which
saw the dramatic arrest of Chinese activists by Japanese authorities following their
successful fourth landing attempt. Preceding the incident was the resumption of illegal
Chinese activities in the disputed waters, which prompted a MOFA protest.27
On March 24, seven mainland Chinese activists from the “China Federation for
Defending the Diaoyu Islands” landed on Uotsuri-shima/Diaoyu-dao, after successfully
evading the JCG patrol ships (JT 25/03/2004). According to Curtin, after spending hours
planting the Chinese flag, giving mobile phone interviews to the Chinese media, and
avoiding capture, they were finally taken into custody by the Okinawa Prefectural Police for
violating the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law (2004b; KN 24/03/2004).
The incident was significant in that it marked the first time mainland Chinese nationals were
directly involved and detained for landing on Senkaku/Diaoyudao (Su 2005:47; Smith 2004).
The Japanese government lodged an immediate protest (MDN 24/03/2004), whereas the
Chinese authority responded by denouncing the provocative action, and demanded the
release of the detainees28 amid popular Chinese protest outside the Japanese embassy in
26 For a comprehensive report, see also “Japanese warship attacked Chinese fishing boats in areas off Diaoyu
Island,” PLA Daily, 16 January 2004.
27 A Chinese vessel was sighted on 17 February 2004, conducting “illegal” research activities in Japan’s EEZ,
prompting the MOFA to call for a cease in Chinese activities on March 2-4. This was followed by Vice-FM
Takeuchi’s statement on March 8, 2004, deeming the Chinese activities as “extremely regrettable” in response
to the JDA report, citing 11 instances of Chinese illegal and ostensibly military-oriented research activities,
since the beginning of the year (cf. Przystup 2004b:109, 114-115).
28 The official position of the PRC on the incident can be found in the statement issued by the Chinese MFA
spokesperson on 25 March 2004 posted on MFA website at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgmel/eng/yrth/t80720.
htm (accessed on 10/10/2007). For Japanese and Chinese media interpretations of both governments’ handling
of the dispute, see “Free the Diaoyus activists now, Beijing demands,” South China Morning Post, 26 March
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Beijing, where Japanese flags were purportedly burnt (MDN 25/03/2004; BBC 25/03/2004).
In Tokyo, indignation flared up as rightwing politicians and the media engaged in
nationalistic rhetoric to assert Japan’s claims, while Nihon Seinensha announced its
intention to send another expedition to the island in a “tit-for-tat” response to Chinese
provocation (Curtin 2004b; AFP 25/03/2004). The Japanese government, nonetheless,
decided against pressing criminal charges, and instead deported the activists on March 26,
in an effort to defuse the situation (BBC 26/03/2004; DY 28/03/2004). The following day, FM
Kawaguchi called on her Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing to prevent a recurrence of the
incident, and protested the flag burning (KN 27/03/2004). This episode of the ECS dispute
not only resulted in the cancellation of a scheduled bilateral talks on the UNCLOS,29 but also
saw the Diet promptly passing an unprecedented resolution addressing Senkaku/Diaoyudao
as an issue of Japanese territorial integrity (JT 31/03/2004; DY 01/04/2004).30 Despite being
“diluted”,31 the motion drew instant denunciation from the Chinese MFA (XNA 01/04/2004).
By late May 2004, the territorial row developed into a maritime boundary and energy
dispute involving Japanese contestations over Chinese repeated incursions into Japan’s
EEZ, and more contentiously, exploration activities in the ECS natural gas fields close to,
albeit on the Chinese side of the so-called “median line”.32 Bilateral tension began to brew
after both sides disagreed over the delimitation issue in the rescheduled UNCLOS meeting
on April 22. The Chinese continued their “illegal” research forays, leading to MOFA’s official
protest on May 13, several days after the JCG discovered a Chinese vessel operating near
Uotsuri-shima (BBC 13/05/2004). Despite Beijing’s refutation, the ship left the disputed
waters a day after MOFA’s protest (BBC 14/05/2004).
2004; “Japan told not to harm Diaoyu Islands activists,” People’s Daily, 25 March 2004; and “Japan grills isle
intruders; China demands their release,” Japan Times, 26 March 2004.
29 The cancellation was possibly a belated response by the Chinese leadership to divert nationalist political
pressure after a perceived soft handling of the March incident (JT 01/04/2004).
30 A resolution aimed at “preserving [Japan’s] territorial integrity” was adopted on March 30, 2004 by the
Lower House Security Committee, which requested the Japanese government to “forcefully promote all sorts of
measures, including diplomatic efforts” to defend Japanese territorial sovereignty (cf. Przystup 2004c:124)].
31 The Koizumi administration, represented by CCS Fukuda, reportedly implored the LDP to use non-
provocative language in the motion (DY 01/04/2004).
32 The disputed oil and natural gas fields include Chunxiao/Shirakaba, Tianwaitian/Kashi, Duanqiao/Kusunoki,
Longjing/Asunaro and Lengquan/Kikyo (Drifte 2008b:39; see also Masaki 13/03/2007; Curtin 2005c).
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However, Japanese media reports emerged late May concerning China’s
construction of exploration facilities in close proximity to the ECS median line (Liao
2007:40). Confirmation by the Japanese government on June 7, prompted media and LDP
pressure for a strong response toward Chinese actions (KN 08/06/2004; Przystup
2004c:125). Concerned that the Chinese exploration activities would siphon off gas from the
Japanese side of the demarcation line, Tokyo requested for Chinese exploration data during
the Foreign Ministers meeting at the sidelines of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue on June 21
(Takahashi 27/07/2004). Beijing declined, and instead, proposed joint development
(Valencia 24/02/2005), but Japan was sceptical, due to concerns over the Senkaku/
Diaoyudao sovereignty status (Drifte 2008a/b).33 The deadlock led to METI chief, Nakagawa
Shoichi declaring on June 29 regarding Japan’s intention to start its own exploration of the
area (AFP 29/06/2004), which the Japanese promptly initiated on July 7, despite Chinese
apprehension and mutual calls to resolve the issue through “peaceful consultation” (AFP
07/07/2004; Przystup 2004d:117). Bilateral tension continued to simmer, with China
reportedly granting exploration rights to Chinese companies in areas alledgedly within
Japan’s EEZ (BBC 17/10/2004). Mutual consultation did not materialise until late October
2004, when working-level talks finally began in Beijing.34 Although the talks failed to yield
any solution, both sides agreed to maintain the dialogue (BBC 25/10/2004).
Meanwhile, Chinese incursions into Japanese EEZ intensified throughout July-
August 2004, with various sightings of research and naval ships conducting oceanographic
surveys reported around the vicinity of Senkaku/Diaoyudao and Okinotorishima,35 fuelling
33 According to Drifte (2008a/b), Japan has always insisted on settling the demarcation issue as a pre-condition.
34 The inaugural director-general-level talks took place on 25 October 2004. Japan was represented by MOFA’s
AOAB chief, Yabunaka Mitoji, and Kodaira Noboyuki of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, while
the head of MFA’s Asian Affairs, Cui Tiankai, represented the PRC (Jiji 25/10/2004). There were altogether 11
rounds of “Japan-China Consultations concerning the ECS and Other Matter” before a breakthrough was
achieved with the announcement for joint development on June 18, 2008 (cf. Drifte 2008b:41; Table 1).
35 Okinotorishima is the southernmost island of the Japanese archipelago, which became a Japanese-Chinese
dispute since 2004, following China’s contestation of Japan’s definition of Okinotorishima as an “island”,
which allows the Japanese to establish claim for an extended EEZ, at the expense of Chinese EEZ claims, and
maritime/geo-strategic interests. The Chinese refuted Japan’s claim, stating that Okinotorishima, used by Japan
to establish its EEZ, is more a “rock” rather than an “island”, which disqualifies Japanese claims over its EEZ
boundary measured from that point (cf. Przystup 2004c:124). Consequentially, China also refuted Japan’s
claims of its repeated EEZ violations notably near Okinotorishima (Drifte 2008a:20). For a detailed discussion
on the Okinotorishima issue, see Yoshikawa (2005; 2007).
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speculations over China’s intention to expand its naval/submarine operations, not
mentioning undermine Japan’s maritime resource survey in the ECS36 (Tkacik Jr. 2004;
Przystup 2004d:119). Already reflected in the Defense of Japan, approved in July, which
called for vigilance over Chinese military development,37 Japan’s security concerns were
further heightened on 10 November 2004 by the discovery of an unidentified submarine
traveling submerged through Japanese waters off Okinawa (JT 11/11/2004b).38
Subsequently identified as a Chinese Han-class nuclear submarine, the incursion led to “the
highest alert levels” in postwar Japan (Fanell 2006), as MSDF destroyers and planes
tracked the vessel for two hours, while it manoeuvred towards Chinese waters (Takamine
2005:440; Ferguson 2004b).39 On November 12, MOFA protested the incursion and
demanded an apology (AFP 12/11/2004), but the Chinese MFA refuse to respond, pending
on its ongoing investigation over the incident (Reuters 13/11/2004). Meanwhile, reactive
anti-Chinese nationalism unravelled in Japan, fuelled by a barrage of speculations, rhetorical
attacks, and critical statements by the Japanese media and political parties (Chan 2004).
The controversy finally ended on November 16, when China accepted responsibility,
attributing the incident to “technical errors” during training routines (Przystup 2005a:122),
and extended what Japan quickly interpreted to be an “apology”40 (Chan 2004).
The submarine incident nonetheless, exacerbated Japan’s perception of China as a
security concern,41 which already saw the JDA developing contingency plans envisaging the
36 On July 14, 2004, a Chinese naval vessel allegedly overtook a Japanese resource survey ship in the disputed
waters in a hazardous manner, forcing it to alter its route to avoid collision (Tkacik, Jr. 2004).
37 Apart from this annual JDA white paper, then LDP secretary-general, Abe Shinzo also regarded the
perception of Chinese military threat as conventional wisdom in Japan, during an interview with Asahi’s AERA
magazine in late July 2004 (cf. Przystup 2004d:123).
38 Under Article 20 of the UNCLOS, a submarine is required to surface and display its national flag, while
transiting the territorial waters of other foreign countries (cf. Dai 2006:140, fn.31).
39 The MSDF had apparently detected the submarine days earlier, operating submerged near Japan’s maritime
border. The JDA was alerted when it trespassed into Japanese waters between the remote southwesterly islands
of Tarajima, Miyako and Ishigaki, where it was immediately tracked by two MSDF destroyers, and a P-3C
aircraft, until it returned to Chinese waters. For specific information regarding how the incident transpired, see
Curtin (2004c), and Ferguson (2004b). MSDF commanders later revealed that the incident could have triggered
the first Japanese-Chinese naval battle since WWII (YS 22/11/2004 cf. Takamine 2005:440).
40 The Chinese confirmed and deemed the incident as “extremely regrettable” during a meeting between
Chinese Vice-FM, Wu Dawei and the Japanese ambassador, Anami Koreshige in Beijing (see MOFA 2005:37).
41 Furthermore, China’s decision to mark its 16th consecutive year of double-digit growth in defence expenditure
with a call for another 12.6% increase in 2005 (XNA 05/03/2005) did little in convincing the Japanese
regarding its benign ambitions.
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possibility of a Japanese-Chinese military confrontation over the ECS resources and
territorial claims, in conjunction with the drafting of the new National Defence Programme
Guidelines (NDPG) (Dai 2006:140).42 Besides strengthening the US-Japan alliance via the
“Two-plus-Two” talks in February 2005,43 Japanese press also reported in March 2005 on
Tokyo’s consideration to establish a stronger military presence in Okinawa’s southernmost
islands near Senkaku/Diaoyudao, ostensibly to counter growing Chinese presence in the
area (Przystup 2005b:114).
The disputes over EEZ encroachment and natural gas exploration continued to fester
during early 2005. In February, Japan accused China of extending its exploration activities
beyond the median line into Japanese EEZ,44 and demanded a cessation of activities and
renewed request for the provision of exploration data, which Beijing promptly rejected
(Harrison 2005:4; Przystup 2005b:115; Brooke 29/03/2005; Drifte 2008b:37). Bilateral
tension was also aggravated by Tokyo’s controversial decision to place the Seinensha-built
lighthouse on Uotsuri-shima under state control, triggering instantaneous Chinese diplomatic
and popular protest (KN 09/02/2005).45 This was followed by other reported decisions
between early March-June to develop, erect a lighthouse, and provide an address for
Okinotorishima, to substantiate Japan’s claims to an extended EEZ (AFP 20/06/2005;
Yoshikawa 2005; 2007).46 Japan’s decision to consider the applications and granting of
exploration rights in the ECS to Japanese oil companies in April 2005, further exacerbated
Chinese consternation (Harrison 2005:4-5). Compounded by several other issues mentioned
in previous chapters, bilateral ties spiralled dangerously downward in April 2005, as anti-
42 For details of the contingency plans, see “Defense strategists look to China’s attack threat,” Japan Times, 9
November 2004.
43 Although the joint statement of the “Two-plus-Two” talks, officially known as the “Joint Statement of the
US-Japan Security Consultative Committee” generally calls for “greater collaboration between US and Japanese
forces…in an area stretching from Northeast Asia to South China Sea” (quoted in Klare 2006), the geographical
definition also suggests the inclusion of Taiwan and, possibly the ECS (see Klare 2006).
44 On February 18, METI Minister Nakagawa Shoichi remarked the possibility of two out of three areas
currently developed by China in the ECS extending to the Japanese side of the median line, based on the
METI’s interim report released that day (Brooke 29/03/2005; see also Drifte 2008b:37).
45 On 9 February 2005, CCS Hosoda announced the government’s take-over of responsibility and management
of the Uotsuri lighthouse. The decision prompted Beijing to call the move as “illegal and invalid”, and “a
serious provocation”, while popular anti-Japanese protest began to resonate across China (KN 09/02/2005).
46 The Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport officially gave Okinotorishima an address (No.1
Okonotori Island, Ogasawara Village, Tokyo) on June 17, 2005 in an apparent effort to strengthen Japan’s
expanded EEZ claims from the island’s baseline (see also Liu Henry C.K. 09/09/2006; Przystup 2005b:132).
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Japanese demonstrations spread across Chinese cities. Mutual efforts to de-escalate
tensions in the aftermath saw both sides resuming bilateral consultations on the ECS issues
on May 30-31. This second-round talks again ended fruitless as disagreement over each
other’s requests and proposals for joint development stagnated the progress of seeking a
resolution to the dispute,47 prompting METI to grant exploration rights to Teikoku Oil on July
14 (Jiji 14/07/2005).
The ECS gas dispute continued to escalate, with both sides pushing ahead their
unilateral development plans. With the third round of consultation on September 30 –
October 1 ending in deadlock, while the fourth, planned for October 19 was effectively
stymied by Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit two days earlier, the prospect of a resolution appeared
dim. Meanwhile, the ECS became increasingly volatile as the presence of Chinese navy
warships near the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas fields in September 2005 compelled the LDP to
legislate for the protection of Japanese exploration activities, which was subsequently
approved on 10 March 2006 (SCMP 14/09/2005; Przystup 2006a:116; Valencia 2006).48
Semi-formal talks resumed in January 2006 leading to the recommencement of
official consultation in March, but yielded no progress. China advanced a joint development
proposal in the Beijing dialogue, which Japanese diplomats agreed to bring back for further
study (AFP 07/03/2006).49 However, the “provocative” proposal, which called for joint
development of two areas, one near the median line but in the waters disputed by Japan
and South Korea, and the other in the vicinity of Senkaku/Diaoyudao, was immediately
rejected by key state-elites like Abe Shinzo and Aso Taro (AP 08/03/2006). It also elicited
calls for counter-measures against continuous Chinese exploration activities (KN
15/03/2006), including military response in the event of unprovoked Chinese attack on
47 For more details about the second-round consultation, see “China refuses to halt gas projects: Japan refuses
proposed joint exploration of the disputed area,”Japan Times, 1 June 2005.
48 It was reported that five Chinese warships were detected in the disputed area in September prior to the Lower
House Elections. A Chinese destroyer reportedly targeted its guns on a MSDF P-3C at the vicinity of the
Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field, while Chinese surveillance planes were seen in the area monitoring the operation
of Japanese naval ships (Curtin 2005c; Valencia 2006; Fanell 2006; Drifte 2008b:37-38).
49 Although both sides agreed in principle during this round of talks to pursue joint development in the areas,
they remained apart over the specific area where it should take place (see also JT 08/03/2006).
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Japanese vessels operating at the disputed waters.50 Indeed, the SDF planned to conduct
joint exercise with the US Marines between January 9-27, 2006, focusing on the ECS,
including the defence of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Nikkei 31/12/2005). Despite further
working-level dialogues in May and July 2006, a resolution over the ECS gas dispute
remained elusive (JT 19/05/2006; 11/07/2006; PD 10/07/2006),51 as Koizumi’s premiership
drew to a close in September. Incidents concerning the ECS gas dispute and Senkaku/
Diaoyudao continued to occur during the early months of the Abe administration, against the
backdrop of improved bilateral ties, as the new PM sought to mend fences with China.
7.3. A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation of Nationalism and Japan’s China Policy
towards the ECS Dispute
The following section maps the Koizumi administration’s perceived position during the
related ECS incidents within the four quadrants of the NCR diagram, via the assessment of,
and inferences on the prevailing international-domestic conditions and actors/factors, and
their interactions that influenced Japan’s China policy-making. Although the analysis draws
attention to all three aspects of the ECS dispute, empirical attention is devoted to specific
incidents, namely the 2004 Senkaku/Diaoyudao debacle involving the detention of Chinese
activists, the Chinese submarine intrusion in November of the same year, and the natural
gas exploration issue, which is addressed as a protracted dispute between 2004 and 2006.
7.3.1. The Senkaku/Diaoyudao incidents (2003-2004)
Japan’s management of the events leading to the March 2004 diplomatic row over
Senkaku/Diaoyudao highlights the interaction between domestic nationalist pressure and
Japanese state-elites’ perceptions/calculations regarding the prevailing external
environment and their domestic political resolves, which constrained their policy-options
towards China. Internationally, the post-Cold War conditions stipulated in the previous case-
50 The SDF, in its “Security and Guarding Plans” has, for the first time, identified China as a potential threat,
and planned for contingencies involving Chinese invasion of Senkaku/Diaoyudao (Valencia 2006; IHT
27/09/2005).
51 Nonetheless, both sides agreed to shelve the EEZ delimitation issue to advance joint development
negotiations during the May 2006 talks (Drifte 2008b:40) while the July round saw a mutual agreement to
establish a panel of technical experts to facilitate resolution of, as well as a mechanism to avoid “contingencies”
in the ECS (JT 11/07/2006; see also Fanell 2006).
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study, namely a fluid external environment and strengthening allied resolve (via the US-
Japan alliance) provided the Koizumi administration an opportunity to redress Japan’s
traditionally deferential diplomacy vis-à-vis China. The presence of such an environment,
against the backdrop of domestic nationalist undercurrent has had Tokyo demonstrating
greater resolve in asserting its sovereignty claims over Senkaku/Diaoyudao since the 1990s.
This is reflected by its assertive posturing during the 1996 incident, and subsequently, what
observers noticed as an incremental strategy to strengthen its “effective control”52 over the
islands (Su 2005; Chung 2004). Indeed, this Japanese strategy was responsible for the
2004 dispute, beginning with media revelation on Tokyo’s controversial leasing of the three
islets in January 2003 that instigated a series of landing attempts by Chinese nationalists
between June 2003 and March 2004 to challenge the Japanese state’s action.
In many ways, Tokyo’s decision to lease the islands was ushered by similar external-
domestic conditions, as perceived by the Koizumi administration that elicited the premier’s
third Yasukuni visit in January 2003. So, what were the conditions leading to the March 2004
Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute, and to what extent was Tokyo’s assertive handling of the
incident attributed to domestic nationalist pressure? For a start, the prevailing international
environment that facilitated Koizumi’s New Year’s Day 2004 Shrine visit remained relatively
unchanged, especially in terms of Japan’s growing confidence towards a vastly improved
US-Japanese relationship serving as the fulcrum for its more assertive-nationalistic China
policy-orientation. Besides providing logistical support in the Indian Ocean and pledging
financial assistance for US policy in Iraq, Koizumi’s effort to strengthen the US-Japan
alliance reached a new threshold in February 2004 with the successful deployment of the
GSDF to Iraq, despite growing domestic scepticism (JT 04/02/2004). At about the same
time, the debate on constitutional amendment/reinterpretation of the Article IX to facilitate
Japan’s right for collective self-defence under the alliance framework was also gathering
momentum (Przystup 2004b:107), not mentioning, Tokyo’s earlier decision in December
52 Observers see the Japanese government taking gradual actions since the “Okinawa reversion” to enhance the
degree of “effective control” over Senkaku/Diaoyudao, such as its gradual and inconspicuous building of
structures (i.e. helicopter pads in Uotsuri-shima in 1979) and endorsement of the navigational beacons erected
by nationalist groups like Seirankai and Seinensha (1989) on the islands (Su 2005:43; Chung 2004:41).
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2003 to proceed with the acquisition and deployment of TMD (Hughes 2006:2).
Aforementioned, this conspicuous pro-American stance endeared Koizumi to the Bush
administration, where the budding “special relationship” between the two leaders, and
Washington’s appreciation of its Japanese ally, led to an unusual absence of American
gaiatsu on Japan’s China policy, which contributed to Tokyo’s boldness in advancing some
of its nationalist goals at the expense of Japanese-Chinese ties. On a more specific note,
Japanese policy-makers would have taken comfort in the 1997 US-Japan Defence
Guidelines’53 implicit acknowledgement, and later on, the “Armitage Doctrine’s”54 more
explicit statement regarding the geographical coverage of the US-Japan Security Treaty that
legally included the Senkaku/Diaoyudao archipelago, despite Washington’s enduring
neutrality on its sovereignty status (Narayanan 2005:21; Tkacik Jr. 2004; Wu 2000:299-300).
The perception of a favourable “allied resolve/commitment” would have emboldened Tokyo
to adopt a strategy of “calculated assertiveness” over the ECS disputes.
However, the same cannot be said about the bilateral conditions vis-à-vis China.
Their robust economic relationship notwithstanding, diplomatic ties noticeably deteriorated in
2003 following the mentioned history-related incidents, which culminated in Koizumi’s
January 2004 visit to Yasukuni. Although China’s “Hu-Wen” leadership had initially appeared
pragmatic and prepared to promote better ties with Japan, which included lesser harping
over “history”, and its somewhat restrained, if not muted response toward the June 2003
Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident,55 Koizumi’s obstinate Yasukuni policy instantaneously
undermined the prospect for improving political relations as the new year dawned.
53 According to observers, the stipulation concerning the “surrounding areas” in the renewed Guideline was
taken to mean Taiwan and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (see Wu 2000:299-300; Li 1999:11).
54 The so-called Armitage Report on US-Japan Relations (October 2000) recommended, among others that “The
United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defence of Japan and those areas under the administrative
control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands” (quoted in Narayanan 2005:21). Published before Richard
Armitage joined the Bush administration, the report has been widely perceived to reflect Bush’s policy towards
Japan (and China). For details, see The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,
U.S. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 11 October 2000. (commonly known
as the Armitage Report). Also in late 2001, a senior Bush administration official indirectly hinted possible US
support for Japan in the event of a Chinese attack on Senkaku/Diaoyudao (KN 11/12/2001).
55 The Chinese government responded by reiterating its claims to the islands, but stop short of protesting or
criticising Japanese actions with the usual fervent rhetoric. Conversely, the Japanese government was more
forthright in its remarks, i.e. Fukuda’s remarks (see JT 24/06/2003; CD 24/06/2003; Urabe 2004a).
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That said, the presence of extensive high-level exchanges during the first quarter of
2004 (i.e. China visits by senior members of Japan’s ruling coalition, vice ministerial-level
coordination for the February 2004 Six-Party Talks, resumption of bilateral defence dialogue
after a three-year hiatus, etc.) (Przystup 2004b:107-108) gave the impression that Beijing
was willing to maintain a functional relationship, despite the protracted “political chill”. Also,
China’s continued low-key response towards alleged Japanese heavy-handedness during
the Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident on January 14-15, despite ongoing Chinese discontent
about the Yasukuni visit, equally boosted Tokyo’s “quiet confidence” of the Hu-Wen
leadership’s “new thinking” on Japanese-Chinese diplomacy. Indeed, Beijing’s response to
the “controlled aggression” of the JCG during the episode was unusually mellow, in that no
diplomatic protests were lodged other than the mild rhetoric issued by the Chinese media56
(Urabe 2004a). Such ambiguous signals from Beijing plausibly encouraged Japanese policy-
makers to maintain “cautious optimism” in re-establishing a more realistic relationship with
China, which included advancing Japanese interests more forcefully in the ECS. Japanese
confidence of Chinese pragmatism was likewise, boosted by their flourishing trade ties and
economic interdependence, not mentioning, Tokyo’s calculation that its friendly gestures
over the Qiqihar poison gas incident, and Koizumi’s reassurance to the Chinese following
his Yasukuni visit, would have bought Japan some goodwill in Beijing.
In fact, Japan’s “low-risk” estimation of an assertive policy-option in the March
incident was vindicated by another relatively mild official Chinese response, reflected by
“calm and subdued” reporting from the People’s Daily (cf. Urabe 2004b) and the usual
official reiteration of Chinese claims,57 against the outbreak of “relatively low-key” popular
protests (Blanchard 2006:220).58 Beijing even prevented the departure of another planned
Chinese “tour” to the islands in the aftermath, possibly to quell growing anti-Japanese
56 According Urabe’s comments of the China Daily report on the incident, “the tone of the report is, in relative
terms, calm and reasonable” with neither condemnation of the JCG’s action, nor the usual “hysteria” found in
Chinese media reporting of Japanese-Chinese issues (Urabe 2004a).
57 Beijing also called for calm, while the Chinese ambassador, Wu Dawei reportedly “reminded diplomatically”
on China’s firm position in his meeting with Vice-FM Takeuchi (JT 27/03/2004).
58 Even the popular protest outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing was only made possible with permission
from the Chinese government, as reported by the BBC, confirming the conventional wisdom amongst Japanese
policy-makers that popular anti-Japanese sentiment are predominantly state-abetted (BBC 25/03/2004).
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sentiments in China (DY 29/03/2004). Considering the above atmosphere, the Koizumi
administration would have anticipated ambiguous diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China.
Domestically, the Koizumi administration was reaping the fruits of the November
2003 Lower House electoral success, which provided a relatively favourable political
environment vis-à-vis its detractors (i.e. left-wingers/pacifists and/or China sympathisers),
and more importantly, the mandate to advance an assertive China policy. Meanwhile, the
timing of the March 2004 Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident was, according to Curtin (2004b),
“particularly unpropitious”, insofar as the general public mood towards China was severely
affected by anti-Chinese sentiment triggered by the sensational media reporting on the
“macabre” murder trial of Chinese students accused of brutally killing a Japanese family in
Fukuoka (see JT 24/03/2004).59 With the Japanese public appalled by the crime, nationalist
politicians/figures exploited the popular mood, inciting anti-Chinese nationalism and their
stereotyped “China threat” perception with acerbic rhetoric (Curtin 2004b). Compounded by
recent commotions over the resumption and intensification of Chinese vessel intrusion into
Japanese waters, the prevailing domestic milieu had undeniably amplified the event that
unfolded in Senkaku/Diaoyudao, which received extensive coverage from the Japanese
media. Besides the nationalistic actions of politicians and pressure groups, media pressure
also constrained Tokyo’s policy-options, with the likes of Yomiuri Shimbun blaming as much,
the Japanese government’s past inaction, as the Chinese state’s intransigence over the
ECS, for the debacle (Katsumata 27/03/2004; Curtin 2004b). The “highly visible” Chinese
provocation thus, necessitated a strong, discernible response from a Japanese government
under intense media/public scrutiny, which plausibly explained the punitive action taken
against the Chinese activists, substantiated by official protest via diplomatic channels.
That said, domestic political apprehension towards Koizumi’s hardline China policy
was also evident, especially after his January shrine pilgrimage. Considering the domestic
concerns over potential economic repercussions, and the diplomatic cost of a Sino-
59 For a description of the gruesome murders, and how it has untimely affected the Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident
in March 2004, see Curtin (2004b).
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Japanese fallout on the North Korean problem (Daniels 2004:33), the Koizumi government
would presumably, need to prudently manage the territorial row that followed. Hence,
besides defusing the situation, Tokyo’s relatively swift decision to deport rather than
prosecute the activists could be interpreted as a conciliatory gesture to undercut the
diplomatic damage incurred by the assertive action taken initially (JT 27/03/2004; Mori
interview).60 Indeed, some government officials contend that the wishes of the “China-
friendly” CCS, Fukuda Yasuo, may have influenced the decision (DY 28/03/2004), while
several senior MOFA officials interviewed defined it as a move out of politico-diplomatic
rather than legal considerations (Anonymous interview F and I). Koizumi’s “conciliatory tone”
and “use of measured words” (Curtin 2004b) in his effort to reduce bilateral tension
immediately after the arrest also confirms this observation.61
Japan’s policy-options during the March 2004 incident were therefore, plausibly
made upon the anticipation of an ambiguous external condition posited by enhanced allied
resolve via the US-Japan ties, but ambivalent diplomatic leverage over China, insofar as the
mixed signals from Beijing, despite recent history-related enmity provided an indeterminate
environment for policy flexibility. Meanwhile, an initially encouraging domestic environment,
fostered by the electoral victory, and public support for an assertive China policy, which was
then, doused with “reactive” anti-Chinese nationalist pressure fuelled by recent events,
generated an external-domestic nexus that saw the Koizumi government moving into a
position between Quadrant C and D in the NCR framework. The preferences-of-action taken
by Tokyo reflected NCR’s dictum, which required a mix of assertive-nationalist (highly
visible) foreign (China) policy-option to appease nationalist demands, complemented with
conciliatory gestures to reduce the diplomatic cost of potential Chinese blowback.
60 This is a generally acknowledged view in Japanese media. Indeed, it was reported that the police initially
preferred the option of prosecuting the activists, but a police official later said that “At the last minute, politics
interfered” (quoted in AS 29/03/2004). Also, Koizumi reportedly instructed government officials on “how to
handle the issue from a comprehensive viewpoint”, and was quoted as saying that the deportation, instead of
prosecution was “to avoid hurting bilateral relations with China” (quoted in JT 27/03/2004).
61 According to Curtin, Koizumi calmly and carefully address Japan’s handling of the incident by saying that “It
is unusual, but natural for Japan, a country governed by law and which handles people according to the law…It
is necessary for both parties to handle the case in as calm a manner as possible” (2004b).
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7.3.2. Chinese submarine intrusion (November 2004)
According to the NCR schematics, Japan’s management of the submarine incident suggests
that Japanese policy-makers may have perceived the external environment leading to the
episode to be relatively indeterminate. Japan continued to enjoy exceptionally good ties with
the US via the Bush-Koizumi “special relationship”, and Tokyo’s unprecedented resolve in
passing legislations circumventing Article IX to meet the expectations of the alliance.
Understandably, a sense of “quiet confidence” did reverberate in Kasumigaseki’s corridors-
of-power regarding the maturity and value of the alliance as a deterrence against potential
Chinese belligerence in the ECS.62 Indeed, it is not far-fetched to suggest that Japan’s
assertiveness in advancing its interests in the disputed waters since Koizumi took office was
partly, derived from such perception/calculation (Mori interview).
However, such optimism could have been somewhat dampened after the March
2004 Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute, especially regarding American obligation in meeting
Japanese expectation of the alliance to defend Japan’s territorial/maritime interest in the
ECS. Washington’s neutrality and strategic ambiguity, demonstrated by the US State
Department’s “impartial” response to the March incident (AFP 24/03/2004)63 could have re-
awakened Tokyo to the stark reality of possible US non-commitment/intervention in the
event of a Japanese-Chinese confrontation in the contested waters.64 Japanese policy-
makers were also becoming aware of Washington’s qualitatively different attitude towards
Tokyo’s handling of Japanese-Chinese schisms, which appeared more tolerant of Koizumi’s
62 Based on Japan’s recent and sustained efforts to meet the demands of the security alliance, Japanese policy-
makers may have been overly optimistic that the US would reciprocate by meeting its obligation to defend
Japan against potential Chinese belligerence in the ECS. Furthermore, the enhanced state of the alliance itself
serves as a credible deterrence against any risk-taking by the Chinese to rapidly escalate the dispute, which
could compel an alliance response. This is the opinion of many interviewees, including Mori Kazuko.
63 The Deputy spokesperson of the US State Department, Adam Erelli, reiterated the US longstanding stance by
telling reporters on 24 March 2004 in the wake of the detention of Chinese activists “that the US does not take a
position on the question of the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands” (quoted in AFP
24/03/2004; see also Department of State, USA March 24, 2004: 14; JT 26/03/2004).
64 According to Tkacik, Jr. (2004), the US State Department has continued maintaining a neutral stance as
recent as March 2004, in response to the Senkaku dispute, although the US-Japan Security Treaty does cover
“all territories under the administration of Japan”, which under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, legally includes
Senkaku/Diaoyudao. He opines that China’s forays into Senkaku/Diaoyudao appear partly “designed to probe
where the bedrock of US-Japan alliance begins” (Tkacik, Jr. 2004). Washington’s reluctance to stand firmly and
unequivocally with Japan on the issue, despite Tokyo’s efforts to meet the obligations of the US-Japan alliance
in Iraq and the Indian Ocean, has certainly disconcerted Japanese policy-makers (Tkacik, Jr. 2004).
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obstinacy on “symbolic” disputes like Yasukuni and history, compared to the “real” and
potentially explosive nature of the ECS territorial/maritime conflict (Mori interview). With the
American military juggernaut overstretched by commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
the significance of Chinese partnership in the “war or terror” and North Korean nuclear
brinksmanship, it was in the US interest to see the ECS status quo maintained. In this
sense, Tokyo’s policy-options during the following submarine row would have been, partly
affected by perceptions of an ambiguous allied resolve towards the dispute.
Conversely, bilateral relations with China have been on the decline since the
Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident in March 2004, despite burgeoning trade ties65 and mutual
efforts to advance cooperation via multilateral platforms like the ASEAN-Plus-Three and Six-
Party Talks. The Chinese leadership tried to maintain a degree of pragmatism towards
Japan, but the Yasukuni issue has rapidly developed into a “diplomatic faux pas” that
constrained its policy-options on other areas of bilateral exchanges (Okazaki interview).
Indeed, Chinese activities and incremental encroachment in the ECS demonstrated to an
extent, the Hu-Wen leadership’s depleting goodwill towards the Koizumi administration, let
alone susceptibility to domestic nationalist pressure to rethink their “new thinking on Japan”.
Premier Wen’s belated altercation with FM Kawaguchi over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident
during a “fence-mending” meeting in Beijing early April (BBC 04/04/2004; JT 04/04/2004),
signifies the Chinese leaders’ hardening attitude in the face of growing nationalist pressure
at home. China’s decision to start exploration in Chunxiao/Shirakaba since May, and its
impertinence towards repeated Japanese requests for suspension of exploration and data
sharing on the contested gas fields also ratcheted up bilateral tension. The spectre of
heightened competition for energy resources in the ECS loomed throughout the remainder
of 2004, with bilateral consultations yielding more frustration than resolution (van Kemenade
2006:71-72). The prickly atmosphere was likewise, aggravated by the resumption and
65 On 24 August 2004, Japan’s External Trade Organisation (JETRO) announced a record expansion of two-
way trade for the first six-month of the year, for the fifth consecutive year, and a surplus of imports from China
for the first time since 1992 (cf. Przystup 2004d:123). These encouraging figures would go on to a record high
by year’s end as China overtook US for the first time to become Japan’s largest trade partner in 2004, as
mentioned in Chapter 3.
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intensification of “illegal” research activities by Chinese vessels, notably between July-
August, as well as anti-Japanese fervour during the Asia Cup football tournament that
culminated in mob-like demonstrations directed against the Japanese entourage following
China’s defeat to Japan in the final. The Chinese also reportedly took exception to Tokyo’s
linking of Chinese military development with its decision to reduce ODA loans,66 and were
offended by JDA’s call for vigilance and contingencies to counter China’s military intentions
(KN 07/11/2004; CD 10/11/2004). Altogether, these issues set the stage for the diplomatic
showdown over the submarine incident in November 2004.
In the domestic context, the Koizumi government faced increased nationalist
pressure to act more decisively in asserting Japan’s sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyudao,
especially after its perceived “docile” handling of the March 2004 incident had left Japanese
nationalists fuming. Indeed, pressure began to mount almost immediately, beginning with
the first-time adoption of a resolution aimed at “preserving [Japan’s] territorial integrity” by
the Diet’s House of Representatives Security Committee on March 30 that requested the
government to “forcefully promote all sorts of measures, including diplomatic efforts” to
defend Japanese territorial sovereignty (quoted in Przystup 2004c:124). According to
Przystup, although “initially cool to the resolution,” the government, presumably under
duress, eventually agreed to the committee’s adoption of the revised version (2004c:124).67
Nationalist assertions of Japanese sovereignty over the islands continued with Land
Minister, Ishihara Nobuteru calling on the government to construct a lighthouse, or heliport
on Senkaku/Diaoyudao during a public speech on April 3 (BBC 03/04/2004),68 followed by
the formation of the LDP-DPJ-led, non-partisan Diet-members Association to Defend
Japan’s Territorial Integrity, several days later (Przystup 2004c:131). The LDP, through its
66 Indeed, Japan has since 1995, strategically utilised ODA as a foreign policy tool towards China in its attempt
to put pressure against Chinese military development (Takamine 2005:440). For details of the recent calls, see
“State urged to pare, eventually end yen loans to aid-donor China,” Japan Times, 11 November 2004a.
67 CCS Fukuda Yasuo reportedly agreed to the adoption of the resolution, after potentially provocative language
that may antagonise China was removed from the initial draft (Przystup 2004c:124).
68 Ishihara Nobuteru’s nationalist mantle may likely derive from his father, Ishihara Shintaro, the Tokyo
governor and infamous nationalist and anti-China figure. He made the call during a speech in Beppu, Oita. See
also “Kawaguchi, Wen clash over Senkaku, Yasukuni; Land chief talks tough,” Japan Times, 4 April 2004.
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working group on maritime interests also pressured the government to adopt a
comprehensive national strategy on maritime-related issues, and initiate unilateral
exploration on Japan’s side of the median line, in June, followed by a proposal to bolster the
JCG in terms of personnel and equipment, a month later (KN 11/06/2004; Przystup
2004c:133; 2004d:119).69
Meanwhile, on the popular front, a Japanese uyoku rammed a bus into the Chinese
consulate in Osaka, on 23 April 2004, apparently to protest China’s claims over
Senkaku/Diaoyudao (MDN 23/04/2004). The media also reported earlier on April 7 that
Seinensha members would go ahead with initial plans to land on the islands (Reuters
07/04/2004). Popular anti-Chinese sentiment was likewise, heightened by agitated reporting
in the Japanese media concerning Chinese activities in the ECS, and widespread anti-
Japanese hostility during the mentioned football tournament. Sustained media pressure in
reaction to continuous Chinese maritime probing began to constrain the Japanese
government’s capacity to opt for a moderate approach in managing the debacle.70 For
instance, the conservative and usually pro-establishment Yomiuri Shimbun published
several scathing editorials in June 2004, attributing the government’s failure to decisively
address the ECS issues to its fixation on mollifying China. The editorials specifically blamed
it on the workings of pro-China forces and MOFA’s indifferent attitude, and demanded the
PMO “to exert strong leadership on the issue” (cf. Przystup 2004c:125).71
In fact, Japan’s “nationalist-rightwing” press apparently played a key role forcing
Tokyo to abandon its cautious diplomatic response towards the submarine incident.
According to observers, the Koizumi administration initially played down the issue when it
69 The LDP Working Group on Maritime Interests, chaired by House of Councillor member, Takemi Keizo, was
established in 2003, in response to the urgent need for Japan to develop a comprehensive framework for
administering its maritime resources. The key impetus was undoubtedly the growing Japanese-Chinese
confrontation in the ECS. The Working Group published a report on June 11, 2004, comprising nine proposals
to secure Japan’s oceanic interests. This was followed by an “emergency proposal” of policy-measures in 2005,
which forms the backbone of the proposed Fundamental Maritime Law” scheduled for debate in the Diet in
2007. For more information on these proposals, see Shiraishi (2007) and Terashima (2007).
70 The JCG reported as many as 14 cases of Chinese maritime intrusions into Japanese EEZ without prior
notification during the first nine months of 2004 (IHT 12/11/2004).
71 Yomiuri Shimbun’s editorials on June 9 and 19 called on the government to take concrete actions, to protect
Japanese sovereignty and interests, and to counter Chinese provocations in the ECS (cf. Przystup 2004c:125).
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first occurred on November 10, with the JDA hesitating to speculate the vessel’s identity,
while MOFA remained tight-lipped about the incident (IHT 12/11/2004; Chan 2004). The
Japanese media, led by Yomiuri and Sankei was less courteous, strongly speculating the
“intruder” to be a Chinese submarine, and taking the Koizumi government to task for what
was perceived to be its “slow and ineffective” response in defending Japanese oceanic
security, with the former demanding “a no-compromise policy” (cf. Curtin 2004c; DY
11/11/2004). Meanwhile, a “united front” of political leaders “up-the-ante” with statements
criticising the latest Chinese provocation (Chan 2004).72 Intensified media pressure, and
concerns over domestic repercussions expectedly forced Tokyo to take a more strident
approach, as reflected by the subsequent decision to declare the vessel’s identity, and
MOFA’s protest and demand for a Chinese apology (Curtin 2004c). The protest instigated
further nationalist outcry that dominated both papers’ editorials, in an attempt to incite anti-
Chinese nationalism, specifically (DY 13/11/2004; AFP 13/11/2004; Chan 2004),73 and raise
the general level of popular nationalistic sentiment, in anticipation of the ongoing
negotiations in Pyongyang over the abduction issue (see JT 10/11/2004; Curtin 2004c).
Although the Japanese government had since taken a hardline posture by adamantly
maintaining the vessel’s identity as Chinese, despite Beijing’s initial refusal to acknowledge,
and insufficient “hard” evidence to validate its origin, it also carefully avoided excessively
acerbic rhetoric throughout the controversy that could escalate tension (Przystup
2005a:122). Tokyo was equally hasty in accepting Beijing’s subsequent admission, even
interpreting its “halfhearted” expression of regret as an “apology” to close the episode (Chan
2004). This plausibly indicates the Koizumi government’s diplomatic manoeuvres to strike a
balance between appeasing nationalist demands and not adversely affecting bilateral ties,
based on its perception/calculation of the prevailing external-domestic situations. Indeed, it
72 The LDP Secretary-General Takebe Tsutomu, Shin-Komeito Diet Policy Committee head, Higashi Shunji,
and DPJ’s president, Okada Katsuya and shadow Defence Minister, Maehara Seiji issued statements criticising
China for the provocative intrusion and its failure to apologise over the issue (Przystup 2005a:122; Chan 2004).
73 The Yomiuri editorial attacked Tokyo’s delayed response as “untenable” demanding a firmer stand, while
Sankei Shimbun called the Chinese behaviour on the incident as “unforgivable” and also criticised the Japanese
government’s initial soft handling, demanding more unspecified “counter-measures” if China failed to provide
an “honest response” (cf. DY 13/11/2004; AFP 13/11/2004).
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could be that Koizumi wanted a swift and amicable settlement to ensure the long-awaited
bilateral summit with Hu Jintao would materialise at the APEC’s sideline in Chile, days later,
after a difficult year of relationship (IHT 18/11/2004; Mori interview). Likewise, Curtin (2004c)
opines that the earlier decision to escalate the submarine issue could be based on a
“calculated-risk” that this round of Japanese-Chinese altercation would be quickly
overshadowed by a fresh eruption of the North Korean abduction issue, soon after.74
Japan’s policy-options during the submarine episode, again, reflect the NCR model’s
hypotheses, insofar as the perception/calculation of an increased vulnerability to domestic
nationalist pressure, compounded by relatively indeterminate external environment (i.e.
unfavourable diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China/ambiguous allied resolve), locates the
Koizumi administration’s position more within Quadrant D (see Diagram 4). This explains the
measured, albeit moderate response cloaked in visible nationalistic rhetoric/gesture to
simultaneously, satisfy both external-domestic imperatives.
7.3.3. Natural gas exploration dispute (May 2004-September 2006)75
Unlike the other two ECS contentions, the natural gas dispute has not triggered specific
bouts of diplomatic clashes/escalation, despite gradually festering into a potentially volatile
conflict during the period of investigation, due to unilateral actions and counter-actions from
both sides. One can observe that the Japanese government has been maintaining its
assertiveness, taking tangible, albeit calculated measures periodically, to assert Japan’s
claims in response to Chinese effrontery. Yet, such assertions have also been
interceded/arbitrated by moderate policy-behaviour that saw Tokyo agreeing to participate in
protracted and unprogressive dialogues, even when Beijing continued to defy its request
and proceeded with its own devices. The NCR dictum suggests these “ambiguous” policy-
preferences as reflecting state-elites/policy-makers’ calculation/perception of the prevailing
74 Curtin opines that the return of Japan’s official delegation and “fact-finding mission” from North Korea on
November 13-14 would have put the abduction issue back into the limelight, and at the top of the nationalist list
of preoccupations, thus giving a breather to the comparatively “mild” submarine problem (2004c).
75 For a comprehensive and excellent analysis of the ECS gas dispute, see Drifte (2008a).
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external-domestic conditions and processes during a particular time and context, which
affected their decisions.
As highlighted, the natural gas issue erupted in May 2004, following Chinese
exploration in Chunxiao/Shirakaba that prompted repeated Japanese protests, and requests
for suspension of survey and data provision. China’s lackadaisical attitude elicited tougher
Japanese response, with METI deciding to conduct survey on Japan’s side of the median
line by July 2004 (KN 09/07/2004),76 leading to Chinese calls for working-level dialogues on
the issue that transpired into several rounds of fruitless consultations between 2004-2006,
beginning October 2004 (Drifte 2008a; Valencia 2007). Risking over-generalisation, it is
construable that Tokyo’s measured responses during the nascent stages of the gas dispute
mirrored the perceived external environment and domestic conditions/processes elaborated
in the “submarine-incursion” analysis, as both issues occurred at almost the same time and
context. This means discernible policy-actions (declaration of intent followed by concrete,
albeit low-risk launching of survey), mediated by persistent request for Chinese cooperation
and agreement to bilateral exchanges (the dialogues) that were required to keep diplomatic
channels open for peaceful resolution, while avoiding serious escalation of the situation.
Nonetheless, the dispute became volatile in 2005 with Japan visibly advancing its
interests amid serious declination in politico-diplomatic relations caused by a tempestuous
mix of issues. Specifically, bilateral conditions vis-à-vis China became unfavourable, despite
the promising “sideline summitries” in Chile and Vientiane in late 2004, and various levels of
bilateral contact during the first quarter of 2005,77 including the establishment of the “Vice-
Foreign Ministerial Comprehensive Dialogue”.78 On the security front, China was concerned
about the strategic implications of the February “Two-plus-Two” talks, and upset by
Japanese attempt to subvert the lifting of the European Union (EU) arms embargo on the
76 Beginning July 2004, Japan charted the Norwegian seismic survey ship “Ramform Victory” to survey Japan’s
side of the line, opposite Chunxiao/Shirakaba, Tianwaitian/Kashi, and Duanqiao/Kusunoki natural gas fields
(Harrison 2005:4). For more chronological details, see Harrison (2005), Valencia (2007), Drifte (2008a/b).
77 For a summary of the high-level bilateral contacts during this period, see Przystup (2005b:110-112).
78 The Chinese called it the “China-Japan Strategic Dialogue”, while the Japanese, for reasons of political
sensivity concerning the use of the term “strategic”, initially referred to it as the above. The first round was held
on 13-14 May 2005 in Beijing, followed by the second round on 23-24 June in Tokyo (Reuters 24/06/2005).
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Chinese, especially with METI chief, Nakagawa, and PM Koizumi lobbying to dissuade their
French counterparts from such considerations (JT 15/01/2005; Przystup 2005b:114).79 The
adoption of the Anti-Secession Law in March was clearly a strong Chinese response
towards the development in US-Japanese security cooperation, not mentioning Beijing’s
strengthened resolve to oppose Tokyo’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat that started gaining
momentum since late 2004 (Marquand 2005b).
The territorial/maritime dispute, likewise, escalated in February, fuelled by the
Japanese government’s controversial decision to take administrative control of
Senkaku/Diaoyudao, and other endeavours to strengthen claims to sovereignty, i.e.
Okinotorishima80 (Yoshikawa 2005), against the backdrop of persistent Chinese
encroachment of Japanese-claimed EEZ, and exploration activities at the fringes of the
median line. The large-scale, anti-Japanese demonstrations in April, in reaction to the
plethora of Chinese grievances, including a fresh eruption of the Tsukurukai textbook
controversy, further aggravated Japanese-Chinese tension (van Kemenade 2006:72).
Although there were mutual efforts to resuscitate the flagging ties, Koizumi’s Yasukuni
exploit as elaborated in the previous chapter, ensured that political chill remained throughout
2005, which, in the course, effectively subverted the progress of resolving the ECS dispute
via consultations. Indeed, Japan’s intention to use the scheduled October 19 dialogue to
force a definitve solution to the issue was squandered by Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit, two days
earlier, which saw China temporarily cancelling all diplomatic exchanges with Japan (van
Kemenade 2006:73; Curtin 2005c). Whether Beijing was deliberately “buying time” (Curtin
2005c) by keeping the ECS negotiations deadlocked remains to be proven, but China’s
military presence and provocative actions in the contested waters unquestionably made the
79 METI chief, Nakagawa Shoichi expressed to his French counterpart, Herve Gaymard on January 13, 2005
regarding East Asian nation’s concern with the prospect of the lifting of China arms embargo (enforced since
the 1989 Tiananmen Incident) (JT 15/01/2005), while Koizumi reinforced Japanese concerns during his Tokyo
meeting with the French President, Jacques Chirac on March 27 (JT 28/03/2005).
80 The Tokyo Metropolitan government led by Ishihara Shintaro established extensive plans to develop the
Okinotorishima, while the Japanese government also decided in mid-2005 to build a lighthouse on this “barren
rock” to support its claim to an extended EEZ (see KN 24/08/2005; BBC 16/05/2005; XNA 20/06/2005).
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situation more perilous.81 The unfavourable bilateral conditions vis-à-vis China suggest the
need for Japan to maintain a cautious approach in managing the natural gas issue.
In terms of allied resolve, Japanese policy-makers may have remained doubtful of
Washington’s alliance commitment, when it comes to defending Japan’s ECS claims, the
new impetus from the “Two-plus-Two” talks notwithstanding. To be sure, one can argue that
Tokyo could have taken heart from the talks, plausibly in the shape of discreet reassurance
from its American ally to counter potential Chinese belligerence in the ECS. This is
especially so, after the submarine incident which, including the repeated ECS forays, were
widely perceived by observers as China’s attempt “to probe the bedrock of the US-Japan
[allied resolve]” (Tkacik Jr. 2004). Also, one can construe the Joint Statement to be as much
a value-added deterrence, as a veiled American caution against potential Chinese
“adventurism” in Taiwan Strait and ECS (Anonymous interview F), besides serving as a
“safety-valve” to keep domestic nationalist pressure for a more independent Japanese
military solution in check.82 That said, the continuous absence of explicit and firm articulation
of the US position, despite Washington’s reassurances over the years, and given the other
perceived external constraints vis-à-vis China, would have meant that a policy of calculated
assertiveness mixed with diplomatic prudence serves Japanese interests best in the ECS.
Specifically, while Tokyo would need to demonstrate a degree of assertiveness, it also has
to pursue joint development as “the best means for unlocking the impasse” (Curtin 2005c;
Takahashi 27/07/2004; Drifte 2008a), and to avoid adversely affecting the ECS status quo.
The Koizumi government is required to demonstrate assertiveness in the natural gas
dispute, not only to protect Japan’s oceanic resources and security in the name of national
81 In September 2005, a PLA-Navy destroyer reportedly aimed its guns at a MSDF’s P-3C plane near the
Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas fields, while as mentioned, five Chinese warships were spotted manoeuvring in the
same area, days before the September 11, 2005 Lower House election (see Masaki 13/03/2007; Curtin 2005c).
China also announced the formation of the East China Sea naval fleet on September 27 (KN 27/09/2005).
82 The “safety valve” function in this context is commonly noted, and was mentioned by several interviewees
(Anonymous interview F, Takagi interview, Murata interview) Interestingly, the February 2005 situation was
somewhat reminiscent to the Hashimoto administration’s widely believed effort to seek for the revised US-
Japan Guidelines to cover the Senkaku/Diaoyudao as a “safety-valve” to reduce nationalist-rightwing pressure
on the government to seek unilateral remilitarisation to defend Japan’s territorial integrity, and realise its overall
security interests, following the 1996 Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute (Green 2001:87-88) .
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interest, but also to soothe nationalist demands for domestic political expediency.
Unquestionably, nationalist pressure continued to mount in reaction to Chinese defiance
towards repeated Japanese requests and proposal to facilitate a resolution of the dispute
(Tsunekawa 2006:7). From the outset, the reputedly “hawkish” METI chief, Nakagawa
Shoichi,83 has consistently pursued an assertive stance on the issue since mid-2004, and
his televised address in February 2005 regarding the likelihood of Chinese siphoning off
Japanese resources via their exploits in Chunxiao/Shirakaba fuelled both nationalist and
public contempt towards China (AFP 20/02/2005). At the political front, the DPJ advocated a
Diet-legislation draft in March, to protect Japanese ships engaged in exploration activities in
the disputed area (Przystup 2005b:116), while members from the LDP, Shin-Komeito, and
DPJ increased pressure on the Japanese government to proceed with the granting of
exploration rights, after aerial observation of Chinese activities in the ECS during early April
(Fanell 2006). Nationalist pressure also emerged in the form of reactive popular anti-
Chinese nationalism that reached a high, following the anti-Japanese demonstrations in
China, with a string of “vandalism and harassment against Chinese businesses, schools,
and diplomatic establishments reported across Japan between April 11-19” (Chan and
Bridges 2006:129; Przystup 2005c:129). Although chiefly triggered by the Chinese
demonstrations, these xenophobic activities also reflected pent-up frustration amongst
Japanese nationalists towards perceived Chinese bullying and obstinacy over a range of
issues, including the ECS gas dispute (Tsunekawa 2006:7, 19-20). Indeed, Tokyo’s decision
to proceed with unilateral exploration plans, soon after, and Koizumi’s dismissal of concerns
that it could further strain Japan-China ties (Przystup 2005c:126), suggest the salience of
domestic pressure, nationalist or otherwise, in determining the assertive policy-response.84
83 An LDP politician, Nakagawa Shoichi is well known for his hawkish and nationalistic disposition, and
“China bashing” remarks (Masaki 13/03/2007; Mori 2007; Anonymous interview H). See also Curtin (2005c).
84 The Japanese government maintained its assertive stance, declaring on April 11 that it would proceed with
exploration activities despite the massive anti-Japanese demonstration in China (JT 12/04/2005). Indeed, after
several advanced notifications that failed to elicit Chinese response, Tokyo finally announced on April 13, 2005
that it would grant exploratory rights in the ECS to Japanese companies, prompting instantaneous protest and
strongly worded warning from Beijing. Nonetheless, Tokyo proceeded with the processing of the application for
exploration rights by the Teikoku Oil Company on 28 April 2005 (JT 15/04/2005; 29/04/2005).
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Japan’s posture on the gas issue remained unchanged throughout 2005, as
sustained nationalist pressure required the Koizumi administration to stand tall against
China. The METI, personified by Nakagawa, continued to pursue a hardnosed approach,
accusing China for deliberately prolonging the consultations, while pushing ahead with its
exploration activities in Chunxiao/Shirakaba, and then, extending to Tianwaitian/Kashi,
despite Japanese protests (YS 21/09/2005; IHT 04/10/2005; Curtin 2005c). Media pressure
also derived from Yomiuri Shimbun’s October editorial that reiterated the conventional
wisdom of Chinese “time buying”, and questioned the possibility of such manoeuvres as
Chinese strategy to turn their continuous development of the gas fields into “a fait accompli”,
especially in the absence of Japanese counter-actions (cf. Curtin 2005c). Such agitated
reporting expectedly, galvanised Japanese public opinion, which saw 70% of respondents
agreeing that China should cease its operations in the ECS during a mid-October Yomiuri
poll, with 65% favouring unilateral Japanese development of the disputed area, if Beijing
refuses to comply (Przystup 2006a:116). Interestingly, the same poll recorded an “almost
evenly divided” opinion on Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit (cf. Curtin 2005c), suggesting that public
support for a forceful China policy was more cohesive on the ECS dispute, compared to
symbolic issues. This inadvertently means greater pressure on the Koizumi government to
maintain, if not increase its assertiveness on the former issue, amid mounting public
impatience. Aforementioned in Chapter 6, the LDP’s landslide victory in the September 2005
Lower House election was, driven as much by Koizumi’s domestic reform agenda, as his
uncompromising China policy. It is plausible to suggest that Tokyo’s posturing before the
snap election, which included its assertive stance on the ECS natural gas issue reflected
Koizumi’s sensitivity towards the prevailing public mood, which he masterfully rallied to his
political advantage.
Also, unlike Yasukuni, there was a unified opinion between the LDP and DPJ for a
forceful ECS policy, with both parties advocating respective legislations in late 2005 to
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protect Japan’s EEZ against foreign encroachment.85 Political elites, namely DPJ’s
president, Maehara, and FM Aso even amplified the “China threat” theory with their
provocative remarks, purportedly in response to China’s military development and its related
activities in the ECS (Marquand 2005b; CD 03/04/2006).86 Whereas the LDP-coalition
government later backtracked on Aso’s remark, the DPJ went ahead adopting the “China
threat” perception as its official view on 23 January 2006 (Przystup 2006b:126). Meanwhile,
the prospective LDP candidates to succeed Koizumi in September 2006 also began playing
to the nationalist tune, with Abe and Aso leading the chorus of criticisms on China over
Yasukuni and ECS, ostensibly to boost their nationalist credentials. As revealed, both firmly
rejected China’s proposal for joint development that was forwarded to the Japanese
delegation, when dialogue resumed early March 2006 (AS 09/03/2006). Abe also reportedly
chided Sasae Kenichiro, MOFA’s AOAB Director-General for not rejecting it outright during
the talks87 (Przystup 2006b:123), while Aso advocated “counter-measures”, if China
proceeded with gas production in Chunxiao/Shirakaba (KN 15/03/2006). To be sure, these
confrontational/nationalistic expressions were often, moderated by conciliatory posturing of
other policy-makers, like the “pro-China” METI chief, Nikai Toshihiro, who called for level-
headedness in dealing with the ECS issue.88 In fact, Nikai reportedly rebuked Aso for his
provocative, yet unproductive recommendation, highlighting the emerging schism between
METI and MOFA over the dispute (AS 20/03/2006). Ironically, METI was perceptively more
85 The DPJ announced its intention to submit a bill to have the JCG protect Japanese companies’ test-drilling, or
developing maritime resources, and prohibiting resource exploration activities in Japan’s EEZ by foreign ships
(DJN 19/10/2005; Przystup 2006a:116). Meanwhile, the LDP Working Group on Maritime Interest led by
Takemi Keizo compiled a bill on December 1, 2005 aimed at protecting Japanese vessels engaged in maritime
resource and exploration activites within Japan’s 200nm EEZ. Specifically, it was meant to support Teikoku
Oil’s intended test drilling at the disputed waters (JT 02/12/2005; Przystup 2006a:116).
86 DPJ president, Maehara Seiiji raised the “China threat” notion during his lecture at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. on December 8, 2005 (Oda 22/12/2005). He then told a
Kyodo News study group on January 11, 2006 that there exist differences of opinion among party ranks
regarding the “China threat” assessment, but he personally would continue perceivng China as an “actual
threat”(cf. Przystup 2006b:126). For FM Aso’s remark, see “Japan FM calls China a military threat,” China
Daily, 3 April 2006.
87 The incident was reported in the nationalist-rightwing daily, Sankei Shimbun (Przystup 2006b:123).
88 Replacing the “China-bashing” Nakagawa during the cabinet reshuffle in October 2005, Nikai is widely
perceived to be a “pro-China” LDP leader who has developed close contacts with the Chinese political echelon
(van Kemenade 2006:74; DY 08/03/2006). A senior METI official interviewed went as far as calling him a
“panda-hugger” (Anonymous interview G). Since taking office, Nikai promoted a moderate, less-
confrontational approach to resolve the ECS issues, which led to some progress in terms of mutual agreements
to shelve the maritime border delimitation impasse and establish a panel of technical experts to facilitate a
peaceful resolution during the July 2006 consultations (PD 10/07/2006; see also Drifte 2008a).
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confrontational during the earlier stages, notably under Nakagawa, while MOFA, before Aso,
was more tactful. This suggests that leadership’s “nationalistic” disposition tends to personify
the policy-orientation of Japanese bureaucracies (Anonymous interview G).
Overall, it is viable to suggest that the Koizumi government had been under
consistent pressure from domestic forces to adopt and maintain an assertive-nationalistic
policy-orientation towards China over the ECS gas dispute, since its outbreak in mid-2004.
Japan’s pressure on China to suspend exploration activities and share geological data on
the disputed gas fields as pre-conditions for joint development negotiations, as well as
visible moves taken to protect Japanese interests in response to Chinese refusal to
cooperate, imply, to an extent, the influence of domestic nationalist impetus on such policy-
behaviour. An ex-METI Senior Vice-Minister even conceded that the ECS became
problematic following Nakagawa’s “nationalistic” overtures and posturing (Anonymous
interview H), while a former top diplomat to China conceded that Diet and LDP pressure
made any Japanese concession, or “peaceful solution” to the issue difficult (Anonymous
interview I). Indeed, Tokyo’s tough stance, despite informed opinions that full-scale gas
production in the ECS is neither economically viable, nor cost-effective for Japan, compared
to importing from cheaper neighbouring sources, i.e. Russia and Southeast Asia, goes on to
support such a view.89
Conversely, Japanese policy-makers (Chinese as well) would have estimated the
risk of a Japanese-Chinese military conflict to be low, since the dispute over natural gas per
se is arguably “non-zero-sum”, insofar as both countries are able to source it from these
regional suppliers, and that the calculated costs and benefits favour joint development.90
89 Such was the opinion of several senior bureaucrats in MOFA and METI (Anonymous interviews C, F, G, and
H). This viewpoint is also shared by other interviewees, including Prof. Takagi Seiichiro, Prof. Kikuchi
Tsutomu, Prof. Ma Xiaojun, and Yoshida Reiji.
90 From a rational-choice/economic perspective, both countries are more likely to reach for a mutually equitable
settlement and engage in joint development, rather than military confrontation over the ECS gas issue, as the
mutual economic benefit deriving from the former far outweighs the latter strategy. Moreover, both countries
have diversified their respective energy sources over the years to enhance energy security, and are therefore, not
over-dependent on the ECS for their energy supply. In fact, the notion of joint development as “the best way to
move forward” (Curtin 2005c) is shared by informed Japanese intellectuals, bureaucrats, and political elites (i.e.
Noda interview; Anonymous interview H and I).
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Thus, a degree of nationalistic “brinksmanship” in dealing with the Chinese would not be
overly damaging to Japan’s overall interests. However, the fact that Tokyo has: 1) tolerated
Beijing’s continuous defiance, despite its repeated request for cooperation; 2) demonstrated
willingness to participate in protracted, yet unprogressive consultations; and 3) hesitated to
adopt counter-measures, as reflected by the relatively sluggish/lengthy proceedings in
granting exploration rights to Teikoku Oil, let alone permitting actual drilling, also suggest the
limits of nationalism vis-à-vis other determinants in Japan’s China policy-making.91
A neoclassical realist interpretation would emphasise the prevailing external
conditions elaborated earlier, and their interactions with domestic imperatives that plausibly
contributed to Tokyo’s “measured” approach of discernible, albeit calculated-assertiveness,
mediated by diplomatic prudence, when dealing with Beijing over the issue. Indeed, whilst
Japan took incremental counter-actions, Koizumi’s periodic conciliatory tone and calls for
both sides to transform the ECS from a “sea of confrontation to a sea of cooperation” (cf.
Przystup 2005c:126; Drifte 2008a/b)92 not mentioning, his decision to replace the so-called
“China-bashing” Nakagawa with the “pro-Beijing”’ Nikai as one of Japan’s key bureaucratic
actors in the dispute during the October 2005 Cabinet reshuffle, plausibly reflect
perceptions/calculations of a less-sanguine external environment, characterised by
ambiguous alliance support and adverse bilateral conditions vis-à-vis China, which require
Japanese state-elites to adopt restrained policy-preferences. Arbitrated by relatively
intensed domestic nationalist pressure, the external-domestic nexus would have informed
their perceived location within the NCR diagram, and therein the stipulated policy-option.
This generalised policy-trend is essentially, based on the assessment of the gas issue being
a protracted conflict, and therefore, does not account for variations in state-elites’
91 However, it is also true that Tokyo’s so-called “foot-dragging” over the ECS negotiation was partly, caused
by the lack of “driving force” i.e. limited initial interests from Japanese oil companies to invest in the
development of the area due to economic and security considerations, not mentioning that the ECS energy
resources were not overly important to Japan, considering the low wholesale price of natural gas, back then
(before 2007). I would like to thank senior METI and MOFA officials for pointing out this observation during
our interviews (Anonymous interviews G, H and I).
92 Drifte (2008b) aptly introduces part of this slogan/phrase as the title of his excellent article, “From ‘Sea of
Confrontation’ to ‘Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship’?-Japan Facing China in the East China Sea”, to
evaluate, and describe the developments in the ECS dispute, and the possible directions following the June 2008
agreement/announcement by both sides to jointly develop oil/gas in the area.
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perceptions that lead to specific manifestations of Japanese policy-behaviour at particular
points, during the period of investigation (2004-2006).
7.4. Conclusion
Japan’s management of the ECS territorial/maritime issues during the Koizumi
administration implies, to an extent, the salience of domestic nationalist pressure affecting
its policy-choices. However, unlike the predominantly symbolic nature of the Yasukuni
problem, the ECS disputes are real/tangible, and have the potential to escalate into armed
confrontations, amid a volatile concoction of chauvinistic nationalist passion and military
brinksmanship. Accordingly, NCR’s dictum expects Japanese state-elites/policy-makers to
be more constrained by the relative determinacy of the ECS issues, to allow nationalistic
fervour to dictate decision-making. The measured policy-options and diplomatic manoeuvres
undertaken clearly suggest the prevalence of sensibility and reason over sense and passion
(Gries 2004), and balancing on Tokyo’s part, to simultaneously advance its foreign and
domestic policy-goals. This demonstrates the extent to which nationalism determines
Japan’s China policy-making, which under particular external-domestic conditions and time
context, as perceived by Japanese state-elites, can be more, or less salient vis-à-vis other
variables in shaping their policy-options. Indeed, the recent breakthrough in June 2008,
where both sides reached an agreement to jointly develop the disputed ECS gas fields,
further underscores nationalism’s limitations (Yoshida and Terada 19/06/2008).
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Diagram 4
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
This thesis has striven to assess nationalism’s role and salience in shaping Japan’s China
policy in the context of their post-Cold War bilateral ties, notably during the Koizumi
administration. It has earmarked important research questions that required investigation
pertaining to the conventional wisdom regarding nationalism’s efficacy in engendering the
debilitative trend in Japanese-Chinese relations. By incorporating an NCR analytical model,
this study has sought to explicate why, how, when, and the extent to which rising/resurgent
nationalism has affected Japanese state-elites/policy-makers’ perceptions and calculations
that determine their policy-options vis-à-vis China, when managing issues of nationalist
persuasions, considering the presence of other noteworthy determinants that simultaneously
influence their bilateral interactions. As described in Chapter 2, nationalism is commonly
marginalised by the IR theoretical straightjackets of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, while
over-emphasised in constructivist/Area-studies analysis of Japanese-Chinese diplomacy. To
bridge the apparent theoretical/methodological divides, this thesis has operationalised
nationalism via NCR’s middle-grounding schema, to promote a more comprehensive
understanding of the underlying logic behind Japan’s China policy-behaviour, where
nationalist politics appear ubiquitous in the policy-making process. True to the spirit of NCR,
it hypothesised that nationalism is salient, albeit under particular external-domestic
conditions and time context, which implies the need to account for the plausible prevalence
of other variables in explaining Japan-China relations.
This chapter attempts to firstly, summarise the empirical findings from the case-
studies of the Yasukuni Shrine and ECS disputes, by re-engaging the research questions,
and identifying the commonalities and differences between the two issue-areas, to establish
nationalism’s causality vis-à-vis other determinants in Japan’s China policy and the bilateral
ties. This is followed by an evaluation of the theoretical/analytical approach that focuses on
the feasibility and relevancy of the NCR construct in addressing the “national” question, as
compared to the conventional IR and constructivist/Area-studies frameworks that dominated
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the literature on Japanese-Chinese relations. The concluding section delineates this study’s
implications for future IR-oriented investigations of Japanese-Chinese diplomacy, and
generally, interstate relations that are obfuscated by domestic-ideational problems, like
nationalism and identity politics. Perhaps, most emphatically, it highlights the
progressiveness of IR realism via NCR in addressing its “Achilles’ heel” of domestic-
ideational theorising, to advance a more wholesome explanation of state behaviour in
international relations.
8.1. Empirical Findings
The analysis of the Yasukuni and ECS disputes reveals a number of cross-case empirical
commonalities and differences, with regard to nationalism’s impact on Japan’s China policy
prescriptions for the respective issue-areas. The findings of this section are guided by the
central research question, namely the manner, conditions, and the extent to which
nationalism affects Japanese state-elites’ perception/calculation and policy-options vis-à-vis
the Chinese, when managing these nationalistic-nuanced bilateral issues. They are also
formulated around the correlated questions regarding its salience vis-à-vis other
determinants in constraining Japan’s preference-of-action, and whether these other
imperatives exacerbate, or mitigate nationalism in the policy-making process.
8.1.1. The salience and limits of nationalism
For a start, this investigation found that in both case-studies, nationalism, defined in terms of
domestic nationalist pressure, and/or nationalistic-rightwing conviction of key state-elites,
was to an extent, responsible for the Japanese government’s policy-options that aggravated
diplomatic conundrums and periods of sustained political tension with China. For reasons of
identity and/or political/strategic expediency, nationalism was unequivocal in fuelling the
Japanese-Chinese disputes over Yasukuni and the ECS. Nationalist passion and emotion
were indubitably involved in arousing Japanese pride and prejudices vis-à-vis the Chinese,
and so were their strategic instrumentalisation by Japanese state-elites in foreign policy-
making, to advance both personal political goals, and the nationalist agenda of history
revisionism and territorial/maritime sovereignty.
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However, nationalism, though salient, did not appear to be the primary determinant
of Tokyo’s external behaviour. Indeed, neither case-study depicted instances of Japanese-
Chinese altercations festering beyond strident rhetorical exchanges and measured
diplomatic responses that stop short of hostile actions, despite the nationalistic sensitivities
surrounding both issues. The fact that none of the disputes escalated into violent
confrontations suggests that nationalist passion and emotions do not automatically render
the “rationality” of policy-makers/state-elites obsolete, and that domestic nationalist pressure
does not necessarily translate into assertive-nationalist policy-options. A clear example of
such behaviour can be drawn from Japan’s management of the ECS natural gas dispute. As
described, the Japanese government encountered significant domestic nationalist pressure
for more decisive actions in dealing with China, following its perceived “soft handling” of the
Senkaku/Diaoyudao and submarine incidents, and especially after reports of Chinese
encroachment and alleged exploration activities at the fringes of the ECS median line. Yet,
despite nationalist pressure and Chinese provocations, the Koizumi administration did not
opt for an outright assertive-nationalist policy, in a “tit-for-tat” action to stake Japan’s claim
that would have risk a high-sea confrontation with the PLA-Navy. Instead, a policy of
discernible, albeit calculated-assertiveness modulated by diplomatic prudence was preferred
to advance a more pragmatic solution to the dispute.
Similarly in the Yasukuni Shrine row, Koizumi’s annual pilgrimages at the expense of
Japanese-Chinese political relations demonstrated nationalism’s salience in shaping his
nonchalant policy towards China. However, notwithstanding fervent nationalist calls for a
more forthright treatment of his “original” Yasukuni pledge (annual homage on August 15),
the timing, policy-options, and diplomatic manoeuvres undertaken by Koizumi and his
government during each of the six Shrine visits suggest the prevalence of state-elites’ astute
perception/calculation and shrewd statecraft, rather than purely nationalistic passion and
emotionally laden decision-making. Koizumi’s decision to avoid the contentious date in all
but his last Yasukuni visits, most vividly depicted by his “eleventh hour” “change-of-date”
strategy in August 2001, further confirms this observation.
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The extent to which nationalism affected foreign policy-making were likewise
demonstrated by the differences in Japanese state-elites’ treatment of, and attitude towards
the two issue-areas of history and security (symbolic/intangible versus real/tangible),
especially when it came to suppressing, or allowing the neo-nationalist agenda to manifest
in China policy-making. It is obvious that the Koizumi administration was generally more
prepared to pander to nationalist demands to advance an assertive-nationalist policy over
the history-oriented Yasukuni dispute, due to the symbolic and less risk-adverse nature of
the issue. Conversely, its inclination to modulate between assertive and moderate policy-
options, when managing the security-oriented ECS disputes, connotes its readiness to rein
in, or divert excessive nationalist pressure to other less tangible issues, considering the real
and potentially explosive nature of the territorial/maritime disputes. The qualitatively different
treatment of, and policy approach towards these two issue-areas, as reflected by its cavalier
attitude in advancing the neo-nationalist revisionist history agenda via the Yasukuni issue,
while embracing a cautious and measured response towards the ECS debacle, evidently
highlight the limits of nationalism in affecting Japan’s China policy.
Overall, the evidence from both case-studies show that Japan’s China policy is
determined by much more than nationalistic and emotive goals of reinstating Japanese pride
and identity, via the reinterpretation/reinvention of history, and defending Japanese
territorial/maritime sovereignty. Rather, foreign policy reflects the broader national interests
of the Japanese state/state-elites, defined in terms of realising “an amalgam” of pragmatic
external goals and domestic agendas (Bong 2002:260). In both cases, “sensibility and
reason” appeared to override “sense and passion” (Gries 2004) in Japanese policy-making,
despite the latter combination being popularly, albeit mistakenly perceived as the driving
force behind Koizumi’s hardnosed Yasukuni policy towards the Chinese. It is undeniable that
Koizumi’s obstinacy in the Yasukuni debacle was, to an extent, the result of intense
domestic nationalist pressure (Izokukai, LDP-rightwing Diet-members etc.), and plausibly his
personal nationalist conviction. However, it was also evident that such behaviour only
manifested because of the symbolic rather than tangible nature of the dispute, and more
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significantly, Koizumi’s over-emphasis and dependence on a pro-US foreign policy, where
the anticipation of favourable US-Japan relations vis-à-vis China, facilitated his aloof Shrine
bravados. It is, likewise, true that Koizumi and several key Cabinet members have been,
commonly regarded as “neo-conservatives” and/or “normal-nationalists” (Samuels 2007a),
who long for the revival of Japanese pride and prestige in the international arena (see
Chapter 4). Yet, in most of the diplomatic incidents discussed, their nationalistic demeanours
did not appear to cloud their judgement and policy-deliberation, nor did these so-called
“normal-nationalists” indiscriminately pursue nationalistic policy-options vis-à-vis China, to
advance the more parochial dimensions of Japanese national interests. These empirical
observations, though not denying nationalism’s salience in affecting Japanese policy-
making, suggest the need to redress the common misinterpretation regarding its primacy in
shaping Japan’s contemporary relations with China.
PM Abe Shinzo’s proactive actions to revitalise political relations with Beijing upon
assuming office, further demonstrated nationalism’s limits in China policy-making. Despite
his renowned hawkish, anti-China stance and nationalist candours, Abe exhibited his
pragmatic side by making the PRC his maiden official overseas destination,1 in an attempt to
seize the opportunity to restore leadership summits and mutual state visits that had been,
frozen since 2001, owing particularly to Koizumi’s Yasukuni intransigence. During their
summit, both Abe and the Chinese leadership agreed to build “a mutually beneficial
relationship based on common strategic interests”, which was a qualitative improvement to
the 1998 pledge of “a partnership of friendship and cooperation” (cf.Nabeshima 16/10/2006;
IIPS 2008:6). They also agreed to strengthen bilateral relations by “turning the wheels” of
politics and economics simultaneously, instead of maintaining the seikei bunri principle, and
establishing bilateral panels to study the history and ECS issues (Nabeshima 16/10/2006).
Perhaps, nationalism’s centrality has been most evidently, dismissed by Abe’s observation
of the Yasukuni moratorium under the pretext of “strategic ambiguity” during his short-lived
premiership. Taken together with this hindsight, the empirical evidence does not appear to
1 In fact, Abe is the first postwar Japanese premier who chose China as the destination for his first official
overseas trip (PD 08/10/2006)
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support the conventional/popular wisdom regarding rising nationalism being the dominant
feature of their contemporary relationship, or the primary driver of Japan’s China policy.
8.1.2. Nationalism’s efficacy vis-à-vis other variables
This brings us to a second, correlated conclusion that views nationalism’s saliency as being
dependent on its interaction with other variables, which can either mitigate, or exacerbate its
efficacy, and which, under particular conditions and time context, can be more prevalent in
determining Japanese policy-options. Both case-studies evinced that domestic nationalist
pressure did not act in isolation to determine Japan’s China policy-making, even though both
issue-areas are genuinely rooted in the nationalist ideology, and fuelled by nationalist
passion/emotions. Rather, nationalism’s salience depended on Japanese state-elites’
perception of the prevailing external environment, and the domestic political
conditions/processes that affected their policy-calculations. In particular, the Koizumi
administration’s pursuance of a nationalistic-assertive China policy reflected its perception of
a sanguine external environment, defined in terms of an advantageous relative power
position vis-à-vis China, forged mainly by a combination of favourable allied resolve via the
US-Japanese alliance, and bilateral leverage over Beijing, as well as limited economic cost
to their deepening interdependence. Conversely, a perceptively disadvantageous, or
ambivalent power position, had almost always induced less palpable nationalistic policy-
options that came either in the form of non-action masqueraded in nationalist rhetoric, a
tangibly moderate-conciliatory policy, or a discernibly assertive policy modulated by
appeasing measures. Mediating Tokyo’s decision-making were the developments in the
domestic political context, namely the magnitude of official and popular nationalist-rightwing
vis-à-vis pacifist-leftist/opposition political pressure for a more assertive, or moderate China
policy, the personal politico-ideological convictions of state-elites, notwithstanding.
Both cases showed limited instances where the Japanese government had chosen
an outright nationalistic policy-option, following its perception of a favourable external
condition/power position vis-à-vis China. Instead, the most favoured option appeared to be a
combination of assertive-cum-moderate behaviour that reflected Tokyo’s predominant
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perception of an ambiguous external condition leading to the various diplomatic clashes.
However, a more important observation lies with the fact that Japan’s behaviour towards
China was primarily constrained by external impetus, an observation that is theoretically
consistent with the NCR dictum espoused by this thesis. Indeed, in both cases, the choice
between nationalistic and moderate policy-options essentially hinged on state-elites’
perception of the external environment, which delineated the parameter of Japan’s policies
in the context of Japanese-Chinese relations. Empirically, the Koizumi administration
appeared more willing to support the neo-nationalist agenda, or allow domestic nationalist
pressure to affect its China policy, to various degrees, under a perceptively favourable or
ambivalent external environment. Conversely, it had exercised diplomatic prudence,
suppressing domestic nationalist sentiment, when the external environment was
perceptively unfavourable. Such policy-behaviour clearly reflects NCR’s presupposition
regarding domestic variables gaining salience and assuming a relatively independent
function affecting foreign policy, under low-pressured or ambiguous external conditions, and
vice-versa, during periods of high external pressure.
Yet, both case-studies demonstrate that the prevailing external environment did not
directly translate into specific behaviour/preference-of-action, but had to be mediated by
domestic variables in the guise of nationalist pressure and other political processes, and
more fundamentally, the “fuzzy” perceptual lenses of Japanese state-elites that served as
the final arbiter of the specific policy-options (Gideon Rose 1998; Sterling-Folker 1997:19).
In other words, it was unit-level causality in the shape of key decision-makers within the
Koizumi administration that subjectively defined the external conditions, which, calculated
together with the other domestic impetus, shaped the respective policy-options and
diplomatic manoeuvres vis-à-vis China. Again, this conclusion not only conforms to NCR’s
theoretical underpinnings that posit a causal role for domestic variables like nationalism in
foreign policy analysis, but also evidently justify its advocacy for explicit domestic-level
theorising, which under particular condition/context, can be affective, or otherwise, in
constraining state behaviour/preferences.
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As noted, the Koizumi administration mostly perceived the external condition/relative
power position vis-à-vis China to be ambiguous, while its domestic political resolve vis-à-vis
nationalist pressure leading to the incidents in both cases were largely unfavourable.
Straddling in between the external-domestic nexus, the anticipated position expectedly
predisposed Tokyo towards its preferred policy-option of visible, assertive-nationalist
responses moderated by conciliatory measures, when dealing with Beijing. This apparent
“balancing” behaviour of satisfying nationalist demands, domestically, while appeasing the
Chinese, externally, also validates the NCR-centred argument in Chapter 1 regarding state-
elites’ inclination to strike a balanced foreign policy of simultaneously pursuing nationalistic
goals and the broader national interests. In the Japanese case, these potentially divergent
goals were defined in terms of the quest for national pride and prestige, and “normal
statehood,” on one hand, and a stable Japanese-Chinese relationship for mutual economic
and strategic benefits, on the other. Time and again, “trade-offs” occurred in the form of
pursuing “damage-control” measures to compensate for the initial provocative actions, i.e.
visiting Yasukuni, detaining Chinese activists in Senkaku/Diaoyudao, and pursuing unilateral
exploration plans in the ECS, where pragmatic considerations, like preventing further
escalations of diplomatic tension, and sustaining their flourishing economic ties to fuel
Japan’s economic vitality, were prioritised over narrower nationalist objectives.
Another interesting empirical point to note is that, in most of the contentious
episodes, the Koizumi administration had chosen the expected policy-options that reflected
its anticipated position resulting from the interplay between external and domestic dynamics.
However, Koizumi’s controversial decision to visit Yasukuni on August 15, 2006, seemed
anomalous, since the unfavourable external environment and domestic political resolve,
would have required him to adopt non-action, or a conciliatory policy-option. Yet, when
interpreted from NCR’s perspective, his “nationalistic” action conforms to the assumption
that state-elites do not necessarily respond effectively/adequately to the stipulated decision-
making constraints, due to domestic “intervening” elements. In this respect, the decision
arguably reflected, as much, Koizumi’s anticipation that a shrine visit during his last weeks in
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office would not trigger debilitating international and domestic political repercussions, as his
intentions to “immortalise” his personal political image as the leader who stood tall against
China, and even plausibly, fulfill his nationalist convictions.
As concluded earlier, the perception of an advantageous relative power position vis-
à-vis China, forged by a combination of favourable US-Japan allied resolve/commitment,
diplomatic/bilateral leverage over China, and sustainable economic interdependence,
tended to allow domestic nationalist impetus greater leverage in shaping Japan’s China
policy. Individually and collectively, these external dynamics also exhibited mitigating and
exacerbating effects on nationalism’s efficacy. In both case-studies, it is apparent that
favourable allied resolve/commitment in the shape of a strengthened US-Japanese alliance,
was an essentially decisive external factor influencing Koizumi’s foreign/China policy
orientation. Both elucidated that the perception of the prevailing external condition/relative
power position vis-à-vis China, significantly depended on the Japanese government’s
anticipation of the atmosphere of US-Japan ties, the proximity between Tokyo and
Washington vis-à-vis Beijing in the US-Japan-China “triangular ties”, and American gaiatsu,
pertaining to the two issues. Undoubtedly, such estimations were engendered by Koizumi’s
“grand strategy” of hitching Japanese foreign policy to that of their American ally to facilitate
the quest for “normal” statehood, and greater international role and recognition. Since
Japan-China relations have traditionally been, and continued to be greatly affected by their
relationships with the US, Washington’s encouragement and appreciation of Japan’s overtly
pro-American foreign policy, obviously, have had Tokyo gaining the impression of greater
leverage vis-à-vis Beijing in their “strategic triangularity” (Soerensen 2006), thus boosting
Koizumi’s confidence in advancing an assertive, and occasionally “aloof” China policy.
Specifically, this study found that Koizumi’s Yasukuni policy was particularly
facilitated by the post-“9/11” expansion of US-Japanese security relations under the aegis of
their alliance. Japan’s unwavering support for US external/security agenda endeared
Koizumi to the Bush administration, where the “Bush-Koizumi special relationship” led to
minimal American gaiatsu on Japanese diplomacy towards China, at least on history-related
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quarrels. Indeed, Washington, for most part, maintained its silence and tolerated the
Japanese PM’s Yasukuni antics, despite their debilitating impact on Japan’s Asia policy, and
the corresponding repercussions to US regional strategy. However, when it came to the
security-oriented ECS debacles, Washington was more prepared to vocalise its
“impartiality”, i.e. during the 2004 Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute, apparently to send a clearer
signal to Tokyo regarding possible US “non-commitment” in the event of an ECS
contingency, and its preference for status quo, to dissuade further provocative actions from
its Japanese ally. Both instances not only demonstrated the prevalence of “allied resolve”
impinging on the Koizumi administration’s perception/calculation of its relative power
position vis-à-vis China, but also, in exacerbating as well as mitigating nationalism’s role in
Japan’s China policy-making. In fact, the general assertiveness of Koizumi’s China policy
gave the impression that he was willing, to an extent, to marginalise/discount other policy-
determinants, to advance the neo-nationalist agenda, and upset the Chinese in the process,
for as long as propitious US-Japanese ties were in place. It is therefore viable to deduce that
the correlation between Washington’s alliance commitment and the “strategic empowerment
of nationalism” (Bong 2002:266) by Japanese state-elites denotes what observers
acknowledged as Japan’s “dependent nationalism”, one which is only feasible via American
encouragement/sponsorship (McCormack 2007; Tsunekawa 2006; Samuels 2007a/b).
The prevalence of the alliance factor in Japan’s external calculus invariably connotes
the limits of deepening economic interdependence and other external-domestic
determinants in moulding its China policies. As described, his aloofness in continuing shrine
visits, despite the threats of Chinese economic retributions, and more ominously, following
the massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, indicates Koizumi’s willingness to risk
damaging Japanese-Chinese economic ties. Likewise, Tokyo’s forceful detention of Chinese
activists during the March 2004 Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident, regardless of the earlier
Chinese veiled threat to undermine Japanese bid for a lucrative Shinkansen project, in the
wake of Koizumi’s New Year shrine visit, further allude to the limits of economic
interdependence in mitigating nationalistic tendencies in Japan’s China policy. However, it
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has to be clarified that these specific instances do not adequately represent the full impact of
economic considerations on Japanese policy-making, especially when viewing their bilateral
ties from the broader and longer-term perspective. On the contrary, the “damage-control”
measures and swift diplomatic “fence-mending” by Japan (and China, as well) following
several of the bilateral altercations, suggest economic interdependence as having much
more constraining effect on Japanese state-elites’ decision-making. Thus, despite limited
contextual evidence indicating the impact of specific economic consideration on Tokyo’s
policy calculation during the various diplomatic contentions, it is still credible to deduce that
their flourishing bilateral trade and investment relations did factor into Japan’s pragmatic
posturing, especially when its long-overdue economic recovery has much to do with China’s
robust economic growth and burgeoning domestic consumption. Moreover, with China
becoming Japan’s top trading partner since 2004, and Japanese investments pouring into
the Chinese mainland against the backdrop of popular anti-Japanese fervour, rational and
calculated policy judgments, rather than purely emotional responses that could undermine
Japanese business interests, appeared to be Tokyo’s modus vivendi towards Beijing.
Besides, China’s “comfortable” acquiescence of the seikei bunri-styled relationship,
epitomised by the “hot economics, cold politics” arrangement, gave the impression of both
governments plausibly operating on a “double-track” approach, when managing the political
and economic dimensions of their diplomacy (Anonymous interview C; Drifte 2003:19). If
true, this hypothesis would have offered Tokyo more flexibility in terms of policy-choices
towards Beijing without being overly concerned with Chinese economic retributions. It would
have equally explained the Koizumi administration’s relatively indifferent perception/
calculation of its diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China, especially in the majority of the
Yasukuni incidents discussed, which partly encouraged his obstinate Shrine policy.
Similarly, Tokyo’s “calculated assertiveness” in the submarine and gas disputes, despite the
unfavourable diplomatic conditions vis-à-vis China, partly reflects its confidence towards
Beijing’s economic pragmatism in mitigating against excessive Chinese responses to
escalate the disputes. These evidences highlight the correlation between economic
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interdependence and Japan’s perception of its bilateral leverage over China, where the latter
was, to an extent, dependent on Japanese state-elites’ consideration of the former. More
significantly, they illustrate not only the moderating, but also exacerbating qualities/attributes
of economic interdependence on nationalistic tendencies in Japan’s China policy-making,
where increased confidence towards the positive effects of greater interdependence actually
encouraged Japanese state-elites to be less bridled in pursuing nationalistic-inclined
policies.
As for domestic politics, both case-studies demonstrated, to varying degrees, the
causality of inter/intra-party political competition, and the affective role of domestic, non-
state actors in Japan’s China policy-making. They also highlighted the intertwined relations
between domestic politics and nationalism, where Japanese state-elites demonstrated
inclination to indulge in nationalist politics, and propensity to stoke nationalist sentiment for
domestic political expediency, all of which contributed to Japan’s assertive-nationalist policy-
options (actual and rhetorical), when managing the two issue-areas. Indeed, both cases
witnessed how the changing dynamics of intra-LDP politics, namely the ascendancy of
nationalistic-rightwing and “anti-China” forces, via the “seiwa-kai” faction, diplomatic zoku,
the PARC, and various Diet-members’ grouping, had engendered a more assertive and
realpolitik-oriented China policy. This policy-shift was encouraged by waning leftwing
opposition, and the resulting drift of Japanese mainstream politics to the right. Furthermore,
despite its political opposition on symbolic issues like the Yasukuni visits, the largest
opposition party, DPJ, has revealed that it can be as, if not more, nationalistic than the LDP,
when it came to defending Japanese interests in the ECS, or fuelling the “China threat”
notion (see Chapter 7). Meanwhile, PM Koizumi’s promotion of neo-conservative elites to
key cabinet positions also saw China policy-making becoming relatively dependent on these
central decision-makers’ political resolve vis-à-vis domestic nationalist pressure, their own
nationalistic convictions aside. Additionally, the enhanced foreign policy-making leverage of
the Cabinet and the PMO saw MOFA’s traditionally moderating influence on China policy
diminished, while Koizumi’s pro-US external orientation facilitated the ascendancy of the so-
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called “American school” bureaucrats at the expense of “China school” officials within the
MOFA setup (Sasajima interview). These domestic political transformations, among others,
have allowed the mainstream neo-nationalist/neo-conservative version of “American-
dependent” nationalism to take root at the apex, the legislative, and the bureaucratic levels
of Japanese policy-making during Koizumi’s premiership.
Moreover, in both cases, nationalist pressure groups, the Japanese media, and
public opinion became important sources of nationalistic-oriented political pressure affecting
Tokyo’s policy-deliberations, and state-elites like Koizumi, Abe, Aso, and Nakagawa, all
demonstrated inclination to instrumentalise “anti-China” nationalism to appease these non-
state actors, in their efforts to advance both neo-nationalist and their personal
political/nationalist agendas. Conversely, the traditionally salient, non-official mitigating
forces of pacifist pressure groups and zaikai appeared less effective in suppressing
nationalist tendencies, as vividly demonstrated by the Koizumi administration’s rebuff on
their calls for a moratorium of prime ministerial Yasukuni visits.
Overall, one can conclude that domestic politics has remained a salient determinant,
exhibiting both exacerbating and mitigating influence on nationalistic tendencies in Japan’s
China policy-making. However, like nationalism, it appeared more affective under sanguine,
or ambiguous relative power position vis-à-vis China, as perceived by Japanese state-elites,
who were more prepared to consider, or accommodate to domestic political imperatives in
their policy decision-making, under such external conditions. This again, corresponds with
NCR’s assumptions regarding the primacy of external constraints in delineating the
parameters of state behaviour, and the causality of domestic political processes in
determining the specific preference-of-action.
8.2. Theoretical Findings and Reflections on Neoclassical Realism
It was argued in Chapter 2 that the mainstream IR theories of neo-realism and neo-
liberalism were handicapped in explicating nationalism in the analysis of foreign policy and
interstate relations, due to their privileging of external and structural-material variables, and
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marginalisation of domestic-ideational theorising. Conversely, constructivism and Area-
studies that favoured domestic-ideational analysis, though empirically rich and deep in their
explanations of nationalism and identity politics, commonly discounted the constraints
imposed by the external environment, and tended not to incorporate clear analytical
frameworks to systematically theorise state behaviour/preferences. Both approaches have
been used in existing studies of Japanese-Chinese relations, and both have been found
wanting, to varying extent, in generating a fuller explanation that accounts for nationalism
and other equally important external-domestic determinants that concurrently affect the
bilateral relations. To overcome this apparent “analytical myopia” (Berger 2000), the middle-
grounding NCR was introduced to operationalise nationalism within its essentially realist-
based construct, to shed light into the stipulated research questions.
8.2.1. General evaluation of the NCR Model of Nationalism and State Behaviour
Overall, the NCR framework fared relatively well in answering, and meeting the research
questions and objectives of this thesis. First, and foremost, it was accommodative towards
the “national question”, in that nationalism and identity politics were aptly, and deductively
operationalised as a “domestic” variable within its construct, as well as systematically
assessed in terms of their interaction with, and salience vis-à-vis structural-material
determinants that conventionally governed mainstream theories. Indeed, unlike the
mainstream realist and liberal constructs’ inclination to either discount, or introduce it as an
addendum in their analysis, the NCR model gave nationalism adequate emphasis by
juxtaposing it within its external-domestic nexus to demonstrate its interplay with the external
constraints and domestic political process involved in Japan’s China policy-making.
Although foregrounding on basic realist assumptions, NCR’s hospitability towards non-
material, unit-level variables helped theoretically bridge the supposedly incompatible
assumptions of structuralist and cultural-ideational theories, which enabled this study to
generate relatively novel, realist-based conclusions about nationalism in Japan’s relations
with China.
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NCR’s unequivocal acceptance of nationalism’s function in foreign policy-making,
expectedly, helped realise two fundamental objectives of this thesis. They were: i) to
determine the meanings and manifestations of nationalism in contemporary Japan, and
reveal its correlations with Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy; and ii) to
systematically assess its impact vis-à-vis other variables on Japan’s China policy that
defined the atmosphere of their bilateral relations. Specifically, the “bridging qualities” of
NCR assumptions facilitated this thesis’ responses to the related central research question
of why, how, when, and to what extent nationalism affected Japanese external behaviour,
interests, and goals vis-à-vis China, all of which, I contend, were adequately dealt with in the
preceding chapters. On why nationalism and nationalist politics mattered in Japan’s China
policy-making, the NCR analysis employed the constructivist-akin methodology of
scrutinising the ideational (history, culture, ideology), psychological (perception, images,
attitudes), and material (power, capabilities, prestige) dimensions of Japanese nationalism,
to cultivate a deeper appreciation of its contemporary meanings, agendas, driving forces,
and typically anti-Chinese-manifestation in post-Cold War Japan. This exercise was
deliberately, meant to bring to light the underlying passion and emotion that drove the
nationalist logic that made Japanese nationalists, and to an extent, the general public, so
resolute in defending what they perceived to be their national identity and territorial
sovereignty, and their eagerness to defy the Chinese. In so doing, it also alluded to
nationalism’s growing influence within Japanese domestic politics and its anticipated impact
on Japan’s behaviour towards China.
The analysis also dealt with the “unit-level” intricacies of identifying the actors and
processes involved, to infer the linkage between nationalism and foreign policy, namely how
nationalism intersected with actor interests, and wielded its influence in policy-making. To be
fair, the empirical findings were not affirmatively conclusive, both in ascertaining the
nationalistic convictions of key actors, and establishing a direct linkage between nationalist
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convictions/pressure and policy-decisions, due to limitations of scope and analytical tools.2 It
was also difficult to objectively, verify that nationalist passion drove Japanese state-elites to
behave the way they did during the instances of diplomatic contentions. Yet, both case-
studies demonstrated that nationalism’s saliency did not solely derive from unadulterated
passion and emotions. Japanese state-elites also invoked nationalism’s instrumentality for
political/strategic purposes, underscoring its efficacy in foreign policy-making, when
strategically empowered by the power-wielders as a political tool (Bong 2002:266).
Moreover, the widely reported personalities, political/ideological dispositions and affiliations,
and actions/reactions of, as well as opinions and statements by key actors, before, and
during the periods of disputes, provided ample evidence that enabled the credible assertion
of nationalism’s affective role in Japan’s China policy-making.
In responding to the questions of when, and the extent to which nationalism affected
Japanese state-elites’ China policy decisions, both cases, as concluded in the previous
section, largely conformed to NCR’s assumptions regarding nationalism’s causality under
particular external conditions and domestic political process. In so doing, the NCR schema
also shed light into the inquiries concerning the saliency of other relevant variables, and their
exacerbating/mitigating impact on nationalism in Japanese policy-making. True to its realist
pedigree, the NCR analysis, although recognising the causality of nationalism and/or other
domestic sources on Japanese behaviour/preferences vis-à-vis China, also firmly identified
power “at the heart of international politics” (Davidson 2002:3). To reiterate, NCR “holds that
the international environment in which states interact is the primary determinant of their
interests and behaviour” (Taliaferro 2006:479-480), and that relative power position
establishes “the basic parameter of a country’s foreign policy” (Gideon Rose 1998:146). The
Koizumi administration’s external behaviour/preferences, when dealing with China over the
Yasukuni and ECS disputes, echoed these assumptions, in that its policies largely hinged on
its perception/calculation of the external environment, defined in terms of relative power
position vis-à-vis the disputant-state, China. Domestic politics and nationalist pressure
2 See the following section on “Implications for future research” for an elaboration on this caveat, and the
opportunities for future research on this aspect.
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obviously factored into Tokyo’s calculations, and key members of the Administration did
exhibit willingness to satisfy nationalist demands and/or their personal nationalist passion, or
gain political mileage by advancing nationalistic policies to varying degrees. However, the
extent of nationalism’s manifestation, and the level of policy assertiveness were constrained
by the external conditions noted earlier, indicating consistency between the empirical
findings and NCR’s realist-centred premise. That said, NCR’s auxiliary assumptions also
indicate that external constraints limit, but do not determine specific foreign policy-choices,
and that states do not always respond effectively to the exigencies of the impending
environment. One can thus explain the supposed anomaly to the realist dictum in the case
of the 2006 Yasukuni visit via this NCR notion regarding the likelihood of states/state-elites
responding inappropriately to external imperatives, due to unit-level “intervening” factors,
which during that instance, was arguably attributed to Koizumi’s perception, nationalist
conviction and personal expedience.
8.2.2. Comparative evaluation: nationalism vis-à-vis power politics, and interdependence?
From a comparative perspective, NCR’s “integrative framework” certainly has its advantages
over the rigid constructs of “Waltzian” realism and neo-liberalism in understanding
nationalism and other domestic-ideational sources that, together with the preferred variables
of these orthodoxies, concurrently influenced Japan’s relations with China. As noted in the
general evaluation, its foregrounding on realism’s fundamental tenets, and deductive
incorporation of unit-level variables, endowed the NCR analysis with “operational flexibility”
and greater explanatory power that made it robust, yet meticulous and better equipped to
analysing variations in state behaviour/preferences, and international relations.
Specifically to this thesis, NCR offered far better insights into the workings and
internal attributes of Japanese (nationalist) politics and China policy-making that both neo-
realist and neo-liberal studies commonly missed out, or marginalised, due to their
presupposition of such sources as a given. It facilitated the systematic assessment of
nationalism as both a power and ideational variable without negating the significance of the
constraints imposed by the external environment on Japanese policies towards China. This
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provided a more inclusive explanation of the parameters, and variations in Japanese policy-
options, especially with regard to nationalism’s impact, during particular conditions and time
contexts, compared to neo-realism’s preoccupation with systemic-structural
constraint/international system, which in Waltz’s own admission, “does not dictate exactly
how each state will respond within those parameters” (cf. Taliaffero 2006:482). Similarly, the
neo-liberals’ central variables also proved deficient on their own, in explaining the anomaly
of worsening Japan-China relations against the backdrop of deepening economic
interdependence (“cold politics, hot economics”), without the necessary domestic inputs
espoused by NCR. Hence, rather than attributing Japan’s deteriorating relationship with
China solely to the intricacies of balance-of-power politics and shifting power dynamics, or
the downside of interdependence and under-institutionalisation of their bilateral framework,
the NCR analysis evinced that domestic nationalist wherewithal and political exigencies
were, as much causal in Tokyo’s China policy-deliberations, as with the exacerbating
consequence of their interaction with these neo-realist/neo-liberalist interpretations that led
to the contemporary outcome in Japanese-Chinese ties.
Although its advocacy for unit-level explanation brought accusations of
“reductionism,” the NCR analysis proved critics wrong by demonstrating that the causes of
the bilateral outcomes and Japan’s behaviour towards China did not rest solely on the
causal properties of unit-level variables, and unlike “reductionist” theories, it did not rely on
domestic attributes to do most of the explanation (Taliaferro 2006:481-482; Gideon Rose
1998). Meanwhile, the charges of NCR’s so-called violation of realism’s structural logic is, in
Taliaferro’s contention, due to their widely misinterpreted notion that IR realism is a rigid
research schema “whose “hard core” is synonymous” with neo-realism, whereas in actuality,
both NCR and neo-realism are part of its broader research programme (2006:480; 482).
NCR also faired better than constructivism in explaining why nationalism/identity
politics, though efficacious, was not the primary driver of Japanese policy towards China.
Although embracing the constructivist approach of scrutinising domestic-ideational sources,
it did not forsake the international forces that equally constrained Japan’s policy-making, nor
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over-emphasise sense over sensibility, or passion over reason (Gries 2004), on the part of
Japanese state-elites, which explained their reluctance to pursue determinative policies to
defend Senkaku/ECS, or be forthright in visiting Yasukuni. Moreover, unlike constructivist
studies, NCR does not dispense with the services of a working analytical model, which in
this thesis, allowed the systematic theorisation of the relevant variables that helped generate
comparatively more intelligible explanations of how, when, and to what extent nationalism
affected Japan’s China policy-making.
It is, henceforth, reasonable to conclude that the NCR analysis has generated robust
interpretations, and relatively insightful explanations of nationalism’s functions and impact on
Japan’s relations with China. Its merits included: 1) the provision of a clear, operational
framework, through which the interplay between nationalism and power politics became
intelligible and assessable in Japanese foreign/China policy-making; and 2) its fostering of
both intra- and inter-paradigm exchanges/interactions helped reduce the “analytical myopia”
within mainstream and alternative IR constructs, when theorising their nationalism-tainted
bilateral relationship. Together, they facilitated the formulation of reasonably fresh IR-based
conclusions about the stipulated research problems.
8.3. Implications for Future Research
This dissertation has demonstrated via NCR, the continued relevance and progressiveness
of IR realism in the analysis of Japan’s post-Cold War relations with China. By deductively
introducing non-traditional reasoning, it has taken steps to address the “Achilles heel” of
mainstream realism, and enhance the explanatory power of the realist paradigm on the
international relations of regions like East Asia that are facing emerging power competitions,
and baffled by clashing nationalisms, memories, and identities (Berger 2003).
There are, however, noticeable caveats to this modestly defined study. Theoretically,
critics may argue that although the domestic “black box” was exposed, some areas of unit-
level theorising remained inconspicuous in this investigation. Specifically, the linkage
between nationalism, and the intersubjectivity of state-elites perceptions and socio-
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psychological dimensions of decision-making, were not thoroughly developed and
exhaustively elaborated,3 and so were the aforementioned difficulties in affirmatively linking
nationalism and intention to specific policy-decisions, following the limitations of research
scope and empirical materials. Indeed, it is difficult to make objective inferences on such
intersubjective dimensions of policy-making and validate them, without substantial written,
and/or verbal evidence from the protagonists themselves, or those closest to them (i.e.
personal memoirs, interviews), an “empirical luxury” that, to my knowledge/effort, remains
unavailable, due to the recentness of, and the sensitivities that still surround the issue-
areas.4 Moreover, as purported in Chapter 1, this was never intended to be a socio-
psychological/ideational study of Japanese nationalism and/or policy-making per se, but a
modest attempt to introduce an IR-oriented analysis that operationalised nationalism as both
a power and ideational determinant, to assess its causality vis-à-vis other variables in
Japan’s China policy-making. This explains the modest theorisation of the intersubjective
linkages mentioned, as the study’s limitation called for emphasis to be given to theorising
the external-domestic interplay, and lesser on those domestic linkages. Undoubtedly, these
caveats and limitations require further treatment, via a more advanced NCR construct, and
hence the avenue for future research on this topic, when “first-hand/primary-level” empirical
information becomes more accessible. Also, the NCR model can be utilised to investigate
similar research problems, from either the Chinese, or a comparative perspective, which
were beyond the scope of this dissertation.
3 Considering the technical constraints (i.e. word limit, size of dissertation) that limited the research scope of
this dissertation, the questions of how these other unit-level, non-material factors, under the mediation of
nationalism, affected Japanese state-elites perceptions of Japan’s relative power position vis-à-vis China, and
how they were, then, translated into specific policy-options, were not thoroughly explicated. This caveat would
have to be left for future theorisation, via a more expansive NCR construct and analysis.
4 Specifically, the recentness of the scope of investigation meant that official documents/records pertaining to
the issue-areas were mostly unavailable/inaccessible to validate the inferences/observations made regarding the
nationalistic convictions and intentions of the key state-elites, and the extent to which nationalist pressure from
various domestic sources affected their policy deliberations. Also, to achieve that would necessitate first-
hand/personal accounts that come from none other than the so-called “horse’s mouth”. However, interviews
with the key protagonists were difficult to arrange, while those interviewed, with few exceptions, were cautious
and hesitant to reply and reminisce at length about, or validate/invalidate the related events, due to the
sensitivity that still surround the issues. These constraints meant that the study largely depended on credible
media sources/reports, and expert interviews with renowned scholars/observers as the main primary sources for
the reconstruction of the related policy-making environment and process.
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Lastly, with its relative capacity to generate predictions of state behaviour, students
of Japan-China relations and NCR should look at developing more elaborative models, to
guesstimate the future direction of the bilateral ties. Based on this thesis’ findings, it is
credible to envisage nationalism becoming increasingly salient in Japanese politics and
foreign policy, for the foreseeable future, as Japan drives towards “normal statehood.” For
that reason, relations with China would continue to struggle, as domestic nationalist
pressure increasingly constrain Japanese (and Chinese) state-elites’ management of issues
endemic to the bilateral ties. However, nationalism’s dynamism would largely depend on
American encouragement, considering its contemporary attributes and Japan’s trademark
dependency on its ally, and for as long as the “neo-conservative/normal-nationalist”
(Samuels 2007a/b) discourse remains dominant.
With the future of Japanese-Chinese ties and East Asia’s well-being partly resting on
Tokyo and Beijing’s ability, and political will to suppress their confrontational nationalisms,
the onus would be on Washington to prudently manage the US-Japan alliance, and promote
more equidistant relations with both governments within their emerging “triangular”
framework, to control overly nationalistic tendencies in one’s policy towards the other. On
Japan’s China policy, gaiatsu from the US, together with other strategic and economic
considerations, and domestic actors that act to preserve their interests in maintaining good
relations with China, would remain credible mitigating factors against excessive nationalistic
preoccupations in Tokyo’s policy-making process. One would therefore expect a kind of
“pragmatic nationalism tempered by diplomatic prudence” (Zhao 2005:132) to prevail in
Japan, where parochialism is mediated by sensible considerations that befit the behaviour of
an interdependent and status quo power. On that note, Japanese-Chinese diplomacy would
remain volatile, as Japanese policy-makers strive to delicately balance their pursuit of both
nationalist and pragmatic goals, but in a “trade-off” situation, the former is unlikely to
supersede the latter, or become the primary driver of foreign/China policy-making in Japan.
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APPENDIX 2
KEY CHRONOLOGIGAL DEVELOPMENTS SHAPING JAPAN’S EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC CONDITIONS IN RELATIONS TO
CHINA POLICY-MAKING (APRIL 2001- SEPTEMBER 2006)
TIME
PREIOD EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
Before April
2001
- Revision of the US-Japan Guidelines for Security Cooperation and
Japan’s participation in TMD; the “Armitage Report” calling for
stronger US-Japan alliance commitments; Condoleeza Rice’s
remarks on China’s potential challenge in Foreign Affairs -
signified the new Bush administration assertive China policy
- US-China diplomatic tension over Belgrade embassy bombing, EP-
3 incident; and US-Japan concerns over China’s challenge.
- China sought improved ties with Japan after the 1998 “war
apology” issue; i.e. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s diplomatic
“charm-offensive” during Japan visit in 2000
- High frequency of Chinese research vessels intrusion into
Japanese EEZ; advance notification mechanism for maritime
research activities established
- History textbook issue began (mid February)
- Nationalism regaining currency in Japan following changes in
domestic terrain, i.e. impact of “Lost Decade” on Japanese
confidence/identity; generational change; weakening of pacifist
forces; growing insecurity, etc.
- Decline in Japanese perception of China since Tiananmen 1989,
and Taiwan Straits crisis (1996); etc.
- China’s rise exacerbated “China threat” perception in Japan
- Japanese images of China undermined by Chinese president Jiang
Zemin’s actions during Japan visit (November 1998)
- Japanese government passed security bills in 1999 to expand
security activities under the US-Japan alliance
- “historical revisionism” movement becoming pro-active
April 2001 - Chinese lodged protest over textbook issue
- Tokyo granted visa to ex-Taiwan president, Li Denghui; China
protested decision, postponed ex-Premier Li Peng’s Japan visit
- Japan imposed temporary safeguards on Chinese agricultural
produces; China threatened retaliation
- Chinese research vessels returned to disputed waters in ECS
- Beijing voiced concerns over new PM Koizumi Yasukuni pledge.
- Political/administrative reforms/bureaucratic restructuring began
- MOE/MEXT approved Tsukurukai’s history textbook
- LDP presidential candidate, Koizumi Junichiro pledged domestic
political/economic reforms, and visit to Yasukuni Shrine;
contender Hashimoto Ryutaro ruled out Yasukuni visit.
- Koizumi won the LDP presidential election; appointed Japan’s PM
May 2001 - Chinese kept up pressure on Yasukuni issue i.e. Jiang Zemin
criticised Koizumi’s shrine plans during meeting with South
Korean delegation; criticism from the China’s MFA spokesperson.
- Mainichi’s public poll recorded overwhelming public support of
above 90% for Koizumi’s planned Yasukuni visit
June 2001 - China retaliated on Japan’s “protectionist” trade measures by
raising 100% tariff rates on Japanese automobiles, mobile
phones, and air-conditioner
- China’s ambassador to Japan urged Koizumi to reconsider
Yasukuni visit
- Public support for Koizumi’s Yasukuni pledge favourable -
Mainichi’s poll
July 2001 - Secretaries-general of Japan’s ruling coalition visited China and
South Korea; Yasukuni and textbook issues discussed; Chinese
reportedly indicated willingness to tolerate one Yasukuni visit by
Koizumi on date other than August 15
- FM Tanaka met FM Tang Jiaxuan in Hanoi, Tang asked to Tanaka
to prevent Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit; Chinese maritime
activities/intrusion into Japan’s EEZ also topic of discussion
- FM Tanaka expressed personal opposition to Koizumi’s Yasukuni
plan
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Aug. 2001 - LDP’s Nonaka Hiromu visited China; Yasukuni main issue
- China protested Yasukuni visit; refused bilateral summit with
Koizumi; Jiang planned to avoid Koizumi in Shanghai’s APEC
summit
- US relatively quiet over Yasukuni issue, as with most ASEAN
states
- Chinese vessel incursions temporarily halted
- Cabinet members called for caution over Yasukuni visit; group of
105 diet-members supported visit
- Public opinion polls in early August generally supportive of PM
Yasukuni visit
- Koizumi met key political allies Yamasaki Taku, Kato Koichi, and
CCS Fukuda Yasuo for final deliberation on date of Yasukuni visit;
Izokukai chief Koga Makoto consented to change-of-date; Chinese
reportedly acquiesced to date change; FM Tanaka not involved.
- Koizumi visited Yasukuni on Aug. 13; issues statement of remorse
for Japan’s war role
- Mainichi’s public opinion poll conducted soon after revealed
continuously favourable support for Yasukuni visit
Sept. 2001 - Terror attacks on the US (Sept. 11)
- US preparing to launch “global war on terror” (GWOT); sought
international support, including Japan and China
- Japanese government passed security bills enabling Japan to
support US in UN-sanctioned GWOT
Oct. 2001 - Koizumi made one-day visit to China; met Chinese leaders and
made friendly gestures; sought understanding for Japanese
support on GWOT
- US launched Afghanistan “anti-terror” campaign
- Koizumi met Jiang at Shanghai’s APEC summit
- Cabinet Office annual polls noted decline in Japanese public
perceptions/images of China - first time since 1997
Nov. 2001 - Koizumi met Jiang Zemin at Brunei’s ASEAN+3
- China and Japan agreed on bilateral defence exchanges and
mutual navy visits
Dec. 2001 - JCG detected, pursued, and sank fushinsen in China’s EEZ;
Japanese-Chinese diplomatic exchanges ensued
Jan. 2002 - Chinese media expressed concern over bilateral ties following FM
Tanaka’s resignation
- FM Tanaka resigned following conflict of interests with Koizumi
Feb. 2002 - Japan sought China’s understanding on Japanese interest
to probe sunken fushinsen
March 2002 - China raised concern regarding Japanese actions in Chinese EEZ
regarding fushinsen issue
- Resumption of Japan-China security dialogue
- Japanese media reported US intelligence suggesting possible
indirect Chinese involvement in supplying the sunken fushinsen
April 2002 - CNPC chairman Li Peng visited Japan
- Koizumi attended Boao Forum in Hainan; made positive remarks
on China’s rise (China not a threat)
- China lodged protest over Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit; cancelled
defence exchange and navy visit; nonetheless, senior CCP official,
Zeng Qinghong visited Japan
- US remained silent over Yasukuni issue
- Koizumi faced strong opposition/anti-reform forces within LDP
over postal privatisation
- Koizumi’s political ally, Kato Koichi resigned from Diet and LDP
following scandal over improprieties involving ex-aide
- Koizumi’s public approval rating declined significantly since 2001;
public scepticism of his ability to advance reform
- Koizumi made second Yasukuni visit
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May 2002 - Japanese-Chinese diplomatic stand-off - “Shenyang incident” - “Shenyang incident” triggered intra-LDP factional debate over
present course of Japan’s China policy and MOFA’s ineptness; DPJ
sent delegation to investigate incident, further revealed MOFA’s
weak handling during the course of event; Japanese media
coverage heightened popular anti-Chinese sentiment
June 2002 - Japan and China reached agreement to raise sunken fushinsen - 5 Cabinet members visited Yasukuni on August 15
July 2002 - FM Kawaguchi met Chinese counterpart at ARF
Aug. 2002 - Koizumi announced decision to skip 30th anniversary celebration
in Beijing
Sept. 2002 - 30th anniversary celebration on Japan-China normalisation
- Koizumi met Zhu Rongji at ASEM sidelines
- Koizumi’s made a visit to North Korea
- Koizumi’s North Korea trip backfired; Japanese abduction issue
fuelled nationalistic sentiment in Japan
Oct. 2002 - Koizumi met Jiang at Mexico’s APEC summit - Cabinet Office annual polls on foreign relations noted another
year of decline in Japanese public perceptions/images of China
Nov. 2002 - Koizumi met Zhu Rongji at ASEAN+3 in Cambodia
- Li Denghui applied for Japan visa; withdrew application later on
Dec. 2002 - Ma Licheng’s “new thinking on Japan” article; indication of China’s
“4th generation” leaders’ pragmatic Japan policy-direction
- Advisory group set up by CCS Fukuda in August 2001 concluded
report recommending establishment of secular war memorial as
alternative to Yasukuni
- Koizumi re-iterated intention to continue visiting Yasukuni
Jan. 2003 - Japanese government reportedly leased three islets in
Senkaku/Diaoyudao; Chinese lodged protest
- China lodged protest over Yasukuni visit
- Koizumi made 3rd Yasukuni visit
- Koizumi re-iterated to Diet his intention to continue Shrine trip
April 2003 - SARS epidemic in China and Southeast Asia
- FM Kawaguchi met new Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao; failed to
arrange Koizumi’s meeting with China’s new President, Hu Jintao;
Hu met DPJ leader, Kan Naoto, his first with Japanese leaders as
China’s president.
- METI’s 2002 trade statistics showed Japan’s imports from China
surpassing those from US for the very first time
- Japan launched anti-SARS assistance to China
May 2003 - Koizumi met Hu Jintao in St. Petersburg
June 2003 - JCG blocked Chinese activists landing attempts on
Senkaku/Diaoyudao
Aug. 2003 - abandoned chemical weapons hurt Chinese citizens in Qiqihar
- CCS Fukuda met Hu-Wen leadership in Beijing; meanwhile
Chinese FM Li Zhaoxing met Koizumi in Tokyo
- Japan sought China’s help in resolving abduction issue in Six-
Party Talks
- Japanese nationalists responded to Chinese failed attempt by
landing on Senkaku/Diaoyudao to assert Japan’s claims
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Sept. 2003 - JDA chief Ishiba Shigeru visited China-resumption of top-level
bilateral defence exchange
- 25th anniversary celebration of Japan-China PFT
- Zhuhai “sex orgy” involving Japanese tourists
- Koizumi re-elected as LDP president
Oct. 2003 - Koizumi met Wen Jiabao at Bali’s ASEAN+3 and Hu Jintao at
APEC in Bangkok
- Japan made settlement on Qiqihar poison gas incident
- Lewd performance by Japanese students in Xian; public uproar
- Japan pledged monetary support to Iraq’s reconstruction
- Chinese activists made second unsuccessful landing attempt on
Senkaku/Diaoyudao
- Cabinet Office annual polls revealed a consistent declining trend in
Japanese public perceptions/images of China since 2001
Nov. 2003 - MSDF spotted Chinese submarine on surface in international
waters off Japan’s coast
- Keidanren delegation to China lobbied for Chinese decision for
Shinkansen technology in the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed
railway project
- LDP victory in Lower House election; mandate for Koizumi to
continue China policy
- Tokyo defied public disapproval over plans for GSDF dispatch to
Iraq, under the US-led campaign
Dec. 2003 - Tokyo announced decision to deploy GSDF to Iraq - Koizumi’s aide publicly announced Koizumi’s contemplation to visit
Yasukuni on August 15, 2004
Jan. 2004 - China protested over Yasukuni visit; postponed mutual navy visit
again; however, Japan-China vice-ministerial defence dialogue
resumed after long hiatus
- Koizumi’s conciliatory measure – instructed Japanese delegation
to China to convey message of friendship
- JCG blocked Chinese landing attempt on Senkaku/Diaoyudao;
Beijing did not lodged formal protest; mild rhetoric in Chinese
media
- Koizumi made fourth Yasukuni visit on New Year’s Day
- Mainichi’s opinion poll recorded decline in public support for
Yasukuni visit, dropping below 50%.
- LDP declared adoption of Yasukuni visit as political platform,
together with other “nationalistic” issues
Feb. 2004 - Japan-China mutual high-level exchanges transpired
- Chinese indicated possibility of Japan losing bid for high-speed
train project due to Yasukuni fallout
- Chinese research vessel sighted in Japan’s EEZ
- J-GSDF deployed to Iraq; US-Japan alliance boosted
- Osaka District Court dismissed Yasukuni lawsuit
March 2004 - MOFA requested China to cease research activities in disputed
waters (Japan’s EEZ)
- FM Kawaguchi failed to arrange Koizumi state visit during meeting
with Chinese Vice-FM
- 7 Chinese activists landed on Senkaku/Diaoyudao; arrested by
Okinawa Prefectural Police; popular Chinese protests and
diplomatic stand-off ensued leading to their eventual deportation
- Chinese postponed scheduled UNCLOS meeting with Japan
following Senkaku/Diaoyudao incident
- Matsuyama District Court dismissed Yasukuni lawsuit
- Fukuoka murder trial involving Chinese students triggered anti-
Chinese sentiment; fanned by nationalist politicians and media
- Nationalist-rightwing politicians and media engaged in more
nationalist rhetoric to assert Japan’s claims in response to Chinese
“illegal” landing on Senkaku/Diaoyudao; Media blamed Japanese
government for past inaction in dealing with ECS issues,
pressured for punitive actions against Chinese detainees
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March 2004 - Beijing reportedly prevented departure of another planned
Chinese visit to Senkaku/Diaoyudao
- Diet’s Lower House Security committee adopted unprecedented
resolution to protect Japan’s territorial integrity following Chinese
landing on Senkaku/Diaoyudao
April 2004 - Japan-China resumed UNCLOS meeting postponed last month - Land Minister Ishihara Nobuteru called for the building of
lighthouse and heliport in Senkaku/Diaoyudao
- LDP-DPJ Diet-members established Diet-members League to
Defend Japan’s Territorial Integrity
- Fukuoka District Court ruled PM’s Yasukuni visit unconstitutional
- Japanese uyoku rammed bus into main gate of Chinese consulate
in Osaka in protest of Senkaku/Diaoyudao
May 2004 - Chinese research vessel intrusion on Japan’s EEZ; left on the day
Tokyo lodged protest to Chinese MFA
- Osaka District Court ruled Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit as private
- Japanese media reported China’s construction of natural gas
drilling platforms in ECS
June 2004 - Japan voiced concerns over Chinese activities in ECS; demanded
sharing of data on Shirakaba/Chunxiao natural gas field
- LDP Working Group on Japan’s Maritime Interests report urged
government to begin natural resources exploration on Japanese
side of median line in ECS, and establish comprehensive strategy
to safeguard Japan’s maritime interests
- Japanese media reported Chinese construction of test-drilling
facilities near disputed area in ECS
- Yomiuri Shimbun editorials criticised Tokyo’s weak response and
failure to decisively address ECS issues
- METI minister, Nakagawa Shoichi confirmed Chinese natural gas
exploration activities following aerial inspection
- Nakagawa informed Japanese media of intention to launch
unilateral exploration on Japan’s side of median line
July 2004 - Chinese vessels detected in Japanese EEZ
- China protested Japanese exploration in ECS
- Anti-Japanese sentiments during Asia Cup tournament in China;
Tokyo urged Beijing to protect Japanese football team and fans
- Japanese launched survey activities in Japanese EEZ
- LDP Working Group on Japan’s Maritime Interests urged
expansion of JCG to protect Japan’s maritime interests
- Defense of Japan called for vigilance over Chinese military
development
Aug. 2004 - Further Chinese vessels intrusion reported
- Anti-Japanese fracas following China’s defeat to Japan in Asia Cup
final; Japan lodged protest
- Japanese media reported alleged Chinese activities in laying gas
pipelines in ECS gas fields
Sept. 2004 - Koizumi re-launched Japan’s bid for permanent UNSC seat;
negative reactions from Chinese MFA
Oct. 2004 - Inaugural round of Director-general level dialogues on ECS - METI chief Nakagawa accused China of granting exploration rights
in Japanese EEZ
- Koizumi insisted Yasukuni visits not an obstacle to Japan-China
ties during Diet sessions
- Cabinet Office annual polls noted drastic decline in Japanese
public perceptions/images of China
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Nov. 2004 - MSDF detected submarine intrusion into Japanese waters,
eventually identified to be of Chinese origin; diplomatic stand-off
ensued; Beijing initially denied, but subsequently acknowledged
responsibility and offered an “apology”
- Japanese delegation in North Korea to address abduction issue
- Koizumi met Hu Jintao at Chile’s APEC sidelines; and then, Wen
Jiabao at Laos’ ASEAN+3 meeting; Yasukuni issue raised by
Chinese leaders on both occasions
- Diet called for eventual termination of ODA to China
- Japanese media and nationalists increased pressure on submarine
intrusion issue, called for more assertive action; nationalistic
sentiment also raised by Japanese abduction issue
- Chiba District Court dismissed Yasukuni lawsuit
- Koizumi informed media of China’s time for graduation from ODA
- Asahi opinion poll recorded significant level of Japanese public
distrust towards China
Dec. 2004 - Continuation of Chinese vessels intrusions; Japanese lodged
protest yet again
- Japan granted visa to Li Denghui, Chinese protested decision
- Japan released new NDPG, included contingency plans regarding
possible Japanese-Chinese military confrontation over ECS
- Yomiuri-Gallup polls recorded dramatic increase in Japanese
public distrust towards China
- Mainichi’s poll on support for Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit ambiguous,
those approving slightly lower than those disapproving visit.
Jan. 2005 - METI minister Nakagawa expressed concerns to French
counterpart over EU plan to end China arms embargo
- MOF revealed China as top trade partner in 2004 statistics
- LDP launched platform calling for continuation of Yasukuni visits
by PM during 50th anniversary convention.
- Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro announced plans to develop
Okinotorishima
Feb. 2005 - Tokyo assumed management of lighthouse on Uotsuri-shima;
China protested decision
- US-Japan Joint statement in “2+2 Talks”
- Japan again requested cessation of Chinese exploration activities
in ECS, and data sharing
- METI released interim report on Chinese activities in ECS
- METI’s Nakagawa told media regarding strong possibility of
Chinese exploration activities extending into Japanese EEZ
March 2005 - Discussion on EU’s China arms embargo during Koizumi meeting
with French President Jacques Chirac
- China introduced Anti-Secession Law
- Popular Chinese internet petition against Japan’s UNSC bid
- DPJ announced intention for legislation to protect Japanese
exploration activities in Japan’s EEZ
- Japanese NGO began research activities on Okinotorishima
- Japanese press reported Tokyo’s consideration to establish
stronger military presence in Okinawa’s southernmost islands to
counter Chinese presence in disputed waters
April 2005 - Massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in Chinese cities opposing
Japan’s UNSC bid, textbook revision and other bilateral grievances
- Diplomatic quarrel heightened over “responsibility” for anti-
Japanese demonstrations
- Demonstrations subsided following Beijing’s effort to control anti-
Japanese activities
- MOE/MEXT approved revised Tsukurukai’s history textbook
- METI minister Nakagawa announced government preparation to
grant exploration rights in ECS to Japanese companies
- Popular anti-Chinese sentiment and reprisal in reaction to anti-
Japanese demonstrations in China
- Tokyo District Court dismissed Yasukuni lawsuit
- Mainichi’s poll for Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit remained ambiguous;
those approving slightly lower than those disapproving
- Teikoku Oil company applied for ECS exploration rights
May 2005 - Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi visited Japan for Aichi Expo and
“fence-mending” meetings; abruptly cancelled summit with
Koizumi following his Yasukuni remarks
- Koizumi said Yasukuni visits had not undermined Japanese-
Chinese relations during Diet Lower House budget committee
session.
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May 2005 - Japan-China 2nd round of dialogue/consultations over ECS issue - Governor Ishihara conducted inspection tour of Okinotorishima
- Mainichi’s poll on Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit showed slight decline in
support compared to previous month, but remained ambiguous
June 2005 - China’s NPC Standing Committee chairman insinuated Japan’s
unfavourable prospect for participation in the Beijing-Shanghai
high-speed railway project during meeting with head of Japan-
China Parliamentary Friendship Association
- Ex-Japanese PMs met Diet Lower House speaker, Kono Yohei over
Japanese-Chinese relations and Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits
- Ex-PM Nakasone voiced concern and disapproval over Koizumi’s
Yasukuni visits
- Nihon Izokukai called on Koizumi to consider sentiments of
Japan’s neighbours regarding Yasukuni visits; subsequently
reaffirmed support for prime ministerial homage
- Koizumi received boost from Diet-member groups in support of
Yasukuni visits
- METI announced preparation to grant ECS exploration rights to
Teikoku Oil
- Koizumi rejected growing calls for establishment of alternative
war memorial
- Official postal address granted to Okinotorishima
July 2005 - China protested Japan’s granting exploration rights in ECS to
Teikoku Oil
- Tokyo approved granting of ECS exploration rights to Teikoku Oil
- Osaka High Court dismissed appeal to Yasukuni lawsuit
Aug. 2005 - MOFA protested Chinese gas exploration activities in ECS;
requested for exploration data and ceasing of activities
- Koizumi called for Lower House Election, following lack of political
support to advance postal reform agenda
- Koizumi told media Yasukuni not an election issue
- Teikoku Oil announced preparation for ECS exploration; sought
protection from possible Chinese reprisal
Sept. 2005 - 5 Chinese warships detected close to ECS median line
- Signs of US signalling for Japan’s re-assessment of China policy
following US Deputy Secretary Zoellick’s speech to national
committee on US-China relations
- 3rd round of Japan-China consultations on ECS
- JCG asked funding of lighthouse development on Okinotorishima
- LDP secured landslide victory in Lower House Election
- Japanese media reported China had begun gas production at
Tianwaitian/Kashi gas field near median line
- METI’s Nakagawa assured Teikoku Oil of protection to ECS
exploration activities
- Tokyo High Court dismissed Yasukuni lawsuits; conversely, Osaka
High Court ruled Koizumi’s visit as “official”
Oct. 2005 - Beijing protested Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit; cancelled FM meeting;
Chinese anger over timing of visit, coincided with China’s
successful second manned space mission
- China postponed 4th round of ECS consultations in reaction to
Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit.
- Koizumi made his fifth visit to Yasukuni during Autumn Festival
- Keidanren chairman Okuda Hiroshi suggested Koizumi’s Yasukuni
visits negatively affected Japanese-Chinese political relations, but
economic ties remained robust.
- Cabinet Office annual polls noted unprecedented decline in
Japanese public perceptions/images of China; 63.4% feeling no
closeness to China
- Koizumi reshuffled cabinet; hawkish and nationalistic figures i.e.
Abe Shinzo and Aso Taro appointed to key cabinet position.
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Nov. 2005 - Koizumi met President Bush; Yasukuni amongst discussion topics,
Bush hinted that Koizumi should consider relations with Asian
neighbours when deciding on shrine visits
- Koizumi re-iterated intention to stop China from using Yasukuni as
diplomatic card during address at LDP headquarters
- Mainichi’s poll on public support for Yasukuni visit rose
significantly; nearly 70% approving visit.
Dec. 2005 - Beijing and Seoul agreed postponement of tripartite dialogue with
Japan under ASEAN’s auspices, following Yasukuni fallout
- LDP Working Group on Maritime Interests proposed and
subsequently adopted draft legislations to protect ECS exploration
activities by Japanese companies
- JCG planned to upgrade vessels/aircrafts to enhance protection of
Japanese interests in ECS
- DPJ’s chief Maehara Seiji, and FM Aso labelled China a “threat”
Jan. 2006 - Informal Japan-China consultations on ECS
- FM Aso toned down “China threat” rhetoric, welcomed China’s
“peaceful rise” in foreign policy address
- J-SDF conducted joint-exercise with US Marines; partly focused
on defence of Senkaku/Diaoyudao and ECS maritime claims
- LDP adopted platform supporting Yasukuni visits
- DPJ adopted official China’s threat view
- FM Aso called for Emperor to visit Yasukuni
- Koizumi administration adopted position paper rejecting China
threat notion
Feb. 2006 - China conveyed message “writing off” Koizumi administration for
making progress in bilateral relations
- Diet study group established to contemplate secular war memorial
- Yomiuri’s chairman criticised Koizumi’s Yasukuni policy in New
York Times interview and Asahi’s Ronza journal; Yomiuri-Asahi
jointly called for moratorium on Yasukuni visits; agreed for joint-
project on question of Japan’s war responsibility
March 2006 - ECS dialogue resumed; China again advanced joint development;
CCS Abe rejected Chinese proposal, reasserted Japan’s rights to
conduct unilateral exploration
- Hu Jintao conveyed to the heads of seven Japan-China friendship
organisations on top-level summit resumption if Japanese PM
halts Yasukuni visits.
- METI minister Nikai called for further diplomatic efforts to resolve
ECS issues; FM Aso suggested possible counter-measures in the
event of further Chinese gas field development.
- LDP’s anti-Yasukuni visit study group established
- LDP’s legislation to protect exploration activities in ECS approved
April 2006 - METI chief Nikai met Chinese Vice-President; both re-iterated
desire to seek peaceful resolution to ECS issues
- Shin-Komeito leader, Kanzaki Takanori called for improvement in
Japanese-Chinese ties
May 2006 - ECS dialogue failed to make progress, both sides agreed to
continue with consultations
- Keizai Doyukai called for moratorium on PM Yasukuni visits;
proposed establishment of alternative war memorial. Koga Makoto
Izokukai’s head, called for a halt, proposed separation of class-A
war criminals from Yasukuni.
June 2006 - Hu Jintao re-iterated to Japanese ambassador his interest to visit
Japan under “favourable” conditions
- Strong congressional opposition towards Yasukuni visits – Koizumi
ostensibly denied chance to address Congress during farewell
tour to the US
- Japan’s Supreme Court upheld Osaka High Court’s decision in
dismissing Yasukuni lawsuit/compensation claims
- FM Aso toned down Yasukuni position, called for government to
consider separation of class-A war criminals
July 2006 - Chinese research vessels in Japan’s EEZ; MOFA lodged protest
- ECS dialogue/consultations resumed in Beijing
- Koga Makoto called for secular war memorial as solution to
Yasukuni impasse
- Mainichi and Sankei’s polls saw public support for Koizumi’s
Yasukuni visits dropping to less than 40%
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July 2006 - Nikkei published memoir revealing reason behind Emperor
Showa’s decision to stop visiting Yasukuni
- LDP presidential hopeful, Abe Shinzo, opted ambiguous position
on Yasukuni visit, if appointed as PM; Tanigaki reaffirmed decision
to avoid Yasukuni visits
Aug. 2006 - China lodged protests over Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit on August 15 - Koizumi re-iterated intention to fulfill pledge to visit Yasukuni on
August 15, which he eventually did.
- Mainichi’s poll on public support for Yasukuni visit conducted
immediately after Koizumi visit = ambiguous, those approving
equalling those disapproving.
Sept. 2006 - China adopted “wait-and-see” approach regarding new PM Abe’s
China policy-orientation
- Abe, Aso and Tanigaki declared candidacy for LDP presidency; all
three declared respective Yasukuni positions; Abe opted for
strategic ambiguity; Aso to visit only when Yasukuni’s legal status
is changed; Tanigaki declared a moratorium
- Abe emerged victorious in LDP presidential election; elected as
LDP president and Japan’s PM
Sources: Przystup (2001-2006) – multiple volumes; News reports between 2000-2006 (various media sources)
(See Bibliography for full information)
